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Bavinck,  Herman,  1854-1921. 

The  philosophy  of  Revelation 


THE   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 


THE   PHILOSOPHY  OF 
REVELATION 

?4l 

THE  STONE  LECTURES   FOR   1908-1909 
PRINCETON   THEOLOGICAL   SEMINARY 


BY 

HERMAN  "bAVINCK 

DOCTOR  OF  THEOLOGY  ;    PROFESSOR   IN   THE  FREE   UNIVERSITY 

OF   AMSTERDAM 


LONGMANS,  GREEN,  AND    CO. 

91    AND    93    FIFTH    AVENUE,   NEW    YORK 

LONDON,  BOMBAY,  AND    CALCUTTA 

1909 


Copyright,  1908, 
By  Longmans,  Green,  and  Co. 


THE   UNIVERSITY    PRESS,    CAMBRIDGE,    U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

THE  following  lectures  were  prepared  in  response  to 
an  invitation  from  the  faculty  of  Princeton  Theologi- 
cal Seminary  to  deliver  the  L.  P.  Stone  Lectures  for  the 
academic  year  of  1908  and  1909.  Only  six  of  them  were 
actually  delivered,  however,  at  Princeton.  These  are 
represented  by  the  first  seven  lectures  as  here  printed. 
The  author  desires  to  express  his  thanks  to  Drs.  Geer- 
hardus  Vos  of  Princeton,  Nicholas  M.  Steffens  of  Holland, 
Mich.,  and  Henry  E.  Dosker  of  Louisville  for  kindly  ren- 
dering these  lectures  for  him  into  English. 

Some  of  the  lectures  have  been  delivered  also  at  Grand 
Rapids  and  Holland,  Mich. ;  Chicago ;  Louisville ;  New 
Brunswick  and  Paterson,  N.  J. ;  and  New  York. 

Drs.  G.  Vos  and  B.  B.  Warfield  have  been  good  enough 
to  prepare  the  manuscript  for  the  printer  and  to  see  the 
book  through  the  press. 

The  occasionally  occurring  superior  numerals  in  the 
text  refer  to  notes  which  will  be  found  at  the  end  of  the 
volume.  These  notes  are  almost  entirely  of  a  biblio- 
graphical character. 

It  may  be  proper  to  mention  that  these  lectures  are 
published  in  Dutch  and  in  German  simultaneously  with 
their  publication  in  English. 


CONTENTS 


Lecture  Paqe 

I.  The  Idea  of  a  Philosophy  of  Revelation    .     .       1 

Universality  of  the  supernaturalistic  world-view  among  all 
peoples  in  all  ages  and  all  religions,  including  Christianity  and 
the  Reformation.  Change  in  this  respect  in  the  eighteenth 
century  through  the  "  Enlightenment."  The  autonomy  of  the 
world  and  humanity  applied  first  by  way  of  revolution,  then 
by  way  of  evolution.  Attempts  at  reconciliation  in  idealistic 
monism.  The  unsatisfactory  character  of  this  and  indispensa- 
bleness  of  supernatural  ism  for  all  religion.  The  idea  of  reve- 
lation and  its  psychological  and  historical  mediation.  The 
philosophy  of  revelation  thinks  through  its  content  and  corre- 
lates it  with  the  thought  and  life  of  humanity  as  a  whole. 

II.  Revelation  and  Philosophy       29 

The  present  status  of  philosophy.  Revival  of  the  need  of 
philosophy  and  reappearance  of  old  tendencies.  Three  types 
of  philosophical  world-interpretation  ;  theistic  (religious,  theo- 
logical), naturalistic  (pantheistic,  materialistic),  humanistic. 
Decline  of  naturalism  in  its  materialistic  form.  Rise  and 
growth  of  the  pantheistic-monistic  view  in  its  various  forms. 
Energetic  monism.  Psychical  monism.  Epistemological  or 
logical  monism.  Criticism  of  monism  and  the  formula  of 
evolution.  Reaction  against  monism  from  the  side  of  prag- 
matism. Pragmatism  not  merely  a  new  method  but  a  peculiar 
conception  regarding  reality  and  truth. 

III.  Revelation  and  Philosophy  —  continued    ...     53 

The  merit  of  pragmatism.  Its  unsatisfactoriness.  Due  to 
an  insufficiently  empirical  spirit  and  ignoring  of  the  facts  of 
reality.  Nominalistic  character  of  pragmatism.  Self-con- 
sciousness the  point  of  departure  in  all  knowledge.  Truth  and 
error  in  idealism.  Nature  of  self-consciousness  as  the  unity 
of  real  and  ideal  being.   Its  content.   Augustine  the  discoverer 


viii  CONTENTS 

Lecture  t  Page 

of  self-consciousness  as  fhe  starting-point  of  a  new  meta- 
physics. Self-consciousness  the  basis" of  religion  and  morality, 
science  and  philosophy,  because  it  discloses  to  man  his  own 
being,  the  reality  of  the  world,  and  the  existence  of  God. 

IV.  Revelation  and  Nature 83 

God,  the  world,  and  man  the  threefold  object  of  science  and 
philosophy.  Restricted  use  of  the  English  word  "science." 
Independence  and  limitations  of  natural  science.  The  con- 
ception of  nature.  Physics  presupposes  metaphysics.  Its 
constant  use  of  metaphysical  concepts.  Its  ignorance  as  to 
the  origin,  essence,  and  movement  of  things,  inadequate  view 
of  the  laws  of  uature,  and  silence  as  to  the  final  cause  of  the 
world.  The  world  unexplainable  without  God.  Proof  of  this 
is  the  pantheistic  deification  of  the  creature  and  the  present 
revival  of  superstition  in  many  circles.  The  importance  of 
Christianity  for  natural  science. 

V.  Revelation  and  History 113 

History  shows  still  more  plainly  the  necessity  and  signifi- 
cance of  revelation.  Present-day  conceptions  of  history.  The 
significance  of  evolution  in  history.  Historical  facts  too  rich 
to  be  subsumed  under  one  formula.  The  same  difficulty  in 
the  attempt  to  distinguish  a  succession  of  periods  and  to  dis- 
cover the  laws  of  history.  The  greatest  difficulty  of  all  in  the 
inquiry  into  the  meaning  and  purpose  of  history.  An  objec- 
tive norm  required  for  this.  No  history  without  metaphysics, 
without  belief  in  a  divine  wisdom  and  power.  Significance 
of  Christianity  for  the  study  of  history. 

VI.  Revelation  and  Religion 142 

Religion  as  the  chief  ground  of  the  conviction  that  the 
world  rests  on  revelation.  The  existence  of  religion  itself  a 
decisive  consideration.  Universality  and  necessity  of  religion. 
Origin  of  religion.  Impossibility  of  explaining  its  origin 
historically  and  psychologically  through  study  of  primitive 
man  and  the  child.  The  construction  of  primitive  man  out 
of  the  data  of  animal  life,  life  of  nature-peoples,  child  life,  a 
pure  product  of  the  imagination.  Revival  of  the  idea  of  a 
religio  inrita.  Inquiry  into  the  essence  of  religion  leads  to 
the  same  conclusions.  No  religion  without  revelation.  The 
attempt  at  classifying  religions  leads  back  to  the  old  division 
between  true  and  false  religions  in  a  new  form. 


CONTENTS  ix 

Lecture  Page 

VII.  Revelation  and  Christianity 170 

The  religio-ethical  development  of  humanity  leads  to  belief 
in  the  necessity  and  reality  of  revelation.  The  origins  of  the 
human  race  unknown  to  science,  partially  disclosed  in  tra- 
dition. The  significance  of  tradition  as  estimated  in  previous 
ages  and  at  the  present  day.  Its  relative  value  shown  in  the 
history  of  primitive  culture,  the  study  of  Greek  philosophy, 
the  discoveries  in  Babylon  and  Assyria.  The  Volkeride'e 
of  Bastian.  The  unity  of  the  human  race  well-nigh  uni- 
versally accepted  at  present.  Unity  includes  common  origin, 
common  habitat,  and  common  tradition.  Content  of  tradition. 
The  Old  Testament  attaches  itself  to  the  tradition  of  the 
nations.  Resemblance  and  peculiarity  of  Israel's  religion  as 
compared  with  the  religions  of  the  nations.  Fulfilment  in 
Christianity. 

VIII.  Revelation  and  Religious  Experience      .     .     .  203 

Causes  for  the  wide-spread  weakening  of  faith :  divisions 
of  Christianity;  growing  acquaintance  with  many  new  re- 
ligions; the  agnostic  tendency  in  philosophy.  Many  take 
their  standpoint  in  the  religious  subject.  Theology  as  re- 
ligious anthropology,  science  of  experience.  Experience  taken 
in  a  totally  different  sense  than  in  natural  science.  Not  fitted 
to  serve  as  aT  heuristic  principle.  The  psychology  of  religion, 
however  important  in  its  own  sphere,  cannot  judge  of  the 
right  of  existence  and  value  of  religious  phenomena.  It  is 
especially  apparent  in  the  study  of  the  phenomenon  of  con- 
version. Logically  this  standpoint  ought  to  lead  to  absolute 
indifferentism,  which  can  never  satisfy  the  needs  of  practical 
life.  Attempts  to  ascend  from  the  subject  to  the  object. 
Empirical  psychology  insufficient.  Must  reach  out  into  meta- 
physics. Peculiar  position  of  Christianity  with  reference  to 
all  these  problems.  Conversion  Christianity's  own  way  to 
fellowship  with  God.  Significance  of  this  for  the  method  of 
theology.  Scriptural  conception  of  conversion  points  back  to 
a  supernatural  factor,  notwithstanding  all  psychological  and 
historical  mediation. 


IX.  Revelation  and  Culture 242 

The  relation  between  revelation  and  culture  the  problem  of 
the  ages.  Rise  of  the  problem  with  the  entrance  of  Chris- 
tianity into  the  world.    View  of  the  first  Christians.    Romanist 


x  CONTENTS 

l.i  <  i  due  Page 

and  Protestant  conception.  Present-day  position  on  the  right 
and  left.  Tolstoi  and  Nietzsche.  Recent  hyper-eschatologi- 
cal  views  about  the  Person  of  Jesus.  Necessity  of  clear 
definition  of  conception  of  culture  in  general  and  modern 
culture  in  particular  in  order  to  determine  their  relation  to 
Christianity.  Christ  in  his  relation  to  culture.  The  inesti- 
mable value  of  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  Aim  and  value  of 
ethical  culture.  Autonomy,  heteronomy,  and  theonomy. 
Jetueitigkeit  the  goal  of  human  history.  Relation  of  Chris- 
tianitv  to  culture  determined  by  the  Christian  doctrines  of 
creation  and  the  resurrection. 

X.  Revelation  and  the  Future 270 

Christianity  according  to  many  a  negligible  factor  in  fu- 
ture development.  Self-consciousness  and  self-sufficiency  of 
modern  mau  as  reflected  in  the  energetic  world-view.  Efforts 
aft  er  race-improvement  through  artificial  selection,  reform  of 
education  in  all  grades  of  schools,  and  entire  reconstruction 
of  society.  Utopian  expectations  built  on  these  efforts  seem- 
ingly based  on  immanent  development  but  in  reality  resting 
on  deification  of  the  creature  and  issuing  in  the  strangest 
conceptions  with  reference  to  the  future  both  on  earth  and 
beyond  the  grave.  Superstitious  character  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution.  The  meliorism  of  James.  Condition  of  present- 
day  culture.  Neither  science  nor  philosophy  able  to  afford 
certainty  with  regard  to  the  future.  Religion  alone  able  to 
do  this,  especially  Christianity  because  it  believes  in  God  the 
Creator,  Reconciler,  and  Restorer  of  all  things. 

Notes 317 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  REVELATION 


THE  IDEA   OF   A  PHILOSOPHY   OF  REVELATION 

THE  well-known  Assyrian  scholar,  Hugo  Winckler, 
some  years  ago  boldly  declared  that  "in  the  whole 
of  the  historical  evolution  of  mankind  there  are  only  two 
general  world-views  to  be  distinguished,  —  the  ancient 
Babylonian  and  the  modern  empirico-scientific  "  ;  "  the 
latter  of  which,"  he  added,  "is  still  only  in  process  of 
development." x  The  implication  was  that  the  religion 
and  civilization  of  all  peoples  have  had  their  origin  in  the 
land  of  Sumer  and  Akkad,  and  more  particularly  that  the 
Biblical  religion,  in  its  New  Testament  no  less  than  in  its 
Old  Testament  form,  has  derived  its  material  from  that 
source.  This  pan-Babylonian  construction  of  history  has, 
because  of  its  syncretistic  and  levelling  character,  justly 
met  with  much  serious  opposition.  But  there  is  undoubt- 
edly an  element  of  truth  in  the  declaration,  if  it  may  be 
taken  in  this  wider  sense,  —  that  the  religious  supra- 
naturalistic  world-view  has  universally  prevailed  among 
all  peoples  and  in  all  ages  down  to  our  own  day,  and 
only  in  the  last  hundred  and  fifty  years  has  given  way  in 
some  circles  to  the  empirico-scientific. 

Humanity  as  a  whole  has  been  at  all  times  supra- 
naturalistic  to  the  core.  Neither  in  thought  nor  in  life 
have  men  been  able  to  satisfy  themselves  with  the  things 
of  this  world ;  they  have  always  assumed  a  heaven  above 

l 


2  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  earth,  and  behind  what  is  visible  a  higher  and  holier 
older  of  invisible  powers  and  blessings.  This  means  that 
God  and  the  world  while  sharply  distinguished  have  at 
the  same  time  stood  in  the  closest  connection;  religion 
and  civilization  have  not  appeared  as  contradictory  and 
opposing  principles,  but  religion  has  been  the  source  of 
all  civilization,  the  basis  of  all  orderly  life  in  the  family, 
the  state,  and  society.  Nor  has  this  religious  view  of  the 
world  been  confined  to  the  East,  so  that  it  might  properly 
be  designated  the  oriental  or  old-oriental  conception.  We 
find  it  in  all  lands  and  among  all  nations.  Moreover,  men 
have  not  felt  it  a  yoke  or  a  burden  pressing  heavily 
upon  them ;  on  the  contrary,  they  have  lived  in  the  con- 
viction that  this  is  the  normal  state  of  things,  that  which 
should  be  and  could  not  be  otherwise.  Of  a  conflict  be- 
tween religion  and  civilization,  generally  speaking,  no 
trace  can  be  discovered.  The  ancient  view  of  the  world 
was  thoroughly  religious,  and  in  consequence  of  this  bore 
a  unified,  harmonious  character,  so  as  to  impart  to  the 
whole  of  earthly  life  a  higher  inspiration  and  sacredness.2 
Christianity  introduced  no  change  in  this  respect. 
Towards  the  pagan  world  it  assumed,  to  be  sure,  a  nega- 
tive and  hostile  attitude,  because  it  could  not  take  over 
its  corrupt  civilization  without  radical  cleansing.  But 
this  was  precisely  the  task  it  set  for  itself,  namely,  to 
subject  and  adjust  the  whole  of  earthly  existence  to  the 
kingdom  of  heaven.  It  succeeded  in  conquering  the  old 
world  and  leavening  it  with  its  own  spirit.  In  the  Middle 
Ages  there  remained  in  the  practical  conduct  of  life  ele- 
ments enough  which  came  into  conflict  with  a  system  of 
Christianity  that  had  been  externally  imposed  and  not 
inwardly  assimilated;  }ret  even  here  we  meet  with  a  uni- 
fied view  of  the  world  which  set  its  stamp  upon  every 


IDEA   OF   A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION      3 

part  of  life.  Whether  the  mediseval  Christian  strove  to 
control  the  world  or  to  escape  it,  in  either  case  he  was 
guided  by  the  conviction  that  mind  is  destined  to  gain  the 
victory  over  matter,  heaven  to  conquer  earth. 

The  Reformation  brought  a  change  in  so  far  as  it  en- 
deavored to  transform  the  mechanical  relation  between 
nature  and  grace  of  Rome  into  a  dynamical  and  ethical 
one.  The  image  of  God  not  being  a  supranatural  addi- 
tion but  an  integral  part  of  the  nature  of  man,  grace 
could  no  longer  be  considered  a  quantitative  and  mate- 
rial possession,  preserved  by  the  church,  deposited  in  the 
sacrament,  and  communicated  through  the  priest.  Ac- 
cording to  the  Reformers  grace  consisted  above  all  in  the 
gift  of  forgiveness  of  sins,  in  restoration  to  divine  favor, 
in  God's  disposition  towards  man,  so  that  it  cannot  be 
won  by  any  works,  but  is  given  by  God  and  appre- 
hended in  childlike  faith.  Over  against  the  objective 
materializing  of  the  benefits  of  salvation,  the  Reformers 
laid  the  stress  on  the  religious  subject;  they  gave  due 
recognition,  certainly,  to  the  freedom  of  man;  not,  of 
course,  to  the  freedom  of  sinful,  natural  man,  but  to  the 
freedom  of  the  Christian  man,  the  spiritual  man,  who, 
having  been  made  free  by  Christ,  strives  to  fulfil  the 
demands  of  the  law  in  walking  after  the  Spirit. 

Great  as  was  the  importance  of  this  religious-ethical 
movement  of  the  sixteenth  century,  it  was  after  all  a 
reformation,  not  a  new  erection  from  the  foundation.  No 
assault  was  made  upon  the  system  of  the  old  religious 
world- view ;  it  was  rather  reinforced  than  weakened. 
Within  the  Church  of  Rome  itself  the  Reformation  in 
fact  contributed  in  no  small  measure  towards  stemming 
the  tide  of  religious  indifference,  and  setting  in  motion  an 
earnest  effort  towards  improvement  in  life  and  morals  on 


4  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  basis  of  Rome's  own  principles.  This  positive  effect 
of  the  Reformation  is  persistently  ignored  in  Romanist 
and  liberal  circles,  and  the  Reformation  movement  sys- 
tematically represented  as  the  origin  and  source  of  the 
Revolution.  Cousin  and  Guizot  agree  in  this  judgment 
with  De  Bonald  and  De  Maistre.3  French  Protestantism 
finds  it  acceptable,  and  puts  forward  and  praises  the 
"  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  "  as  a  blessed  fruit 
of  the  labors  of  Luther  and  Calvin.  And  in  Germany,  by 
men  like  Paulsen  and  Julius  Kaftan,  Kant  is  glorified  as 
a  second  Luther,  the  true  philosopher  of  Protestantism.4 

No  doubt  between  these  two  mighty  movements  of 
modern  history  certain  lines  of  resemblance  may  be 
traced.  But  formal  resemblance  is  not  the  same  as  real 
likeness,  analogy  as  identity.  Between  the  freedom  of 
the  Christian  man,  on  behalf  of  which  Luther  entered  the 
lists,  and  the  liberty,  equality,  fraternity,  which  the 
Revolution  inscribed  on  its  banner,  the  difference  is  fun- 
damental. Luther  and  Voltaire  are  not  men  of  the  same 
spirit ;  Calvin  and  Rousseau  should  not  be  named  in  the 
same  breath  ;  and  Kant,  with  his  epistemological  and  moral 
autonomy,  was  not  the  exponent  of  the  Reformation,  but 
the  philosopher  of  Rationalism.  This  is  implicitly  ac- 
knowledged by  all  who  accord  the  honor  of  emancipating 
the  mind  of  man  in  the  sixteenth  century  to  Erasmus 
rather  than  to  Luther,  and  who  rank  the  Renascence  in 
importance  and  value  above  the  Reformation.6  Accord- 
ing to  this  view  Erasmus  and  his  like-minded  fellow- 
workers  attempted  a  regeneration  of  Christianity,  but 
sought  this  not,  like  Luther,  in  a  repristination  of  the 
teaching  of  Paul,  but  in  a  return  to  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount.  He  is  to  be  thanked,  then,  that  supranaturalism 
has  slowly  given  way  to  materialism,  transcendence  to  im- 


IDEA   OF   A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION      5 

manence,  Paulinism  to  the  religion  of  Jesus,  dogmatics  to 
the  science  of  religion.  Luther  remains  the  father  of  the 
old  Protestantism ;  to  Erasmus  belongs  the  glory  of  hav- 
ing been  the  first  exponent  of  modern  Protestantism. 

In  this  historical  judgment  there  undoubtedly  lies  an 
element  of  truth.  Erasmus  and  his  kindred  spirits,  no 
less  than  the  Reformers,  aimed  at  a  simpler  and  more 
interior  type  of  religion  to  be  attained  through  contact 
with  the  Person  of  Christ.  But  the  fact  is  lost  sight 
of  that  all  these  men,  in  their  conception  of  the  essence 
of  religion,  remained  entangled  in  mediaeval  dualism, 
and  were  thus  in  no  position  to  effect  a  fundamental 
reformation  of  the  doctrine  and  worship  of  the  Church  of 
Rome.  The  whole  mental  attitude  of  humanism  was 
such  as  to  render  it,  above  everything,  afraid  of  tumult, 
and  bent  upon  preserving  the  "amabilis  ecclesise  Con- 
cordia." "  Summa  nostrse  religionis  pax  est  et  una- 
nimitas,"  said  Erasmus.  But  altogether  apart  from  this, 
humanism  was  and  remained  one  of  the  many  "  Aufkla- 
rungsbewegungen "  which  have  periodically  emerged  in 
the  Roman  Church,  and  will  not  fail  to  reappear  in  the 
future.  The  experience  of  sin  and  grace  which  came  to 
Luther  in  the  monastery  of  Erfurt  fixed  itself  in  these 
two  conceptions ;  the  humanists  felt  no  need  of  the  liberty 
and  joy  which  flow  from  the  sinner's  justification  in  the 
sight  of  God  through  faith  alone  and  without  the  works 
of  the  law.  Humanism,  therefore,  was  nothing  more  nor 
less  than  the  Reformed-Catholicism  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury ;  in  the  end  it  not  only  broke  with  Luther,  but  came 
to  the  help  of  Rome  and  the  Counter-Reformation.6 

Nevertheless,  there  is  this  much  of  truth  in  the  view 
in  question,  —  that  Luther  and  Erasmus  were  two  differ- 
ent men,  and  the  old  and  the  new  Protestantism  are  in 


6  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

principle  distinct.  Confirmation  of  this  has  recently  come 
from  an  unprejudiced  quarter,  namely,  from  Professor 
Troeltsch,  of  Heidelberg,  in  an  important  study  of  Prot- 
estantism contributed  by  him  to  Die  Kultur  der  Q-egen- 
wart?  He  acknowledges,  of  course,  that  the  ancient 
world-view  was  modified  by  the  Reformation,  and  en- 
riched with  a  new  conception  of  religion ;  but  he  none 
the  less  maintains  that  its  general  structure  was  pre- 
served intact.  In  their  view  of  the  world  and  life,  sin 
and  grace,  heaven  and  earth,  church  and  state,  faith  and 
knowledge,  Luther,  Zwingli,  and  Calvin  were  children  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  and  revealed  this  fact  at  every  point  of 
their  activity  as  Reformers.  The  supranaturalism  which 
finds  expression  in  the  Gospel,  and  more  particularly  in 
the  theology  of  Paul,  received  the  fullest  consent  of  their 
hearts.  They,  no  doubt,  moderated  and  softened  the 
eschatological  and  mystic-ascetic  elements  which  charac- 
terized primitive  Christianity;  but,  in  Troeltsch's  view, 
they  utterly  failed  to  perceive  the  great  differences  which 
exist  within  the  New  Testament  itself  between  the  Syn- 
optics and  the  Apostolic  Epistles,  between  Jesus  and 
Paul.  The  Christianity  of  the  Bible,  the  Christianity  of 
the  first  four  centuries  was,  to  their  naive  conception,  an 
undifferentiated  whole,  a  system  of  faith  and  practice 
which  they  believed  themselves  to  have  received  unmodi- 
fied, and  whicli  they  meant  to  set  as  the  pure  expression 
of  the  Christian  religion  over  against  the  caricature  that 
the  Roman  Church  had  later  made  of  it. 

On  the  other  hand,  Professor  Troeltsch  thinks  that 
the  modern,  anti-supranaturalistic  type  of  Protestantism 
gained  no  hearing  until  the  eighteenth  century.  For  this 
form  of  Protestantism  is  not  to  be  understood  as  a  logi- 
cally or  historically  consistent  development  of  the  prin- 


IDEA   OF   A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION      7 

ciples  of  the  Reformation,  but  as  the  product  of  "  a  great 
and  radical  revolution."  In  the  so-called  "  Enlighten- 
ment "  it  presented  the  world  with  a  new  form  of  culture 
which  differed  in  principle  from  the  culture-ideal  of  the 
Reformation.  Consequently  not  the  sixteenth  but  the 
eighteenth  century,  not  the  Reformation  but  the  "  En- 
lightenment," is  the  source  of  that  world-view  which, 
turning  its  back  on  all  supranaturalism,  thinks  to  find  in 
this  world  all  that  science  and  religion,  thought  and  life, 
can  ask. 

In  point  of  fact,  before  the  eighteenth  century  the  exist- 
ence of  a  supranatural  world,  and  the  necessity,  possi- 
bility, and  reality  of  a  special  revelation,  had  never  been 
seriously  called  into  question.  But  Deism,  springing  up 
in  England,  emancipated  the  world  from  God,  reason  from 
revelation,  the  will  from  grace.8  In  its  first  exponents, 
Herbert,  Locke,  Toland,  Collins,  and  their  fellows,  as  also 
later  in  Kant,  Fichte,  and  Lessing,  it  is  true,  it  did  not 
yet  deny  in  principle  the  possibility  and  reality  of  revela- 
tion. But  in  the  first  place,  from  a  formal  point  of  view, 
it  subjected  the  authenticity  of  revelation,  especially  of 
"  traditional  revelation,"  in  distinction  from  "  original 
revelation,"  to  the  critical  test  of  reason,  as  may  be  seen 
in  such  writers  as  Herbert,  Hobbes,  and  Locke.  And, 
secondly,  with  respect  to  the  content  of  revelation,  it  laid 
down  the  canon,  that  since  we  have  no  power  to  assimi- 
late anything  else,  it  can  comprise  nothing  beyond  truths 
of  reason,  that  is,  such  truths  as  would,  no  doubt,  sooner 
or  later  have  been  discovered  by  reason,  but  have  been 
made  known  earlier  and  more  readily  by  revelation.  This 
concession,  however,  was  deprived  of  all  real  value  by 
adding  that  God  had  commonly  given  the  earlier  revealed 
truth  in  such  a  symbolical  form  that  its  essential  rational 


8  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

content  was  not  understood  until  the  present  age  of  en- 
lightenment.9 All  deistic  thought  tended  towards  mak- 
ing revelation  superfluous,  and  all  action  of  God  in  the 
world  unnecessary.10  While  the  fact  of  creation  was  still 
commonly  admitted,  it  served  with  the  original  Deists  no 
other  purpose  than  with  Kant,  and  later  with  Darwin, 
namely,  to  give  the  world  an  independent  existence.  The 
world  had  in  creation  been  so  abundantly  supplied  with 
all  manners  of  powers  and  gifts  that  it  could  dispense 
with  God  altogether,  and  could  save  itself  without  any 
outside  aid  and  with  completeness. 

This  principle  of  autonomy,  transplanted  into  France, 
first  sought  to  gain  supremacy  for  itself  by  way  of  revo- 
lution. The  French  Revolution  of  1789  furnished  the 
first  typical  example  of  this.  This  was  not  a  revolt  like 
that  of  the  Netherlands  against  Spain,  or  of  the  Puritans 
against  the  Stuarts,  or  of  the  American  Colonies  against 
Britain,  for  all  these  upheavals  left  untouched  the  politi- 
cal system,  the  fundamental  principle  of  government, 
the  droit  divin  of  the  magistracy.  The  Revolution  in 
France  sprang  from  a  definite  deistical  theory,  and  bore 
from  the  outset  a  doctrinaire,  specifically  dogmatic  char- 
acter. Attaching  itself  to  the  fiction  of  the  contrat 
social^  it  endeavored  to  subvert  the  entire  existing  social 
order,  and  to  replace  it  by  a  newly  conceived  and  self- 
manufactured  order  of  things.  It  was  a  violent  effort  to 
establish  the  principle  of  popular  sovereignty,  and  was 
hailed  everywhere,  even  by  men  like  Kant  and  Schiller, 
as  the  dawn  of  popular  enfranchisement.11 

But,  although  this  Revolution  was  launched  under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances,  enjoyed  the  advantage  of 
international  sympathies,  and  found  imitation  on  a  smaller 
or  larger  scale  in  all  countries  on  the  continent  of  Europe 


IDEA   OF  A  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION      9 

and  in  South  America,  it  nevertheless  passed  beyond  the 
experimental  stage  in  none  of  these  movements,  but  in 
them  all,  sooner  or  later,  issued  in  failure.  So  far  from 
realizing  the  ideal,  they  overwhelmed  their  fanatical  ad- 
herents with  grievous  disappointment  and  a  deep  feeling 
of  shame.12  In  the  leading  thought  of  the  world  the  idea 
of  revolution  gradually  gave  way  to  that  of  evolution. 
The  eighteenth  century  principle  of  autonomy  was  not 
abandoned,  but  its  application  and  development  were 
sought  by  a  different  method. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  the  term  evolution 
has  not  in  itself,  any  more  than  revolution,  an  objectionable 
connotation.  The  idea  of  development  is  not  a  production 
of  modern  times ;  it  was  already  familiar  to  Greek  philos- 
ophy. More  particularly  Aristotle  raised  it  to  the  rank 
of  the  leading  principle  of  his  entire  system  by  his  sig- 
nificant distinction  between  "  potentia  "  and  "  actus." 
The  true  reality  he  did  not  place  with  Plato  outside  of 
and  behind  and  above  phenomenal  things,  but  conceived 
of  it  rather  as  their  immanent  essence,  not,  however,  as 
from  the  outset  fully  actualized  in  them,  but  as  finding 
gradual  realization  in  the  form  of  a  process.  According  to 
Aristotle,  therefore,  becoming  and  change  are  not  to  be 
explained  by  mechanical  impact  or  pressure,  nor  by  chem- 
ical combination  or  separation  of  atoms.  On  the  contrary, 
he  derived  his  theory  of  becoming  from  the  facts  of  or- 
ganic life,  seeing  in  it  a  self-actualizing  of  the  essential 
being  in  the  phenomena,  of  the  form  in  the  matter.  The 
essence,  the  idea  of  a  thing,  is  not  simply  a  quiescent 
archetype,  but  at  the  same  time  an  immanent  power  pro- 
pelling the  thing  and  moving  it  on  to  its  development  in 
a  definite  direction.  Evolution,  as  conceived  by  Aristotle, 
bears   thus  an   organic   and   teleological  character ;   the 


10  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

7eVecri?  exists  for  the  sake  of  the  ovala ;  becoming  takes 
place  because  there  is  being.13 

This  idea  of  development  aroused  no  objection  what- 
ever in  Christian  theology  and  philosophy.  On  the  con- 
trary, it  received  extension  and  enrichment  by  being 
linked  with  the  principle  of  theism.  For  the  essence  of 
it,  it  appears  also  in  modern  philosophy,  in  Lessing,  Her- 
der and  Goethe,  Schelling  and  Hegel,  and  in  many  his- 
torians of  distinction.  Some  of  these,  it  is  true,  have 
severed  the  idea  of  development  from  the  theistic  basis 
on  which  it  rests  in  Christianity,  and  by  so  doing  have 
reverted  to  the  ancient  pre-Christian  naturalism.  Never- 
theless, even  so,  their  naturalism  retains  a  specific  char- 
acter, clearly  enough  distinguishable  from  the  later 
materialism.  Whatever  terms  Goethe  and  Herder,  Schel- 
ling and  Hegel  might  employ  to  designate  the  core  and 
essence  of  things,  they  never  regarded  nature  as  a  dead 
mechanism,  but  as  an  eternally  formative  power,  a  cre- 
ative artist.  The  notion  that  all  higher  forms  of  being 
have  sprung  through  the  action  of  purely  mechanical  and 
chemical  forces  from  lower  ones  is  entirely  foreign  to 
them.  The  ascending  forms  in  the  world  of  nature  and 
spirit  appear  to  them  rather  evidence  of  the  inexhaust- 
ible fulness  of  life  and  the  infinite  creative  power  present 
in  the  universe.14  With  Hegel  the  entire  world  becomes 
one  mighty  process  of  thought,  which  in  each  of  its  mo- 
ments and  in  each  of  its  stages  is  rational,  so  far  as  it 
is  real ;  but  which  at  the  same  time,  by  the  principle  of 
immanent  antithesis,  to  which  it  remains  subject,  is 
forced  ever  forward  and  upward.  Whatever  exists  is 
therefore  pure  becoming,  not  being ;  it  exists  for  no  other 
purpose  but  to  pass  away ;  in  pursuance  of  the  law  of  the 
dialectic  process  the  old  continually  gives  way  to  the 


IDEA   OF  A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION     11 

new.  Hence  we  should  draw  back  from  all  violent  revo- 
lutions and  futile  experiments ;  the  eternal  spirit  itself  is 
unceasingly  occupied  in  breaking  down  while  building  up, 
and  in  building  up  while  breaking  down.  Process,  evo- 
lution, endless  and  restless  becoming,  is  the  principle 
which  governs  the  Hegelian  system  to  a  much  higher  de- 
gree, and  much  more  one-sidedly,  than  those  of  Aristotle 
and  Leibnitz.15 

This  doctrine  of  evolution,  however,  was  too  rational- 
istic, too  aprioristic,  too  romantic  in  construction  to  with- 
stand the  onset  of  the  natural  science  which  was  now 
growing  up.  It  soon  gave  way  before  the  mechanical 
and  anti-teleological  principles  of  the  theory  of  descent. 
Darwin  was  led  to  his  agnostic  naturalism  as  much  by 
the  misery  which  he  observed  in  the  world  as  by  the 
facts  which  scientific  investigation  brought  under  his 
notice.  There  was  too  much  strife  and  injustice  in  the 
world  for  him  to  believe  in  providence  and  a  predeter- 
mined goal.  A  world  so  full  of  cruelty  and  pain  he  could 
not  reconcile  with  the  omniscience,  the  omnipotence,  the 
goodness  of  God.  An  innocent  and  good  man  stands 
under  a  tree  and  is  struck  by  lightning.  "Do  you  be- 
lieve," asks  Darwin  of  his  friend  Gray,  "  that  God  slew 
this  man  on  purpose  ?  Many  or  most  people  believe  this ; 
I  cannot  and  will  not  believe  it."  The  discovery  of  the 
so-called  law  of  "  natural  selection  "  brought  him  accord- 
ingly a  real  feeling  of  relief,  for  by  it  he  escaped  the  neces- 
sity of  assuming  a  conscious  plan  and  purpose  in  creation. 
Whether  God  existed  or  not,  in  either  case  he  was  blame- 
less. The  immutable  laws  of  nature,  imperfect  in  all  their 
operations,  bore  the  blame  for  everything,  while  at  the  same 
time  guaranteeing  that  the  world  is  not  a  product  of  chance 
and  is  progressing  as  a  whole  towards  a  better  condition.16 


12  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Just  as  Darwin  discovered  the  misery  in  nature,  so 
Karl  Marx  discovered  the  misery  in  society.  In  the  same 
year  in  which  Darwin's  Origin  of  Species  was  published, 
Marx's  Political  Economy  also  appeared.  At  the  grave 
of  Marx,  on  the  17th  of  March,  in  the  year  1883,  Fried- 
rich  Engels  declared  that,  as  Darwin  had  found  the  law 
of  the  development  of  organic  nature,  so  Marx  had  dis- 
covered that  of  the  development  of  human  society. 
Darwin  believed  that  his  natural  selection,  with  its  ad- 
juncts, had  once  for  all  disposed  of  teleology,  miracles, 
and  all  supranaturalism ;  Marx  was  convinced  that  he 
had  freed  Socialism  from  all  utopianism  and  established 
it  on  a  firm  scientific  foundation.  Both  Darwin  and 
Marx  were  thorough  believers  in  the  inviolability  of  the 
laws  of  nature  and  the  necessary  sequence  of  events ; 
both  were  deeply  moved  by  the  fact  that  this  necessary 
process  of  development  has  both  in  the  past  and  present 
brought  into  existence  terrible  conditions  ;  and  both  cher- 
ished the  fixed  hope  that  development  means  progress, 
and  carries  with  it  the  promise  of  a  better  world,  a  better 
race,  and  a  better  society. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  this  mechanical  and  anti- 
teleological  conception  of  evolution  left  no  room  for  mir- 
acles, for  a  world  of  the  supranatural,  for  the  existence  and 
activity  of  God.  Darwin,  while  at  first  adhering  to  the 
deistic  belief  in  creation,  afterwards  declined  more  and 
more  to  agnosticism.  It  was  his  custom  to  dismiss  reli- 
gious  problems  by  saying  that  he  had  not  sufficiently 
reflected  upon  them  and  could  not  lay  claim  to  a  strong  reli- 
gious feeling.17  And  Marx  was  of  the  opinion  that  religion, 
"that  opiate  of  the  people,"  was  destined  to  die  a. natural 
death  in  the  perfect  society  of  the  future.18  The  belief  that 
modern  natural  science,  with  its  doctrine  of  evolution,  had 


IDEA   OF  A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION     13 

made  an  end  of  mediseval  dualism  with  its  conception  of 
two  worlds,  and  the  principle  of  naturalism  had  perma- 
nently triumphed,  found  an  echo  in  the  widest  circles. 
Revelation  could  no  longer  be  considered  a  possibility. 
Renan  declared  apodic  tic  ally;  "  II  n'y  a  pas  de  surnaturel." 
According  to  Haeckel,  all  revelations  to  which  religions 
appeal  are  pure  figments  of  human  phantasy  ;  the  one 
true  revelation  is  nature  itself.  And  Strauss,  not  quite 
so  sure  that  the  victory  had  been  gained  and  the  enemy 
slain,  called  to  battle  with  the  summons:  "The  last 
enemy  to  be  conquered  is  the  conception  of  another 
world."  The  term  evolution  embodies  in  itself  a  harm- 
less conception,  and  the  principle  expressed  by  it  is  cer- 
tainly operative  within  well-defined  limits  throughout 
the  universe.  But  the  trend  of  thought  by  which  it  has 
been  monopolized,  and  the  system  built  on  it,  in  many 
cases  at  least,  avail  themselves  of  the  word  in  order  to 
explain  the  entire  world,  including  man  and  religion  and 
morality,  without  the  aid  of  any  supranatural  factor, 
purely  from  immanent  forces,  and  according  to  unvary- 
ing laws  of  nature. 

Nevertheless,  the  transition  from  the  nineteenth  to  the 
twentieth  century  has  witnessed  an  important  change 
in  this  respect.  The  foremost  investigators  in  the  field 
of  science  have  abandoned  the  attempt  to  explain  all 
phenomena  and  events  by  mechanico-chemical  causes. 
Everywhere  there  is  manifesting  itself  an  effort  to  take 
up  and  incorporate  Darwin's  scheme  of  a  nature  subject 
to  law  into  an  idealistic  world-view.  In  fact  Darwin 
himself,  through  his  agnosticism,  left  room  for  different 
conceptions  of  the  Absolute,  nay  repeatedly  and  em- 
phatically gave  voice  to  a  conviction  that  the  world  is 
not  the  product  of  accident,  brute  force,  or  blind  neces- 


14  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

sity,  but  in  its  entirety  has  been  intended  for  progres- 
sive improvement.19  By  way  of  Darwin,  and  enriched  by 
a  mass  of  valuable  scientific  material,  the  doctrine  of 
evolution  has  returned  to  the  fundamental  idea  of  Hegel's 
philosophy.  The  mechanical  conception  of  nature  has 
been  once  more  replaced  by  the  dynamical ;  materialism 
has  reverted  to  pantheism ;  evolution  has  become  again 
the  unfolding,  the  revealing  of  absolute  spirit.  And  the 
concept  of  revelation  has  held  anew  its  triumphant  entry 
into  the  realm  of  philosophy  and  even  of  natural  science.20 

Such  generous  concessions  have  not  failed  to  meet 
with  response  from  the  side  of  theology.  It  is  true  the 
exponents  of  the  "new  theology"  which  has  made  its 
appearance  in  recent  years,  differ  greatly  among  them- 
selves as  to  the  significance  which  should  be  accorded 
in  revelation  to  nature  or  history,  to  individualism  or 
collectivism,  to  the  intellect  or  the  heart.  Nevertheless, 
the  movement  as  a  whole  is  clearly  inspired  and  con- 
trolled by  the  desire  to  identify  revelation  and  evolution, 
and  for  this  purpose  to  shift  the  centre  of  gravity  from 
the  transcendence  of  God  to  his  immanence.  To  it  God 
is  "  that  which  is  implied  in  all  being,  the  reality  behind 
all  phenomena,  the  sum  of  the  forces  of  the  universe."  It 
is  admitted  that  this  idea  of  the  immanence  of  God  was 
not  unknown  in  former  ages ;  but  never  until  the  present 
has  it  been  made  the  lever  of  a  "  moral  and  spiritual 
movement,"  such  as  may  now  be  witnessed  through  the 
whole  of  Christendom,  a  movement  which  aims  at  the 
perfect  reconciliation  of  religion  and  science  and  finds  its 
highest  expression  in  "  the  gospel  of  the  humanity  of  God 
and  the  divinity  of  man." 

It  needs  no  pointing  out  that  on  this  principle,  as  with 
Hegel,  the  divine  revelation  must  be  co-extensive  with  all 


IDEA   OF   A  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION     15 

that  exists,  with  nature  and  history,  with  all  nations  and 
religions.  Everything  is  a  manifestation  of  God.  The 
finite  in  all  its  parts  is  an  essential  element  of  the  infinite. 
It  is  the  infinite  itself,  as  become  finite  in  the  creature. 
But  there  is  a  definite  course  and  gradation  in  the  self- 
realizing  of  God.  From  the  inorganic  it  ascends  to  the 
organic,  from  the  physical  to  the  psychical,  from  nature 
to  spirit,  reaching  its  culminating  point  in  man.  "  We 
are  a  part  of  the  universe,  and  the  universe  is  a  part  of 
God;  there  is  no  real  difference  between  humanity  and 
deity ;  every  soul  is  a  sparkle  of  the  divine  spirit.' ' 
Humanity  ever  increasingly  reveals  God  to  us,  *  in  the 
same  proportion  that  it  develops  and  progresses.  For 
everything  is  subject  to  the  law  of  progress.  Everything 
is  continually  in  the  making.  Man  has  sprung  from  the 
animals,  and  has  in  the  civilized  portion  of  the  race  risen 
far  superior  to  his  ancestors ;  but  still  he  has  before  him 
an  endless  vista  of  development.  He  is  not  "  simply 
what  he  is,  but  all  he  yet  may  be."  He  is,  and  becomes 
ever  more  and  more,  an  organ  of  the  eternal  conscious- 
ness. He  was  an  animal,  he  became  a  man,  and  after 
humanizing  comes  deifying.  By  way  of  anticipation 
the  Christian  religion  illustrates  this  principle  in  the 
person  of  its  founder;  in  Christ  humanity  and  divinity 
are  one.  According  to  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  Christ  is  the 
glorification  of  human  effort,  the  upward  development 
of  manhood,  the  highest  point  of  human  striving,  the 
supreme  flower  of  our  race.  All  men  are  potential 
Christs,  all  moving  on  by  the  development  of  the  forces 
of  our  own  nature  into  that  Christhood 21. 

Although  the  New  Theology  likes  to  represent  this 
conception  as  a  new  movement,  it  is  at  bottom  nothing 
but  a  repetition  of  the  pantheistic  world-view  which  has 


16  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

been  embodied  in  the  systems  of  Erigena,  Spinoza,  and 
especially  Hegel.  And  in  all  probability  no  greater  success 
than  was  attained  by  these  philosophers  will  attend  the 
present  attempt  to  harmonize  after  this  fashion  faith  and 
science,  the  revelation  of  the  Scriptures,  and  a  materialist- 
ically or  pantheistically  conceived  doctrine  of  evolution. 
There  is  cause  for  rejoicing  that  the  intellectualism  of  the 
last  century  has  been  succeeded  by  a  feeling  for  religion 
and  mysticism,  for  metaphysics  and  philosophy ;  and  that 
in  religion  itself  there  is  now  recognized  a  reality  and  a 
revelation  of  God.  But  joy  over  this  change  in  the  atti- 
tude of  the  leading  minds  of  the  age  should  not  blind  us  to 
the  danger  to  which  it  exposes  us.  The  religious  craving 
at  present  asserting  itself  bears  a  pronouncedly  egoistic 
character ;  it  reveals  a  longing  rather  for  self-satisfaction 
than  for  knowledge  and  service  of  the  living  God ;  it 
seeks  God  not  above  but  in  the  world,  and  regards  his 
essence  as  identical  with  that  of  the  creature.  All  of 
which  goes  to  show  that  the  world-view,  which  formerly 
offered  itself  under  the  name  of  "  the  scientific,"  has  not 
essentially  changed,  but  has  simply,  owing  to  various  in- 
fluences, assumed  now  a  religious  form,  and  taken  up  its 
position  as  a  new  faith  over  against  the  old  faith.22  The 
difference  consists  merely  in  the  doctrine  of  evolution 
no  longer  contenting  itself  with  standing  as  "science  "  by 
the  side  of  or  over  against  Christianity,  but  pressing  on 
determinedly  to  usurp  the  place  of  Christianity  as  dogma 
and  religion.  Monism  lays  claim  through  the  mouth  of 
Haeckel  and  the  monistic  alliance  not  only  to  the  title  of 
the  true  science,  but  likewise  to  that  of  the  one  true 
religion.23 

As  a  form  of  religion,  however,  monism  hardly  deserves 
serious  consideration.     A  religion  which  has  nothing  to 


IDEA   OF   A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION     17 

offer  but  an  immangnjL.Grod,  identical  with  the  world,  may  I 
for  a  while  aesthetically  affect  and  warm  man ;  it  can! 
never  satisfy  man's  religious  and  ethical  needs.  It  fails  to 
raise  us  above  the  actual,  and  supplies  no  power  stronger 
than  the  world  ;  it  brings  no  peace,  and  offers  no  rest  on 
the  Father-heart  of  God.  This,  after  all,  is  what  man  seeks 
in  religion,  —  strength,  life,  a  personal  power,  that  can 
pardon  sin,  receive  us  into  favor,  and  cause  us  to  triumph 
joyfully  over  a  world  of  sin  and  death.  The  true  religion 
which  shall  satisfy  our  mind  and  heart,  our  conscience 
and  our  will,  must  be  one  that  does  not  shut  us  up  in,  but 
lifts  us  up  high  above,  the  world ;  in  the  midst  of  time 
it  must  impart  to  us  eternity  ;  in  the  midst  of  death  give 
us  life ;  in  the  midst  of  the  stream  of  change  place  us  on 
the  immovable  rock  of  salvation.  This  is  the  reason  why 
transcendence,  supranaturalism,  revelation,  are  essential 
to  all  religion. 

Thus  also  is  explained  why  humanity,  no  less  than 
formerly,  continues  to  think  and  live  after  a  supranatural- 
istic  fashion.  As  regards  the  heathen  and  Mohammedan 
nations,  this  needs  no  pointing  out.  As  to  Christendom, 
here  also  the  Greek  Church  continues  to  occupy  the  or- 
thodox position.  The  Roman  Church,  contrary  to  the 
expectation  of  many,  has  during  the  nineteenth  century 
almost  e\  ery where  increased  in  power  and  influence,  and 
yet  in  the  encyclical  letter  of  July  3,  1907,  it  repudiated 
without  hesitation  the  notion  that  revelation  involves 
nothing  more  than  man's  becoming  conscious  of  his  rela- 
tion to  God.  And  while  Protestantism  is  divided  within 
itself  even  more  thoroughly  than  Romanism,  yet  to  a 
large  extent,  among  all  classes  in  all  lands,  it  too  still 
holds  to  the  fundamental  elements  of  the  Christian  con- 
fession.    Thus,  notwithstanding  all  the  criticism  that  has 

2 


18  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

been  brought  to  bear  upon  the  Scriptures,  the  Bible  retains 
its  unique  place  in  the  church,  —  in  the  sermon,  in  the 
worship,  in  catechetical  instruction.  More  than  this,  all 
our  modern  civilization,  art,  science,  literature,  ethics, 
jurisprudence,  society,  state,  politics,  are  leavened  by 
religious,  Christian,  supranaturalistic  elements,  and  still 
rest  on  the  foundation  of  the  old  world-view.  "  The 
stamp  of  this  education,"  says  Troeltsch,  "Europe  bears 
deep  in  its  soul  up  to  to-day."  24  Much,  therefore,  will 
have  to  be  done  before  the  modern,  pantheistic  or  materi- 
alistic, world-view  shall  have  conquered  the  old  theistic 
one.  Nay,  in  view  of  the  past  history  of  mankind,  it  may 
safely  be  added  that  this  will  never  happen. 

Nor  is  there  any  warrant  for  ascribing  this  loyalty  to 
the  Christian  supranatural  world-view,  to  stubborn  con- 
servatism or  incorrigible  lack  of  understanding.  It  requires 
little  discernment  to  perceive  that  the  revelation  which 
every  religion,  and  more  particularly  Christianity,  claims 
for  itself  is  something  essentially  different  from  that 
which  the  new  theology  and  philosophy  would  commend 
to  us.  This  was  frankly  acknowledged  not  long  ago  by 
Friedrich  Delitzsch.  In  his  first  address  on  Babel  and 
Bible,  he  had  affirmed  that  the  Old  Testament  idea  of 
revelation,  like  many  other  Old  Testament  ideas,  was  in 
perfect  accord  with  that  found  in  the  Babylonian  religion. 
This  identification  having  been  contradicted,  he  reverted 
to  the  point  in  his  fourth  lecture  entitled  Rilckblick  und 
Ausblick.  Here  he  points  out  that  the  conception  of 
revelation  is  no  doubt  modified  by  many  to-day  so  as  to 
make  of  it  a  humanly  mediated,  gradual  process  of  histor- 
ical evolution.  But  he  immediately  adds  that  such  a  con- 
ception, while  quite  acceptable  to  him  personally,  is,  after 
all,  only  a  weak  dilution  of  the  Biblical  and  theological 


IDEA  OF   A  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION     19 

conception  of  revelation.25  And  there  can  hardly  be  two 
opinions  on  this  point.  Not  only  does  Scripture  draw  a 
sharp  distinction  between  that  revelation  which  God  con- 
tinues to  give  to  the  heathen  through  nature  and  the  false 
religion  to  which  the  heathen  have  abandoned  them- 
selves (Rom.  i.  19-23),  as  well  as  between  that  special 
revelation  which  he  has  granted  to  his  people  Israel  and 
the  idolatry  and  image-worship  by  which  the  people  of 
God  were  constantly  led  away  ;  but  it  also  most  emphat- 
ically proclaims  as  a  fundamental  truth,  that  Jehovah, 
who  revealed  himself  to  Moses  and  the  prophets,  is  the 
true  living  God,  and  that  all  the  gods  of  the  heathen  are 
idols  and  things  of  naught. 

If  this  be  so,  it  must  be  contrary  to  the  plain  intent  of 
Scripture  to  identify  revelation  and  development,  divine 
law  and  human  conduct,  or  to  consider  these  as  two  sides 
of  one  and  the  same  process.  When  Hegel  says  of  the 
infinite  and  the  finite:  "The  truth  is  the  inseparable 
union  of  both,"26  we  recognize  in  this  not  the  primum 
verum  but  the  irpwrov  -v/reOSo?  of  his  philosophy.  As  in 
science  one  must  distinguish  between  the  ideas  which 
God  has  deposited  in  his  works,  and  the  errors  which 
constantly  are  being  drawn  from  them  as  truth,  even  so 
revelation  and  religion  are  not  two  manifestations  of  the 
same  thing,  but  differ  as  God  differs  from  man,  the  Cre- 
ator from  the  creature.  Although  Gwatkin  some  times 
so  widens  the  idea  as  to  make  revelation  and  discovery  the 
same  process  viewed  from  different  standpoints,  he  quite 
correctly  explains  that  not  every  thought  of  man,  but 
only  true  thought,  echoes  God's  thought,  and  that  religions 
can  be  viewed  as  divine  revelations  only  so  far  as  they 
are  true.27 

This  distinction  between  revelation  and  religion,  and 


20  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

consequently  the  good  right  of  supranaturalism,  begins 
slowly  to  dawn  once  more  on  people.  Titius  declared 
some  time  ago  that  it  is  the  common  conviction  of  all 
theologians  from  Kahler  to  Troeltsch  that  supranatural- 
ism and  Christianity  stand  or  fall  together.  Certainly 
Troeltsch  insists  over  against  Fr.  R.  Lipsius  upon  a  cer- 
tain supranaturalism.  Loofs  maintains,  no  doubt,  that 
the  supranaturalism  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  cen- 
turies was  of  too  clumsy  construction  for  the  science  of 
nature  and  history  seriously  to  reckon  with  it.  But  he 
propounds  at  the  same  time  the  pertinent  question, 
whether  it  is  really  an  immutable  axiom  of  all  modern 
culture  that  natural  science  has  made  belief  impossible 
in  any  kind  of  revelation  except  one  that  can  be  fully 
explained  on  the  principle  of  evolution,  and  in  any  kind 
of  redemption  except  one  worked  out  by  purely  immanent 
forces.  And  returning  the  answer  to  the  question  himself, 
he  declares:  "  The  decisive  battle  between  the  i  diesseits- 
religion,'  based  on  pantheistic  ideas  of  immanence,  and 
the  traditions  of  a  more  robust  theism  has  not  yet  been 
fought  out."  Titius,  adverting  to  this,  gives  his  opinion 
to  the  effect  that  a  more  exact  investigation  of  the  problem 
of  supranaturalism  forms  the  chief  task  of  the  Dogmatics 
of  the  future,  and  is  of  supreme  importance  for  the  abso- 
lute character  of  Christianity.28 

With  the  reality  of  revelation,  therefore,  Christianity 
stands  or  falls.  But  our  insight  into  the  mode  and 
content  of  revelation  admits  of  being  clarified ;  and,  in 
consequence,  our  conception  of  this  act  of  divine  grace 
is  capable  of  being  modified.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this 
has  taken  place  in  modern  theology.  In  the  first  place, 
the  transcendence  of  God  has  assumed  for  us  a  meaning 
different  from  what  it  had  for  our  fathers.     The  deistic 


IDEA   OF   A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION     21 

belief  that  God  worked  but  a  single  moment,  and  there- 
after granted  to  the  world  its  own  independent  existence, 
can  no  longer  be  ours.  Through  the  extraordinary- 
advance  of  science  our  world-view  has  undergone  a  great 
change.  The  world  has  become  immeasurably  large  for 
us ;  forwards  and  backwards,  in  length  and  breadth  and 
depth  and  height,  it  has  extended  itself  into  immensity. 
In  this  world  we  find  everywhere  second  causes  operating 
both  in  organic  and  inorganic  creation,  in  nature  and 
history,  in  physical  and  psychical  phenomena.  If  God's 
dwelling  lies  somewhere  far  away,  outside  the  world, 
and  his  transcendence  is  to  be  understood  in  the  sense 
that  he  has  withdrawn  from  creation  and  now  stands 
outside  of  the  actuality  of  this  world,  then  we  lose  him 
and  are  unable  to  maintain  communication  with  him. 
His  existence  cannot  become  truly  real  to  us  unless  we 
are  permitted  to  conceive  of  him  as  not  only  above  the 
world,  but  in  his  very  self  in  the  world,  and  thus  as 
indwelling  in  all  his  works.29 

Thus  the  divine  transcendence  was  understood  by  the 
Apostle  Paul,  who  declared  that  God  is  not  far  from 
any  one  of  us,  but  that  "  in  him  we  live  and  move  and 
have  our  being."  The  transcendence  which  is  inseparable 
from  the  being  of  God  is  not  meant  in  a  spacial  or  a 
quantitative  sense.  It  is  true  Scripture  distinguishes 
between  heaven  and  earth  and  repeatedly  affirms  that 
God  has  heaven  especially  for  his  dwelling-place,  and 
specifically  reveals  there  his  perfections  in  glory.  But 
Scripture  itself  teaches  that  heaven  is  part  of  the 
created  universe.  When,  therefore,  God  is  represented 
as  dwelling  in  heaven,  he  is  not  thereby  placed  outside 
but  in  the  world,  and  is  not  removed  by  a  spacial  trans- 
cendence from  his  creatures.     His   exaltation  above  all 


frii 


22  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

that  is  finite,  temporal,  and  subject  to  space-limitation 
is  upheld.  Although  God  is  immanent  in  every  part 
and  sphere  of  creation  with  all  his  perfections  and  all  his 
being,  nevertheless,  even  in  that  most  intimate  union 
he  remains  transcendent.  His  being  is  of  a  different 
and  higher  kind  than  that  of  the  world.  As  little  as 
eternity  and  time,  omnipresence  and  space,  infinitude  and 
finiteness  can  be  reduced  to  one  or  conceived  as  reverse 
sides  of  the  same  reality,  can  God  and  the  world,  the 
Creator  and  the  creature,  be  identified  qualitatively  and 
essentially.  Not  first  in  our  time,  nor  by  way  of  con- 
cession to  science  or  philosophy,  but  in  all  ages,  the 
great  theologians  have  taught  the  transcendence  of  God 
in  this  Scriptural  sense. 

Since,  however,  we  take  this  idea  more  seriously  at  pres- 
ent, because  of  the  great  enrichment  our  world-view  has 
received  from  science,  this  needs  must  give  rise  to  a  some- 
what modified  conception  of  revelation.  The  old  theology 
construed  revelation  after  a  quite  external  and  mechanical 

shion,  and  too  readily  identified  it  with  Scripture.  Our 
ej'es  are  nowadays  being  more  and  more  opened  to  the 
fact  that  revelation  in  many  ways  is  historically  and 
psychologically  "  mediated."  Not  only  is  special  reve- 
lation founded  on  general  revelation,  but  it  has  taken 
over  numerous  elements  from  it.  The  Old  and  the  New 
Testaments  are  no  longer  kept  isolated  from  their  milieu  ; 
and  the  affinity  between  them  and  the  religious  repre- 
sentatations  and  customs  of  other  peoples  is  recognized. 
Israel  stands  in  connection  with  the  Semites,  the  Bible 
with  Babel.  And  although  the  revelation  in  Israel  and 
in  Christ  loses  nothing  of  its  specific  nature,  nevertheless 
even  it  came  into  being  not  all  at  once  but  progressively, 
in   conjunction   with    the    progress    of    history  and   the 


IDEA   OF   A  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION     23 

individuality  of  the  prophets,  7ro\v/jL€pco<;  teal  irokvrpoiTU)^. 
Even  as  Christ  the  Son  of  God  is  from  above,  and  yet 
his  birth  from  Mary  was  in  preparation  for  centuries, 
so  every  word  of  God  in  special  revelation  is  both  spoken 
from  above  and  yet  brought  to  us  along  the  pathway 
of  history.  Scripture  gives  succinct  expression  to  this 
double  fact  when  it  describes  the  divine  word  as  prjOev  I 
virb  rod  6eov  Bia  roiv  Trpocftrjrwv.  ^ 

One  of  the  results  of  the  trend  of  present-day  science 
is  that  theology  is  just  now  largely  occupied  with  the 
second  of  these  two  elements,  that  of  the  .historical  and 
psychological  "  mediation."  Its  present  interest  centres 
rather  in  the  problem  how  revelation  has  come  about, 
than  in  the  question  what  the  content  of  revelation  is. 
There  is  connected  with  this  investigation  the  dis- 
advantage that  often  the  woods  are  not  seen  for  the 
trees;  that  the  striking  analogies  in  other  religions  have 
dulled  perception  of  what  is  peculiar  to  the  religion  of 
Israel ;  and  that  the  discovery  elsewhere  of  some  trait 
more  or  less  closely  parallel  is  hastily  given  out  as  a 
solution  of  the  problem  of  origin.  But,  apart  from  this, 
these  historical  and  psychological  investigations  are  in 
themselves  an  excellent  thing.  They  must  and  will  con- 
tribute towards  a  better  understanding  of  the  content  of 
revelation ;  the  pr)6ep  Sea  rwv  irpo^TOiv  will,  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  more  profoundly  understood,  lead  to  a  truer 
appreciation  of  the  prjdev  vtto  tov  Qeov.  For,  since  all 
historical  and  psychological  research  into  the  origin  and 
essence  of  the  religion  of  Israel  and  Christianity  must 
leave  their  peculiarity  untouched,  what  else  will  remain, 
but  either  to  reject  them  on  account  of  their  alleged 
foolishness  or  to  accept  them  in  faith  as  divine  wisdom  ? 

Belief  in  such  a  special  revelation  is  the  starting-point 


24  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

and  the  foundation-stone  of  Christian  theology.  As  sci- 
ence never  precedes  life,  but  always  follows  it  and  flows 
from  it,  so  the  science  of  the  knowledge  of  God  rests  on 
the  reality  of  his  revelation.  If  God  does  not  exist,  or  if 
he  has  not  revealed  himself,  and  hence  is  unknowable, 
then  all  religion  is  an  illusion  and  all  theology  a  phan- 
tasm. But,  built  on  the  basis  of  revelation,  theology 
undertakes  a  glorious  task,  —  the  task  of  unfolding  the 
science  of  the  revelation  of  God  and  of  our  knowledge 
concerning  him.  It  engages  in  this  task  when  seeking 
to  ascertain  by  means  of  exegesis  the  content  of  revela- 
tion, when  endeavoring  to  reduce  to  unity  of  thought 
this  ascertained  content,  when  striving  to  maintain  its 
truth  whether  by  way  of  aggression  or  defence,  or  to 
commend  it  to  the  consciences  of  men.  But  side  by  side 
with  all  these  branches  there  is  room  also  for  a  philosophy 
of  revelation  which  will  trace  the  idea  of  revelation,  both 
in  its  form  and  in  its  content,  and  correlate  it  with  the 
rest  of  our  knowledge  and  life. 

Theological  thought  has  always  felt  the  need  of  such  a 
science.  Not  only  Origen  and  the  Gnostics,  but  also 
Augustine  and  the  Scholastics,  made  it  their  conscious 
aim  both  to  maintain  Christianity  in  its  specific  character 
and  to  vindicate  for  it  a  central  place  in  the  conception 
of  the  world  as  a  whole.  And  after  Rationalism  had  set 
historical  Christianity  aside  as  a  mass  of  fables,  the  desire 
has  reasserted  itself  in  modern  theology  and  philosophy 
to  do  justice  to  this  central  fact  of  universal  history,  and 
to  trace  on  all  sides  the  lines  of  connection  established  by 
God  himself  between  revelation  and  the  several  spheres 
of  the  created  universe.30 

It  must  be  acknowledged  that  the  attempt  to  outline  a 
philosophy  of  revelation  exposes  one  to  losing  himself  in 


IDEA   OF   A  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION     25 

idle  speculation.  But,  besides  appealing  to  the  general 
principle  that  the  abuse  of  a  thing  cannot  forbid  its  proper 
use,  we  may  remind  ourselves  that  this  danger  is  just 
now  reduced  to  a  minimum,  because  philosophy  itself  has 
become  thoroughly  convinced  of  the  futility  of  its  apri- 
oristic  constructions,  and  looks  to  the  empirical  reality  for 
the  subject  matter  of  its  thought.  A  philosophy  which, 
neglecting  the  real  world,  takes  its  start  from  reason,  will 
necessarily  do  violence  to  the  reality  of  life  and  resolve 
nature  and  history  into  a  network  of  abstractions.  This 
also  applies  to  the  philosophy  of  the  Christian  religion. 
If  this  be  unwilling  to  take  revelation  as  it  offers  itself, 
it  will  detach  it  from  history  and  end  by  retaining  noth- 
ing but  a  dry  skeleton  of  abstract  ideas.  The  philosophy 
of  Hegel  has  supplied  a  deterring  example  of  this,  as  is 
well  illustrated  by  the  Leben  Jesu  and  the  Glaubenslehre 
of  Strauss.  Speculative  rationalism,  to  borrow  a  striking 
word  of  Hamann,  forgot  that  God  is  a  genius  who  does 
not  ask  whether  we  find  his  word  rational  or  irrational. 
Precisely  because  Christianity  rests  on  revelation,  it  has 
a  content  which,  while  not  in  conflict  with  reason,  yet 
greatly  transcends  reason ;  even  a  divine  wisdom,  which 
appears  to  the  world  foolishness.  If  revelation  did  not 
furnish  such  a  content,  and  comprised  nothing  but  what 
reason  itself  could  sooner  or  later  have  discovered,  it 
would  not  be  worthy  of  its  name.  Revelation  is  a  dis- 
closure of  the  fjLvarijpcov  rou  deov.  What  neither  nature 
nor  history,  neither  mind  nor  heart,  neither  science  nor 
art  can  teach  us,  it  makes  known  to  us,  —  the  fixed,  unal- 
terable will  of  God  to  rescue  the  world  and  save  sinners, 
a  will  at  variance  with  well-nigh  the  whole  appearance 
of  things.  This  will  is  the  secret  of  revelation.  In  crea- 
tion God  manifests  the  power  of  his  mind ;  in  revelation, 


26  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

which  has  redemption  for  its  centre,  he  discloses  to  us 
the  greatness  of  his  heart.31 

The  philosophy  of  revelation,  just  like  that  of  history, 
art,  and  the  rest,  must  take  its  start  from  its  object, 
from  revelation.  Even  its  idea  cannot  be  construed 
apriori.  There  is  but  one  alternative :  either  there  is  no 
revelation,  and  then  all  speculation  is  idle ;  or  else  there 
comes  to  us  out  of  history  such  a  revelation,  shining  by 
its  own  light;  and  then  it  tells  us,  not  only  what  its  content 
is,  but  also  how  it  comes  into  existence.  The  philosophy 
of  revelation  does  not  so  much  make  this  fit  in  with  its 
system  as  rather  so  broadens  itself  that  it  can  embrace 
revelation  too  in  itself.  And  doing  this,  it  brings  to  light 
the  divine  wisdom  which  lies  concealed  in  it.  For  though 
the  cross  of  Christ  is  to  the  Jews  a  stumbling-block  and 
to  the  Greeks  foolishness,  it  is  in  itself  the  power  of  God 
and  the  wisdom  of  God.  No  philosophy  of  revelation, 
any  more  than  any  other  philosophy,  whether  of  religion 
or  art,  of  morals  or  law,  shall  ever  be  able  to  exhaust  its 
subject,  or  thoroughly  to  master  its  material.  All  knowl- 
edge here  on  earth  remains  partial ;  it  walks  by  faith  and 
attains  not  to  sight.  But  nevertheless  it  lives  and  works 
in  the  assurance  that  the  ground  of  all  things  is  not 
blind  will  or  incalculable  accident,  but  mind,  intelligence, 
wisdom. 

In  the  next  place  this  philosophy  of  revelation  seeks  to 
correlate  the  wisdom  which  it  finds  in  revelation  with  that 
which  is  furnished  by  the  world  at  large.  In  former  times 
Christian  theology  drew  the  distinction  between  special 
and  general  revelation.  But  it  never  wholly  thought 
through  this  distinction,  nor  fully  made  clear  its  rich  sig- 
nificance for  the  whole  of  human  life.  When  modern 
science  arose  and  claimed  to  have  found  a  key  to  the  solu- 


IDEA   OF   A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION    27 

tion  of  all  mysteries  in  the  principle  of  evolution,  the  at- 
tempt was  made  to  withdraw  successively  nature,  history, 
man,  and  his  entire  psychical  life,  from  the  control  of  the 
existence,  the  inworking,  the  revelation  of  God.  Not  a 
few  theologians  have  yielded  to  this  trend  and  with  more 
or  less  hesitation  abandoned  the  entire  world  to  modern 
science,  provided  only  somewhere,  in  the  Person  of  Christ, 
or  in  the  inner  soul  of  man,  a  place  might  be  reserved  for 
divine  revelation.  Such  a  retreat,  however,  betrays  weak- 
ness and  is  in  direct  opposition  to  the  idea  of  special  rev- 
elation. Revelation,  while  having  its  centre  in  the  Person 
of  Christ,  in  its  periphery  extends  to  the  uttermost  ends 
of  creation.  It  does  not  stand  isolated  in  nature  and  his- 
tory, does  not  resemble  an  island  in  the  ocean,  nor  a  drop 
of  oil  upon  water.  With  the  whole  of  nature,  with  the 
whole  of  history,  with  the  whole  of  humanity,  with  the 
family  and  society,  with  science  and  art  it  is  intimately 
connected. 

The  world  itself  rests  on  revelation ;  revelation  is 
the  presupposition,  the  foundation,  the  secret  of  all  that 
exists  in  all  its  forms.  The  deeper  science  pushes  its 
investigations,  the  more  clearly  will  it  discover  that  rev- 
elation underlies  all  created  being.  In  every  moment  of 
time  beats  the  pulse  of  eternity ;  every  point  in  space  is 
filled  with  the  omnipresence  of  God ;  the  finite  is  sup- 
ported by  the  infinite,  all  becoming  is  rooted  in  being. 
Together  with  all  created  things,  that  special  revelation 
which  comes  to  us  in  the  Person  of  Christ  is  built  on  these 
presuppositions.  The  foundations  of  creation  and  redemp- 
tion are  the  same.  The  Logos  who  became  flesh  is  the 
same  by  whom  all  things  were  made.  The  first-born  from 
the  dead  is  also  the  first-born  of  every  creature.  The  Son, 
whom  the  Father  made  heir  of  all  things,  is  the  same  by 


28  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

whom  he  also  made  the  worlds.  Notwithstanding  the 
separation  wrought  by  sin,  there  is  a  progressive  approach 
of  God  to  his  creatures.  The  transcendence  does  not  cease 
to  exist,  but  becomes  an  ever  deeper  immanence.  But  as 
a  disclosure  of  the  greatness  of  God's  heart,  special  reve- 
lation far  surpasses  general  revelation,  which  makes  known 
to  us  the  power  of  his  mind.  General  revelation  leads  to 
special,  special  revelation  points  back  to  general.  The  one 
calls  for  the  other,  and  without  it  remains  imperfect  and 
unintelligible.  Together  they  proclaim  the  manifold  wis- 
dom which  God  has  displayed  in  creation  and  redemption. 
It  will  be  impossible  in  the  following  lectures  to  develop 
a  system  of  the  philosophy  of  revelation,  both  formally  and 
materially  considered.  I  shall  have  to  confine  myself  to 
setting  forth  the  principal  ideas  that  enter  into  the 
structure  of  such  a  system. 


II 

REVELATION   AND  PHILOSOPHY 

IN  entering  upon  our  task  we  may  derive  encourage- 
ment from  the  position  accorded  at  present  to  philo- 
sophical thought.  There  is  reason  for  rejoicing  in  the 
reflection  that  from  an  object  of  contempt  it  has  come  to 
inspire  the  warmest  interest.  When  in  the  last  century 
the  natural  sciences  began  their  triumphal  progress,  and 
the  enthusiasm  Hegel  had  aroused  gave  way  to  sober  dis- 
enchantment, people  turned  their  backs  on  all  metaphysics 
and  for  a  while  cherished  the  delusion  that  exact  science 
would  sometime  give  a  satisfactory  solution  to  all  the 
problems  of  life.  This  was  the  so-called  "  period  of 
Renan,"  in  which  physics  was  satisfied  with  itself  and 
professed  to  have  no  need  of  metaphysics.1 

But  this  period  now  belongs  to  the  past.  Natural 
science,  it  is  true,  has  by  no  means  become  insolvent,  as 
Brunetiere  asserted.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  gone  on  year 
after  year  adding  one  great  discovery  to  another.  But 
many  have  been  disappointed  in  the  foolish  expectations 
they  had  cherished  regarding  it :  the  ignoramus  et  ignor- 
abimus  has  rudely  awakened  them  out  of  their  dreams. 
Thus  toward  the  close  of  the  last  century  a  great  change 
gradually  took  place  in  the  prevailing  mental  attitude. 
With  the  return  to  mysticism  in  literature  and  art,  the 
need  of  philosophy  and  metaphysics  and  religion  reasserted 
itself.  This  remarkable  reaction  has  extended  into  the 
very  camp  of  natural  science.      Not  only  has   Ostwald 


30  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

published  his  "Lectures  on  Natural  Philosophy,"  his 
"Annals  of  Natural  Philosophy,"  and  Reinke  his  "  Phi- 
losophy of  Botany,"  but  natural  scientists  have  eagerly 
discussed  philosophical  and  especially  epistemological 
problems  —  witness  such  names  as  W.  K.  Clifford,  Poin- 
care*,  Kleinpeter,  Ostwald,  Verworn.  Haeckel,  no  doubt, 
professes  to  base  his  conclusions  wholly  on  facts,  but  even 
he,  none  the  less,  recognizes  that,  in  order  to  reach  a  mo- 
nistic world-view,  thought  must  be  called  to  the  aid  of 
perception,  philosophy  of  science,  faith  of  knowledge.'^ 

Nor  is  this  return  to  philosophy  and  religion  the  result 
of  arbitrary  caprice.  It  has  all  the  characteristics  of  a 
universal  and  necessary  phenomenon.  It  is  not  confined 
to  one  people  or  one  stratum  of  society,  but  appears  in 
many  countries  and  among  men  of  all  ranks.  It  is  not 
peculiar  to  this  or  that  particular  branch  of  learning,  but 
manifests  itself  in  the  spheres  of  history,  jurisprudence, 
and  medicine,  as  well  as  in  that  of  natural  science ;  its 
influence  is  no  less  strong  in  literature  and  art  than  in 
religion  and  theology  themselves.  Verlaine  and  Maeter- 
linck, Sudermann  and  Hauptmann,  Ibsen  and  Tolstoi  and 
Nietzsche  are  all  equally  dissatisfied  with  present-day 
culture,  and  all  seek  something  different  and  higher.  They 
endeavor  to  penetrate  beneath  the  appearance  of  things  to 
the  essence,  beneath  the  conscious  to  the  unconscious, 
beneath  the  outward  forms  to  the  inner  mystery  of  in- 
finite life,  of  silent  power,  of  hidden  will.  From  every 
quarter  comes  the  demand  for  a  new  dogma,  a  new  religion, 
a  new  faith,  a  new  art,  a  new  science,  a  new  school,  a  new 
education,  a  new  social  order,  anew  world,  and  a  new  God. 
The  things  offered  under  this  label  are  too  varied,  and 
often  also  too  silly,  to  enumerate.  Buddhism  and  Mo- 
hammedanism and  the  religion  of  Wodan  are  commended 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  31 

to  us,  theosophy,  occultism,  magic  and  astrology,  daemon- 
ism  and  satan-worship,  race-  and  hero-worship,  ethical 
culture  and  the  pursuit  of  ideals,  the  cult  of  humanity 
and  of  Jesus.  Reform  movements  are  the  order  of  the 
day.     Modernism  is  in  the  air  everywhere.3 

Divergent  as  these  tendencies  may  be,  they  all  have 
two  characteristics  in  common.  In  the  first  place,  the 
principle  of  autonomy,  expressing  itself  on  the  one  hand  in 
anarchism  of  thought,  on  the  other  hand  in  the  auto- 
soterism  of  the  will.4  Each  individual  regards  himself  as 
independent  and  self-governing,  and  shapes  his  own  course 
and  pursues  his  own  way.  Having  nothing  to  start  with 
except  a  vague  sense  of  need,  men  seek  satisfaction  in 
every  possible  quarter,  in  India  and  Arabia,  among  the 
civilized  and  uncivilized  nations,  in  nature  and  art,  in 
state  and  society.  Religion  is  treated  as  a  matter  of  purely 
personal  invention  and  individual  construction,  as  a  mere 
product  and  element  of  culture.  Everybody  has  his  own 
religion,  —  not  merely  every  nation  and  every  church, 
but  every  person.  Thus  we  hear  of  a  religion  of  the  modern 
man,  a  religion  of  the  layman,  a  religion  of  the  artist,  a 
religion  of  the  scientist,  a  religion  of  the  physician.  It 
has  become  a  vogue  to  study  and  expound  the  religion 
of  Goethe  and  Lessing,  of  Kant  and  Schleiermacher,  of 
Bismarck  and  Tolstoi. 

But  in  the  second  place  these  modern  movements  are  all 
alike  seeking  after  religion,  after  the  supreme  good,  abid- 
ing happiness,  true  being,  absolute  worth.  Even  though 
the  word  "  religion  "  be  avoided  and  the  new-fashioned 
term  "  world-view  "  preferred,  in  point  of  fact  the  satisfac- 
tion of  no  other  need  is  aimed  at  than  that  which  used  to 
be  supplied  by  religion.  As  to  the  proper  definition  of 
such  a  world-view,  there  exists  considerable  divergence  of 


32  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

opinion.  But  whether  with  Windelband  we  define  phi- 
losophy as  the  theory  of  "  the  determination  of  values,"  as 
the  science  of  "  normal  consciousness,"  or  conceive  of  it 
with  Paulsen  as  a  mode  of  viewing  the  world  and  life 
"  which  shall  satisfy  both  the  demands  of  reason  and  the 
needs  of  the  heart, "  in  any  case  it  is  plain  that  philos- 
ophy is  not  content  with  a  scientific  explanation  of  reality, 
but  seeks  to  vindicate  the  higher  ideals  of  humanity,  to 
satisfy  its  deepest  needs.  Philosophy  wishes  itself  to 
serve  as  religion,  and  from  an  attitude  of  contempt  for  all 
theology  has  veered  round  to  a  profession  of  being  itself 
at  bottom  a  search  after  God.6 

The  agreement  between  these  various  movements  of 
reform  extends,  however,  still  farther  than  this.  The 
ways  in  which  satisfaction  is  sought  for  the  ineradicable 
"metaphysical  need  "appear  to  be  many  and  divergent. 
But  appearances  are  deceitful.  Some  youthful  enthusi- 
ast discovers  an  idea,  which  takes  him  by  surprise,  and  he 
forthwith  claims  for  it  the  importance  of  a  new  religion,  or 
a  new  philosophy.  But  historical  study  and  scientific  re- 
flection will,  as  a  rule,  convince  him  in  short  order  that 
the  thing  he  regarded  as  new  was,  in  point  of  fact,  quite 
old,  having  in  the  past  repeatedly  emerged  and  passed 
away.  That  which  has  been  is  that  which  shall  be,  and 
there  is  no  new  thing  under  the  sun.  The  new  fashions 
in  theology  are  as  much  like  the  old  Arianism  and  Socini- 
anism  and  Gnosticism  and  Sabellianism  as  one  drop  of 
water  is  like  another.  The  new  roads  in  philosophy  have 
all  been  travelled  by  the  thinkers  of  ancient  Greece.  It  is 
difficult  to  square  this  fact  with  the  theory  of  evolution 
and  its  boast  of  the  wonderful  progress  of  our  times.  But 
in  reality  the  limitations  of  the  human  intellect  soon  be- 
come apparent,  the  originality  of  human  thought  is  readily 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  33 

exhausted.  Troeltsch  strikingly  observes  that  "  the  num- 
ber of  those  who  have  had  something  really  new  to  tell 
the  world  has  always  been  remarkably  small,  and  it  is  as- 
tonishing to  observe  on  how  few  ideas  humanity  has  actu- 
ally subsisted."6  The  directions  in  which  it  is  possible  for 
our  thinking  to  move  are  not  nearly  so  numerous  as  we 
suppose  or  imagine.  We  are  all  determined  in  our  thought 
and  action  by  the  peculiarity  of  our  human  nature,  and 
then  again  by  each  one's  own  past  and  present,  his  char- 
acter and  environment.  And  it  is  not  rare  that  those  who 
seem  to  lead  others  are  rather  themselves  led  by  them.7 

If,  then,  we  attend  to  details,  to  words  and  forms  of  ex- 
pression, to  outward  considerations  and  modes  of  presen- 
tation, we  seem  in  the  presence  of  a  chaotic  mass  of 
religions  and  world-views  among  which  choice  is  diffi- 
cult. But  when  we  penetrate  to  the  centre  of  things 
and  consider  principles,  all  this  mass  reduces  itself  to  a 
few  types.  "  The  epochs  of  human  life,"  as  Goethe's 
saying  has  it,  "  traverse  in  typical  development  a  series  of 
world-views."  8  And  as  every  world- view  moves  between 
the  three  poles  of  God,  the  world,  and  man,  and  seeks  to 
determine  their  reciprocal  relations,  it  follows  that  in 
principle  only  three  types  of  world- view  are  distinguish- 
able,— the  theistic  (religious,  theological),  the  naturalistic 
(either  in  its  pantheistic  or  materialistic  form),  and  the 
humanistic.  These  three  do  not  succeed  one  another  in 
history  as  Comte  imagined  his  trois  etats  to  do.  They 
rather  recur  in  rhythmical  waves,  more  or  less  intermin- 
gle, and  subsist  side  by  side.  Thus  Greek  philosophy 
was  born  out  of  the  Orphic  theology,  passed  over  into  the 
naturalism  of  the  old  nature-philosophy,  and  became 
humanistic  in  the  Sophists  and  the  wisdom-philosophy 
of  Socrates.     Plato  in  his  doctrine  of  ideas  went  back  to 

3 


34  PHILOSOPHY    OF   REVELATION 

the  old  theology  and  to  Pythagoras ;  but,  after  Aristotle, 
his  philosophy  gave  way  to  the  naturalistic  systems  of 
Epicurus  and  the  Stoa ;  and  these  in  turn,  by  way  of  re- 
action, gave  birth  to  the  teachings  of  the  sceptical  and 
mystical  schools.  Christianity  gave  theism  the  ascend- 
ancy for  many  centuries  ;  but  modern  philosophy,  which 
began  with  Descartes  and  Bacon,  assumed  in  ever  increas- 
ing measure  a  naturalistic  character  till  Kant  and  Fichte 
in  the  ego  once  more  took  their  starting-point  from 
man.  After  a  brief  period  of  the  supremacy  of  the  the- 
istic  philosoplry  in  the  nineteenth  century,  naturalism  in 
its  materialistic  or  pantheistic  form  resumed  its  sway, 
only  to  induce  during  these  recent  years  a  new  return  to 
Kant  and  the  principles  of  humanism. 

At  present  the  materialistic  form  of  naturalism  has  been 
generally  discredited  among  all  thinkers  of  repute.  Prac- 
tically it  still  survives  and  counts  many  adherents,  but 
it  has  lost  all  hold  upon  the  leaders  of  thought.  Three 
causes  have  chiefly  contributed  to  this. 

In  the  first  place,  the  criticism  to  which  Darwinism 
in  the  narrower  sense  of  this  term  has  been  subjected. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  Darwin  was  not  the  father 
of  the  idea  of  evolution.  This  existed  long  before  him. 
Bodin  and  Hobbes,  Montesquieu,  Voltaire  and  Rousseau, 
Kant  and  Schiller,  had  already  taught  that  the  original 
state  of  man  was  merely  animal.  Hegel  had  changed 
Spinoza's  substance  into  a  principle  of  active  force,  and 
made  out  of  immutable  being  a  restless  becoming.  But 
all  these  earlier  thinkers  held  the  idea  of  evolution  in  a 
purely  philosophical  form.  Darwin,  on  the  other  hand,  en- 
deavored to  supply  it  with  a  scientific  basis  in  facts,  just 
as  Marx  tried  to  detach  the  socialistic  hopes  from  all 
utopianism  and  raise  them  to  the  rank  of  a   scientific 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  35 

theory.  But  no  sooner  had  Darwin  succeeded  in  laying 
such  a  scientific  foundation  in  his  "  struggle  for  exist- 
ence "  with  its  correlates  of  "  natural  selection  "  and  "  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest,"  than  the  attack  on  his  work  and  its 
demolition  began.  In  rapid  succession  the  principles  of 
struggle  for  existence,  of  unlimited  variability,  of  gradual 
accumulation  of  minute  changes  during  vast  periods  of 
time,  of  the  heredity  of  acquired  qualities,  of  the  purely 
mechanical  explanation  of  all  phenomena,  of  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  teleology,  were  subjected  to  sharp  criticism  and 
in  wide  circles  pronounced  untenable.  The  prophecy  of 
Wigand  that  this  attempt  to  solve  the  riddle  of  life  would 
not  survive  until  the  close  of  the  century  has  been  liter- 
ally fulfilled.  And  the  declaration  of  J.  B.  Meyer  has 
met  with  wide  assent  that  Darwin's  doctrine  of  descent 
was  not  so  much  an  hypothesis  proposed  to  explain  facts 
as  rather  an  invention  of  facts  for  the  support  of  an 
hypothesis.9 

In  the  second  place,  natural  science  itself  has  undergone 
considerable  modification  in  its  fundamental  conceptions. 
Physics  and  chemistry  for  a  long  time  proceeded  on  the 
assumption  of  atoms,  which,  however  minute,  yet  had  the 
property  of  extension  and  were  capable  of  filling  space. 
With  sober  scientists  this  atomism  never  took  the  place 
of  a  scientific  theory,  but  served  simply  as  a  working  hy- 
pothesis within  defined  limits.  Materialism,  however,  ele- 
vated this  hypothesis  into  a  theory  capable  of  explaining 
the  world,  regarded  the  atoms  as  the  ultimate  and  sole 
elements  of  the  universe,  and  viewed  all  change  and  vari- 
ation in  the  world  as  due  in  the  last  analysis  to  mechanical 
combination  and  separation  of  these  primitive  elements. 
Not  merely  was  protest  raised  against  this  by  philosophical 
thought  as  represented  in  Kant,  Schelling,  and  Schopen- 


36  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

hauer,  on  the  ground  that  atoms  possessing  extension  and 
filling  space  cannot  at  the  same  time  be  conceived  as  indi- 
visible; but  modern  physics  and  chemistry  themselves 
through  their  study  of  the  phenomena  of  light,  and  their 
discovery  of  the  Roentgen  and  Becquerel  rays,  and  their 
insight  into  the  endless  divisibility  of  matter,  came  more 
and  more  to  the  conviction  that  actio  in  distans  is  ab- 
surd, that  empty  space  between  the  atoms  is  inconceivable, 
that  the  atom  itself  is  a  mere  figment,  and  that  the  exist- 
ence of  a  world-sether  filling  all  is  highly  plausible.10 

To  this  must  be  added,  in  the  third  place,  the  effect  of 
the  criticism  which  has  been  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
naturalistic  hypothesis  from  the  epistemological  point  of 
view.  Materialism  made  pretence  to  being  monistic,  but 
could  furnish  no  support  for  this  claim,  seeing  that  in  its 
atoms  it  continued  to  place  matter  and  force  side  by  side 
and  had  nothing  to  say  about  the  relation  between  these 
two,  and  so  remained  obviously  dualistic.  Hence,  in  the 
name  of  monism  materialism  was  condemned.  Ostwald 
dispensed  entirely  with  the  conceptions  of  atom,  matter, 
substance,  "  thing-in-itself,"  and  substituted  for  them  the 
idea  of  energy.  What  the  vulgar  notion  regards  as  matter 
is  a  pure  product  of  thought,  and  in  itself  nothing  else  but 
"a  group  of  various  energies  arranged  in  space."  These 
energies  are  the  only  reality.  All  our  knowledge  of  the 
outside  world  can  be  subsumed  under  the  form  of  repre- 
sentation of  existing  energy.11 
0'  But  even  this  "  energetic  monism,"  which  Ostwald 
sought  to  substitute  for  "  material  monism,"  did  not  prove 
a  permanent  resting-place.  On  further  reflection  it  ap- 
peared that  none  of  the  outside  world,  including  ourselves, 
is  directly  present  to  our  ego,  but  comes  to  us  through 
the  medium  of  consciousness  only.  The  ultimate  elements, 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  37 

therefore,  which  are  positively  given  and  form  the  founda- 
tion of  science,  appear  to  be  not  matter  and  force,  aether 
and  energy,  but  sensations  and  perceptions.  The  phenom- 
ena of  consciousness  are  the  only  fixed  reality.  Hence  it 
becomes  the  task  of  all  genuine,  empirical,  and  exact  sci- 
ence, taking  its  start  from  these  phenomena  of  conscious- 
ness, to  strip  them  of  all  accretions,  and  then  to  proceed 
to  the  construction  of  a  system  on  the  basis  of  these  ulti- 
mate elements  of  "  pure  experience  "  only.12 

These  considerations,  drawn  from  the  philosophy  of 
"pure  experience,"  as  advocated  chiefly  by  Mach  and 
Avenarius,  led  the  Gottingen  physiologist,  Max  Verworn, 
to  a  new  form  of  monism,  to  "  psychical  monism."  In  the 
opinion  of  this  scientist,  materialism,  while  capable  of 
rendering  some  service  as  a  working  hypothesis,  is  alto- 
gether without  value  as  an  explanation  of  the  world. 
Mind  cannot  be  explained  from  matter,  nor  phenomena  of 
consciousness  from  the  movement  of  atoms.  Even  the 
"  parallelistic  monism "  of  Spinoza,  advocated  of  late 
chiefly  by  Paulsen,  does  not  satisfy,  because  it  is  neither 
monism  nor  parallelism.  Nor  is  the  "  energetic  monism" 
of  Ostwald  more  satisfactory,  because  it  continues  to  dis- 
tinguish between  physical  and  psychical  energy,  thus  fall- 
ing back  into  dualism.  There  is  no  way  of  saving  monism 
except  by  abandoning  materialism  and  energeticism  alike, 
rejecting  altogether  the  distinction  between  soul  and  body 
as  a  delusion  inherited  from  primitive  man,  and  deliber- 
ately reducing  reality  in  its  whole  extent  to  a  "content 
of  the  soul."  ™ 

In  view  of  the  fact,  however,  that  such  "  psychical  mon- 
ism" may  easily  lead  to  solipsism  and  scepticism,  others 
have  concerned  themselves  with  establishing  the  objective 
reality  of  the  phenomena  of  consciousness.    The  Marburg 


38  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

school,  represented  by  Cohen,  Natorp,  Cassirer,  and  their 
colleagues,  seeks  to  secure  this  end  by  finding  the  subject 
of  experience,  not  like  Protagoras,  in  the  consciousness  of 
the  individual  as  such,  but  in  this  as  rooted  in  and  sup- 
ported by  a  universal,  objective,  transcendental  conscious- 
ness, which,  although  incapable  of  individual  states  of 
experience,  yet  bears  in  itself  aprioristic  forms  and  so 
offers  to  our  representation  a  basis  and  a  norm.14 

Others,  however,  while  equally  intent  upon  maintaining 
the  objectivity  of  knowledge,  regard  such  a  "  transcenden- 
tal psychical  monism "  as  unwarranted  and  unnecessary. 
They  believe  an  "  epistemological  or  logical  monism  "  suf- 
ficient to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  case.  Especially 
Rickert,  but  also  Schuppe,  Leclair,  Rehmke,  Schubert- 
Soldern  and  their  supporters,  are  convinced  indeed  that  in 
order  to  escape  from  solipsism  a  universal  consciousness 
must  needs  be  assumed.  But  they  do  not  understand  by 
this  a  concrete,  objective,  real  consciousness,  carrying  the 
individual  consciousness  in  itself,  like  a  sort  of  deity, 
something  as  Malebranche  said  that  man  sees  all  things  in 
God.  Their  view  rather  is  that  a  nameless,  general,  im- 
personal consciousness  suffices,  a  consciousness  which 
forms  the  abstract,  logical  presupposition  of  all  human 
consciousness,  but  can  never  itself  become  the  content  of 
conscious  experience,  which  therefore  as  a  matter  of  fact 
amounts  to  the  presence  in  the  world  of  a  universal 
potency  attaining  to  consciousness  in  man.15 

The  unprejudiced  mind,  passing  in  review  these  several 
attempts  to  save  monism,  can  scarcely  fail  to  reach  the 
conclusion  that  the  history  of  this  monistic  movement 
provides  to  a  remarkable  degree  its  sufficient  criticism. 
Its  development  is  a  rapid  process  of  dissolution.  The 
very  name  with  which  the  philosophy  of  the  preceding 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  39 

century  loves  to  describe  itself  is  open  to  objection.  It 
is  difficult  to  find  in  the  history  of  science  another  such 
instance  of  the  wanton  abuse  of  a  word.  It  is  of  com- 
paratively recent  origin,  and  came  into  vogue  especially 
as  an  attractive  designation  of  pantheism,  which  in  its 
turn,  if  we  may  believe  Schopenhauer,  is  but  another 
name  for  atheism,  although  it  takes  leave  of  God  after  a 
somewhat  more  polite  fashion.  But  while  the  name 
"  pantheism  "  still  bears  some  definite  meaning,  the  term 
"  monism  "  is  so  vague  and  meaningless  as  to  make  it  im- 
possible to  attach  to  it  any  clear  conception.  All  possible 
or  impossible  systems  may  be  so  designated.  We  hear  of 
a  materialistic,  pantheistic,  parallelistic,  energetic,  psychic, 
epistemological,  logical,  and  still  further  of  an  empirical, 
a  critical,  an  idealistic,  a  naturalistic,  a  metaphysical,  a 
concrete,  an  immanent,  a  positive,  and  of  several  other 
kinds  of  monism.16 

The  name  is  particularly  affected  by  the  pantheistic 
materialism  of  Haeckel,  who  wishes  by  its  use  to  brand 
every  system  differing  from  his  own  as  dualism,  and  so  to 
bar  it  out  as  unscientific.  By  his  own  "  pure  monism  "  he 
understands  that  there  exists  but  a  single  substance  which 
is  at  one  and  the  same  time  God  and  world,  spirit  and 
body,  matter  and  force.  And  in  his  opinion  this  monism 
is  the  world-view  to  which  modern  natural  science  stands 
committed.  He  agrees  with  Schopenhauer  in  declaring  it 
equivalent  to  atheism,  at  least  if  God  is  to  be  conceived 
as  a  personal  being.  In  the  name  of  this  monism  he  con- 
demns as  unscientific  all  who  recognize  in  nature,  in  the 
soul,  in  consciousness,  in  the  freedom  of  the  will,  I  do  not 
say  a  supernatural  factor,  but  even  any  force  different  from 
and  higher  than  that  at  work  in  the  mechanism  of  natural 
science.    That  men  of  high  standing,  like  Kant,  von  Baer, 


40  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Dubois-Reymond,  Virchow,  have  kept  aloof  from  this 
mechanical  monism,  is  due,  declares  the  President  of  the 
German  Monistic  Alliance,  to  inconsistency  in  thought  or 
some  decay  of  mental  powers. 

Such  an  act  of  scientific  excommunication  in  itself 
betrays  an  arrogance  little  calculated  to  commend  a 
theory.  No  one  who  has  proofs  to  rely  on  need  resort  to 
"  energetic  language  "  like  this.  In  the  realm  of  science 
there  is  no  pope  to  proclaim  dogmas,  no  emperor  to  pro- 
mulgate laws.  All  investigations  here  stand  on  equal 
ground,  and  truth  alone  is  lord.  But  least  of  all  is  such  a 
lofty  tone  in  place  when  one's  own  system  utterly  fails 
to  meet  the  scientific  requirements  laid  down.  Haeckel 
himself  oscillates  between  materialism  and  pantheism, 
conceives  of  his  substance  as  both  God  and  world, 
ascribes  to  his  atoms  a  principle  of  life  and  consciousness, 
and  appears  to  be  naively  unconscious  of  the  involved 
antinomies.  And  the  same  is  true  of  all  systems  which 
offer  themselves  under  this  name  of  "  monism."  The  name 
is  a  mere  disguise  under  which  are  concealed  the  distinc- 
tions between  God  and  world,  mind  and  matter,  thought 
and  extension,  being  and  becoming,  physical  and  psychical 
energy,  as  with  Ostwald,  or  consciousness  and  the  content 
of  consciousness,  as  with  Verworn. 

But  even  more  serious  is  the  objection  that  no  one  can 
tell  us  what  this  straining  after  monism  in  science  and 
philosophy  exactly  means.  Does  it  mean  that  there  shall 
be  recognized  in  the  last  analysis  only  one  single  and 
simple  substance  or  force  or  law  ?  But  to  lay  down  such 
an  axiom  apriori  amounts  to  a  palpable  petitio  principii, 
and  applies  to  the  world  perchance  a  standard  by  which  it 
neither  can  nor  will  be  measured.  The  universe  is  doubt- 
less much  richer  and  more  complex  than  we  are  able  to 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  41 

imagine.  Reinke  very  properly  says  :  "  I  regard  monism 
as  an  abortive  attempt  to  understand  the  world.  .  .  . 
The  desire  for  unity,  natural  though  it  be,  should  never 
be  given  decisive  weight  in  determining  our  world- view. 
The  supreme  question  is  not  what  would  please  us,  but 
what  is  true."  17  No  doubt  science  properly  strives  to 
reduce  the  phenomena  as  much  as  possible  to  simple 
principles  and  to  subsume  them  under  general  laws.  And 
in  accordance  with  this  our  thoughts  refuse  to  rest  in  a 
sort  of  eternal  Manichaeism,  which  assumes  two  powers 
antithetically  related  to  each  other.  But  Sir  Oliver  Lodge 
truly  observes  that  in  this  sense  the  striving  after  monism 
is  proper  to  all  science :  "  the  only  question  at  issue  is, 
what  sort  of  monism  are  you  aiming  at  ?  "  18  When  the 
use  of  this  name  is  intended  to  imply  that  all  multi- 
formity in  the  world  must  be  merely  the  manifestation  of 
one  substance,  we  must  reject  the  demand  as  unwarranted, 
as  the  offspring  of  an  aprioristic  philosophical  system,  and 
as  directly  opposed  to  the  results  of  all  unprejudiced 
investigation  of  the  phenomena. 

The  demand  in  question  appears  even  more  unjustified 
when  we  consider  how  the  monists  attain  the  desired 
unity.  The  actual  world  presents  to  us  an  infinite 
variety  of  things  and  phenomena,  and  by  no  empirical 
research  do  we  discover  that  unity  of  matter  and  force 
out  of  which  monism  seeks  to  explain  the  world.  If  such 
a  unity  be  assumed,  it  can  be  reached  only  by  way  of 
abstraction.  Greek  philosophy  was  the  first  to  conceive 
the  idea  of  a  principle  of  things,  wherein  it  found  both  the 
temporal  beginning  and  the  efficient  cause  of  all  phe- 
nomena. Such  a  principle  always  necessarily  bears  this 
characteristic,  —  that  all  the  peculiarities  which  actuality 
presents  to  our  view  have  been  eliminated,  and  nothing  is 


42  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

left  except  the  notion  of  universal,  abstract  being,  which 
is  not  capable  of  any  further  definition.  Even  if  we 
suppose  that  thought  can  without  logical  fallacy  reason 
from  the  full  actuality  to  such  an  aireipov,  this  would 
by  no  means  prove  that  the  world  really  had  sprung 
from  and  been  formed  out  of  this  apyr).  Pantheistic 
philosophy,  to  be  sure,  proceeds  on  this  assumption,  identi- 
fying as  it  does  thought  and  being.  But  this  is  to  forget 
that  logical  analysis  is  something  totally  different  from 
real  decomposition  or  regression.  In  geometry  points  are 
conceived  as  occupying  no  space,  but  it  does  not  follow 
that  such  points  can  exist  anywhere  objectively  in  the 
real  world.  Real  space  and  real  time  are  always  finite, 
but  this  does  not  prevent  the  attribution  to  them  in 
thought  of  infinite  extension  and  duration.  Similarly  the 
conception  of  ultimate  being  reached  by  abstraction  is  a 
mere  product  of  thought,  upon  which  nothing  can  be 
posited  in  the  real  world ;  nothing  can  come  out  of  it 
because  it  is  itself  nothing. 

#*  The  proof  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  relation  be- 
tween the  absolute  and  the  world  is  described  by  panthe- 
ism only  by  the  aid  of  varying  images  and  similes.  It 
speaks  of  natura  naturans  and  natura  naturata,  of  sub- 
stantia and  modi,  of  the  idea  and  its  objectivation,  of 
reality  and  appearance,  of  the  whole  and  its  parts,  of  the 
species  and  the  individuals,  of  the  ocean  and  the  waves. 
But  it  utterly  fails  to  form  a  distinct  idea  or  clear  con- 
ception of  this  relation.  Closely  looked  at,  the  relation 
assumed  appears  in  each  case  to  be  either  that  of  emana- 
tion or  that  of  evolution.  In  former  times,  when  thought 
was  more  accustomed  to  the  category  of  substantiality, 
the  former  was  in  vogue.  The  absolute  was  represented 
as  a  fulness  of  being  out  of  which  the  world  flowed  as 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  43 

water  from  a  fountain.  After  criticism  had  attacked  this 
conception  of  substance,  thinking  reverted  to  the  category 
of  actuality,  and,  under  the  influence  of  Hegel,  substance 
was  changed  into  a  subject,  being  into  an  absolute  becom- 
ing, and  thus  the  idea  of  evolution  was  made  supreme. 

The  term  "  evolution,"  in  point  of  fact,  has  become  a 
magic  formula.  Says  L.  Reinhardt:  "The  idea  of  evo- 
lution was  like  the  kindling  of  a  torch  which  suddenly 
cast  a  brilliant  light  upon  the  mysterious  processes  of 
nature,  the  dark  recesses  of  creation,  and  gave  us  the 
simple,  nay,  the  only  possible  explanation  of  them ;  evo- 
lution is  the  magic  formula  through  which  we  learn  the 
secret  of  the  apparently  insoluble  riddle  of  the  origin  and 
development  of  the  infinite  variety  of  terrestrial  crea- 
tures." 19  To  all  questions  concerning  the  origin  and  the 
essence  of  things,  of  heaven  and  of  earth,  of  minerals  and 
of  plants,  of  animals  and  of  men,  of  marriage  and  of 
family,  of  the  state  and  of  society,  of  religion  and  of 
ethics,  the  same  answer  is  invariably  given :  evolution  is 
the  key  to  the  origin  and  existence  of  all  things. 

It  is  a  pity  that  a  conception  which  is  to  explain  every- 
thing should  itself  so  much  need  explaining.20  The  defi- 
nitions that  are  given  of  it  vary  immensely.  A  widely 
different  sense  attaches  to  it  in  Heraclitus  and  Aristotle, 
in  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz,  in  Goethe  and  Schelling,  in 
Hegel  and  von  Hartmann,  in  Darwin  and  Spencer,  in 
Huxley  and  Tylor,  in  Haeckel  and  Wundt.  And  no 
single  definition  covers  all  the  phenomena  that  are  sub- 
sumed under  the  conception.  In  the  several  realms  of 
nature,  and  in  the  various  stages  of  historical  process,  the 
element  of  becoming  that  is  met  everywhere  bears  widely 
different  characters.  The  transformation  observed  in  the 
inorganic  world  is  of  a  different  kind  from  that  seen  in 


44  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

living  beings.  And  among  the  latter,  again,  consciousness 
and  will,  science  and  art,  the  family  and  society,  the  indi- 
vidual and  the  body  collective,  have  each  its  own  nature 
and  its  own  law.  There  is  unity,  no  doubt,  but  this 
unity  does  not  justify  our  dissolving  the  variety  into  a 
mere  semblance.  There  is  no  formula  which  will  fit  the 
universe  with  all  its  wealth  of  matter  and  force  and  life. 
"  Do  not  think  it  likely,"  says  Lodge,  repeating  with 
slight  modification  a  saying  of  Ruskin,  —  "  do  not  think 
it  likely  that  you  hold  in  your  hand  a  treatise  in  which 
the  ultimate  and  final  verity  of  the  universe  is  at  length 
beautifully  proclaimed  and  in  which  pure  truth  has  been 
sifted  from  the  error  of  the  preceding  ages.  Do  not  think 
it,  friend ;  it  is  not  so." 21 

The  most  striking  proof  of  the  pertinence  of  this  criti- 
cism of  monism  has  been  furnished  in  a  practical  way  by 
the  rise  of  that  new  form  of  philosophical  thought  which 
introduces  itself  as  pragmatism  (activism,  humanism), 
and  already  numbers  conspicuous  adherents  in  various 
lands.  Though  it  has  taken  many  by  surprise,  its  appear- 
ance is  easily  explicable.  When  naturalism  passes  over 
from  pure  materialism  to  pantheism,  this  is  tantamount 
to  the  return  of  philosophy  to  the  ideas  of  life,  mind,  and 
soul.  If,  having  recovered  these,  philosophy  be  unwilling 
to  refer  them  to  their  origin  in  a  personal  God,  it  can  find 
no  foothold  except  in  man.  Hence,  taking  pragmatism 
as  a  general  type  of  philosophical  thought  (as  James  him- 
self describes  rationalism  and  empiricism M)  apart  from 
all  individual  modifications,  as  these  appear  in  James  or 
Schiller,  Pierce  or  Panini,  Hoffding  or  Eucken,  we  find 
in  it  a  reaction  of  the  ego  from  monism  in  its  several 
forms,  a  self-assertion  of  the  science  of  mind  against  the 
science  of  nature,  of  the  one  against  the  many,  of  man 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  45 

against  the  world.  Very  properly  James  calls  pragma- 
tism "  a  new  name  for  some  old  ways  of  thinking." 
Wherever  monism  makes  of  the  absolute  a  Saturn  de- 
vouring his  own  children,  wherever  the  substance  is  per- 
mitted to  resolve  the  modi,  the  natura  naturans  the  natura 
naturata,  being  the  becoming,  reality  the  appearance,  into 
a  mere  semblance,  there  humanity,  personality  with  its 
consciousness  and  will,  with  its  sense  of  religious  and 
ethical  values,  with  its  scientific  and  aesthetic  ideals  will 
never  fail  to  enter  an  emphatic  protest. 

Thus  Socrates  brought  philosophy  back  from  heaven 
to  earth.  Thus  in  the  Renascence  and  the  Reformation 
the  human  mind  shook  off  the  shackles  of  scholasticism. 
Thus  over  against  the  dogmatism  of  the  rationalists  the 
philosopher  of  Kbnigsberg  asserted  the  autonomy  of  human 
knowledge  and  action.  And  when  in  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury monism  had  waxed  powerful,  and  had  found  in  social- 
ism an  ally  in  the  sphere  of  civil  and  practical  life,  the 
birthhour  of  a  new  sense  of  personality  could  no  longer 
be  delayed.  Of  this  movement  Carlyle  was  the  first,  the 
mighty,  the  paradoxical  prophet.  During  the  years  1883 
and  1834  he  lifted  up  his  voice  against  the  intellectualism 
of  the  school  of  Bentham  and  Mill,  and  pleaded  the  cause 
of  faith,  of  personal  conviction,  of  the  experience  of  the 
soul.  All  of  his  ego  rose  in  him  and  set  over  against  the 
no  of  the  world  its  strong,  triumphant  yea.  I  am  greater 
than  thou,  O  nature ;  I  stand  above  thee,  for  I  know  and 
have  power ;  in  the  life  of  my  spirit,  in  my  religion  and 
ethics,  in  my  science  and  art,  I  furnish  proofs  of  my  im- 
perishable superiority.  And  this  cry,  born  from  distress 
of  soul,  found  an  echo  everywhere.  It  was  the  same 
impulse  that  led  a  Sc-'ren  Kierkegaard  to  revolt  against 
the  Christianity  and  Church  of  his  time ;  that  induced  a 


46  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Ritschl  to  break  as  a  church-historian  with  the  Tubin- 
gen school ;  that  made  a  Hoffding  range  "  values  "  above 
"  facts  " ;  that  determined  an  Eucken,  in  the  mental  life 
of  man,  to  choose  his  standpoint  above  the  empirical  re- 
ality ;  that  in  the  Netherlands  filled  the  poet  de  Ge'nestet 
with  horror  at  the  web  which  Scholten's  monism  threat- 
ened to  spin  around  him;  that  impelled  a  Tolstoi,  an 
Ibsen,  a  Nietzsche  to  hurl  their  anathemas  against  the 
corruption  of  society ;  that  caused  the  men  of  art  to  draw 
back  from  naturalism  to  symbolism  and  mysticism,  and 
everywhere  procured  for  the  principle  of  u  voluntarism  " 
an  open  door  and  a  sympathetic  reception.23 

While  formerly  the  attempt  was  made  to  explain  man 
from  nature,  thus  doing  violence  to  his  personality,  at 
present  it  is  proposed  to  pursue  the  opposite  method  and 
seek  in  man  the  solution  of  the  riddle  of  the  world. 
Heretofore  thinkers  have  looked  backward,  and  investi- 
gated the  past  in  order  to  discover  the  origin  of  man  and 
how  he  became  what  he  is  ;  now  the  effort  is  to  look  for- 
ward, to  inspire  man  to  work  for  his  future,  with  the 
watchword,  "  make  life,  the  life  thou  knowest,  as  valuable 
as  possible."  M  Hitherto  man  has  learned  to  know  him- 
self only  as  a  product  of  the  past :  let  him  now  learn  to 
regard  himself  as  "  creator  of  the  universe."  25  For  is  it 
not  evident  that  in  man  evolution  has  reached  its  culmi- 
nating point?  Having  after  endless  ages  of  strife  and 
labor,  after  innumerable  failures  and  disappointments  of 
every  sort,  produced  man,  evolution  now  continues  its 
task  in  and  through  man  exclusively,  with  his  co-opera- 
tion and  under  his  guidance.  Personality  is  the  most 
precious  product,  the  most  valuable  quintessence  of  the 
process  of  the  development  of  nature.  Goethe's  words, 
"  Hochstes  Gliick  der  Erdenkinder  ist  nur  die  Person- 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  47 

lichkeit,"  are  being  quoted  with  universal  delight  and 
approval. 

We  see,  therefore,  that  pragmatism  as  a  philosophical 
theory  stands  by  no  means  isolated,  but  is  connected  with 
a  mighty,  ever  recurrent  mental  movement.  None  the  less 
it  has  a  shade  and  color  of  its  own.  True,  at  first  sight 
it  seems  to  be  nothing  more  than  the  recommendation  of  a 
new  method  differing  from  that  usually  applied  in  philos- 
ophy ;  and  sometimes  it  introduces  itself  with  an  amiable 
modesty  befitting  this  humble  claim.  It  disclaims  every 
desire  to  advocate  any  dogma,  and  maintains  no  precon- 
ceived theories.  Discouraged  by  the  outcome  of  the  phil- 
osophical systems,  and  sceptical  as  to  the  fruitfulness  of 
philosophic  thinking,  it  turns,  we  are  told,  its  back  upon 
all  "  verbal  solutions,  apriori  reasons,  fixed  principles,  and 
closed  systems, "  and  applies  itself  to  "  concreteness  and 
adequacy,  to  facts,  to  action,  and  to  power."  Still  this  is 
nothing  more  than  the  old  demand  which  we  have  become 
accustomed  to  hear  from  varying  quarters,  that  science 
must  not  start  from  preconceived  opinions,  but  with  strict 
impartiality  build  on  the  simple  naked  facts.  Empiricism 
through  the  ages  has  harped  on  this,  and  positivism  has 
simply  played  again  the  same  tune  in  a  slightly  higher 
and  shriller  tone. 

In  making  this  demand  these  schools  of  thought  have 
acted  under  the  na'ive  impression  that  they  themselves 
stand  outside  of  the  pale  of  philosophy  and  are  absolutely 
free  from  all  preconceptions.  Pragmatism  also  cherishes 
this  conviction,  and,  through  the  mouth  of  Schiller,  com- 
pares itself  to  a  corridor  or  passage  in  a  hotel  through 
which  all  the  guests  from  the  different  rooms  must  pass  in 
order  to  reach  the  open  air.  This  is,  however,  nothing  but 
a  well-meant  delusion.     Empiricism  is  as  much  a  guest  in 


48  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  great  hotel  of  science,  and  as  truly  occupies  a  separate 
room,  as  all  other  inmates  of  the  building.  All  engaged  in 
the  pursuit  of  knowledge  recognize  that  thought  must  be 
based  on  experience,  and  that  no  other  foundation  can 
be  laid  on  which  to  build  science  than  that  of  the  facts  of 
nature  or  history.  The  scientific  investigator  does  not 
resemble  the  spider  or  the  ant,  but  the  bee ;  he  gathers  the 
honey  of  knowledge  from  the  flowers  of  experience.  In 
order  to  see  one  has  to  open  his  eyes ;  in  order  to  hear,  his 
ears.  Even  mediaeval  scholasticism,  which,  owing  to  vari- 
ous causes  held  the  writings  of  antiquity,  especially  of 
Aristotle,  in  excessive  reverence,  never  failed  to  recognize 
the  principle  that  "  omnis  cognitio  intellectualis  incipit  a 
sensu."  But  there  is  and  always  has  been  difference  of 
opinion  with  regard  to  the  influence  which  is  exercised  or 
which  should  be  exercised  by  the  personality  of  the  inves- 
tigator in  the  discovering,  observing,  arranging,  and  sys- 
tematizing of  the  facts.  No  difference  exists  as  regards 
the  formal  canon  that  science  must  proceed  on  the  basis 
of  the  facts.  Pragmatism,  in  exhorting  us  to  obey  this 
canon,  does  no  more  than  reiterate  a  well-known  and  well- 
nigh  universally  acknowledged  principle.  The  difference 
begins  when  the  question  what  are  the  facts  is  reached, 
how  they  are  to  be  found  and  observed,  to  be  classified  and 
elaborated. 

The  case  of  pragmatism  itself  furnishes  the  best  illus- 
tration of  this.  While  offering  itself  as  a  mere  method,  it 
soon  appears  to  be  a  theory  and  a  system.  It  brings  to  the 
investigation  of  things  a  preconceived  judgment  of  its  own, 
both  as  to  reality  and  as  to  truth. 

As  regards  reality,  pragmatism  not  only  declares  the 
philosophy  of  materialism  and  pantheism  aprioristic  and 
dogmatic,  but  passes  the  same  judgment  on  all  philosophy 


REVELATION  AND  PHILOSOPHY  49 

which  would  recognize  the  reality  of  ideas  and  would  count 
ideas  among  the  facts  to  which  consciousness  bears  wit- 
ness. Appealing  to  the  well-known  words  of  Goethe,  "  In 
the  beginning  was  not  the  word  but  the  deed,"  it  rejects 
all  realism  in  the  mediaeval  sense  of  this  term,  to  take  its 
stand  consciously  and  unequivocally  on  the  side  of  nomi- 
nalism. All  generic  conceptions,  such  as  God,  the  abso- 
lute, the  world,  the  soul,  matter,  force,  time,  space,  truth, 
substance,  causation,  language,  religion,  morality,  and  the 
like  are  considered,  therefore,  not  designations  of  objective 
realities,  but  terms  by  means  of  which  we  put  together  for 
the  sake  of  convenience  certain  groups  of  phenomena, 
mere  "helps  to  thought,"  which  have  to  prove  their  ser- 
viceableness  and  value  in  the  using ;  by  no  means  invested 
capital,  but  current  coin,  subject  to  fluctuation.  To  the 
pragmatist  the  world  is  in  itself  no  unity,  no  organism,  no 
kosmos,  but  an  avowed  multiplicity  of  phenomena,  an  infi- 
nite mass  of  facts,  a  i/X??,  a  chaos. 

Pragmatism  adduces  in  favor  of  this  nominalistic  world- 
view  the  consideration  already  urged  by  Aristotle  against 
Plato's  doctrine  of  ideas,  namely,  that  otherwise  the  world 
exists  in  duplicate,  or  even  in  triplicate.  For,  as  James  ob- 
serves, to  the  rationalist  the  world  exists  either  from  the 
outset  complete  in  the  idea,  or,  at  any  rate,  finished  and 
ready  in  its  objective  reality  exterior  to  us,  in  which  case 
it  once  more  appears  in  the  form  of  a  more  or  less  imper- 
fect copy  in  our  minds.  To  the  pragmatist,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  unity  of  the  world  is  not  a  given  fact,  but  a 
growing  thing,  ever  in  process  of  becoming  and  improve- 
ment. In  itself  the  world  is  essentially  unformed  matter, 
v\t),  but  "  it  is  still  in  the  making,  and  awaits  part  of  its 
completion  from  the  future."  Or,  better  still,  the  world 
becomes  what  we  cause  it  to  be  ;  "  it  is  plastic,  it  is  what 

4 


50  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

we  make  it."  For  this  reason  it  is  a  matter  of  comparative 
indifference  how  we  conceive  that  it  in  the  past  became 
what  it  now  is,  whether  we  explain  it  materialistically  or 
theistically.  For,  after  all,  the  world  is  that  which  it  is. 
And  the  main  question  is  not,  What  has  it  been?  but 
What  is  it  becoming?  What  are  we  doing  with  it  and 
making  of  it  ?  26 

From  this  peculiar  outlook  upon  reality  pragmatism 
reaps  the  advantage  of  being  able  to  accord  unstinted  and 
honest  recognition  to  many  facts  which  rationalism  has  to 
ignore  or  explain  away.  The  world  is  a  chaos,  full  of  pa- 
thetic facts  of  sin  and  misery  and  sorrow,  facts  which  the 
philosophy  of  the  absolute  seeks  in  vain  to  justify  or  to 
reconcile  with  the  harmony  of  the  universe.  It  also  gives 
due  consideration  to  a  great  number  of  the  most  diversified 
phenomena  and  experiences  of  religious  and  moral  life, 
and,  without  in  connection  with  these  raising  the  question 
of  truth  and  right,  seeks  to  respect  and  appreciate  them 
from  a  psychological  and  sociological  point  of  view.  Since 
it  does  not  take  its  start  from  any  idea  of  the  absolute,  not 
even  of  absolute  goodness  or  justice  or  ominipotence,  it 
does  not  feel  called  upon  to  furnish  a  theodicy.  It  does 
not  sacrifice  reality  to  any  theological  or  philosophical  the- 
ory nor  force  it  into  the  procrustean  bed  of  any  apriori 
system.  The  world  is  a  miserable  world  and  in  itself 
cannot  be  anything  else. 

But  while  judging  thus  pessimistically  of  the  past  and 
the  present,  pragmatism  cherishes  quite  optimistic  expec- 
tations with  regard  to  the  future.  And  in  connection 
with  this  it  holds  a  peculiar  conception  of  truth.  Behind 
and  around  about  us,  no  doubt,  gloom  and  darkness  reign, 
but  ahead  of  us  the  dawn  is  breaking.  For  evolution  has 
now  so  far  advanced  as  to  produce  man,  and  has  com- 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  51 

mitted  to  him  the  further  improvement  of  the  world.  On 
man  it  depends  what  the  world  is  to  become.  True,  this 
renders  the  future  more  or  less  uncertain;  the  world  is 
not  saved,  necessarily,  by  its  own  inherent  powers  ;  if  to 
be  saved,  it  must  be  saved  by  man.  Still  this  salvation  is 
possible,  and  in  part  even  probable.  Pragmatism  is  not 
wholly  pessimistic  nor  wholly  optimistic ;  its  frame  of 
mind  might  be  described  as  melioristic.  Although  the 
world  be  wretched  in  itself,  the  power  and  the  duty  of 
saving  it  belong  to  us. 

Man  possesses  such  power  because  through  a  long 
series  of  ages  he  has  come  to  be  a  knowing,  and  especially 
a  willing  and  acting,  being;  his  intellect  and  his  will 
constitute  him,  in  the  midst  of  the  sad,  ugly  reality,  "  a 
creative  power."  He  has  raised  himself  gradually  to  this 
plane.  He  was  not  endowed  with  such  intellect  and  will 
at  the  start;  he  has  slowly  acquired  them.  Nor  is  he  by 
nature  endowed  with  a  so-called  "  common  sense,"  with 
innate  knowledge  of  apriori  forms,  as  even  Kant  from 
his  rationalistic  standpoint  still  imagined.  The  intellect 
itself,  with  all  its  content  of  conceptions,  categories,  laws  of 
thought,  etc.,  has  been  evolved  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence, because  it  proved  practically  useful  and  valuable 
for  life.  And  this  consequently  is  the  only  criterion  of 
truth. 

Truth  does  not  exist  before  or  outside  or  independent 
of  man.  It  has  no  more  objective  existence  than  the 
unity,  the  goodness,  or  the  happiness  of  the  world.  It  is 
nowhere  to  be  found  in  its  completeness,  as  though  man 
could  receive  it  after  a  purely  passive  fashion  into  his 
consciousness.  Nor  does  its  criterion  lie  in  the  agree- 
ment of  our  representations  with  the  external  reality,  for 
it  exists  only  in  and  not  outside  of  man.     It  is  not,  but 


52  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

becomes ;  as  the  world  in  general,  so  truth  is  "  in  the 
making."  Truth  is  that  which  in  the  experience  of  the 
life  of  knowledge  and  volition  approves  itself  as  useful. 
Its  changeableness  and  relativity  are  necessarily  given 
with  this.  There  is  no  single  truth  that  is  settled 
absolutely,  above  all  possibility  of  doubt ;  all  truth 
remains  subject  to  revision.  Every  truth  is  to  be 
measured  by  its  value  for  life,  and  for  this  reason  may 
change  any  day.  Science  itself  gives  no  knowledge  of  the 
objective  reality.  All  it  can  do  is  to  provide  us  with 
instruments  for  using  the  reality.  It  furnishes  no 
absolute,  but  only  relative,  practical  truth.  It  teaches 
no  necessary,  but  only  contingent,  laws.  That  system  is 
most  true  which  is  most  useful.  Truth,  religion,  morality, 
civilization  in  its  whole  extent,  are  all  subject  and  sub- 
servient to  life.  The  reality  may  be  hard  and  chaotic ; 
it  is  for  us  to  make  it  true  and  good.27 


Ill 

REVELATION  AND   PHILOSOPHY  —  continued 

TO  pragmatism  belongs  the  great  merit  of  having 
freed  us  from  the  bane  of  monism  and  of  having 
exposed  the  barrenness  of  its  abstract  conceptions.  It 
deserves  appreciation  and  praise  so  far  as  it  turns  its  back 
upon  "  fixed  habits,  pure  abstractions,  and  verbal  solutions," 
calls  us  back  to  the  facts,  and  places  emphasis  afresh  on 
the  practical  element  in  all  knowledge  and  science. 

But  if  it  may  be  justly  demanded  of  every  world-view 
that  it  shall  satisfy  both  the  requirements  of  the  intellect 
and  the  needs  of  the  heart,  it  will  be  seen  that  pragmatism 
also  is  unsatisfactory.  It  is  itself  not  pragmatic  enough.  * 
While  professing  to  have  no  dogmas,  and  rejecting  alike  the 
philosophy  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  of  Spinoza  and  Hegel, 
of  Bradley  and  Taylor,  in  point  of  fact  it  aligns  itself 
with  the  humanism  of  Socrates,  links  its  thinking  to 
that  of  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume,  and  Kant,  and  simply 
replaces  the  philosophy  of  rationalism  by  that  of  empiri- 
cism. When  it  not  only  throws  overboard  the  abstract 
conception  of  the  absolute  and  its  self-realization  in 
the  world-process,  but  also  refuses  to  acknowledge  as 
realities  "  upon  which  it  can  rest "  God  and  his  attri- 
butes, mind  and  matter,  reason  and  conscience,  and  finds 
in  all  these  names  merely  "  a  programme  for  more  work, 
only  with  a  practical  value";  when  it  discards  the  idea 
of  substance  and  resolves  the  thing  into  its  properties; 
when  it  regards  religion  and  philosophy  as  "largely  a 


54  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

matter  of  temperament,  even  of  physical  condition,"  and 
places  the  criterion  of  all  truth  in  "  satisfactoriness " 
alone ;  pragmatism  proves  that  it  is  far  from  merely  a 
new  method,  but  is  to  all  intents  a  new  philosophy,  and 
comes  therewith  into  conflict  with  its  own  point  of  de- ' 
parture  and  its  own  fundamental  principle.  No  wonder 
James  declares  that  it  cannot  be  refuted  by  pointing  out 
in  it  a  few  contradictions,  but  that  the  only  way  to  learn 
to  understand  and  accept  it  is  by  becoming  thoroughly 
"inductive-minded  "  one's  self  through  "  a  real  change  of 
heart,"  "a  break  with  absolutistic  hopes."1  Here  we 
touch  the  real  core  of  pragmatism :  it  has  abandoned  all 
hope  of  knowing  anything  that  bears  any  absolute  char- 
acter,—  not  only  God,  but  all  ideas  and  names.  It  is 
born  from  a  sceptical  frame  of  mind,  and  for  this  reason 
as  a  last  resort  clings  to  what  it  considers  ultimate, 
incontrovertible  facts. 

It  follows  from  this  that  pragmatism  is  not  correctly 
defined  by  saying  that  it  "  represents  the  empiricist  atti- 
tude. "  Almost  every  school  in  science  and  philosophy 
professes  in  the  last  analysis  to  set  out  from  facts.  Prag- 
matism carries  with  it  a  peculiar  conception  of  the  facts, 
a  peculiar  judgment  as  to  reality.  Between  rationalism 
and  empiricism,  intellectualism  and  voluntarism,  there  is 
a  difference  not  merely  in  regard  to  "the  value  of  facts," 
but  in  regard  to  the  facts  themselves.  Pragmatism  takes 
a  different  view  of  things  ;  its  idea  of  the  world  is  different 
from  that  of  the  idealistic  philosophy.  According  to  the 
latter  the  world  is  the  embodiment  of  thought,  rests  in 
mind  and  is  governed  by  reason.  In  presenting  this  view 
idealistic  philosophy  is  not  merely  toying  with  abstract 
conceptions  or  idle  ratiocinations,  but  takes  its  start  from 
reality,  —  reality,  to  be  sure,  as  seen  by  it.     Even  Hegel, 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  55 

who  certainly  of  all  philosophers  has  most  sinned  by 
apriori  constructions,  had  far  more  knowledge  of  the  facts 
of  nature  and  history  than  his  opponents  have  given  him 
credit  for.  But,  if  we  may  believe  the  pragmatists,  the 
history  of  philosophy  has  been  a  long  process  of  shelving 
all  absolute  metaphysical  conceptions :  first,  the  second- 
ary properties ;  next,  substance  and  causality,  matter  and 
force,  law  and  norm,  truth  and  language.  There  are  no 
apriori  ideas  or  principles  that  govern  the  world.  The 
world  in  itself  is  a  chaos,  a  rudis  indigestaque  moles, 
which  only  through  the  knowledge  and  activity  of  man 
has  been  gradually  transformed  into  a  cosmos.  True, 
pragmatism  does  not  always  consistently  adhere  to  this 
bold  assertion.  James  says  in  one  place  that  space  and 
time,  number  and  order,  consciousness  and  causality,  are 
categories  which  are  difficult  to  be  rid  of.2  But,  judg- 
ing from  its  principle  and  tendency,  pragmatism  is  op- 
posed to  all  general  conceptions,  in  which  it  recognizes 
not  fixed,  apriori  categories,  but  only  abstract  names  for 
the  results  of  human  thinking.3 

Against  such  pragmatism  the  objection  must  be  urged, 
not  that  it  strives  to  be  empirical,  but  that  it  is  not  nearly 
sufficiently  so ;  inasmuch  as  it  excludes  from  its  horizon 
the  most  important  and  principal  facts.  Reality,  the 
whole,  rich  reality  is  something  different  from  what  this 
new  type  of  philosophy  sets  before  us ;  it  contains  more 
elements,  more  "facts,"  than  pragmatism  takes  into  ac- 
count. The  only  possible  way  of  demonstrating  this  is 
by  briefly  inquiring  how  we  approach  reality  and  in  what 
way  we  discover  its  content.  From  this  it  will  appear 
that  neither  materialism  nor  humanism,  but  only  theism, 
that  neither  emanation  nor  evolution,  but  revelation  alone, 
is  capable  of  solving  the  problem. 


56  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

The  only  path  by  which  we  are  able  to  attain  reality  is 
that  of  self-consciousness.  The  truth  of  idealism  lies  in 
this,  that  the  mind  of  man,  in  other  words,  sensation  and 
representation,  is  the  basis  and  principle  of  all  knowl- 
edge. If  there  be  an  objective  reality,  a  world  of  matter 
and  force,  existing  in  the  forms  of  space  and  time,  then  it 
follows  from  the  nature  of  the  case  that  the  knowledge 
of  it  can  reach  me  through  my  consciousness  only.  In 
this  sense  it  is  quite  proper  to  affirm  that  the  object  ex- 
ists for  the  subject  alone,  and  that  the  world  is  our  rep- 
resentation. Apart  from  consciousness  I  know  nothing, 
whether  of  myself  or  of  any  other  province  of  reality.  In 
the  defence  of  this  truth  idealism  holds  strong  ground  over 
against  that  naive  naturalism  which  thinks  it  possesses  in 
atoms  and  sether,  in  matter  and  energy,  a  directly  given 
reality,  and  which  loses  sight  of  the  influence  exerted  by 
the  subject  in  every  perception  of  an  object. 

But  idealism  is  wrong  when  from  this  incontrovertible 
fact,  that  reality  can  be  approached  only  through  the 
medium  of  consciousness,  it  draws  the  conclusion  that 
perception  is  a  purely  immanent  act,  and  that  therefore 
the  object  perceived  must  itself  be  immanent  in  the  mind. 
It  is  quite  true  that  nobody  can  see  himself  pass  before 
the  window,  or  can  lift  himself  by  his  own  hair ;  in  other 
words,  that  no  one  can  know  reality  except  through  his 
consciousness,  since  it  is  obviously  impossible  to  know 
without  knowing.  Perception  on  the  part  of  the  sub- 
ject renders  a  double  service ;  it  is  at  once  the  condition 
and  the  instrument  of  the  perception  of  the  object.  None 
the  less  there  is  a  great  difference  between  the  view  that 
subjective  perception  is  the  means  and  organ,  and  the 
other  view  that  it  is  the  principle  and  source  of  the 
knowledge  of  the  object.     The  mistake  of  idealism  lies 


KEVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  57 

in  confounding  the  act  with  its  content,  the  function 
with  the  object,  the  psychological  with  the  logical  nature 
of  perception.  Perception  is  an  act  of  the  subject,  and 
sensation  and  representation,  as  truly  as  concepts  and 
conclusions,  have  a  purely  ideal,  immanent  existence. 
But  perception  as  such  terminates  upon  an  object,  and 
sensation  and  representation,  logically  considered,  by 
their  very  nature  are  related  to  a  reality  distinct  from 
themselves.  Hence  psychology  and  logic  differ  in  char- 
acter. It  is  one  thing  to  consider  the  representations  as 
the}T  lie  in  consciousness  and  another  thing  in  and  through 
them  to  apprehend  the  reality.  To  ignore  this  difference 
means  to  remain  entangled  in  a  sort  of  psychologism,  im- 
prisoned in  one's  self  and  doomed  never  to  reach  reality. 

This  is  seen  most  clearly  from  the  efforts  which,  in 
spite  of  its  fundamental  error,  idealism  has  ever  been 
making  to  escape  from  the  logic  of  illusionism  and  to 
maintain  the  objectivity  of  knowledge.  Two  methods 
chiefly  have  been  adopted  for  this  purpose. 

The  one  method  is  that  of  those  who  on  the  principle  of 
causality  reason  back  from  the  representation  as  an  effect 
to  an  objective  reality  as  its  cause.  The  other  method  is 
pursued  by  those  who  admit  that  we  cannot  infer  reality 
from  the  representation,  but  nevertheless  think  that  by 
way  of  the  will  the  desired  goal  can  be  attained.  They 
reason  that  man  is  not  exclusively  nor  primarily  con- 
sciousness and  representation,  but  force,  impulse,  and 
will;  he  is  himself  a  substance,  a  reality;  his  essence 
consists  not  in  the  cogitare  but  in  the  movere.  Not 
by  his  thought,  but  by  his  willing,  which  continually 
meets  resistance  and  finds  its  freedom  opposed,  man  is 
led  to  assume  behind  his  representation  a  corresponding 
reality. 


58       PHILOSOPHY  OF  REVELATION 

Against  this  whole  manner  of  reasoning  the  objection 
must  be  urged  at  the  outset,  that  it  does  not  appear  with 
what  right  idealism  believes  in  the  law  of  causality  and 
makes  use  of  it  in  bridging  over  the  gulf  between  thought 
and  being.  But,  even  neglecting  this  objection,  we  find 
that  neither  of  the  two  methods  leads  to  the  goal  contem- 
plated. For  previously  to  all  reasoning  about  representa- 
tion and  will,  all  men,  the  unlearned  as  well  as  the  learned, 
and  even  children  and  indeed  animals,  are  convinced  of  the 
reality  of  an  objective  world.  Not  even  the  thinker,  who  by 
scientific  reflection  has  reached  the  position  of  idealism,  can 
divest  himself  of  his  belief  in  this  reality.  Eduard  von 
Hartmann  even  declares  that  without  this  belief  it  is  im- 
possible for  man  to  live.  "  Without  this  faith  in  the  reality 
and  continuity  of  what  we  perceive,"  says  he,  "  we  should 
be  unable  to  live  for  a  moment,  and  hence  this  naively- 
realistic  faith,  coalescing  with  the  perception  itself,  by  way 
of  intuition,  into  an  indivisible  act,  forms  an  indispensa- 
ble, practically  inalienable  ingredient  of  our  mental  equip- 
ment. "  4  As  though  idealism  had  become  frightened  by  its 
own  practical  consequences,  Paulsen  and  Verworn  hasten 
to  assure  us,  that,  whether  one's  philosophy  be  idealism  or 
realism,  everything  in  life  remains  the  same,  and  science 
retains  its  truth  and  value.5  But,  in  addition  to  this,  the 
facts  directly  contradict  the  assumption  that  reality  is 
reached  only  through  a  process  of  reasoning  from  represen- 
tation or  will.  It  is  by  no  means  in  every  case  that  we 
posit  reality  behind  our  representations.  Difficult  as  it 
may  be  to  point  out  the  difference  theoretically,  practically 
we  all  draw  a  distinction  between  the  waking  and  dream- 
ing states,  between  the  representation  of  reality  and  hallu- 
cination. And  in  the  same  manner  we  ascribe  reality  to 
many  things  with  which  our  will  has  no  concern  whatever, 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  59 

and  from  which  it  experiences  no  resistance  whatever. 

The  sun  and  the  moon  and  the  stars  possess  no  less  reality 

for  us  than  the  stone  against  which  we  strike  our  foot  or 

the  wall  which  shuts  off  our  view. 

v 
Now,  since  we  are  not  in  the  least  conscious  of  any  such 

process  of  reasoning  or  inference,  some  have  thought  that 
these  activities  take  place  in  the  subconscious  region  of  our 
mind.6  This,  however,  entirely  fails  to  make  the  matter 
more  plausible.  For  either  an  unconscious  inference  of 
this  kind  must  be  the  precipitate  of  long  years  and  ages  of 
experience,  in  which  case  it  would  presuppose  the  very 
thing  to  be  established  by  it ;  or  the  human  mind  must  by 
its  very  nature  be  under  the  necessity  of  connecting  its 
representations  with  reality,  in  which  case  the  procedure 
can  neither  be  unconscious  nor  consist  of  an  act  of  syllo- 
gistic reasoning ;  or,  as  von  Hartmann  actually  represents 
it,  it  is  something  accomplished  in  us  by  the  great  Uncon- 
scious, in  which  case  it  is  no  conclusion  of  ours,  and  all 
self-activity  of  man  in  thinking  and  acting  disappears. 
When  idealism  has  begun  by  severing  the  representation 
in  its  origin  and  essence  from  reality,  it  has  lost  the  power 
to  reinstitute  the  inward  connection  between  them.  The 
mind,  having  once  shut  itself  up  in  the  circle  of  represen- 
tations, is  unable  to  free  itself  from  this  self-constructed 
prison.  Whithersoever  it  may  turn,  it  perceives  nothing 
but  representations,  products  of  its  own  consciousness  ;  its 
will  is  a  representation  ;  the  resistance  that  will  encounters 
is  a  representation ;  the  ego  is  a  representation.  Repre- 
sentations gird  it  about  on  all  sides,  and  nowhere  is  access 
open  to  reality ;  for  no  inference  can  be  drawn  from  think- 
ing to  being  ;  from  the  representations  there  is  no  bridge  to 
reality.  Just  as  little  as  Satan  can  be  cast  out  by  Satan  is 
there  escape  from  representations  by  means  of  represen- 


60  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

tations.7  Idealistic  philosophy  is  like  the  she-bear  which 
draws  all  her  nourishment  from  her  own  breasts,  and  thus 
eats  herself  up,  ipsa  alimenta  sibi.8 

The  case  becomes  entirely  different  if  we  take  our  start- 
ing-point not  from  the  representations  as  such,  but  from 
self-consciousness ;  if  for  the  act  of  cogitare  we  substitute 
the  fact  coyito.  But  modern  psychology  seeks  to  obstruct 
also  this  last  road  to  reality.  It  bids  us  remark  that  we  do 
not  observe  in  ourselves  any  ego,  any  soul,  any  substance, 
but  only  a  continuous  succession  of  phenomenal  states  of 
consciousness,  and  that  we  lack  warrant  to  infer  from  these 
the  existence  of  a  bearer  or  substrate.  This  obstruction, 
however,  is  easily  removed,  because  the  same  mistake  is 
made  here  that  before  was  found  to  vitiate  the  reasoning 
with  regard  to  the  reality  of  the  outside  world.  As  our  per- 
ception does  not  have  for  its  object  the  representations,  but 
in  and  through  these  the  things  themselves,  so  in  the  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness  our  own  ego  always  presents  itself 
to  us.  In  neither  case  is  there  involved  any  process  of 
reasoning  or  inference.  As  the  external  perception,  of  itself 
and  immediately,  convinces  of  the  reality  of  the  perceived 
object,  so  the  perception  of  self  in  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness assures  us  spontaneously  and  immediately  of  the 
existence  of  ourselves. 

Of  course  a  distinction  must  be  made  here  between  the 
psychological  investigation  to  which  the  man  of  science 
subjects  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  and  by  means 
of  which  he  may  abstract  these  from  the  self-conscious- 
ness, and  the  state  of  self-consciousness  experienced  in 
daily  life  by  every  man,  the  scientist  not  excluded.  But 
in  the  latter  case  the  self  is  always  and  immediately  given 
in  self-consciousness.  If  this  were  not  so,  we  should  in- 
deed be  shut  up  to  the  proposition,  advocated  no  doubt 


KEVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  61 

by  idealism,  but  none  the  less  paradoxical,  which  is  formu- 
lated b}r  Max  Verworn  as  follows :  "  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  a  soul  dwelling  in  the  human  body,  nor  as  a  man 
which  is  the  seat  of  sensations,  but  a  man  is  a  complex 
of  sensations,  and  to  others  as  well  as  to  himself  he  con- 
sists of  sensations."9  That  this  is  a  paradox  is  recognized 
even  by  John  Stuart  Mill,  for  in  spite  of  his  actualistic 
standpoint,  he  declares  that  here  a  dilemma  confronts  us : 
we  must  either  believe  that  the  ego  is  distinct  from  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  belonging  to  it,  or  accept  the 
paradox  that  a  series  of  sensations  can  become  conscious 
of  itself  as  a  series.10  Here,  as  little  as  in  the  case  of  out- 
ward perception,  does  monism  suffice.  There  is  a  distinc- 
tion, an  irremovable  distinction,  between  the  representation 
and  the  thing  of  which  it  is  a  representation,  and  there  is  an 
equally  sharp  and  equally  indelible  distinction  between  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness  and  the  subject  that  manifests 
itself  in  them.  How  else  could  unity  and  continuity  of 
psychical  life,  how  could  memory  and  imagination,  think- 
ing and  judging,  comparison  and  inference,  be  possible  ? 
The  ego  is  not  an  aggregate  of  parts,  not  a  mass  of  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness,  afterwards  grouped  together  by 
man  under  one  name.  It  is  a  synthesis,  which  in  every  man 
precedes  all  scientific  reflection,  an  organic  whole  possess- 
ing members.     It  is  complex  but  not  compound.11 

In  self-consciousness,  therefore,  we  have  to  deal  not 
with  a  mere  phenomenon,  but  with  a  noumenon,  with  a 
reality  that  is  immediately  given  us,  antecedently  to  all 
reasoning  and  inference.  Self-consciousness  is  the  unity 
of  real  and  ideal  being;  the  self  is  here  consciousness, 
not  scientific  knowledge,  but  experience,  conviction, 
consciousness  of  self  as  a  reality.  In  self-consciousness 
our  own  being   is   revealed  to  us,  directly,  immediately, 


62  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

before  all  thinking  and  independently  of  all  willing.  We 
do  not  approach  it  through  any  reasoning  or  exertion  of 
our  own ;  we  do  not  demonstrate  its  existence,  we  do 
not  understand  its  essence.  But  it  is  given  to  us  in 
self-consciousness,  given  gratis,  and  is  received  on  our 
part  spontaneously,  in  unshaken  confidence,  with  imme- 
diate assurance.  In  self-consciousness  the  light  dawns 
for  us  on  our  own  being,  even  as  nature  emerges  from 
darkness  and  stands  revealed  in  the  rays  of  the  sun. 
To  ignore  this  fact  of  self-consciousness,  this  primary 
fact,  this  foundation  of  all  knowledge  and  activity,  to 
make  it  dependent  on  our  own  affirmation,  to  under- 
mine it  by  doubt,  is  to  commit  against  ourselves  and 
against  others  not  merely  a  logical  but  also  an  ethical 
sin.  It  is  to  shake  not  only  the  foundation  of  science, 
but  also  the  indispensable  basis  of  all  human  conduct ; 
to  weaken  all  confidence,  spontaneity,  volitional  energy, 
and  courage.  And  no  effort  of  the  will  can  repair  after- 
wards the  injury  which  has  been  wrought  by  thought. 
The  will  lacks  the  authority  and  the  power  to  become 
the  foundation  of  faith  and  knowledge,  of  religion  and 
morality.  "  Practical  reason "  cannot  bear  the  weight 
which  "  theoretical  reason  "  has  cast  off  of  itself,  and 
"  theoretical  reason  "  is  not  in  a  position  to  demonstrate 
that  which  is  the  presupposition  of  all  demonstration. 
The  "  will  to  believe  "  may  be  indispensable  to  faith, 
but  it  can  never  become  the  ground  of  faith ;  and  every 
demonstration  of  the  intellect  must  rest  on  the  intuitive 
certainty  of  self-consciousness. 

In  self-consciousness,  however,  there  is  revealed  some- 
thing different  from  and  more  than  our  own  self. 
Or  rather,  the  ego  that  is  revealed  to  us  in  self- 
consciousness   is    no   cold,  bald    unity,    no   dead   mathe- 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  63 

matical  point,  no  quiescent,  unvarying  substance  but 
is  rich  in  content,  full  of  life  and  power  and  activity. 
It  is  no  monad  without  windows,  no  insensible  tf  Reale  " 
lying  beneath  the  psychical  phenomena  and  bearing 
them  as  the  stage  bears  the  players.  On  the  contrary, 
it  is  itself  immanent  in  the  psychical  phenomena  and 
develops  itself  in  and  through  and  with  them ;  it 
is  capable  of  working  out  its  own  salvation  with  fear  and 
trembling,  but  also  of  working  its  own  destruction  and 
ruin.  It  is,  but  at  the  same  time  it  becomes  and  grows ; 
it  is  a  fulness  of  life,  a  totality  of  gifts  and  powers,  which 
do  not  play  their  roles  behind  the  curtain,  but  reveal  them- 
selves and  find  development  in  the  multiform  activities 
of  psychical  life,  in  the  whole  man  with  all  his  works. 
Augustine  was  the  first  who  so  understood  self-conscious- 
ness. Socrates  did  not  comprehend  this  ;  for  although  he 
brought  philosophy  back  from  nature  to  man,  he  was 
interested  exclusively  in  gaining  true  conceptions  of 
knowledge  and  conduct.  And  later  Descartes  took,  it 
is  true,  his  starting-point  from  thought,  but  thought 
meant  for  him  the  essence  of  the  soul.  Augustine  went 
deeper  and  found  more  ;  he  discovered  reality  within  him- 
self. The  scepticism  into  which  Greek  philosophy  had 
issued  had  lost,  together  with  God  and  the  world,  also  the 
self-certainty  of  man.  But  when  the  Christian  religion 
revealed  to  us  the  greatness  of  God's  heart,  and  in  the 
day-spring  from  on  high  visited  us  with  his  tender  mercy, 
it  at  the  same  time  cast  its  light  on  man  and  on  the  riches 
and  value  of  his  soul.  It  imparted  to  him  a  new  certainty, 
the  certainty  of  faith ;  it  restored  to  him  his  confidence  in 
God,  and  therewith  his  confidence  in  himself.  And  by 
this  light  of  revelation  Augustine  descended  deep  into  his 
own   inner  life;    forgetting  nature,  he  desired   to  know 


64  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

naught  else  but  God  and  himself.  There  he  found 
thought,  to  be  sure,  but  not  thought  alone;  beneath 
thought  he  penetrated  to  the  essence  of  the  soul,  for  in 
himself  always  life  preceded  thought ;  faith,  knowledge ; 
self-consciousness,  reflection ;  experience,  science  ;  he  first 
lived  through  the  things  which  later  he  thought  and 
wrote.  Thus  Augustine  went  back  behind  thought 
to  the  essence  of  the  soul,  and  found  in  it  not  a  simple 
unity,  but  a  marvellously  rich  totality;  he  found  there 
the  ideas,  the  norms,  the  laws  of  the  true  and  the  good, 
the  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  certainty  of  knowl- 
edge, of  the  cause  of  all  things,  of  the  supreme  good ; 
he  found  there  the  seeds  and  germs  of  all  knowledge 
and  science  and  art;  he  found  there  even,  in  the  triad 
of  memoria,  intellectus,  and  voluntas,  a  reflection  of  the 
triune  being  of  God.  Augustine  was  the  philosopher 
of  self-examination,  and  in  self-consciousness  he  dis- 
covered the  starting-point  of  a  new  metaphysics.12 

The  mind  of  man  is  indeed  no  tabula  rasa,  no  empty 
form,  but  a  totality  of  life  from  the  very  first  moment  of 
its  existence.  And  when  it  becomes  conscious  of  itself, 
this  self-consciousness  is  not  a  mere  formal  apprehen- 
sion of  existence,  but  always  includes  in  it  an  appre- 
hension of  a  peculiar  nature,  a  particular  quality  of 
mind.  It  is  never  a  consciousness  of  pure  being,  but 
always  a  consciousness  of  a  specific  being,  of  a  definite 
something.  This  is  acknowledged  even  by  those  who 
follow  Herbert  Spencer  in  assuming  that  the  rational, 
moral  mind  of  man  has  been  slowly  evolved  out  of  an 
animal  state  and  has  acquired  in  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence a  set  of  general  conceptions,  a  common  sense,  to 
which  attaches,  up  to  the  present  day,  great  practical 
value,  and  which  is  transmitted  as  a  habitus  from  parents 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  65 

to  children.13     By  this  evolutionary  explanation  the  diffi- 
culty is  simply  pushed  back  into  the  past,  into  the  life  of 
our  ancestors.     In  actual  life  we  never  see  mere  sensation 
developing   into    thought,    and   it   is   highly   improbable 
that  such  a  transition  will  ever  be  witnessed,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, in  the  case  of  apes.     But  such  an  evolution  is  no 
easier  to  understand   in   the  past  than  in  the   present ; 
between  perception  and  intellect,  representation  and  con- 
ceptions, association   of    representations    and   conceptual 
thinking,  there  is  a  fundamental  difference.     Association 
combines  representations  according  to  accidental,  exter- 
nal points  of  resemblance ;  thought  combines  conceptions 
according  to  the  laws  of  identity  and  contradiction,  cause 
and  effect,  means  and  end.     Causation,  for  example,  is 
something  wholly  different  from  habitual  association,  be- 
cause it  has  its  essence  in  an  internal  and  necessary  con- 
nection of   phenomena.      Unless   the    thinking   mind   be 
introduced  into  the  explanation  from  the  outset,  every 
effort  to  make  it  emerge  out  of  the  faculty  of  perception 
by  way  of  evolution  must  remain  futile.     Very  properly 
Mr.  R.  W.  B.  Joseph,  in  his  criticism  of  James,  observes, 
that  in  order  to  acquire  a  "  common  sense,"  man  must 
needs  be  possessed  antecedently  of  mind.    "  A  mind  which 
had  no  fundamental  categories  and  whose  experience  was 
purely  chaotic  would  not  be  a  mind  at  all."     The  nature 
of  mind  consists  just  in  "  the  fundamental  modes  of  its 
thinking."14     But,  be   this   as  it  may,  the  evolutionists 
themselves  will  have  to  acknowledge  that  to  the  mind  of 
man,  as  at  present  constituted,  this  "  common  sense  "  is 
an  integral  possession  which  belongs  to  it  from  the  start. 
When    we    endeavor  to    determine   more   closely  the 
nature  of  this  mind   and   descend  for  this  purpose  into 
the  depths  of  self-consciousness,  we  find  at  its  very  root 

5 


66  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  sense  of  dependence.  In  our  self-consciousness  we 
are  not  only  conscious  of  being,  but  also  of  being  some- 
thing definite,  of  being  the  very  thing  we  are.  And  this 
definite  mode  of  being,  most  generally  described,  consists  in 
a  dependent,  limited,  finite,  created  being.  Before  all 
thinking  and  willing,  before  all  reasoning  and  action, 
we  are  and  exist,  exist  in  a  definite  way,  and  inseparable 
therefrom  have  a  consciousness  of  our  being  and  of  its 
specific  mode.  The  core  of  our  self-consciousness  is,  as 
Schleiermacher  perceived  much  more  clearly  than  Kant, 
not  autonomy,  but  a  sense  of  dependence.  In  the  act  of 
becoming  conscious  of  ourselves  we  become  conscious  of 
ourselves  as  creatures. 

This  dependence  is  brought  to  our  knowledge  in  a  two- 
fold way.  We  feel  ourselves  dependent  on  everything 
around  us ;  we  are  not  alone.  Solipsism,  although  the 
inevitable  outcome  of  idealism,  is  in  itself  an  impossible 
theory.  According  to  the  philosopher  Wolf,  there  lived 
in  his  day  in  Paris  a  pupil  of  Malebranche,  who  advo- 
cated solipsism,  and  still  found  adherents,  quod,  Wolf 
observes,  mirum  videri  poterat.  Even  Fichte  felt  com- 
pelled, chiefly  by  moral  considerations,  not  to  regard 
himself  as  the  only  existent  being.15  Every  man  knows 
that  he  does  not  exist  alone,  that  he  is  not  able  to  do 
what  he  pleases,  that  on  every  side  he  is  curbed  and 
hedged  in,  and  encounters  resistance.  But  in  the  second 
place  we  feel  ourselves,  together  with  all  creatures,  wholly 
dependent  on  some  absolute  power  which  is  the  one  infi- 
nite being.  How  this  power  is  defined  does  not  matter 
for  the  present ;  the  main  point  is  that  all  men  feel  them- 
selves dependent  on  a  being  which  is  the  cause  and  ground 
of  all  being.  This  sense  of  dependence,  with  its  two- 
fold reference,  is  not  a  philosophical  conception,  not  an 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  67 

abstract  category,  not  "  a  verbal  solution,"  but  a  fact 
which  in  point  of  certainty  is  equal  to  the  best  established 
fact  of  natural  science.  It  is  something  genuinely  em- 
pirical, universally  human,  immediate,  the  very  core  of 
self-consciousness,  and  involves  the  existence  of  both  the 
world  and  God. 

True,  from  the  standpoint  of  idealism  this  last-named 
conclusion  will  be  rejected.  Still,  two  things  need  to  be 
sharply  distinguished  in  connection  with  this.  That  the 
belief  in  the  existence  of  an  objective  world  (and  likewise 
of  God)  is  a  fact  nobody  can  deny.  The  most  thorough- 
going idealist  cannot  ignore  the  fact  that  all  men  without 
distinction,  and  antecedently  to  all  reasoning,  are  convinced 
of  the  reality  of  the  world,  and  that  he  himself  in  daily 
life  shares  this  conviction,  nay,  finds  it  indispensable  for 
knowledge  and  activity.  Nor  did  Kant  himself  deny  this 
fact.  The  problem  which  Kant  set  himself  to  solve  was  not 
how  the  world  of  our  perception,  the  WahmehmungswirJc- 
UchJceit,  is  produced,  for  it  is  self-evident  that  we  obtain 
this  from  perception,  and  that  from  the  first  we  conceive 
of  it  as  existing  in  space  and  time.  But,  starting  from 
this  world  of  perception  and  presupposing  it,  Kant  sought 
to  answer  this  other  question,  —  how  we  can  obtain 
scientific  knowledge  of  this  empirical  world.  And  for 
this  problem  he  offered  the  solution,  that  such  knowledge 
cannot  come  through  sense-perception,  because  the  latter 
discovers  nothing  but  an  orderless  mass  of  phenomena  ; 
that  scientific  knowledge  is  possible  and  attainable  only 
when  the  human  mind  introduces  order  into  this  chaos 
of  phenomena  and  subjects  it  to  its  own  law.  According 
to  Kant  the  mind  has  such  a  law  of  its  own :  it  carries 
in  itself  all  sorts  of  apriori  forms,  which  are  not  called 
apriori  because  in  point  of  time  they  precede  perception, 


68  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

or  because  they  lie  ready-made  in  our  minds,  but  because 
they  are  independent  of  perception  and  are  produced  and 
applied  by  the  mind  in  the  very  act  of  working  on  the 
representations.18 

From  this  activity  of  the  mind  in  acquiring  scientific 
knowledge,  idealism  (whether  rightly  or  wrongly  appeal- 
ing to  Kant  cannot  and  need  not  be  here  investigated) 
has  drawn  the  conclusion  that  the  world  of  perception  is 
either  in  part  or  in  whole  a  product  of  the  perceiving 
subject.  But  in  doing  this  it  confounds  two  questions 
which  Kant  kept  distinct.  The  world  of  perception  is 
given  to  us  in  our  consciousness,  not  as  dream  or  hallu- 
cination, but  as  phenomenon  and  representation,  involving, 
according  to  universal  belief,  the  existence  of  an  objective 
world.  This  empirical  and  undeniable  fact  is  recognized, 
and  to  some  degree  explained,  only  when  self-conscious- 
ness is  conceived  in  the  sense  above  defined  as  the  unity 
of  real  and  ideal  being ;  when  it  is  recognized  as  a  matter 
of  intuitive  certainty  that  in  self-consciousness  both  the 
existence  and  the  specific  mode  of  existence  of  the  self, 
the  ego,  are  revealed.  For  in  that  case  the  gulf  between 
the  reality  and  the  representation,  between  being  and 
thinking,  is  bridged  over.  And  with  the  selfsame  cer- 
tainty with  which  we  assume  the  existence  of  our  own 
ego,  the  existence  of  the  world  is  recognized.  For  the 
representation  is  connected  with  reality  by  the  same  inner 
tie  that  binds  self-consciousness  to  the  self.  It  is  the 
same  sense  of  dependence  that  inheres  in  the  mind  as  a 
whole  which  also  inheres  in  all  its  representations  and 
activities ;  the  ego  does  not  exist  in  a  quiescent  state, 
nor  lie  insensible  outside  of  and  behind  the  psychical 
phenomena,  but  is  immanently  active  in  them,  and  attains 
in  them  its  revelation  and  development ;   and  self-con- 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  69 

sciousness  does  not  exist  apart  from  the  representations, 
but  lives  and  realizes  itself  in  them ;  it  imparts  its  own 
certainty  to  these  representations ;  it  in  them  feels  assured 
of  itself.  To  undermine  belief  in  the  external  world, 
therefore,  always  carries  with  it  the  undermining  of  self- 
confidence  and  of  volitional  energy,  of  the  faith  the  mind 
has  in  itself,  and  hence  of  the  superiority  of  the  mind  to 
nature,  of  religion  and  morality.  Not  evolution,  but  reve- 
lation, is  the  secret  of  the  mind ;  in  our  self-consciousness, 
independently  of  our  co-operation  and  apart  from  our 
will,  the  reality  of  our  ego  and  of  the  world  is  revealed 
to  us.  Whosoever  here  does  not  believe  shall  not  be 
established. 

In  seeking  to  obtain  knowledge  of  this  world  of  percep- 
tion science  must  needs  set  out  from  this  fact  of  inner  con- 
sciousness. It  can  and  must  endeavor  to  understand  this ; 
but  the  reality  of  the  fact  should  not  be  made  dependent 
on  our  ability  to  explain  it.  We  do  not  know  how  the 
world  can  exist,  or  how,  in  this  world,  consciousness  is 
possible,  yet  no  one  doubts  the  reality  of  either.  It  is 
imperative,  both  logically  and  ethically,  that  science  shall 
respect  the  reality  of  the  soul's  inner  consciousness,  for  if 
it  refuses  belief  here,  it  undermines  its  own  foundation. 
Epistemological  idealism  furnishes  the  most  forcible  dem- 
onstration of  this.  For  according  to  this  theory  reality 
is  itself  a  v\r},  a  chaos,  and  order  is  first  introduced  into 
it  by  the  knowledge  and  activity  of  the  human  mind. 
The  world  in  itself  is  neither  true  nor  good ;  it  is  we  who 
slowly  make  it  true  and  good.  No  doubt  in  this  propo- 
sition, even  when  thus  paradoxically  expressed,  there  is 
always  contained  this  much  of  truth,  that  the  world  apart 
from  man  is  imperfect  and  unfinished.  In  the  Penta- 
teuchal  account  of  creation  the  preparation  of  the  earth 


70  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

is  described  from  this  very  point  of  view ;  in  man  the 
world  finds  its  head  and  its  lord.  Hence  man  is  given  a 
vocation  with  reference  to  this  world.  Though  good,  yet 
it  is  not  "  finished."  It  exists  in  order  to  be  replenished, 
subjected,  made  the  object  of  knowledge,  and  ruled  over 
by  man.  To  this  extent  it  would  be  proper  to  say  that  it 
was  man's  task  to  make  the  world  true  and  good. 

But  the  idealistic  philosophy  understands  all  this  in 
quite  a  different  sense.  It  takes  its  position  in  the  sec- 
ond verse  of  the  first  chapter  of  Genesis,  placing  itself 
not  after  but  before  the  preparation  of  the  earth  by  God's 
omnipotent  hand.  The  earth  in  itself,  apart  from  man,  is 
a  waste  and  empty  chaos,  unformed,  without  ordinances 
and  laws,  without  light  and  color.  Now  right  here  a 
difficulty  emerges  of  so  serious  a  nature  that  it  divides 
the  idealists  into  two  camps,  which  we  may,  perhaps,  call 
the  "  thoroughgoing  "  and  the  "  half-hearted  "  idealists. 
The  thoroughgoing  idealists  dispense  even  with  the  vXrj, 
and  regard  the  entire  world  as  a  product  of  the  human 
mind,  and  man  not  merely  as  the  orderer,  but  also  as  the 
creator  of  the  world.  It  was  in  this  sense  that  Fichte 
affirmed  that  the  ego  posits  the  non-ego,  and  Paulsen, 
along  with  many  kindred  spirits  in  our  own  day,  declares 
that  the  objects  of  the  external  world  are  "  a  creation  of 
the  subject."  17  Most  idealists,  however,  draw  back  from 
this  phenomenalism,  which  would  seem  bound  to  issue 
into  solipsism ;  they,  therefore,  with  Locke,  draw  a  dis- 
tinction between  the  primary  and  the  secondary  qualities 
of  things,  and,  while  ascribing  to  the  latter  a  purely  sub- 
jective origin,  uphold  the  objective  reality  of  the  former 
as  something  that  belongs  to  them  independently  of  man. 

If  this  latter  position,  however,  be  correct,  and  the 
primary  qualities,  such  as  impenetrability,  extension,  num- 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  71 

ber,  motion,  can  lay  claim  to  independent  existence,  then 
the  assertion  that  the  world  in  itself  is  nothing  but  chaos 
seems  overbold ;  for  on  such  a  view  there  must  be  in  it 
substance  and  causality,  law  and  government,  order  and 
measure,  and  man  appears  to  be  not  the  creator,  but 
merely  the  orderer  of  the  world.  And  in  his  ordering  of 
the  world  he  is  dependent  on  these  primary  qualities ;  he 
is  not  absolutely  free,  or  autonomous,  but  determined  in 
his  knowledge  and  activity  by  the  objective  world.  But 
in  that  case  his  activity  cannot,  even  with  regard  to  second- 
ary qualities,  be  held  to  be  an  autonomous,  creative  one. 
It  is  true,  idealism  considers  the  subjective  nature  of  these 
secondary  qualities  the  impregnable  fortress  of  its  posi- 
tion, and  believes  that  both  epistemologically  and  physio- 
logically the  correctness  of  its  view  in  this  respect  has 
been  irrefutably  demonstrated. 

Epistemology,  however,  teaches  the  very  opposite  of 
what  idealism  asserts.  The  perceptive  and  cognitive  ac- 
tivity of  man  is  only  in  a  psychological,  and  not  in  a  logical, 
sense  a  purely  immanent  act  of  the  mind.  Both  perception 
and  representation  would  cease  to  be  what  they  are  if 
nothing  existed  that  was  perceived  and  represented.  On 
both  the  character  of  logical  transcendence  is  indelibly 
impressed  ;  by  their  very  nature  they  point  to  an  objective 
reality,  detached  from  which  they  would  become  equivalent 
to  hallucinations  and  illusions.  As  self-consciousness  pre- 
supposes the  self  not  outside  but  in  the  content  of  con- 
sciousness, so  by  the  same  law  and  with  the  same  certainty 
the  representation,  which  does  not  operate  outside  of  self- 
consciousness  but  is  the  product  and  content  of  it,  points 
back  to  an  object.  This  explanation  of  the  character  of 
perception  has  not  been  modified  in  the  least  by  the  physi- 
ology of  sensation.     Physiology  has  clarified  to  a  very 


72  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

important  degree  our  insight  into  the  conditions  under 
which,  the  ways  by  which,  and  the  means  through  which, 
perception  takes  place,  but  the  act  of  perception  itself  re- 
mains precisely  what  it  was  before.  We  now  know  that 
the  sensations  of  sight  and  of  hearing  cannot  originate  ex- 
cept under  the  condition  of  some  millions  of  aether-vibra- 
tions per  second,  that  the  sensation  of  seeing  is  attended 
by  an  image  thrown  inverted  on  the  retina  of  the  eye,  that 
smell  and  taste  depend  on  a  chemical  dissolution  of  the 
constituents  of  the  object,  that  nervous  stimuli  are  trans- 
mitted from  our  sense  organs  to  the  centre  of  the  brain. 
But  the  nexus  that  exists  between  all  these  intermediate 
processes  and  the  perception  itself  utterly  eludes  us. 
What,  for  example,  has  the  sensation  of  color  as  such  to  do 
with  437  billions  of  vibrations  per  second  ?  What  has  the 
sensation  of  hardness  or  softness  to  do  with  stimulation  of 
the  nerves?  The  distinction  between  the  cause  and  the 
condition,  between  the  mediation  and  the  object  of  the 
perception,  for  all  this,  retains  its  full  validity.  Just  as 
writing  and  reading,  telegraphy  and  telephony  avail  them- 
selves of  all  sorts  of  mechanical  movements  of  hand  and 
tongue  or  of  all  kinds  of  visible  signs  and  audible  sounds, 
and  nevertheless  presuppose  at  each  end  of  the  process  a 
thinking  subject  which  by  means  of  the  signs  understands 
the  thought,  so  the  sense-organs,  together  with  all  further 
intermediaries,  are  only  the  conditions  under  which,  the 
ways  in  which,  the  subject  sees  and  hears,  tastes  and 
smells,  but  in  no  wise  the  cause,  and  hence  not  in  any  way 
the  explanation,  of  these  perceptions.  After  all  physio- 
logical investigation  the  mental  act  of  perception  remains 
as  mysterious  as  before.  Before  and  after  there  remains 
unshaken  and  unreduced  the  distinction  between  subject 
and  object,  between  the  act  of  perception  and  the  object 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  73 

of  perception,  between  sight,  hearing,  smell,  taste,  touch, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  being  seen,  heard,  smelled,  tasted, 
touched,  on  the  other  hand.  Both  grammatically  and  log- 
ically the  distinction  between  the  active  and  the  passive 
voice  remains  in  force. 

The  moderate  idealists,  therefore,  were  wrong  in  con- 
ceding the  subjectivity  of  the  secondary  qualities.  Of 
course,  continued  observation  and  reflection  may  improve 
and  render  more  accurate  our  perceptions  of  color  and 
sound,  of  smell  and  taste,  as  well  as  those  of  space  and 
time,  of  size  and  distance ;  both  soul  and  body,  the  mental 
faculties  and  the  senses,  need  teaching  and  training.  But 
this  does  not  affect  the  fundamental  character  that  should 
be  ascribed  to  the  perceptions  of  the  secondary  qualities 
or  the  maintenance  of  their  objectivity.  It  is  already  note- 
worthy that  a  number  of  such  thinkers  as  Berkeley  and 
Hume,  Paulsen  and  Wundt,  Eucken  and  Stumpf,  consider 
the  distinction  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities 
unfounded  and  arbitrary.18  In  regard  to  space-  and  time- 
relations  errors  are  no  more  excluded  than  in  regard  to 
perceptions  of  color  and  sound.  Apart  from  secondary 
qualities,  space,  extension,  form  are  incapable  of  becoming 
objects  of  perception.  The  objective  validity  of  the  sec- 
ondary qualities  in  no  respect  falls  behind  that  of  the  pri- 
mary qualities.  If  it  be  given  up  with  respect  to  the 
former,  it  will  be  impossible  to  maintain  it  with  respect  to 
the  latter;  semi-idealism  arbitrarily  stops  short  half-way. 
But,  apart  from  this,  if  such  a  great  difference  exists  be- 
tween the  two  groups  of  qualities,  it  is  hard  to  under- 
stand that  ordinary  observation,  in  the  learned  and  the 
unlearned  alike,  has  remained  entirely  unaware  of  this. 
And  yet  ordinary  observation  in  other  cases  draws  all  kinds 
of  distinctions.  It  knows  quite  well  that  an  hallucination  is 


74  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

different  from  a  representation ;  if  a  person  hurts  his  foot 
on  a  stone,  it  predicates  the  pain,  not  of  the  stone,  but  of 
the  subject.  It  knows  that  food  can  be  called  healthy  in  a 
figurative  sense  only,  because  it  promotes  health  (which  is 
the  attribute  of  a  human  being).  And  it  is  likewise  aware 
that  the  senses  of  smell  and  taste  are  much  more  subjective 
than  the  others,  so  as  to  lie  outside  the  region  of  dispu- 
tation. Yet,  notwithstanding  all  this,  ordinary  observation 
adheres  to  the  conviction  that  the  representations  are  no 
more  light  or  dark,  green  or  red,  sweet  or  bitter,  than  they 
are  high  or  low,  round  or  square,  near  or  distant,  but  that 
all  these  qualities  belong  to  the  object,  and  that  the  sub- 
ject does  not  produce,  but  only  perceives  and  takes  knowl- 
edge of  them. 

It  is  impossible,  therefore,  to  remove  or  separate  these 
qualities  —  and  the  secondary  no  less  truly  than  the  pri- 
mary ones  —  from  the  object.  It  will  not  do  to  say  with 
Verworn,  The  stone  is  hard  —  a  sensation ;  it  is  heavy  —  a 
sensation ;  it  is  cold  —  a  sensation ;  it  is  gray  —  a  sensa- 
tion, etc.,  and  thence  to  conclude  that  what  I  call  a  stone  is 
nothing  but  a  specific  combination  of  sensations.  Or  rather, 
it  is  possible  to  talk  in  this  way,  but  it  is  not  feasible  to 
practise  it  in  actual  life.  We  may  proceed  after  this  fash- 
ion in  abstract  thinking  and  come  to  maintain  that  nothing 
objective  remains  ;  but  such  an  abstract  procedure  is  no 
proof  that  we  can  act  on  it  in  practical  life.  The  impor- 
tant point  is  precisely  that  the  stone  is  a  specific  combina- 
tion, or  rather  a  complex,  of  qualities,  which  occur  in 
combination  with  one  another,  and  which  are  not  held  to- 
gether subjectively  in  my  consciousness,  but  objectively  in 
the  thing  itself.19  And  so  it  is  with  every  object  we  per- 
ceive and  with  the  entire  world  spread  out  before  our 
eyes.    The  world  is  not  a  group  of  perceptions  formed  by 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  75 

us  for  economic  reasons,  for  the  sake  of  the  practical  ne- 
cessities of  life,  but  a  complex  of  qualities  which  exist 
objectively  and  are  mutually  bound  together,  a  totality 
which  cannot  be  reduced  to  any  representation  of  ours. 
As  little  as  subjectively  the  ego,  the  personality,  admits  of 
being  resolved  into  a  series  of  sensations,  can  the  world  of 
our  external  perception  be  reduced  to  a  group  of  represen- 
tations. In  both  cases  we  are  face  to  face  with  one  and 
the  same  fact.  In  consciousness  our  own  being,  and  the 
being  of  the  world,  are  disclosed  to  us  antecedently  to  our 
thought  or  volition ;  that  is,  they  are  revealed  to  us  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  the  word.20  \r 

In  man's  self -consciousness,  however,  still  more  is  im- 
plied. Unless  there  were  more,  the  result  obtained  could 
not  satisfy  us.  For  without  more  we  should  not  be  war- 
ranted in  speaking  of  revelation,  and  could  not  maintain 
our  confidence  in  the  testimony  of  our  self-consciousness. 
A  true  unity  would  be  unattainable  for  us ;  naturalism 
and  humanism,  materialism  and  idealism,  monism  and 
pluralism,  would  continue  to  stand  in  irreconcilable 
opposition  to  each  other.  We  should  in  that  case 
have  to  call  in  doubt  even  the  possibility  of  objective 
knowledge,  and  not  be  able  to  answer  the  objection  that 
all  our  knowledge  is  pure  delusion  and  imagination. 
Idealism  has  felt  the  seriousness  of  this  objection,  and  has 
been  led  by  it  to  seek  in  some  way  or  other  in  the  absolute 
the  ground  for  the  objectivity  and  the  reality  of  our 
knowledge.  In  regard  to  the  nature  of  this  absolute 
there  is  difference  of  opinion.  Malebranche  conceived 
of  it  as  a  personal  God  in  whom  we  see  all  things.  Green 
speaks  of  an  eternal  consciousness.  The  Marburg 
school  assumes  a  transcendental  consciousness,  which 
bears  in  itself  the  apriori  forms.     Rickert  believes  that 


76       PHILOSOPHY  OF  REVELATION 

an  abstract  impersonal  consciousness  will  suffice.  Paul- 
sen and  von  Hartmann  think  of  an  absolute  substance 
which  is  the  only  true  being  and  of  which  all  real  things 
are  unsubstantial  accidents. 

That  idealism  has  come  to  such  a  belief  in  the  absolute 
cannot  cause  surprise.  For  it  set  out  by  breaking  down 
the  bridge  between  thinking  and  being,  and  thus  created 
a  chasm  which,  afterwards,  no  reasoning  of  the  intellect 
could  fill  up  nor  any  act  of  the  will  overleap.  Thinking 
lost  hold  upon  being.  If,  therefore,  it  was  not  to  lose 
itself  in  subjective  dreaming,  but  actually  to  issue  in 
knowledge  of  the  truth,  it  was  necessary  to  re-establish, 
either  high  in  the  air  or  deep  underground  in  the  absolute, 
some  connection  between  thought  and  being,  between 
subject  and  object.  The  absolute  thus  serves  to  guaran- 
tee the  truth  of  human  thought.  According  to  some  it 
is  not  even  necessary  that  this  absolute  shall  restore  the 
reality  of  the  objective  world  or  shall  itself  know  all 
things  according  to  truth  ;  it  suffices  if  it  be  no  more  than 
the  objective  norm  of  thinking  or  that  as  unconscious 
force  it  attain  to  consciousness  in  man. 

Although  the  attempt  to  recover  after  this  fashion  the 
lost  unity  of  thought  and  being  deserves  appreciation,  it 
is  impossible  to  regard  it  as  the  true  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem. Here  again  it  is  the  testimony  of  self-consciousness 
that  enters  a  protest.  It  has  already  been  observed  that 
Schleiermacher  apprehended  better  than  Kant  the  essence 
of  self-consciousness  when  he  defined  it  as  an  absolute 
sense  of  dependence.  It  now  remains  to  add  that  in  this 
sense  of  dependence  self-consciousness  at  the  same  time 
posits  the  independence  and  freedom  of  man.  Apparently 
this  is  an  irreconcilable  antinomy,  but  it  will  be  shown 
presently  that  these  two  testimonies  of  self-consciousness 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  77 

are  not  mutually  exclusive,  but  inclusive,  of  each  other. 
Even  Schleiermacher  himself  overlooked  this,  and  Kant 
was  so  far  justified  in  affirming  the  autonomy  of  human 
knowledge  and  action.  For  no  matter  whether  learned  or 
unlearned,  all  of  us  without  distinction  are  conscious  that 
we  ourselves  perceive,  we  ourselves  think,  we  ourselves 
reason,  we  ourselves  draw  conclusions,  and  in  the  same 
manner  that  we  ourselves  deliberate,  will,  and  act.  Re- 
ligion and  morality,  responsibility  and  accountability,  sci- 
ence and  art,  all  the  labor  and  culture  of  humanity  are 
built  on  this  basic  assumption.  Hence  the  absolute  can- 
not be  conceived  as  an  unconscious  and  involuntary  force. 
No  doubt  from  time  to  time  the  deity  has  been  so  con- 
ceived by  a  few  "  intellectuals/'  but  pantheism  has  never 
been  the  creed  of  any  people,  the  confession  of  any  church. 
Men  have,  it  is  true,  often  broken  up,  along  with  the 
unity  of  the  world  and  the  unity  of  the  human  race,  the 
unity  of  God  also  ;  but  the  personality  of  God  has  re- 
mained firmly  established,  always  and  everywhere,  among 
every  nation  and  in  every  religion.  Just  as  confidently  as 
man  is  convinced  in  his  self-consciousness  of  his  own  ex- 
istence and  of  the  reality  of  the  world,  does  he  believe 
also  in  the  reality  and  personality  of  God. 

This  belief  is  interwoven  with  his  self-consciousness, 
more  particularly  with  its  double  testimony  to  dependence 
and  freedom.  These  are  not  antagonistic,  but  rather 
postulate  each  the  other.  The  sense  of  dependence  is 
the  core  of  self-consciousness  and  the  essence  of  reli- 
gion, but  it  is  not  a  mere  de  facto  dependence,  as  the 
unconscious  and  the  irrational  creation  is  dependent  on 
God;  in  man  it  is  a  sense  of  dependence;  the  depend- 
ence in  him  attains  to  a  cognizance,  to  a  testimony  of 
his  self-consciousness,  and  thus  certainly  does  not  cease  to 


78  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

exist,  but  yet  assumes  a  different  form.  It  becomes  a  felt, 
conscious,  voluntary  dependence,  a  dependence  of  man 
as  a  rational  and  moral  being,  and  for  this  very  reason 
it  becomes  a  sense  of  absolute,  schlechthinnige  depend- 
ence. If  the  sense  of  dependence  did  not  include  this 
element,  if  it  did  not  know  itself  as  a  conscious  and  volun- 
tary dependence,  it  would  cease  to  be  absolute,  because 
the  most  important  factors  in  man,  consciousness  and  will, 
would  fall  outside  of  it,  or  stand  opposed  to  it.  Conse- 
quently, if  man  repudiates  his  dependence,  withdraws 
from  it,  he  does  not  thereby  become  independent,  but  his 
dependence  changes  in  nature.  It  loses  its  rational  and 
moral  character  and  becomes  the  subservience  of  a  mere 
means  to  an  end.  Man,  in  becoming  a  sinner,  does  not 
rise,  but  falls ;  does  not  become  like  God,  but  like  the 
animals.  Therefore  the  feeling,  the  sense  of  depend- 
ence, conscious  and  voluntary  dependence,  includes  the 
freedom  of  man:  Deo  parere  libertas ;  Libertas  ex 
veritate. 

This  testimony  of  self-consciousness,  combining  depend- 
ence and  freedom  in  one,  is  further  the  basis  of  religion, 
and  likewise  of  morality.  It  leads  man  everywhere 
and  always,  and  that  quite  freely  and  spontaneously,  to 
belief  in  and  service  of  a  personal  God.  In  view  of  the 
universality  and  the  spontaneity  of  religion  many  have  as- 
sumed an  innate  idea  of  God.  But  this  representation 
is  scarcely  well  conceived,  and  the  name  is  somewhat 
unfortunately  chosen.  Of  course,  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  term  innate  ideas  do  not  exist.  They  savor  rather  of 
rationalism  and  of  a  mysticism  which  separates  man  from 
the  world,  than  of  a  Christian  theism  which  finds  God's 
eternal  power  and  divinity  revealed  in  the  works  of  his 
hands.  It  is  the  mind  of  man,  with  all  of  its  peculiar  nature 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  79 

and  organization,  its  intellect  and  reason,  heart  and  con- 
science, desire  and  will,  and  with  the  ineradicable  conscious- 
ness of  its  dependence  and  freedom,  that  is  innate,  brought 
into  the  world  in  principle  and  germ  at  birth,  not  acquired 
later  phylogenetically  or  ontogenetically.  Thus,  when 
man  grows  up  and  develops  in  accordance  with  the  nature 
implanted  in  him,  not  in  detachment  from  the  world  and 
the  social  organism,  but  in  the  environment  in  which  a  place 
was  assigned  to  him  at  birth,  he  attains  as  freely  and  as 
inevitably  to  the  knowledge  and  service  of  a  personal  God 
as  he  believes  in  his  own  existence  and  that  of  the  world. 
He  does  not  invent  the  idea  of  God  nor  produce  it ;  it  is 
given  to  him  and  he  receives  it.  Atheism  is  not  proper 
to  man  by  nature,  but  develops  at  a  later  stage  of  life, 
on  the  ground  of  philosophic  reflection ;  like  scepticism, 
it  is  an  intellectual  and  ethical  abnormality,  which  only 
confirms  the  rule.  By  nature,  in  virtue  of  his  nature, 
every  man  believes  in  God.  And  this  is  due  in  the  last 
analysis  to  the  fact  that  God,  the  creator  of  all  nature, 
has  not  left  himself  without  witness,  but  through  all 
nature,  both  that  of  man  himself  and  that  of  the  outside 
world,  speaks  to  him.  Not  evolution,  but  revelation  alone 
accounts  for  this  impressive  and  incontrovertible  fact  of 
the  worship  of  God.  In  self-consciousness  God  makes 
known  to  us  man,  the  world,  and  himself. 

Hence  this  revelation  is  of  the  utmost  importance,  not 
only  for  religion,  but  also  for  philosophy,  and  particularly 
for  epistemolog}7.  All  cognition  consists  in  a  peculiar 
relation  of  subject  and  object,  and  is  built  on  the  agree- 
ment of  these  two.  The  reliability  of  perception  and 
thought  is  not  assured  unless  the  forms  of  thought  and 
the  forms  of  being  correspond,  in  virtue  of  their  origin  in 
the  same  creative  wisdom.    Philosophy  itself  has  not  failed 


80  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

to  perceive  the  necessity  of  this,  but  by  taking  a  wrong 
start  it  has  strayed  either  to  the  right  or  to  the  left.  It 
either,  with  Hegel,  has  identified  thought  with  being  and 
raised  logic  to  the  rank  of  metaphysics  ;  or  with  Kant  and 
humanism  it  has  separated  thought  from  being,  leaving 
to  logic  a  purely  formalistic  character.  In  either  case  the 
true  relation  between  thought  and  being,  and  hence  the 
correct  principle  of  all  cognition  and  knowledge,  are 
imperfectly  recognized.  As  even  von  Hartmann  admits, 
there  is  no  other  way  of  doing  justice  to  both  subject  and 
object  except  by  recognizing  that  it  is  one  and  the  same 
reason  "  which  is  active  in  consciousness  as  a  principle 
introducing  order  into  the  sensations,  and  in  the  objective 
world  as  the  principle  of  synthesis  for  the  things  in  thein- 
selves.',  21  The  forms  of  being,  the  laws  of  thought,  and 
—  to  add  this  here  for  the  sake  of  completeness  —  the 
forms  of  conduct,  have  their  common  source  in  the 
divine  wisdom.  The  three  departments  of  philosophy, 
physics,  logic  and  ethics,  form  a  harmonious  whole. 
What  monism  seeks  in  the  wrong  direction,  and  cannot 
attain  unto,  has  here  been  reached,  viz.,  the  unity  which 
does  not  exclude  but  includes  the  multiformity  the 
avanifxa  of  philosophy. 

On  this  firm  theistic  foundation,  finally,  there  is  room 
for  belief  in  the  progress  of  science  and  the  realization  of 
the  ideal  of  truth.  There  is  some  degree  of  warrant  for 
the  assertion  that  the  truth  is  not,  but  becomes.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  the  truth  nowhere  meets  us  "  cut  and 
dried,"  ready,  as  it  were,  to  be  simply  taken  into  our 
consciousness.  On  the  contrary  —  and  this  is  the  differ- 
ence between  "  revelation  "  and  "  discovery  "  —  man  has 
to  conquer  the  truth  in  the  sweat  of  his  brow,  with  the 
exertion  of  all  his  strength,  foot  by  foot  and  piece  by 


REVELATION   AND   PHILOSOPHY  81 

piece.  The  branches  of  knowledge  have  without  ex- 
ception "  grown  up  in  the  practice  of  life  itself  " ; a  they 
have  all  been  born  of  necessity,  and  possess  a  practical, 
economic  value.  Nor  is  the  truth  a  mere  copy,  a  portrait 
of  reality ;  it  is  something  different  from  a  globus  intellec- 
tualis.  No  one,  by  the  mere  act  of  gathering  into  his 
consciousness  a  complete  account  of  Goethe's  life  and 
labors,  to  their  smallest  details,  will  attain  the  truth  con- 
cerning Goethe ;  such  knowledge  is  a  mere  chronicle,  not 
science  ;  a  photograph,  not  a  painting ;  a  copy,  not  a  living 
reproduction.  Science  aims  at  something  higher :  it  seeks 
not  the  dead,  but  the  living ;  not  the  transitory,  but  the 
eternal ;  not  the  reality,  but  the  truth.  Only  it  does  not 
find  the  truth  apart  from  the  reality.  Whosoever  wants 
to  know  Goethe  must  inform  himself  as  to  his  person 
and  labors.  Whosoever  wants  to  know  nature  must  open 
his  eyes.  Whosoever  desires  to  enter  the  kingdom  of 
truth,  no  less  than  he  who  wants  to  enter  the  kingdom 
of  heaven,  must,  to  quote  Bacpn's  words,  become  as  a 
little  child  which  learns  by  obeying.  We  do  not  create 
the  truth,  and  we  do  not  spin  it  out  of  our  brain  ;  but,  in 
order  to  find  it,  we  must  go  back  to  the  facts,  to  reality, 
to  the  sources. 

All  science  rests  on  the  assumption  that  reality  is  not 
co-extensive  with  the  phenomena,  but  contains  a  kernel 
of  divine  wisdom,  being  the  realization  of  the  decree  of 
God.  In  so  far  the  truth  is  bound  to  reality,  and  finds 
its  criterion  in  correspondence  with  reality.  But  the 
truth  transcends  the  empirical  reality,  because  and  in 
the  same  degree  that  scientific  investigation  descends 
more  deeply  and  penetrates  more  fully  into  its  essence. 
And  the  truth  thus  found  by  science  is  adapted  to 
consciousness,  as  it  can  be   discovered  and   received  by 

6 


82  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

consciousness  alone.  It  would,  therefore,  not  be  im- 
proper to  say  that  for  us  the  truth  comes  into  being 
only  by  being  made  the  object  of  our  knowledge  and  an 
element  of  our  consciousness.  For  this  purpose  God 
has  deposited  the  truth  in  nature  and  Scripture,  that  we 
might  have  it,  and  by  knowing  it  might  rule  through 
it.  In  the  knowledge  of  the  truth  lies  the  end  of  its 
revelation ;  reality  is  an  instrument  to  enable  us  to  find 
the  truth;  reality  is  intended  to  become  truth  in  our 
consciousness  and  in  our  experience.  Reality,  therefore, 
does  not  offer  us  in  the  truth  a  mere  copy  of  itself,  so 
that  the  world,  as  pragmatism  objects,  would  be  dupli- 
cated.23 In  the  truth,  reality  rises  to  a  higher  mode  of  ex- 
istence; having  first  lain  in  darkness,  it  now  walks  in  the 
light ;  having  once  been  a  riddle,  it  now  finds  its  solution  ; 
not  understood  at  the  beginning,  it  now  is  "  declared." 

So  the  truth  obtains  an  independent  value  of  its  own. 
Its  standard  does  not  lie  in  its  usefulness  for  life,  for,  if 
usefulness  were  the  criterion  of  truth,  then  perfect  una- 
nimity ought  to  prevail  in  regard  to  usefulness,  and 
life  itself  ought  to  be  a  value  not  subject  to  fluctua- 
tion. But  in  regard  to  life,  what  counts  is  not  merely 
existence,  or  pleasure,  or  intensity,  but  first  of  all  con- 
tent and  quality.  And  it  is  precisely  by  truth  that  this 
content  and  quality  are  determined.  The  truth  is  of 
more  value  than  empirical  life :  Christ  sacrificed  his  life 
for  it.  None  the  less,  by  doing  so  he  regained  his  life. 
Truth  is  worth  more  than  reality ;  it  belongs  to  that 
higher  order  of  things  in  which  physis,  and  gnosis,  and 
ethos  are  reconciled,  and  in  which  a  true  philosophy  gives 
full  satisfaction  both  to  the  demands  of  the  intellect  and 
to  the  needs  of  the  heart. 


IV 

REVELATION   AND  NATURE 

GOD,  the  world,  and  man  are  the  three  realities  with 
which  all  science  and  all  philosophy  occupy  them- 
selves. The  conception  which  we  form  of  them,  and  the 
relation  in  which  we  place  them  to  one  another,  determine 
the  character  of  our  view  of  the  world  and  of  life,  the 
content  of  our  religion,  science,  and  morality.1  But  at  the 
very  outset  there  emerges  a  profound  difference  of  opinion 
in  regard  to  the  sciences  which  are  devoted  to  these  impor- 
tant subjects.  It  is  often  represented  as  if  only  the  special 
science  of  theology  concerned  itself  with  God  and  divine 
things,  and  as  if  all  the  other  sciences,  particularly  the 
natural  sciences,  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  God ; 
nay,  as  if  they  would  even  forfeit  their  scientific  character 
and  become  disloyal  to  their  task,  should  they  refer  to 
him  or  take  account  of  him.  A  chasm  is  thus  created, 
objectively,  in  the  sphere  of  reality,  between  God  and  the 
world,  and,  subjectively,  in  man,  between  his  intellect  and 
heart,  between  his  faith  and  knowledge ;  even  if  the  very 
existence  of  God  be  not  denied  and  all  right  of  existence 
be  refused  to  faith. 

But  such  a  dualism  is  impossible.  God  does  not  stand 
apart  from  the  world,  much  less  from  man,  and  therefore 
the  knowledge  of  him  is  not  the  peculiar  domain  of  the- 
ology. It  is  true,  theology  especially  occupies  itself  with 
his  revelation,  in  order  that  its  nature  and  contents  may 
be,  so  far  as  possible,  scientifically  understood.     But  this 


84  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

revelation  addresses  itself  to  all  men ;  the  religion  which 
is  founded  on  it  is  the  concern  of  every  man,  even  of  the 
man  of  science  and  the  investigator  of  nature ;  for  all  men, 
without  exception,  the  knowledge  of  God  is  the  way  to 
eternal  life.  Moreover,  the  man  who  devotes  himself  to 
science  cannot  split  himself  into  halves  and  separate  his 
faith  from  his  knowledge ;  even  in  his  scientific  investiga- 
tions he  remains  man, —  not  a  purely  intellectual  being,  but 
a  man  with  a  heart,  with  affections  and  emotions,  with 
feeling  and  will.  Not  only  mankind,  but  also  every  indi- 
vidual, finds,  as  he  grows  to  full  consciousness,  a  view  of 
the  world  already  prepared  for  him,  to  the  formation  of 
which  he  has  not  consciously  contributed.2  And  the  de- 
mand which  truth  and  morality  make  on  him  is  not,  and 
cannot  be,  that  he  shall  denude  himself  of  himself,  but 
that  he  shall  be  a  man  of  God,  furnished  completely  unto 
every  good  work.  The  thinker  and  philosopher,  as  well  as 
the  common  citizen  and  the  day  laborer,  have  to  serve  and 
glorify  God  in  their  work.  4 

This  leads  immediately  to  the  conclusion  that  natural 
science  is  not  the  only  science,  and  cannot  be.  The 
French  and  English  use  of  the  word  "  science  "  might,  un- 
fortunately, lead  us  to  think  so,3  and  gives  support  to 
the  idea  of  Comte  that  humanity  has  successively  traversed 
the  three  stadia  of  theology,  metaphysics,  and  positivism, 
and  only  now  has  reached  the  standpoint  of  true  science. 
But  history  knows  nothing  of  such  a  progression ;  the 
sciences  do  not  develop  successively  one  after  the  other, 
but  more  or  less  side  by  side  and  in  connection  with  one 
another.  By  all  sorts  of  interrelations  they  exercise  an 
influence  on  each  other,  and  thus  support  and  promote 
each  other.  Nor,  in  the  development  of  science,  do  all 
things  move  on  as  simply  as  is  postulated  in  the  easy  and 


REVELATION  AND   NATURE  85 

aprioristic  scheme  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution.  No  uni- 
versal formula,  which  endeavors  to  embrace  the  entire 
course  of  history,  is  true ;  and  Comte's  law  also  fails  in 
the  face  of  the  criticism  of  life  in  its  richness.  Not  uni- 
formity, but  differentiation  and  totality,  are  everywhere 
the  distinctive  marks  of  life.4 

To  the  sciences  of  nature,  therefore,  there  belongs  in  the 
circle  of  the  sciences  the  same  liberty  of  movement  and 
work  which  is  the  right  of  every  other  science.  They  have 
their  own  object,  and  therefore  their  own  method  and  aim. 
In  their  effort  to  know  and  to  explain  natural  phenomena 
they  have  no  need  to  call  in  the  aid  of  a  Deus  ex  ma- 
china  and  make  of  faith  an  asylum  ignorantice.  As  a 
science,  natural  science  busies  itself  not  only  with  the  suc- 
cession, but  also  with  the  causes,  of  phenomena.  In  search- 
ing after  these  causes  the  conception  of  evolution,  as  a 
working  hypothesis,  has  done  eminent  service.  Analogies 
and  relations  have  been  traced  out  and  discovered,  which 
otherwise  would  not  so  easily  have  been  found  and  inves- 
tigated. But  here  the  mistake  has  been  made  that  evolu- 
tion, which  has  proved,  like,  for  instance,  the  physical 
atom,  useful  as  a  working  hypothesis,  has  been  elevated 
to  the  rank  of  a  formula  of  world-explanation  and  elabor- 
ated into  a  system  of  world-conception.  Thus  natural  sci- 
ence leaves  her  own  domain  and  passes  over  to  that  of 
philosophy.  It  must  acquiesce  in  the  other  sciences,  of 
religion  and  ethics,  of  jurisprudence  and  aesthetics,  com- 
ing also  to  their  rights  and  incorporating  the  results 
of  their  investigations  too  into  the  structure  of  an  all- 
embracing  view  of  the  world. 

The  representation  is  therefore  wrong,  that  faith  in  the 
existence  and  providence  of  God  finds  its  home  exclusively 
in  the  chasms  of  our  knowledge,  so  that  as  our  investiga- 


86  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

tions  proceed,  we  must  be  continually  filled  with  anxiety, 
and  steadily  lose  the  territory  of  our  faith  in  proportion  as 
more  and  more  problems  are  solved.  For  the  world  is  it- 
self grounded  in  God ;  witness  its  law  and  order.5  Faith 
naturally  insists,  —  how  could  it  fail  to  do  so  ?  —  that  it 
shall  retain  a  place  in  the  world.  It  maintains  its  demand 
that  natural  science  shall  retain  consciousness  of  its  limi- 
tations and  that  it  shall  not  form  a  conception,  out  of  the 
narrow  sphere  in  which  it  works,  in  which  no  room  is  left 
for  the  soul  and  immortality,  for  intelligence  and  design 
in  the  world,  for  the  existence  and  providence  of  God,  for 
religion  and  Christianity.  Natural  science  remains,  there- 
fore, perfectly  free  in  its  own  sphere  ;  but  it  is  not  the  only 
science,  and  must  therefore  cease  striving  to  construe 
religious  and  ethical  phenomena  after  the  same  physico- 
chemical  and  mathematico-mechanical  fashion  as  is  war- 
ranted and  required  in  the  case  of  numberless  natural 
phenomena.  In  principle  what  faith  demands  is  that  sci- 
ence shall  itself  maintain  its  ethical  character,  and  shall 
not  put  itself  at  the  service  of  the  evil  inclination  of  the 
human  heart  in  its  endeavor  to  explain  the  world  without 
God  and  to  erect  itself  into  a  self-supporting  and  self-suf- 
ficient divinity. 

No  barrier  is  thus  erected  around  natural  science  which 
it  cannot  respect ;  but  rather  a  boundary  is  assigned  to  its 
sphere  of  labor  which  is  demanded  by  its  own  object  and 
character.  For  whereas  formerly  the  concept  "  nature  " 
frequently  embraced  all  creation,  and,  as  naturata,  was 
distinguished  from  God  as  the  natura  naturans,  it  is 
nowadays  usually  limited  to  sensible  objects  and  phe- 
nomena, so  far  as  they  are  not  produced  by  human  art. 
In  this  sense  nature  stands,  then,  as  the  non-ego,  in  an- 
tithesis with  the  human  psyche,  as  the  observing  and 


REVELATION   AND   NATURE  87 

knowing  subject.  But  because  the  mechanical  view  has  a 
perfect  right  of  existence  in  a  part  of  the  territory  which 
history  has  gradually  assigned  to  natural  science,  and  has 
indeed  led  in  it  to  various  valuable  results,  many  have 
drawn  the  conclusion  that  natural  science  is  the  only 
true  science,  and  that  the  mechanical  solution  is  the  only 
true  solution  of  all  phenomena.  Haeckel  goes  even  so 
far  as  to  claim  that  every  one  who  still  believes  in  a  soul, 
or  a  principle  of  life,  deserts  the  domain  of  science, 
and  seeks  refuge  in  miracles  and  .supernaturalism.6  On 
the  other  hand,  von  Hartmann  justly  maintains  that  who- 
soever, as  a  scientist,  deems  the  mechanical  explana- 
tion of  the  phenomena  of  life,  for  instance,  insufficient, 
and  endeavors  to  explain  them  in  another  way,  namely, 
by  a  principle  of  life,  deals  with  the  matter  just  as  scien- 
tifically as  any  other.7  And  Ostwald  has  even  called  the 
mechanical  view  of  the  world  "  a  mere  delusion,"  which 
cannot  be  utilized  even  as  a  working  hypothesis.8  In 
fact,  the  conception  that  the  world  as  a  whole  and  in  all 
its  parts  is  one  vast  machine  is  so  absurd  and  self-contra- 
dictory that  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  it  could  even 
for  one  moment  have  satisfied  and  dominated  the  human 
mind.  For  aside  from  the  fact  that  even  a  machine  would 
postulate  an  intelligent  maker,9  the  other  fact  remains 
that  a  machine  which  is  eternally  self-moving,  and  never 
has  ceased  to  work  and  never  will  cease  to  do  so,  is  in 
conflict  with  all  our  experiences  and  all  our  thinking. 
In  point  of  fact  the  world,  far  from  being  intelligible 
as  a  machine,  is  "in  no  respect  self-explaining,  but  in 
every  respect  mysterious."  Its  very  existence  is  a  riddle. 
The  great  miracle  before  which  we  stand  is,  that  there 
is  something  which  is,  that  there  is  an  existence  of 
which  we  are  unable  to  point  to  the  ground.10     To  the 


88  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

world,  as  a  whole  and  in  all  its  parts,  we  ascribe  only  a 
contingent  existence,  so  that  its  explanation  is  not  found 
in  itself.  Physics  points  back  to  and  is  founded  in 
metaphysics. 

This  is  already  evident  from  the  fact  that  the  science 
of  nature,  although  it  has  in  many  respects  the  advantage 
over  the  mental  sciences,  still  utilizes,  and  is  compelled 
to  utilize,  all  sorts  of  ideas  which  are  not  derived  from 
experience,  but  are  present  from  the  very  start.  Ideas 
like  "  thing  "  and  "  property,"  "  matter  "  and  "  force," 
"  aether  "  and  "  movement,"  "  space  "  and  "  time," 
"  cause  "  and  "  design,"  are  indispensable  to  natural  sci- 
ence ;  but  they  are  derived  from  metaphysics.  They  serve 
as  logical  apparatus  which  precedes  all  observation ;  and 
yet  they  are  so  far  from  plain  and  clear  that  they,  each 
in  itself  and  all  together,  contain  a  world  of  mysteries. 
Naturally  this  does  not  satisfy  the  human  mind.  It 
endeavors,  whether  successfully  or  not  makes  no  differ- 
ence, to  apprehend  the  meaning  and  the  truth,  the  prin- 
ciple and  the  cause,  of  these  ideas.  Natural  science  may 
for  a  time  despise  philosophy ;  by  and  by  it  must  return 
to  it,  because  it  has  itself  proceeded  from  it.11  When 
the  "  thirst  for  facts  "  has  been  in  a  way  satisfied,  the 
"  hunger  for  causes "  will  come  to  the  surface.12 

The  proof  of  this  is  found  herein,  that  no  one  is  able 
to  banish  from  his  heart  or  to  remove  from  his  lips  the 
question  of  the  origin  of  things.  Haeckel  justly  observes, 
however,  that  this  question  lies  outside  of  the  domain  of 
natural  science.  If  creation  ever  took  place,  tk  it  lies  en- 
tirely beyond  the  scope  of  human  knowledge,  and  hence 
can  never  become  the  object  of  scientific  investigation." 
But  he  does  not  stop  there,  but  immediately  proceeds: 
"  Natural  science  regards  matter  as  eternal  and  imper- 


REVELATION  AND   NATURE  89 

ishable,  because  the  origination  or  annihilation  of  the 
smallest  of  its  particles  has  never  yet  been  proved  by  ex- 
perience." In  announcing  this  dogma  of  the  eternity  of 
matter,  however,  it  is  not  the  student  of  nature  but  the 
philosopher,  not  science  but  faith,  that  speaks ;  for  what 
he  objects  against  faith  is  of  force  against  himself : 
"  where  faith  begins,  there  science  ceases."  13  And  this 
is  all  the  more  forcible  because  elsewhere  he  is  compelled 
to  admit :  "  We  nowhere  reach  a  knowledge  of  ultimate 
causes  "  ;  even  if  all  the  riddles  of  the  world  and  of  life 
were  solved,  the  one  great  riddle  of  substance  would 
confront  us  like  a  sphinx.14  Physics,  then,  is  not  the 
only  science  solving  all  riddles,  but  before  it  and  above 
it  stands  metaphysics.  If,  nevertheless,  it  wishes  an  ex- 
planation of  the  origin  of  all  things,  it  commits  itself  to 
what,  scientifically  considered,  as  Lodge  says,  "  must  be 
viewed  as  guess-work,  being  an  overpressing  of  known 
fact  into  an  exaggerated  and  over-comprehensive  form 
of  statement."  15 

Not  less  great  are  the  difficulties  which  confront  natural 
science  when  it  investigates  the  essence  of  things.  Here 
we  have  to  deal  with  three  factors,  —  space,  time,  and  a 
quale,  howsoever  we  may  further  define  it,  which  in 
space  and  time  makes  their  mutual  relations  possible. 
These  factors,  too,  the  science  of  nature  does  not  find 
by  its  own  investigations,  but  rather  postulates  from 
the  start.  And  these  ideas  again  embrace  a  whole 
array  of  difficulties.  We  do  not  know  what  space  and 
time  are  in  themselves.  We  do  not  know  the  relation 
which  they  sustain  to  matter  and  force  ;  and  of  their 
finiteness  or  infinity  we  can  form  not  the  slightest 
notion.16  Kant  points  out  in  his  antinomies  of  reason 
that  with  these  ideas  we  confront  difficulties  which  are 


90  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

insoluble  to  our  thought.  The  affirmation  that  the  world 
has  had  no  beginning  and  has  no  limits,  involves  us  in  the 
self-contradictions  of  an  infinite  time  and  an  infinite 
space,  for  the  sum  total  of  finite  parts,  however  many 
they  may  be,  can  never  equal  infinitude.17  Time  and 
space  are  therefore  the  existence-form  of  the  world  and 
the  conception-form  of  our  consciousness ;  but  they  cannot 
be  identified  with  that  which  is  the  absolute  ground  and 
cause  of  all  existence.  In  this  sense  they  belong  not  to 
"  reality,"  but  to  "  appearance,"  or  rather,  they  appertain 
only  to  creation,  but  not  to  the  Creator.  And  since  an 
eternal  time  and  a  boundless  space  are  like  a  wooden  iron, 
our  thinking  forces  us  to  distinguish  the  absolute  from 
the  relative.  Monism  does  not  exist  here,  and  if  it 
nevertheless  be  sought  here,  it  can  bring  us  nothing  but 
confusion.  Eternity  and  time,  immensity  and  space,  do 
not  differ  quantitatively  but  qualitatively.  And  since  the 
words  "  absolute,"  "  eternal,"  "  immense,"  u  infinite,"  are 
predicates,  and,  when  substantivized,  form  only  empty 
abstractions,  they  presuppose  a  transcendent  subject, 
differentiated  from  the  world,  to  Avhom  they  belong. 
That  is  to  say,  physical  science,  which  thinks  through 
its  own  conceptions,  and  fathoms  its  own  nature,  issues 
in  metaphysics  and  rises  straight  to  God. 

Not  less  involved  is  the  problem  presented  by  the 
third  conception,  of  which  the  science  of  nature  makes 
use,  namely,  the  idea  of  some  sort  of  substance  which 
exists  in  the  forms  of  time  and  space  and  makes  their 
interrelation  possible.  In  a  formal  sense  natural  science 
is  "  the  exhibition  of  the  coherence  of  reality  as  a  unified 
system  of  regulated  relations  of  dependence  between 
elements  of  space,  time,  and  number." 18  Its  aim  is  — 
whether  rightly  or  wrongly  —  to  comprehend  all  change 


EEVELATION   AND   NATURE  91 

and  movement  in  a  mathematical  formula  and  to  reduce 
all  qualitative  differences  to  quantity.  So  far  as  it  strives 
after  this  aim,  it  is  a  formal  science.  But  it  is  self- 
evident  that  reality  is  not  comprehended  in  these  formal 
definitions.  Reality  is  something  else  and  something 
more  than  a  complex  of  quantitative  relations.  These 
presuppose  precisely  a  quale,  which  exists  in  those  re- 
lations. Even  if  we  knew  all  the  laws  of  motion  and 
of  change  to  which  matter  is  subject,  with  all  that  its 
essence  would  still  remain  a  mystery.  Astronomy  may  be 
able  to  compute  the  movements  of  celestial  bodies,  but 
this  does  not  enlighten  us  in  regard  to  their  nature  and 
composition. 

Now,  ideas  concerning  the  substance  of  things,  even 
among  the  votaries  of  natural  science,  diverge  very 
widely.  But  even  the  very  first  question,  whether  such  a 
substance  exists,  or  whether  the  psychic  sensations  are 
the  ultimate  elements  of  reality,  falls  entirely  outside  of 
the  bounds  of  physics  and  brings  us  again  into  the 
domain  of  philosophy.  When  Max  Verworn  attacks 
materialism  and  "  energetism  "  in  the  name  of  monism, 
he  no  longer  speaks  as  a  physiologist,  but  as  a  philosopher. 
But  even  he,  although  he  repels  the  antithesis  of  subject 
and  object,  of  spirit  and  matter,  of  soul  and  body,  does 
not  find  monism.  For  when  he  says  that  the  entire 
physical  world  is  only  "  a  content  of  the  psyche/'  he 
begins,  without  admitting  it,  with  the  reality  of  the 
psyche,  that  is  of  substance,  and  differentiates  between  it 
and  its  contents.  As  long,  therefore,  as  science  believes 
in  itself,  it  cannot  escape  the  necessity  of  postulating  in 
and  above  experience  a  unity,  a  bond,  a  subject,  which 
tests  and  orders  this  experience.19  And  as  the  experience 
subjectively  presupposes  a  subject  which  experiences,  it 


92  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

also  objectively  points  to  a  reality,  which  just  as  little 
as  the  subject  is  exhausted  in  relations.  In  the  sub- 
ject there  is  a  difference  between  a  Beziehendes  and  a 
Bezogenes;  and  in  the  object  there  is  a  difference 
between  the  relations  and  the  reality  of  which  they  are 
predicated.  Very  truly  Fechner  says  :  u  Not  merely  the 
detailed  phenomena,  but  also  that  which  holds  them 
together,  has  reality ;  nay,  to  the  latter  belongs  the  highest 
reality."20  But  whatever  we  may  think  of  this,  the 
question  of  the  reality  of  the  soul  and  the  world  belongs 
to  metaphysics ;  it  is  not  answered  by  empirical  investiga- 
tions, but  by  metaphysics,  that  is  to  say,  in  other  words, 
by  faith. 

The  same  is  true  with  reference  to  the  problem  of  the 
ultimate  nature  of  that  reality  which  must  be  accepted 
unless  we  are  willing  to  sink  into  solipsism.  Whether  we 
take  the  theistic  standpoint  here,  or  accept  some  one  of 
the  different  forms  of  monism,  we  do  not  attain  to  our 
conception  of  the  nature  of  reality  by  the  way  of  experi- 
ence, but  must  permit  ourselves  to  be  led  by  metaphysical 
reasoning  on  the  basis  of  observation.  And  it  is  not  exact 
science,  but  faith  and  the  character  of  our  personality,  which 
decides  the  matter  here.  It  is  not  presumable  that  physics 
and  chemistry,  however  far  they  may  extend  their  re- 
searches, will  ever  change  this  state  of  affairs.  Chemistry 
still  has  some  seventy  elements,  whose  resolution  or  com- 
position it  cannot  effect  and  which  differ  from  one  another 
in  qualities.  And  although  physics  reduces  the  phenomena 
of  light,  heat,  and  electricity  to  vibrations,  it  has  not  yet 
succeeded  in  reducing  the  qualitative  differences,  which 
manifest  themselves  in  these  phenomena,  to  quantitative 
relations.  The  nature  of  the  ultimate  element  of  things 
is  still  utterly  unknown.      Whether  these  elements  are 


REVELATION   AND   NATURE  93 

atoms,  which  differ  only  in  size,  form,  and  weight,  or  even 
in  quality,  or  whether  these  ultimate  elements  of  exist- 
ence are  rather  "monads"  or  "reales,"  matter  or  energy, 
or  both  together  —  all  this  is  a  fit  subject  for  philosophic 
speculation,  but  must  per  se  far  transcend  all  observation. 
In  our  day  natural  science,  in  order  to  explain  the  phe- 
nomena of  light  and  electricity,  assumes  the  existence  of 
an  ether,  which  fills  all  space.  But  this  ether  has  never 
been  observed,  and  its  nature  is  unknown.  A  great  effort 
is  being  made  to  discover  an  original  stuff,  which  lies  at 
the  base  of  all  matter,  especially  since  Sir  William  Ram- 
say's announcement  that  radium  can  be  transmuted  into 
helium  and  lithium;  and  hypotheses  have  already  been 
constructed  which  see  such  an  original  stuff  in  hydrogen 
or  in  the  electron  or  in  the  ether.  But  for  the  time  being 
W.  A.  Shenstone  is  perfectly  justified  in  saying,  "that  we 
are  still  very  far  from  knowing  definitely  that  atoms  are 
composed  entirely  of  electrons,  or  that  electrons  are  noth- 
ing but  electric  changes ;  and  though  electrons  have  been 
shown  to  exhibit  electric  inertia,  it  has  not  been  proved 
that  the  inertia  of  atoms  is  also  electrical."  21 

And  just  as  little  as  all  matter  has  been  reduced  to  one 
original  stuff,  have  the  different  forces  been  as  yet  shown 
to  be  only  forms  of  one  original  force.  Force  in  itself  is 
a  mysterious  phenomenon.  When  Ostwald  seeks  to  re- 
duce all  matter  to  energy,  he  can  only  hypostatize  and  per- 
sonify a  conception  which  has  been  derived  from  matter 
by  abstraction,  and  mistakenly  imagines  that  he  has  thus 
eliminated  matter.22  Similarly  every  specific  force  is  an 
unexplained  mystery;  the  force  of  gravitation,  for  instance, 
is  not  an  explanation,  but  only  the  name  of  a  phenomenon, 
and  it  is  even  questionable  whether  the  name  is  exact.23 
Especially  in  regard  to  the  vital  force,  differences  of  opin- 


94  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

ion  assert  themselves.  Mechanism  and  vitalism  here  stand 
in  bitter  opposition,  and  the  neovitalists  are  at  war  among 
themselves  on  the  question  whether  the  cause  of  life  is 
to  be  sought  in  a  special  force  of  the  organism,  or  rather 
in  an  idea  or  form  dominating  and  governing  this  organ- 
ism. And  thus  the  riddles  increase  step  by  step,  as  science 
penetrates  more  deeply  into  the  essence  of  things  or  rises 
higher  in  the  ascending  scale  of  creation.  The  cell  is  the 
last  and  lowest  form  of  life,  but  the  cell-core  and  proto- 
plasm, which  form  the  cell,  are  not  homogeneous,  and  point 
to  different  compositions ;  the  original  individua  of  bio- 
plasts are  not  of  one  kind ;  plants,  animals,  and  man  do 
not  yet  form  an  uninterrupted  ascending  chain  of  crea- 
tures ;  even  the  animals  have  not  been  reduced  to  one 
primordial  type,  and  are  nowadays  usually  divided  into 
eight  classes.  Everywhere  in  creation  we  face  an  endless 
differentation,  an  inconceivable  multiformity  of  creatures, 
an  inexhaustible  wealth  of  essence  and  life. 

Beyond  question  it  is  the  duty  of  science  to  reduce  this 
chaos  of  phenomena  to  order.  It  has  to  give  us  the  thread, 
following  which  we  may  not  lose  our  way  in  this  labyrinth, 
but  find  the  right  path.  But,  as  has  already  been  said,  it 
is  an  aprioristic  and  wholly  unjustified  assumption  that 
this  path  through  the  labyrinth  of  the  world  must  lead 
to  monism,  —  particularly  when  monism  itself  has  been 
erected  on  an  utterly  aprioristic  view  of  the  world ;  namely, 
on  the  conception  that  this  world  must  find  its  explanation 
in  itself.  But  unity,  true  unity,  a  unity  which  does  not 
destroy  differentiation,  but  rather  includes  and  enfolds  it, 
may  come,  and  can  come,  only  when  the  entire  world  is 
conceived  as  the  product  of  the  wisdom  and  power  which 
reveal  God's  eternal  plan.  Only  a  personal  God,  who  is 
both  will  and  intelligence,  can  call  a  world  into  existence, 


REVELATION   AND   NATURE  95 

which  is  one  and  yet  differentiated ;  just  as  man  alone,  who 
has  been  created  in  his  image,,  is  a  knowing  and  willing 
being,  a  knowledge-making  and  tool-making  animal. 

But  suppose  for  a  moment  that  all  matter  and  all  force, 
all  existence  and  all  life,  could  be  reduced  in  our  thinking 
to  one  ultimate  principle ;  even  so  nothing  is  gained  for  the 
truth  of  monism  or  for  the  explanation  of  the  world.  For 
first  of  all  the  old  logical  rule  is  still  in  force  —  a  posse 
ad  esse  non  valet  consequentia.  The  mere  fact  that  in  our 
thought  we  can  form  the  conception  of  a  world  which  has 
produced  itself  from  one  substance  through  the  action  of 
one  force,  would  not  prove  at  all  that  this  conception  is 
the  true  one  and  that  reality  corresponds  to  this  concep- 
tion. For  instance,  it  is  well  known  that  the  elements 
which  constitute  the  bodies  of  living  beings  are,  besides 
oxygen,  carbon,  hydrogen,  nitrogen,  and  sulphur.  But 
these  four  elements  are  never  found  in  a  free  state,  but 
always  in  combination  with  oxygen  (oxidized),  especially 
in  the  form  of  carbonic  acid,  water,  sulphuric  acid,  and 
saltpetre.  In  order,  therefore,  that  they  may  be  serviceable 
for  the  formation  of  albumen  and  other  organic  compounds, 
they  must  first  be  separated  from  the  oxygen  (deoxidized). 
To  the  question  whether,  in  earlier  periods  of  this  world's 
existence,  free  carbon,  hydrogen  and  sulphur  existed,  an 
answer  could  be  given  by  experience  alone;  but  in  the 
nature  of  the  case  this  is  not  available.  Logical  analy- 
sis is  thus  something  different  from  real  decomposition. 
Even  if  chemistry  should  ultimately  discover  a  single  orig- 
inal element,  even  that  would  not  at  all  prove  that  this 
original  element  existed  in  the  beginning  separately,  and 
has  slowly  and  gradually,  through  a  variety  of  mechanical 
combinations,  brought  into  being  the  several  existing  ele- 
ments.24    Physics  never  is  empowered  to  conclude  from 


96  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  posse  to  the  esse,  from  the  conception  to  the  reality ; 
it  is  not  limited  by  any  extraneous  power,  but  by  its  own 
character. 

Still,  for  the  sake  of  argument  let  us  also  admit  that 
there  was  originally  only  one  element  and  one  force,  from 
which  by  slow  degrees  everything  has  developed.  Then 
natural  science  would  be  simplified,  but  the  riddle  of 
the  multiformity  of  the  world  would  continue  undimin- 
ished.26 It  would  be  merely  transferred  and  moved  back- 
wards ;  transferred  to  the  one  substance  and  moved  back 
to  an  endless  past.  And  by  this  it  would  even  be  in- 
creased in  intensity.  For  the  question  thus  becomes : 
how,  from  one  single  uniform  original  element,  by  any  pos- 
sibility, this  world,  with  its  endless  differentiations,  could 
have  been  produced.  The  answer  to  the  atomists  used  to 
be  that  the  Iliad  could  not  have  been  produced  by  an  acci- 
dental collocation  of  a  font  of  type.  But  there  is  nothing 
here  to  compare  to  the  difficulty  of  the  monists  in  explain- 
ing the  world.  For  an  alphabet  at  least  consists  of  differ- 
ent letters,  and  language  may  illustrate  how  the  human 
mind  can  from  a  few  sounds  form  tens  of  thousands  of 
words.  But  the  new  monism  lets  the  Iliad  of  the  world 
arise  out  of  the  collocation  of  the  same  letter  and  the  same 
sound.  Such  a  process  is  possible  only  if  the  one  world- 
substance  is  elevated  to  deity  and  invested  with  the  attri- 
butes of  omniscience  and  omnipotence,  which,  according  to 
theism,  belong  to  the  personal  God  alone.  Without  met- 
aphysics, without  faith,  without  God,  physics  does  not 
reach  its  mark.  But  the  deity  which  is  finally  invoked  is 
a  Deus  ex  machina;  the  faith  in  which  it  hides  itself 
is  an  asylum  iynorantice ;  and  the  divinity  winch  it  con- 
ceives is  one  of  its  own  making. 

In  the  conflict  which  nowadays  rages  on  all  sides,  and 


REVELATION    AND   NATURE  97 

which  is  frequently  represented  as  a  conflict  between  sci- 
ence and  faith,  physics  and  theology,  the  principal  dif- 
ference, therefore,  does  not  concern  the  question,  What 
is  nature?  but  rather  this  other  one,  What  is  God?  If 
possible,  this  will  be  still  more  clearly  seen  if  we  call 
attention  finally  to  the  problem  of  motion.  Nothing 
proves  more  clearly  that  this  problem  cannot  be  solved 
than  the  fact  that  philosophy  throughout  the  ages  and 
among  all  nations  and  down  to  the  present  day  divides 
itself  into  two  tendencies.  With  Zeno,  "  becoming  "  is 
sacrificed  to  "  being,"  or  with  Heraclitus,  "  being "  to 
u  becoming."  In  point  of  fact,  we  can  spare  neither,  for 
"  becoming "  presupposes  "  being."  There  can  be  no 
question  of  change  if  there  is  no  identity  and  continuity 
of  the  subject.26  But  monism  cannot  accept  this  differ- 
entiation, endeavors  to  reduce  motion  to  rest  or  rest  to 
motion,  and  thus  once  again  sacrifices  the  facts  of  reality 
to  a  play  of  ideas.  And  by  this  endeavor  it  gets,  at  every 
subordinate  point  which  is  raised  by  the  problem  of  mo- 
tion, in  an  impasse  which  has  no  outlet. 

For  whether  motion  is  reality  or  appearance,  the  ques- 
tions of  its  cause  and  nature,  its  laws  and  aim,  can  never 
be  suppressed.  If  now  there  is  no  primum  movens,  no 
"  being  "  which  gives  existence  to  the  "  becoming,"  noth- 
ing is  left  but  to  think  of  motion  as  eternal.  And 
Haeckel  accordingly  affirms  that  the  substance  of  the 
universe,  with  its  two  attributes,  matter  and  energy,  fills 
infinite  space  and  is  in  an  eternal  motion,  and  that  this  mo- 
tion thus  proceeds  in  an  endless  time.27  But  such  words, 
though  no  doubt  they  endure  to  be  set  side  by  side  on 
paper,  form  in  thought  an  intolerable  antinomy.  Eter- 
nity and  motion  can  be  just  as  little  correlated  in  one  and 
the  same  subject  as  infinitude  and  space  (or  time),  as  the 

7 


98  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

absolute  and  the  relative,  as  God  and  the  world.  And 
this  is  all  the  less  possible  if  the  world,  according  to 
Haeckel's  notion,  is  a  vast  machine.  For  a  machine 
which  keeps  on  working  forever,  without  ever  coming  to 
a  stop,  is  an  inconceivable  and  impossible  perpetuum  mo- 
bile. If  the  world  is  eternal,  it  is  no  machine ;  if  it  is  a 
machine,  it  cannot  be  eternal. 

A  similar  difficulty  arises  with  respect  to  the  nature  of 
motion.  Man  has  always  lived  in  the  conviction  that 
there  is  no  effect  without  a  cause.  Even  if  in  earlier  times 
numerous  phenomena  or  occurrences  were  explained  by 
the  operation  of  divinities,  of  spirits,  or  of  mysterious 
powers,  this  is  merely  a  proof  that  the  law  of  causality 
is  not  an  invention  of  modern  times,  but  is  a  category  of 
the  human  mind.  Neither  did  men  in  early  times  ascribe 
all  phenomena  to  supernatural  operations,  nor  is  this 
done  to-day  among  the  so-called  "  nature-peoples."  For 
everywhere  and  always  there  has  been  quite  an  extended 
sphere  in  which  things  were  referred  to  natural  causes. 
From  his  origin  man  has  worked  in  order  to  eat ;  has 
applied  himself  to  fishing  and  to  the  chase,  to  agriculture 
and  stockraising,  and,  in  a  primitive  way,  also  to  knowl- 
edge and  art.  By  the  aid  of  the  means  at  hand  he  has 
obtained  food  and  clothing  and  shelter.  The  conception 
of  natural  causes  has  never  been  wholly  lacking  in  man. 
But  no  doubt  this  domain  of  natural  causes  was  much 
more  limited  than  at  the  present  day.  Science  has  grad- 
ually expanded  the  idea  of  nature  and  of  the  natural. 
And  every  reasonable  man  rejoices  in  this  expansion  of 
our  knowledge,  which  is  at  the  same  time  power  and 
domination  of  spirit  over  matter. 

But  when  science  seeks  to  apply  the  law  of  causality 
in  such  sense  as  to  permit  only  a  mechanical  relation 


REVELATION   AND   NATURE  99 

between  cause  and  effect,  it  not  only  passes  beyond  its 
competence,  but  also  cuts  itself  off  from  explaining  the 
phenomena.  For  just  as  motion  presupposes  no  less  con- 
tinuity than  change,  causality  implies  both  that  cause  and 
effect  stand  in  relation  to  one  another,  and  that  the  effect 
is  something  more  than,  or  at  least  something  different 
from,  the  cause.  For  if  this  were  not  so,  ever}rthing 
would  remain  where  it  is,  or  at  least  at  the  same  level ; 
everything  would  revolve  in  a  circle,  and  there  could  be 
no  possible  question  of  progress,  ascent,  or  development. 
Now  reality  teaches  us  certainly  to  recognize  such  prog- 
ress and  development;  there  is  a  great  differentation  of 
being.  And  even  in  the  sphere  where  we  speak,  and 
justly  so,  of  mechanical  causality,  causality  is  not  at  all 
exhausted  by  mechanism.  We  call  it  by  that  name,  no 
doubt,  but  this  name  does  not  cover  the  much  richer 
reality. 

Lodge  has  said  very  truly :  "  There  is  no  necessary  jus- 
tification for  assuming  that  a  property  exhibited  by  an 
aggregate  of  particles  must  be  possessed  by  the  ingre- 
dients of  which  it  is  composed ;  on  the  contrary,  wholly 
new  properties  may  make  their  appearance  simply  by 
aggregation."  28  The  simplest  combinations  of  elements 
already  manifest  properties  different  from  those  of  the  ele- 
ments themselves.  Water  differs  in  nature  from  each  of 
its  two  components,  —  oxygen  and  hydrogen;  vitriol  is 
different  from  any  of  its  three  components,  —  iron  and 
sulphur  and  oxygen.29  And  in  a  much  higher  measure 
this  is  true  of  organic  beings.  Heredity  has  been  for 
years  the  object  of  keen  investigation,  but  no  one  will 
affirm  that  its  secret  has  been  disclosed  and  that  its  ex- 
planation has  been  accomplished.  The  variety  of  the 
theories  which  have  been  framed  concerning  it  —  those 


100  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

of  Lamarck  and  Darwin,  Erlsberg  and  Haeckel,  Nageli 
and  de  Vries,  Weismann  and  Hertwig  —  is  enough  to 
show  that  not  one  of  them  is  satisfactory.  For  the  pres- 
ent we  can  only  say  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  heredity, 
and  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  variability,  as  certainly 
we  might  very  well  have  expected  from  the  beginning. 
But  of  its  cause  and  relations  we  thus  far  know  nothing. 
All  change  seems,  in  varying  degrees,  to  be  a  sort  of 
generation  which  produces  something  newer  and  higher. 
Thus  change,  progress,  and  development  are  possible,  but 
thus  also  it  becomes  manifest  that  the  attempt  to  trans- 
mute all  causality  into  mechanical  relationship  is  doomed 
from  the  very  start.  In  causality  other  forces  are  at  work 
than  those  which  can  be  expressed  by  figures. 

This  being  so,  the  laws  of  nature  also  assume  an  aspect 
different  from  that  which  still  is  often  ascribed  to  them. 
Really  we  can  speak  of  natural  laws  only  from  the  stand- 
point of  theism.  Natural  laws  exist  only  when  there  is 
a  lawgiver,  who  stands  above  nature  and  who  has  decreed 
that  seedtime  and  harvest,  and  cold  and  heat,  and  summer 
and  winter,  and  day  and  night  shall  not  cease  while  the 
earth  remains.  Abstracted  from  God  as  the  law-giver,  the 
laws  of  nature  are  nothing  but  a  human  and  ever  fallible 
description  of  the  way  in  which  things  operate.  Like 
substance  and  force  and  motion,  these  natural  laws  are 
frequently  no  doubt  hypostatized  and  elevated  to  the 
rank  of  powers  and  rulers  over  things.  But  against  this 
the  words  of  von  Hartmann  are  pertinent,  that  "  Of  all 
entities  created  by  hypostatizing  abstractions  probably 
that  of  (natural)  law  as  a  power  antedating  the  existence 
of  things,  hovering  over  them  and  controlling  them,  is  the 
most  fictitious."  ^  Our  natural  laws  are  only  a  formula 
for   the   method   of  work  and  of   motion  of  the  things. 


REVELATION   AND   NATURE  101 

Therefore  they  are  far  from  fixed,  are  anything  but 
unchangeable;  on  the  contrary  they  are  changed,  modified, 
restricted,  enlarged,  according  as  we  learn  to  know  the 
things  better.  Robert  Mayer,  for  instance,  the  discoverer 
of  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy,  completely  ex- 
cluded from  this  law  the  entire  domain  of  psychical  life, 
and  considered  it  a  great  error  to  identify  things  physical 
and  psychical.31  And  although  Wundt  in  the  first  edi- 
tion of  his  Lectures  on  the  Human  and  Animal  Soul, 
published  in  1863,  applied  this  law  in  the  psychical  domain 
too,  he  expressly  receded  from  this  position  in  the  second 
edition  of  his  work,  published  in  1892,  and  has  since 
defended  the  theory  of  psychophysical  parallelism,  —  a 
change  of  opinion  which  brought  upon  him  the  gibe  of 
Haeckel,  that  it  was  usual  in  old  age  for  "a  gradual 
degeneration  to  set  in,  in  the  brain  as  well  as  in  the  outer 
organs."  32  Similarly  Lodge  offers  very  serious  objections 
to  the  laws  of  the  constancy  of  matter  and  energy, 
since  at  best  they  are  applicable  only  to  the  forces 
which  we  know  at  present  and  as  we  now  know  them. 
But  in  case  that  matter  should  prove  the  phenomenal 
form  of  a  complex  of  ether,  production  and  dissolution  of 
matter  would  be  possible.  And  in  case  that  life  should 
prove  to  be  more  than  a  physico-chemical  force,  we  would 
have  to  modify  the  law  of  the  constancy  of  energy,  as 
some  have  already  proposed  to  do,  since  the  discovery  of 
radium.  So  long,  therefore,  as  matter  in  its  essence  is 
unknown,  and  the  resident  forces  of  creation  are  not 
exhausted  by  us,  all  formulation  of  laws  is  necessarily 
tentative,  and  a  large  degree  of  modesty  is  the  proof  of 
a  scientific  spirit.33  For  in  the  last  analysis  all  laws  of 
nature,  whatever  philosophical  standpoint  we  may  occupy, 
are  determined  by  the  nature  of  that  being  which  is  the 


102  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

ground  and  origin  of  all  things  and  the  force  of  all  forces. 
Laws,  ordinances  they  are,  therefore,  then  only,  and  in 
so  far  only,  as  they  may  have  a  metaphysical  character. 

And,  moreover,  only  in  that  case  can  there  be  any 
question,  in  the  development  of  the  world,  of  a  meaning 
and  an  aim.  Darwin  rejoiced  in  the  discovery  of  natural 
selection,  because  he  thought  that  by  its  aid  he  could 
explain  the  adaptations  of  nature  without  a  divine  intelli- 
gence.34 Helmholtz  found  the  novelty  of  the  doctrine  of 
descent,  in  its  exhibition  how  "adaptation  in  the  form- 
ation of  organisms  can  be  produced  by  the  blind  reign 
of  natural  law  without  the  interference  of  any  intelligent 
factor."  ^  And  notwithstanding  his  mechanical  view  of 
the  world,  Haeckel  continues  to  talk  about  means  and  aim, 
about  egoistic  and  altruistic  duties,  about  a  "  fundamental 
law  of  ethics,"  and  about  ethics  as  "  the  science  of  norms."36 
The  attack  of  the  evolutionary  hypothesis  is  really  not 
directed  against  adaptation  in  nature.  On  the  contrary, 
although  it  proceeds  from  a  mechanical  causality,  it  lays 
all  its  stress  on  the  tendency  and  aim  of  the  development. 
It  loves  to  pose  as  the  theory  of  progress,  and  to  tell  us  that 
evolution  has  successively  originated  life,  consciousness, 
will,  and  all  that  is  true,  and  good,  and  beautiful ;  that  it 
has  gradually  ennobled  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  has 
made  it  a  "  battle  of  the  spirit,"  for  that  which  is  noblest 
and  best.  Causality  in  the  doctrine  of  evolution  does  not 
antagonize  teleology,  but  is  only  a  means  and  an  element 
in  the  process  of  development.  By  the  one  it  ascribes 
to  nature  compulsion ;  by  the  other,  will  and  fitness 
(sollen).87 

But  as  soon  as  this  adaptation  in  the  world  is  taken 
as  a  teleological  proof  of  the  existence  and  providence 
of    an    intelligent  power,  opposition  is  aroused,  and   all 


REVELATION   AND    NATURE  103 

monstrosities  and  rudimentary  organs,  all  disasters  and 
mishaps  are  called  to  the  witness-stand,  to  break  down 
the  force  of  this  proof.  There  may  be  an  unconscious 
and  blind  adaptation,  but  no  conscious  and  intelligent 
one.  Haeckel  once  said  that  the  eye  and  the  ear  are 
so  marvellously  constructed  that  they  might  seduce  us 
into  believing  in  a  creation  according  to  a  definitely 
thought-out  plan  of  construction.  But  he  steels  himself 
against  the  "  seduction."  And  thus  he  betrays  the  fact 
that  the  so-called  conflict  between  science  and  faith  lies 
not  in  the  realm  of  the  physical,  but  in  that  of  the  meta- 
physical ;  concentres  not  in  nature,  but  in  God.  What 
nature  is  to  us  is  determined  by  what  we  think  of  God 
and  who  he  is  for  us. 

It  is,  therefore,  by  no  means  an  indifferent  matter  for 
science,  and  especially  for  physics,  what  ground  we  occupy 
in  metaphysics.  We  may  not  think  as  we  please ;  even 
scientific  work  has  a  moral  character,  and  we  have  to 
render  an  account  of  it  as  well  as  of  every  idle  word. 
When  we  sever  nature  from  God,  and  do  not  consider 
nature  as  a  work  and  revelation  of  God,  but  look  on  it  in 
the  completest  sense  as  aOeos,  this  unbelief  immediately 
turns  into  superstition.  Without  God  all  things  go  wrong, 
both  in  our  living  and  in  our  thinking.  The  denial  of  the 
existence  of  God  includes,  in  the  same  moment,  the  ele- 
vation of  the  creature  into  the  place  of  God.  This  is  mani- 
fested in  the  materialism  of  Haeckel,  when  he  openly 
avows  his  atheism,  but  at  once  invests  his  substance  with 
the  predicates  of  eternity,  omnipresence,  omnipotence,  etc., 
which  belong  to  God  alone.  It  comes  even  more  clearly 
into  evidence  in  the  energetic-psychical  and  logical  monism. 
For  there  is  bound  up  with  this  the  acknowledgment  that 
the  world  is  no  machine,  which  man  can  take  apart  and 


104  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

put  together  again,  but  an  unconscious,  mysterious  power, 
which  produces  and  directs  everything.  The  intelligi- 
bility of  nature,  which  was  so  long  believed  in  by  science, 
is  therefore  more  and  more  giving  place  to  the  confes- 
sion of  its  unknowableness.  Some  years  ago  Fechner 
preached  his  hylozoism  and ,  as  many  Greek  philosophers 
had  done,  conceived  of  the  universe  literally  as  a  living 
organism,  and  this  conception  has  of  late  found  accept- 
ance with  many.  In  1889  Vogt  ascribed  to  atoms  a  sense 
of  pain.  Haeckel  not  only  sees  in  the  attraction  and 
repulsion  of  atoms  the  forces  of  love  and  pain,  but  he 
animates  all  plastidules  and  replaces  the  wood-  and  water- 
nymphs  of  the  Greeks  by  countless  elementary  souls 
and  spirits,  which  are  the  properties  of  cells.38  The  laws 
of  nature  —  although  they  are  only  a  defective  formula- 
tion of  the  way  in  which  forces,  which  are  but  imper- 
fectly known,  are  working  —  are  elevated  to  the  rank  of 
mythical  beings,  like  the  abstracta  of  the  Romans.39  All 
investigators  of  nature  apply  to  nature  the  conceptions  of 
power,  force,  industry,  labor,  resistance,  tension,  etc.,  with- 
out stopping  to  consider  that  all  these  things  are  borrowed 
from  human  personality,  have  a  psychological  content,  and 
are  therefore,  when  robbed  of  it,  nothing  but  empty 
forms.  In  the  essence  of  the  thing,  what  is  done  is  what 
is  ascribed  as  a  naive  error  to  primitive  man:  nature  is 
explained  by  animistic  or  anthropomorphic  conceptions.40 
The  issue  of  science  in  our  day,  in  a  remarkable  manner, 
reaches  out  the  hand  of  fellowship  to  man,  such  as  he 
existed,  according  to  the  common  idea,  in  his  infancy.41 

Recent  literature  and  art  afford  even  more  startling 
proof  of  this  deification  of  nature  than  science.  For 
without  in  the  least  belittling  its  value,  it  may  be  said,  on 
good  grounds,  that  recent  art,  as  a  whole,  has  as  its  aim 


REVELATION   AND   NATURE  105 

to  represent  man  as  powerless  over  against  nature.  Its 
revival  in  the  last  century  was  a  reversion  to  mysticism. 
The  essence  of  things  did  not  exist  in  material  atoms,  but 
it  was  life,  infinitely  deep  life,  eternally  operative  force. 
From  this  principle  advance  could  be  made  to  symbolism, 
which  sees  in  art  an  attempt  to  give  a  suggestion,  in  sound 
or  color,  in  line  or  arabesque,  of  the  inexpressible;  and 
fhen  further  to  a  glorification  of  the  mystiei,  and  an  ses- 
thetic  prizing  of  religion,  especially  of  the  Romish  wor- 
ship, as  happened  with  the  "  neo-Chretiens  "  of  France. 
But  from  the  pantheistic  and  agnostic  conception  of  the 
universe,  the  conclusion  could  just  as  well  be  drawn 
that  the  everywhere  operative  force  is  a  mysterious  blind 
fate,  of  which  man  is  the  plaything  and  against  which 
nothing  can  prevail.  It  is  thus  that  in  the  art  of  the 
present  day  nature  is  pictured.  It  is  provided  with  secret 
powers,  dark  operations,  soft  moods,  and  over  against  it 
man  is  degraded  to  the  point  of  a  mere  natural  being, 
which,  borne  down  by  heredity,  is  abandoned  to  the  play 
of  his  lusts  and  passions,  stripped  of  his  spontaneity,  lib- 
erty, and  personality,  and  left  incapable  of  aught  but 
living  himself  out,  like  a  plant  in  the  field.42  Thus  the  re- 
lation of  man  to  nature,  notwithstanding  the  victories  of 
science,  becomes  the  very  opposite  of  what  it  was  before. 
The  Christian  view  of  nature  is  gradually  giving  place 
to  that  of  the  heathen  peoples ;  and  the  widely  spread 
movements  of  theosophy  and  spiritism,  of  telepathy  and 
astrology,  assist  in  this  degradation  of  man  under 
nature.  The  un-deification  of  nature  turns  into  deifi- 
cation of  nature,  the  royal  liberty  of  man  into  fatalistic 
subjection. 

Man  can  attain  to  a  true,  free  relation  to  nature  only 
when  he  stands  in  his  true  relation  to  God.     And  this  we 


106  PHILOSOPHY    OF   REVELATION 

owe  to  Christianity  alone.  In  the  polytheistic  religions 
of  India  and  China,  Babylon  and  Egypt,  Greece  and  Rome, 
man  cannot  obtain  his  freedom  over  against  nature, 
because  all  creatures,  plants  and  animals,  woods  and  trees, 
mountains  and  brooks,  stars  and  suns,  are  conceived  as 
inhabited  by  gods  or  spirits.  Over  against  all  this  man 
is  tortured  by  a  continuous  fear  and  unbroken  anxiety. 
But  this  relation  is  utterly  changed  when  we  listen  to 
Moses  and  the  prophets,  to  Christ  and  the  apostles.  They 
are  all  free  over  against  nature,  because,  through  com- 
munion with  God,  they  are  elevated  above  nature.  Deifi- 
cation of  nature  is  here  just  as  inconceivable  as  contempt 
of  nature.  "Paganism  oscillates  between  overbearing 
abuse  of  the  world  and  childish  dread  of  its  powers." 
But  in  Israel  this  is  wholly  different.  "  With  sovereign 
self-consciousness  the  Hebrew  faces  the  world  and  nature. 
Fear  of  the  world  is  unknown  to  him  ;  nevertheless  he 
meets  it  with  a  sense  of  the  highest  responsibility.  As 
God's  representative  man  rules  the  world,  but  in  that 
capacity  only.  He  may  not  obey  his  caprice,  but  only  the 
revealed  will  of  God." 43 

Man  owes  this  free  and  royal  relation  to  nature  first  of 
all  to  the  fact  that  all  the  world  is  recognized  as  created 
by  God.  Here  at  once  the  truth  is  found  for  which  mon- 
ism seeks  in  vain.  There  must  be  a  unity,  which  lies  at 
the  bottom  of  all  diversity.  But  this  unity  cannot  be 
found  within  the  world,  for  matter  and  force,  spirit  and 
matter,  the  physical  and  the  psychical,  the  psychical  and 
the  ethical,  personality  and  association  cannot  be  reduced 
to  one  another;  they  do  not  exist  after  each  other,  but 
each  with  its  own  concept  and  valuation,  side  by  side 
with  each  other.  Whosoever,  within  the  world,  tries  to 
reduce  unity  to  multiformity,  being  to  becoming,  spirit  to 


REVELATION  AND   NATURE  107 

matter,  man  to  nature,  or  the  reverse,  always  plays  false 
with  the  other  half  of  the  distinction.  Thus  physics  calls 
for  metaphysics ;  nature  itself  shows,  in  the  core  of  its  ex- 
istence, that  it  does  not  exist  of  itself,  has  not  been  origi^ 
nated  by  evolution,  but  is  grounded  in  revelation.  And 
revelation,  by  the  word  of  prophets  and  apostles,  confirms 
this  and  gives  us,  in  the  wisdom  and  omnipotence  of  God, 
in  his  sovereignty  and  counsel,  that  unity  for  which  the 
human  spirit  thirsts.  So  soon,  therefore,  as  this  theistic 
monism  is  surrendered,  after  a  brief  and  unsatisfactory 
trial  of  materialism  and  pantheism,  polytheism  in  different 
forms  returns.44  The  power  of  nature  and  the  power  of 
the  morally  good  fall  asunder  as  in  Manichaeism  ;  to  man 
and  nature,  nations  and  religions,  different  origins  are  as- 
cribed ;  and  since  the  forces  at  work  in  the  world  cannot 
be  reduced  to  unity,  each  of  them  in  its  own  sphere  is 
hypostatised,  and  first  in  the  conception,  but  later  also  in 
the  imagination,  they  are  made  gods.  But  the  revelation 
which  comes  to  us  in  Christ  protects  us  from  all  this.  It 
joins  itself  to  the  revelation,  which  nature  itself  makes 
known  to  us ;  it  elevates  this  to  its  fullest  right,  and  main- 
tains it  in  its  real  value,  and  by  its  doctrine  of  creation 
cuts  all  polytheism  and  all  dualism  up  by  the  roots.  Not 
only  mind  but  also  matter,  not  only  man  but  also  nature,  is 
of  divine  origin,  and  has  lain  in  the  thought  of  God  before 
it  came  into  being. 

The  doctrine  of  creation  maintains  the  divinity,  the 
goodness  and  sacredness  of  all  created  things.  In  this 
world  man  now  receives  his  own  independent  place. 
He  is  of  kin  to  all  the  world,  formed  out  of  matter, 
earthy  of  the  earth ;  nothing  natural  is  strange  to  him. 
But  in  one  respect  he  is  different  from  all  creatures ;  he 
is  the  son,  the  image,  the  similitude  of  God,  his  offspring. 


108  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Thereby  he  is  elevated  above  animal  and  angel,  and  des- 
tined and  fitted  for  dominion  over  all  the  world.  In  this 
relation  of  man  to  God  and  to  the  world  is  the  foundation 
laid  and  the  origin  given  of  all  science  and  art.  For  how 
can  it  be  explained  that  man  through  his  senses  can  ob- 
serve the  world,  and  through  his  intelligence  can  know 
and  understand  it  ?  Whence  this  wonderful  correspond- 
ence of  knowing  and  being?  What  is  the  basis  of  the 
belief  that  the  conception  and  the  thought  in  the  human 
brain  are  no  imagination  and  no  hallucination,  but  corre- 
spond with  the  reality  ?  What  is  the  ground  for  the  har- 
mony between  subject  and  object,  the  ego  and  the  non-ego  ? 
What  is  the  root  from  which  springs  the  unity  of  the 
laws  of  existence,  the  ideas  of  our  thinking,  the  norms  of 
our  actions  ?  In  what  do  physis,  gnosis,  and  ethos  find 
their  common  systema?  What  is  the  foundation  of  the 
symbolism  of  nature,  not  in  the  sense  of  an  unfounded 
nature-theosophy,  but  in  the  sense  in  which  Christ  saw  in 
the  world  a  parable  of  the  kingdom  of  heaven ;  in  the 
sense  in  which  Goethe  said  that  "  all  transitory  things 
are  but  a  parable  "  ;  in  the  sense  in  which  Drummond  in 
"  the  natural  law  "  detected  an  analogy  of  the  law  of  the 
spirit?  On  what,  in  a  word,  are  founded  comparison, 
metaphor,  poetry,  art,  and  all  science  and  all  culture  ? 
On  what  else  do  they  rest  but  on  the  confession  that  one 
word,  one  spirit,  one  divine  intelligence  lies  at  the  foun- 
dation of  all  things  and  maintains  their  unity  and  mutual 
relations  ? 

And  thus  finally  place  is  found  for  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  diversity  of  the  world.  Nothing  is  simpler 
than  to  allow,  according  to  the  scheme  of  emanation,  all 
things  gradually  to  descend  from  above ;  or,  according  to 
the  scheme  of  evolution,  all  things  gradually  to  ascend  from 


REVELATION   AND   NATURE  109 

below.  In  a  museum,  and  equally  in  the  mind,  it  is  a  very 
easy  matter  to  place  one  creature  by  the  side  of  another 
and  to  fill  in  the  missing  links  by  some  hypothesis  or  indi- 
vidual construction.  It  is  just  as  easy  as  —  to  use  a  hu- 
morous example  —  to  explain  the  origin  of  the  English 
fox,  from  the  Greek  word  akdair^  by  assuming  that  the 
transitional  forms,  lopex,  pex,  fex,  have  disappeared.45 
But  reality  laughs  at  this  system  just  as  it  laughs  at  the 
aprioristic  world-construction  in  Hegel's  philosophy.  Crea- 
tures do  not  exist  in  succession  to  one  another,  in  a  straight 
line  of  development,  but  side  by  side ;  they  thus  live  out 
their  lives  and  hold  continually  with  one  another  a  living, 
organic,  diversified,  reciprocal  relation.  So  it  was  through- 
out all  the  ages,  and  so  it  is  yet,  in  our  day.  The  con- 
stancy of  the  species  is  an  undeniable  fact,  in  the  face  of 
all  variability  of  which  we  are  cognizant  in  the  historical 
period  which  we  know.  The  weaker  specimens  and  species 
do  not  die  out,  according  to  the  law  of  "natural  selec- 
tion," but  continue  to  exist,  side  by  side  with  the  stronger, 
to  this  day.  Existence  is  not  simply  and  alone  a  battle  of 
all  against  all,  but  also  a  continuous  mutual  supporting  and 
aiding.  There  is  much  hatred,  but  there  is  also  much  love 
in  the  world.  The  diversity  of  the  world  is  a  fact  which, 
taken  in  connection  with  its  harmony,  can  find  its  expla- 
nation only  transcendently  in  a  personal  God.  For  F.  A. 
Lange  has  said  very  correctly:  "When  after  a  free  and 
grand  fashion  we  ascribe  to  the  one  God  a  unified  plan  of 
operation  on  a  large  and  comprehensive  scale,  then  the 
coherence  of  all  things  according  to  the  principle  of  law 
and  effect,  not  only  becomes  conceivable,  but  even  appears 
a  necessary  consequence  of  this  assumption."  ^ 

Against    this    organic    view   of    the    world    only   one 
argument    is   advanced.     But   it  is  an  argument  which 


110  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

is  of  very  great  weight,  for  it  is  drawn  from  the  awful 
misery  of  the  world.  And  this  misery,  viewed  both  as 
sin  and  suffering,  is  a  touching  and  heart-breaking  fact. 
The  whole  creation  is  in  travail.  Anguish  is  the  funda- 
mental trait  of  all  living  things.  A  great  secret  pain 
throbs  through  nature.  Everywhere  the  lawless,  the 
chaotic,  lies  at  the  base  of  the  orderly;  there  is  an 
inexplicable  restlessness  in  all  things.  Vanity,  change, 
death  are  written  on  all  existing  things.  Humanity 
walks  by  the  margin  of  an  abyss  of  guilt.  It  perishes 
under  the  anger  of  God  and  is  troubled  by  his  wrath. 
How  can  such  a  world  be  reconciled  with  the  wisdom, 
the  goodness,  the  omnipotence  of  God  ?  Both  philosophy 
and  theology  have  made  many  attempts  to  solve  this 
problem.  It  has  been  sought  to  find  the  explanation  of 
misery,  metaphysically,  in  the  finite,  or  to  give  it,  aesthet- 
ically, a  part  in  the  harmony  of  the  world  as  a  whole, 
or  to  interpret  it,  psedagogically,  as  a  strengthening  of 
man's  spiritual  life.  The  infralapsarians  have  deduced 
it  from  the  justice  of  God.  Others,  with  Lotze,  have 
despaired  of  finding  any  explanation,  or  have  even  taken 
refuge  in  a  limitation  of  God's  omnipotence  and  wisdom, 
and  have  found  in  matter  or  in  the  laws  of  nature  a 
limit  to  his  working.47 

But  even  if  there  is  a  measure  of  truth  in  each  of 
these  various  theories,  the  misery  of  the  world  is  too 
great  and  too  diversified  to  be  explained  from  any  single 
cause,  or  to  be  subsumed  under  any  single  formula. 
And  it  is  not  lessened  by  it  all.  What  profit  is  there, 
for  instance,  in  saying :  "  Who  to-day  thinks  of  the 
San  Francisco  earthquake  as  an  act  of  God  and  not  as 
a  mechanical  occurrence?"48  Is  God  then  no  longer 
the  God  whose  providence  extends  over  all?     Pragma- 


REVELATION   AND    NATURE  111 

tism  is  so  far  within  its  right  that  it  finds  all  these 
explanations  insufficient  and  misleading,  and  calls  atten- 
tion once  more  to  realities.  It  breaks  mere  appearance, 
it  snatches  the  blindfolding  from  our  eyes,  and  it  avows 
openly  that  this  world  is  a  chaos,  which  can  become 
good  and  true  only  through  the  hands  of  men. 

But  in  so  doing  it  forgets  that,  in  its  deepest  sense, 
the  struggle  lies  not  between  man  and  nature,  but  is 
fought  out  in  the  heart  of  man  himself,  between  his 
what  is  and  his  what  ought  to  be.  The  struggle  is 
primarily  of  an  ethical  rather  than  of  a  physical  nature. 
This  is  proved  first  of  all  by  the  fact  that  all  the 
acquisitions  of  culture,  however  rich  they  may  be,  do 
not  quiet  the  restlessness  of  the  heart  and  are  unable  to 
silence  the  voice  of  conscience.  Moreover,  according  to 
the  testimony  of  the  heroes  of  our  race,  all  the  misery 
of  the  world  can  be  overcome  by  faith.  And  that  is  the 
only  way  which  revelation — that  in  nature  already,  but 
far  more  plainly  that  in  the  Scriptures  —  points  out  to  us 
for  the  reconciliation  of  the  discord.  It  makes  no  effort 
to  explain  all  the  suffering  of  the  world.  It  allows  it  to 
remain  where  it  is  and  accepts  it:  accepts  it  so  fully 
that  no  pessimistic  literature  can  surpass  the  pathos  of  its 
complaint.  But  revelation  does  not  incite  man  to  resist- 
ance and  rebellion,  but  lays  bare  to  his  consciousness  the 
guilt  in  his  own  life.  It  casts  him  down  in  his  littleness, 
and  says  to  him,  Who  art  thou,  O  man,  that  repliest 
against  God  ?  But  then,  also,  it  immediately  raises  him 
from  his  humiliation ;  it  preaches  to  him  no  stoical  apathy 
or  fatalistic  acquiescence  in  things,  but  it  makes  him 
through  the  Word  to  know  the  will  of  God  to  save  the 
world  notwithstanding  all  its  misery,  and  it  fills  his 
soul  through   the   Spirit  with  the  patience  of  faith,   so 


112  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

that  weak  man  can  endure  all  his  pain,  can  glory  in 
tribulation,  and,  with  God,  can  overcome  the  world.  If 
God  is  for  us,  who  can  be  against  us?  And  this  is 
the  only  victory  which  overcomes  the  world,  even  our 
faith. 


V 

REVELATION  AND   HISTORY 

THE  indispensability  and  significance  of  revelation 
appear  in  history  in  an  even  higher  and  richer 
measure  than  in  nature.  But  so  soon  as  we  set  foot  on 
this  domain,  our  attention  is  immediately  attracted  by 
an  interesting  controversy  which  for  several  years  has 
been  waged  by  historians  among  themselves. 

When  the  natural  sciences  in  the  last  century  attained 
all  manner  of  brilliant  results  through  the  application  of 
the  inductive  method,  the  wish  arose  in  many  breasts  that 
history  might  be  studied  after  the  same  method,  and  thus 
reach  equally  certain  results.  There  was  ultimately  only 
one  science,  that  of  nature ;  whatever  was  reckoned  to 
the  so-called  intellectual  sciences  must  be  reduced  to  and 
embodied  in  natural  science  if  it  were  to  retain  its  claim 
to  the  name  of  science.  Thus  historical  investigation 
could  be  considered  a  true  science  only  if  its  object  — 
historical  occurrences  —  were  conceived  as  a  mechanical 
process,  dominated  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  by  the 
same  laws  as  nature.  But  in  the  attempt  to  make  of 
history  an  empirical,  positive  science  there  were  developed 
from  the  very  beginning  different  tendencies.  All  were 
at  one  in  the  conviction  that  the  events  of  history  were 
just  as  inevitable  as  the  phenomena  of  nature,  and  that 
they  should  be  observed  and  fixed  just  as  unprejudicedly 
and  objectively  as  the  latter.  But  a  great  difference  of 
opinion  arose  upon  the  question  how  these  facts  were  to 

8 


114  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

be  understood  and  from  what  causes  they  were  to  be 
explained. 

There  are  some  who,  like  Buckle,  de  Greef,  Mongeolle, 
seek  the  ultimate  and  principal  causes  of  historic  events 
in  the  physical  environment  of  climate,  soil,  and  food,  and 
base  history  on  anthropogeography.  There  are  others  who, 
like  Taine,  and  especially  Gobineau  and  H.  St.  Chamber- 
lain, consider  the  race  the  principal  factor  in  history  and 
ask  of  ethnology  the  solution  of  historical  problems.  Men 
like  Le  Bon,  Tarde,  Rene  Worms,  Ratzenhofer,  and  Sighele 
try  to  find  the  explanation  of  historical  facts  in  psychol- 
ogy and  social  circumstances ;  whilst  many  scholars  like 
Hobbes,  Rousseau,  Comte,  Spencer,  von  Hellwald,  Schaffle, 
Durkheim,  and  others,  cherish  the  idea  that  society 
itself  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  an  organism  of  a  higher 
order,  which,  like  all  living  things,  stands  under  the 
dominion  of  biological  laws,  and  is  gradually  developed 
and  perfected  in  the  struggle  for  existence  by  natural 
selection  and  heredity.  The  Socialists,  Marx,  Engels, 
Kautsky,  and  their  fellows,  look  at  everything  from  the 
viewpoint  of  the  conflict  between  the  classes,  and  defend 
the  materialistic  or  economic  view  of  history,  according 
to  which  the  consciousness  of  man  does  not  determine  his 
being,  but  reversely  his  social  being  his  consciousness. 
And  finally,  in  these  last  years,  Karl  Lamprecht  has 
appeared  as  a  defender  of  the  culture-historical  method, 
which  discovers  the  deepest  ground  of  historical  events  in 
the  folk-soul,  and  therefore  seeks  after  a  social-psycho- 
logical solution  of  the  problem.1 

This  endeavor  to  bring,  in  these  different  ways,  surety 
and  certainty  into  the  science  of  history,  is  easy  to  under- 
stand. For  history  differs  from  physics  in  this  respect, 
that  it  does  not  have  the  object  of  its  investigation  im- 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  115 

mediately  at  hand  so  as  to  be  able  to  experiment  upon  it, 
but  can  know  it  only  by  means  of  a  testimony  which 
others,  either  intentionally  or  unintentionally,  directly  or 
indirectly,  have  given.  Even  though  this  testimony  is  not 
accepted  unconditionally,  but  is  first  subjected  to  a  severe 
criticism,  there  must  enter  into  the  study  of  history,  through 
the  interposition  of  tradition,  a  certain  personal  element 
of  trust  which  is  not  found,  or  at  least  not  in  such  a 
degree,  in  the  investigation  of  natural  phenomena.  This 
personal  element  in  historical  research  is  considerably 
augmented  by  the  fact  that  we  are  unable  to  assume  as 
objective  and  dispassionate  an  attitude  to  the  persons  and 
testimonies  with  which  history  brings  us  into  contact  as  to 
natural  phenomena.  In  history  we  are  not  disinterested 
observers,  but  live  the  lives  of  other  men,  are  attracted  or 
repelled  by  them,  feel  sympathy  or  antipathy  towards 
them.  And  especially  in  the  case  of  important  persons 
or  great  events,  such  as,  for  instance,  the  origin  of  Chris- 
tianity, the  Reformation,  the  Revolution,  etc.,  our  con- 
victions, our  heart,  and  our  emotions  play  an  important  part. 
From  the  very  start  personal  interest  makes  itself  felt  in 
our  criticism  of  the  witnesses,  and  it  continues  to  exercise 
its  influence  in  the  pragmatic  description  and  judgment 
of  events.  A  believer  in  and  a  denier  of  the  divinity  of 
Christ  cannot  judge  the  books  and  contents  of  the  Old 
and  New  Testaments  in  the  same  way ;  and  we  cannot 
expect  the  same  history  of  the  Reformation  from  a  Roman 
Catholic  and  from  a  Protestant.2  In  historical  research 
the  personality  of  the  student  is  felt  much  more  strongly, 
therefore,  than  in  natural  science ;  the  science  of  his- 
tory splits  into  tendencies  and  thus  seems  to  lose  its 
claim  to  the  name  of  science.  We  can  therefore  perfectly 
understand  the  effort  which  is  made  to  rescue  history,  as 


116  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

a  science,  from  this  subjectivity,  and  to  make  it  just  as 
objective  and  exact  as  the  science  of  nature,  which  seems 
the  same  to  all  men,  without  distinction  of  religious  con- 
victions. 

To  this  was  added  in  the  last  century  that  the  field  of 
history  was  expanded  in  an  extraordinary  way,  in  no  less 
degree  indeed  than  that  of  natural  science.  What  in  the 
fifteenth  century  the  travels  of  Vasco  de  Gama,  Columbus, 
Magellan,  Cook,  etc.,  had  been  for  our  knowledge  of  the 
earth,  the  discoveries  of  Champollion,  Rawlinson,  Grote- 
fend,  Layard,  W.  Jones,  Burnouf,  and  others,  became  for 
our  knowledge  of  history.  Whilst  historical  knowledge 
was  formerly  confined  to  a  few  countries  and  peoples,  it 
has  now  widely  extended  itself  to  all  sorts  of  peoples,  and 
reaches  back  into  the  past  to  times  far  earlier  than  Moses. 
This  extraordinary  extension  of  the  domain  of  investiga- 
tion has,  naturally,  increased  the  material  inconceivably, 
and  made  it  necessary,  in  order  to  create  order  in  this 
chaos,  to  conceive  the  events  in  their  mutual  relations 
and  to  discover  the  process  and  the  law  which  is  hidden 
in  them.  It  was  inevitable  that  the  ideological  view  of 
history  presented  by  Hegel  and  the  Tubingen  school 
should  give  place  under  the  inspiration  of  natural  science 
to  a  positive  and  nomological  treatment  of  history.  It 
was  no  longer  permissible  to  construe  the  facts  in  accord- 
ance with  a  preconceived  idea ;  but,  inversely,  from  the 
facts  the  laws  must  be  learned  which  controlled  them  in 
their  development. 

Apparently  this  positive  treatment  of  history  goes  to 
work  in  an  utterly  unprejudiced  manner, purely  empirically 
and  inductively.  But  actually  it  is  just  as  much  domi- 
nated by  a  preconceived  idea  as  the  ideological  treatment 
of  Hegel,  and  this  idea  is  in  both  cases  that  of  evolution, 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  117 

conceived  in  a  mechanical  or  in  a  dynamic  sense.  It  is 
silently  presupposed  that,  in  the  last  analysis,  one  and  the 
same  causality  originates  all  events  and  causes  them  to 
succeed  each  other  according  to  the  law  of  progressive  de- 
velopment, in  a  straight,  upward  line.  Monism  and  evo- 
lution are  the  principia  of  the  modern  view  of  history,  just 
as  in  the  last  lecture  they  proved  to  be  such  in  the  inves- 
tigation of  nature.  But  it  deserves  attention  at  the  outset 
that  the  conception  of  evolution,  when  applied  in  history 
to  a  family  or  a  tribe,  to  a  people  or  to  humanity,  has  an  en- 
tirely different  sense  from  that  which  it  bears  in  individual 
organisms.  In  a  remarkable  study  of  the  idea  of  develop- 
ment and  its  application  to  history  Mr.  Galloway  says 
perfectly  correctly  that  the  idea  of  development  is  an 
idolum  fori,  "  a  stock  phrase  in  the  scientific  market- 
place." 3  We  can  conceive  what  must  be  understood  by 
development  in  an  organism.  The  germ,  the  egg,  the  em- 
bryo expands  itself,  through  the  working  of  the  power  of 
assimilation,  and  becomes  bigger  and  stronger ;  the  child 
grows  up  into  a  youth  and  a  man.  But  when  development 
is  spoken  of  in  a  people  or  in  humanity,  we  fall  immedi- 
ately into  difficulty  with  the  question  of  what  is  here  the 
subject,  the  germ  or  the  embryo  of  the  development,  and 
in  what  this  development  consists.  We  can  no  doubt  speak 
of  a  unity  in  the  case  of  a  people  or  of  humanity ;  but  this 
unity  is  necessarily  of  a  different  kind  from  that  of  an  in- 
dividual organism.  The  comparison  not  only,  —  for  this 
has  to  a  certain  extent  the  right  of  existence,  —  but 
the  identification  of  society  and  of  a  people  with  an 
organism,  led  Spencer,  Schaffle,  and  others,  into  all 
kinds  of  error  and  artificiality,  which  no  one  would 
now  be  willing  to  take  responsibility  for.  Society  is  not 
a  biological  organism,   but  an  organization,  which    no 


118  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

doubt  is  not  exclusively  established  by  the  will  of  man, 
but  certainly  not  without  it.  Before  we  can  investigate 
the  origin  and  the  development  of  such  an  organization  as 
a  family,  society,  or  people,  other  factors  than  merely  bio- 
logical ones  must  come  into  consideration ;  just  as  in  an 
organism  forces  are  at  work  which  are  not  found  in  a 
machine.  Monism  overlooks  the  difference  between  a  bio- 
logical, a  psychical,  and  an  ethical  organism,  just  as  it  does 
that  between  an  organism  and  a  mechanism  ;  but  neverthe- 
less this  differentation  continues  to  exist  in  reality  with- 
out any  abatement.4 

We  might  speak  of  evolution  in  families,  nations,  or 
humanity  if  men  successively  increased  in  height,  in  size 
and  weight,  in  strength  or  length  of  life,  or  even  in  intel- 
lectual, moral,  or  religious  capacity,  in  "  capability  of  cul- 
ture." But  this  is  by  no  means  the  case.  Years  ago 
Buckle  said  that  the  child  born  in  a  civilized  country  prob- 
ably does  not  excel  that  of  barbarians ;  and  when  this  re- 
mark is  understood  strictly  as  referring  to  the  capacity  and 
not  to  the  milieu  of  the  child,  it  is  rather  strengthened  than 
weakened  by  ethnological  investigation.5  The  capacities 
and  gifts  of  the  culture-people  of  to-day  are,  on  the  average, 
no  greater  than  those  of  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  Babylo- 
nians or  Assyrians ;  the  seventy  or  eighty  years  of  which 
the  Scriptures  speak  are  still  the  limitation  of  the  life  of  the 
strong ;  the  religious  sensibility,  moral  capacity,  adaptation 
to  art,  etc.,  by  no  means  advance  with  the  years ;  "  every- 
where," as  Professor  de  Vries  says,  "  the  characteristics  of 
individuals  librate  about  an  average,  and  everywhere  they 
do  it  according  to  the  same  law."  6  We  might  cherish  the 
hope  of  progress,  however  slow  it  might  be,  if  it  were  es- 
tablished that  characteristics,  once  attained,  are  transmitted 
by  heredity.     But  on  this  there  exists  the  greatest  possi- 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  119 

ble  difference  of  opinion.  Experience  teaches  us  that 
numberless  characteristics,  both  intellectual  and  moral,  are 
not  transmitted  from  parent  to  child.  Learned  men  not 
rarely  have  stupid  children;  pious  parents  frequently 
bring  up  godless  children ;  the  gifts  of  grace  prove  to  be 
no  heirloom.  Newly  acquired  variations  do  not  always  con- 
tinue, but  disappear  after  one  or  more  generations.  Every 
variety  displays  a  tendency  to  return  again  to  the  original 
type,  and  nowhere,  among  plants,  animals,  or  men,  do 
we  find  an  inclination  to  continue  to  vary  in  any  one  given 
direction.  And  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  we  see  organisms 
appreciably  modify  themselves  under  the  influence  of  cli- 
mate, soil,  food,  and  other  circumstances,  and  transmit  their 
variations  to  their  descendants.  Races  and  national  types, 
the  nose  of  the  Bourbons  and  the  lip  of  the  Hapsburgs, 
the  varieties  among  the  descendants  of  the  horse  and  the 
dog,  prove  this  conclusively.  But  a  straight  line  of  devel- 
opment is  nowhere  indicated.  Heredity  is  a  dark  region. 
We  can  do  no  more  for  the  present  than  with  Delage  state 
the  fact  that  modifications  acquired  under  the  influence 
of  environment  generally  are  not,  but  sometimes  are, 
hereditary.7 

Thus  we  can  predicate  with  certainty  only  this  of  the  idea 
of  evolution  in  humanity,  that  later  generations  are  more 
favorably  situated  than  the  earlier  ones,  by  reason  of  the 
inheritance  which  has  come  to  them,  in  money  and  goods, 
in  science  and  art,  in  civilization  and  culture.  But  this  in- 
heritance can  hardly  be  denominated  by  the  name  of  evo- 
lution ;  for  these  several  possessions  of  culture  have  not 
organically  developed  from  a  germ  and  have  not  evolved 
themselves,  but  are  the  product  of  the  thought  and  will  of 
man.  The  discovery  of  America,  the  discovery  and  ap- 
plication of  steam  power,  the  knowledge  and  use  of  elec- 


120  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

tricity,  did  not  come  spontaneously,  nor  are  they  the 
necessary  product  of  economic  or  social  factors,  but  they 
presuppose  thirst  for  knowledge  and  intense  intellectual 
labor  in  man.  It  is  true  man  is  here  subject  to  the  influ- 
ence of  his  environment,  and  is  perhaps  as  much  indebted 
to  it  as  it  is  to  him.  But  the  influence  certainly  does  not 
come  exclusively  from  one  side ;  discoveries  and  inven- 
tions frequently  are  due  to  extraordinary  personalities, 
whose  origin  and  existence  remain  a  mystery,  despite  all 
biographical  investigation.  A  genius  like  Goethe  is  far 
from  explained  when  we  know  that  he  inherited  his  u  stat- 
ure "  from  his  father  and  his  "  cheerful  disposition  "  from 
his  mother.  Evolution  is  a  great  word,  but  it  turns  its 
back  on  difficulties  and  sums  up  a  rich  and  complicated 
reality  under  a  vague  formula.8 

This  appears  all  the  more  clearly  when  we  consider 
that  the  advantages  of  culture,  handed  down  by  progen- 
itors, cannot  be  taken  up,  conserved,  and  increased  by 
their  descendants  without  some  action  on  their  part. 
Although  every  man  is  born  from  the  community,  and 
is  formed  by  it,  he  has  to  begin  again  for  himself  at  the 
very  beginning.  He  has  to  begin  with  the  exercise  of 
his  bodily  members  and  senses,  with  learning  to  read  and 
write  and  cipher.  From  his  birth  on  he  must  strive  to 
make  the  inheritance  of  the  past  his  own ;  he  must 
u  labor  for  it  in  order  to  possess  it."  And  there  is  the 
possibility  and  danger  that  he  may  squander,  dissipate, 
and  turn  to  his  own  destruction  the  treasures  which  fall 
in  his  lap  at  his  birth.  Individuals,  but  also  families, 
tribes,  and  peoples,  are  exposed  to  this  danger.  Culture 
may  be  a  blessing,  but  it  can  also  be  a  curse ;  it  does  not 
always  advance,  it  may  degenerate  and  come  to  nothing ; 
it  can  be  augmented,  but  it  can  also  be  destroyed  and 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  121 

annihilated  through  the  decadence  of  nations,  through 
calamities  and  wars.  And  in  the  strifes  between  peoples 
it  is  not  always  the  cultured  peoples  which  are  victorious, 
but  as  the  history  of  the  Babylonians  and  Assyrians,  of 
the  Greeks  and  Romans,  of  the  Franks  and  Germans 
teaches  us,  very  frequently  those  peoples  who  are  poor  in 
culture  and  well-nigh  devoid  of  civilization.9  When  they 
take  over  the  culture  of  the  conquered  peoples  after- 
wards, this  does  not  happen  on  their  part,  except  in  the 
course  of  a  long  lapse  of  time  and  by  the  efforts  of  their 
own  intellectual  strength.  <^ 

All  these  considerations  show  that  history  presents  a 
character  far  too  involved  and  complicated  to  be  reduced 
to  one  common  formula  or  to  be  explained  from  one 
cause.  Monism,  no  doubt,  endeavors  to  do  this  with 
history  as  well  as  with  nature.  But  all  efforts  to  com- 
prehend historical  personages  and  occurences  exclusively 
from  mechanical,  physical,  biological,  psychological,  so- 
cial, or  economic  factors,  have  only  succeeded  in  mak- 
ing evident  the  richness  of  life  and  the  complication  of 
conditions. 

Lamprecht,  for  instance,  goes  back  to  the  folk-soul,  and 
finds  in  it  the  ultimate  cause  of  history.  But  questions 
multiply  themselves  as  soon  as  we  try  to  give  to  ourselves 
a  somewhat  clear  account  of  this  folk-soul.  What  are 
we  to  understand  by  it,  and  where  is  it  to  be  found? 
How  did  it  originate,  aud  what  factors  influenced  its  for- 
mation ?  And  if  it  exists,  what  is  its  dominant  element  ? 
For  no  more  than  the  soul  of  a  man  can  it  be  a  simple 
phenomenon.  If  the  folk-soul  is  really  a  soul,  what  plays 
the  chief  role  in  it?  Intelligence,  the  emotions,  or  the 
will ;  concepts  or  feelings,  hunger  or  love  ?  And  further, 
what  is  the  connection  between  the  folk-soul  and  the 


122  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

folk -body,  and  between  it  and  all  nature,  climate  and 
soil  and  nourishment?  As  many  questions,  so  many 
enigmas.10  Instead  of  attaining  unity,  we  come  to  an 
infinite  diversity.  For  the  folk-soul  is  no  unity  ;  it  lacks 
the  unity  of  self-consciousness,  which  in  man  is  expressed 
in  his  soul.11  And  it  is  a  matter  of  great  wonderment  that, 
at  a  time  in  which  psychology  is  endeavoring  to  dissolve 
the  individual  soul  into  a  complex  of  experiences,  histor- 
ical science  wishes  to  believe  in  the  unity  of  the  folk-soul. 
In  point  of  fact,  it  thus  walks  in  the  same  path  which  is 
followed  by  natural  science  when  it  just  abstracts  in 
thought  the  forces  of  nature,  and  then  personifies  them 
through  the  imagination.  The  conception  of  a  folk- 
soul  is  just  as  useless  for  history  as  that  of  an  organ- 
ism. There  may  be  analogy,  there  is  no  identity.  In  a 
much  higher  degree  than  is  the  case  in  nature,  we  stand 
in  history  before  a  complex  of  causes  and  operations 
which  are  utterly  unknown  to  us  in  their  essence  and 
interrelations,  and  cannot  be  comprehended  in  one  single 
word.  "There  is  just  as  little  such  a  final  and  simple 
word  of  history,  which  can  express  its  true  sense,  as 
nature  has  such  a  word  to  offer."  u 

The  same  difficulty  which  erects  itself  against  the 
monistic  doctrine  of  causality  returns  when  the  attempt 
is  made  to  distinguish  in  history  an  ascending  series  of 
periods,  and  to  express  each  of  those  periods  in  a  single 
name.  Of  course,  we  are  compelled  to  speak  of  periods 
in  history,  and  to  characterize  them  by  some  trait  or 
other.  If  that  could  not  be  done,  it  would  be  quite  im- 
possible to  bring  order  into  the  chaos  of  events.  We 
speak,  therefore,  without  hesitation,  of  ancient,  mediaeval, 
and  modern  history ;  of  the  age  of  the  Reformation  and 
of  the  "  Enlightenment."    But  we  must  not  forget  that  we 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  123 

do  not  comprehend  the  totality  of  such  a  period,  by  any 
means,  in  such  a  formula.  The  age  of  the  Reformation, 
for  instance,  was  also  that  of  the  Renascence,  of  the  re- 
vival of  philosophy  and  of  natural  science,  of  the  origin 
of  world-communication  and  world-commerce.  The  eigh- 
teenth century  was  the  golden  period  of  the  "  Enlight- 
enment," but  it  also  witnessed  the  activity  of  Pietism, 
Moravianism,  and  Methodism ;  it  also  gave  being  to 
Winckelmann  and  Lessing,  Goethe  and  Schiller,  Rousseau 
and  Kant.  And  when  the  children  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury felt  the  need  of  characterizing  their  own  age,  they 
called  it  the  age  of  historic  sense  and  of  the  natural  sci- 
ences, of  commerce  and  communication,  of  steam  and 
electricity,  of  autonomy  and  anarchy,  of  democracy  and 
popular  power,  of  reason  and  of  mysticism,  of  cosmopoli- 
tanism and  of  the  national  consciousness;  and  all  felt 
that  no  one  of  these  names  answers  to  the  fulness  of  the 
reality.13 

And  we  must  further  keep  in  view  that  all  division 
of  the  world's  history,  however  unprejudicedly  it  be 
studied,  quietly  assumes  the  unity  of  the  race  and  a 
monistic-evolutionary  conception  of  its  history.  The 
consequence  is  that  only  a  narrow  strip  of  peoples  is 
taken  into  account  and  is  abstracted  from  all  other  peo- 
ples. And  at  the  same  time  events  and  conditions  are 
deliberately  placed  in  succession  to  one  another  which  in 
reality  occurred  side  by  side.  A  distinction  is  made  be- 
tween the  stone,  bronze,  and  iron  ages  ;  between  the  chase, 
the  pastoral  life,  agriculture,  manufacture,  and  commerce ; 
between  an  Asiatic-despotic,  mediaBval-feudal,  and  civil - 
capitalistic  society;  between  a  natural-,  money-,  and 
credit-system  of  commerce,  a  home-,  city-,  and  national- 
organization,  a  form  of  economy  based  on  the  principle 


124  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

of  need,  and  one  based  on  the  principle  of  acquisition ; 
between  symbolism,  typism,  conventionalism,  individu- 
alism, and  subjectivism  in  the  history  of  the  German 
people  ;  between  savagery,  barbarism,  and  civilization ; 
between  matriarchy,  patriarchy,  polygamy,  and  monog- 
amy ;  between  fetichism,  polytheism,  and  monotheism  ; 
between  theological,  metaphysical,  and  positivistic  phases, 
etc.  But  in  all  these  distinctions  it  is  forgotten  that  the 
relations  and  conditions  which  are  thus  placed  in  a  series 
one  after  another  exist  throughout  the  ages  side  by  side 
in  different  peoples,  and  even  within  the  same  people  in 
different  strata  of  society.  The  excavations  in  Assyria 
and  Babylon,  in  Egypt  and  Greece,  have  informed  us 
that  a  high  civilization  existed  even  in  antiquity ;  indus- 
try and  technic,  science  and  art,  commerce  and  society 
had  even  then  reached  a  high  degree  of  development. 

It  is  therefore  futile  to  attempt  to  divide  the  history 
of  humanity  into  sharply  defined  periods,  in  accordance 
with  the  evolutionary  hypothesis.  Ranke  saw  better  when 
he  said  that  not  every  succeeding  period  stands  above 
.the  preceding.  A  period  precedent  in  time  does  not 
serve  exclusively,  as  the  system  of  Hegel  demanded,  to 
prepare  for  a  succeeding  one :  it  also  occupies  an  indi- 
vidual, independent  position,  and  represents  an  independ- 
ent value.  Even  if  a  period  is  older  in  history,  it  is 
very  possible  that  it  may  have  something  which  it  alone 
possesses  and  by  which  it  excels  all  others.  The  classi- 
cal period,  the  middle  ages,  and  also  every  one  of  the 
succeeding  ages,  have  each  something  peculiar  to  itself, 
a  special  gift  and  calling,  and  they  add,  each  in  its 
own  way,  to  the  capital  of  humanity.  The  same  is 
true  of  the  nations.  They  do  not  simply  stand  in 
regular  order,   the  one  after    the   other;    but,  whether 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  125 

isolated  or  in  communion,  they  live  on  together.  And 
all  these  periods  and  peoples  have  not  only  a  horizontal 
significance  for  what  succeeds,  but  each  period  and  each 
people  has  also  vertically  its  own  significance  for  God, 
who  created  and  guided  it.  "Each  period  stands  imme- 
diately related  to  God,  and  its  value  does  not  at  all  de- 
pend on  what  proceeds  from  it,  but  on  its  very  existence, 
on  its  very  self."14 

In  the  division  into  periods  the  monistic-evolutionary 
view  of  history  comes  into  still  greater  difficulties.  It 
may  at  best  point  out  that  the  history  of  a  people  here 
or  there  has  followed  a  certain  course.  It  can  never 
furnish  the  proof  that  this  course  is  really  necessarily 
and  universally  prescribed  to  all  peoples.  True,  it  makes 
this  the  starting-point  of  its  monistic  law  of  causality, 
and  this  is  inevitable.  But  this  starting-point  is  arbi- 
trarily chosen  and  is  contradicted  by  facts.  Who  dares 
to  contend  that  every  people  has  passed  through  or 
must  pass  through  the  periods  of  stone  and  copper  and 
iron;  of  the  chase,  agriculture,  and  industry;  of  theol- 
ogy, metaphysics,  and  positivism,  and  the  like?  Even 
more  than  in  nature,  in  history  laws,  if  they  exist  at 
all,  must  bear  an  empirical  character.  They  cannot  be 
determined  beforehand,  but  have  to  be  derived  from  the 
facts.  But  this  exposes  us  to  the  greatest  difficulties. 
It  is  true,  it  is  thoroughly  justifiable  to  search  in  history 
also  for  the  reign  of  law,  for  a  connection  between  cause 
and  effect,  for  an  order  and  a  plan.  In  the  chaotic, 
in  the  arbitrary,  in  the  accidental,  we  find  no  resting 
place,  either  for  our  intelligence  or  for  our  heart.  But 
it  is  equally  certain  that  this  reign  of  law  has  not  yet 
been  found  in  history,  and  presumably  never  will  be. 
If  we  do  not  know,  in  one  way  or  another,  and  to  a 


r 


126  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

certain  extent  from  elsewhere,  it  is  impossible  to  deter- 
mine in  a  purely  empirical  way  from  the  facts,  what 
course  history  takes  and  must  take,  and  to  what  end  it 
is  advancing.  We  feel  the  need  of  this  knowledge  ;  in 
our  innermost  soul  we  all  believe  in  such  a  course  and 
such  an  aim  in  history.  For  if  history  is  to  be  truly 
history,  something  must  be  accomplished  by  it.  It  is 
the  very  sense  and  value  and  meaning  of  history  that 
in  it  and  by  it  something  shall  be  realized  which  makes 
it  worth  while  for  history  to  exist,  with  all  its  misery  and 
pain.  But  the  positivistic  method  does  not  enable  us  to 
find  this  order  and  this  aim  of  history.  In  nature  we 
scarcely  know  as  yet  what  laws  really  are ;  but,  as  is  seen 
and  acknowledged  more  and  more,  in  history  we  have  as 
yet  got  no  farther  than  that  we  perceive  a  certain  rhythm 
in  its  events.15 

And  accordingly  opinions  about  the  meaning  and  aim 
of  history  are  widely  divergent.  There  is  difference  of 
opinion  as  regards  the  place  which  should  be  assigned  to 
the  great  men  in  history,  and  to  each  man  and  people  in 
particular.  Are  the  individual  men  only  thoroughfares 
for  the  idea,  phenomena  of  the  Universal  Being,  ex- 
pressions of  the  folk-soul,  waves  of  the  ocean ;  or  have 
they  each  a  significance  for  eternity  ?  There  is  difference 
as  regards  the  method  by  which  a  rule  of  judgment  may 
be  found.  We  stand  over  against  the  persons  and  the 
events  not  only  as  onlookers,  but  also  as  judges ;  we 
cannot  assume  a  neutral  attitude  with  respect  to  them 
as  we  may  do  in  the  case  of  nature.  But  where  is  the 
standard  which  we  have  to  apply  to  be  found,  and  how 
is  it  to  be  applied  ?  And  in  the  closest  connection  with 
this  there  is  a  great  difference  about  the  true  contents,  the 
moving-forces  and  the  aim  of  history.      Are  these  to  be 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  127 

found  in  the  development  of  the  understanding  and  in 
the  advance  of  science  as  Buckle  thought ;  or  in  the  idea 
of  liberty  as  Kant  and  Hegel  imagined ;  in  the  establish- 
ment of  an  order  of  government  as  Breysig  thinks;  or 
in  production  as  Marx  supposes  ?  Are  they  to  be  found  in 
mind  or  in  matter,  in  man  or  in  culture,  in  the  state  or  in 
society  ?  The  history  which  is  studied  in  an  exclusively 
empirical  way  gives  no  answer.  And  since  every  one 
seeks  an  answer  and  cannot  live  without  such  an  answer, 
the  science  of  history  raises  itself  to  philosophy  of  history ; 
for  the  cause  and  aim,  the  essence  and  development  of  his- 
tory cannot  be  understood  without  metaphysics. 

In  recent  years  this  conviction  has  reasserted  itself  in 
the  minds  of  many.  A  strong  reaction  has  arisen  against 
the  monistic-evolutionary  view  of  history.  In  1883  Dil- 
they  already  declared  the  need  of  a  "  criticism  of  the 
historical  reason ;  "  in  1894  Windelband  pronounced  an 
oration  on  "  History  and  Natural  Science,"  in  which  he 
laid  stress  on  the  independence  of  the  former;  Heinrich 
Rickert  followed  him  in  1899,  with  an  essay  on  "The 
Science  of  Culture  and  the  Science  of  Nature,"  and  pub- 
lished in  1902  an  important  logical  introduction  to  the 
historical  sciences,  entitled,  "  The  Limits  of  the  Applica- 
tion of  Conceptions  framed  by  Natural  Science."  Since 
then  the  scientific  discussion  of  the  character  of  the  sci- 
ence of  history  has  been  unbrokenly  prosecuted,  and  flows 
out  in  a  long  series  of  orations  and  treatises,  which  ap- 
parently increases  day  by  day.16  And  still  further  there 
is  also  a  difference  among  those  who  antagonize  the  nom- 
ological  science  of  history.  According  to  Windelband  and 
Rickert  the  sciences  of  nature  and  history  are  alike  em- 
pirical and  positive ;  but  they  are  distinct  in  the  aim  with 
which  they  are  studied.     The  natural  sciences  take  their 


128  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

start,  like  the  mathematical  sciences,  from  general  propo- 
sitions, axioms,  and  postulates;  or  else  search,  like  the 
empirical  sciences,  in  the  natural  phenomena  for  the  uni- 
versal, the  idea,  the  law ;  they  are  therefore  nomothetic 
in  character.  On  the  other  hand  the  historical  sciences 
do  not  search  out  the  universal,  but  the  particular,  das 
Einmalige  ("the  singular"),  and  they  have  their  strength 
in  the  realizing  power  of  conception ;  they  have  an  ideo- 
graphic character.  But  this  is  not  all.  For  historical 
science  by  no  means  takes  up  everything  which  is  partic- 
ular and  has  occurred  at  some  time  or  other,  but  it  makes 
selection  and  treats  only  that  which  in  a  definite  sense  is 
important  and  possesses  a  real  value.  Just  as  the  indi- 
vidual man  retains  in  his  memory  only  that  which  has 
been  of  importance  for  his  life ;  so  the  history  of  a  people 
or  of  humanity  retains  the  memory  of  those  persons  and 
occurrences  only  which  were  significant  for  the  universal 
progress,  for  the  development  of  the  whole.  To  accom- 
plish this  sifting  of  the  material  the  historian  must  there- 
fore be  u  a  man  of  judgment."  He  must  proceed  from  the 
belief  that  there  are  "  universal  values  "  and  must  derive 
these  from  ethics.  Ethics  is  therefore  the  "  epistemology 
of  the  historical  sciences."  According  to  the  system  of 
"values  "  which  this  science  offers,  the  facts  of  history  are 
sifted,  ordered,  estimated.  History,  in  a  word,  is  not  a 
science  of  nature,  but  a  science  of  culture. 

Others,  such  as  Dilthey,  Wundt,  Sigwart,  go  back  one 
step  farther  still.  They  seek  the  difference  between  nat- 
ural and  historical  science,  not  only  logically  in  the  aim 
with  which  they  are  cultivated,  but  also  in  the  contents  of 
each  group.  The  character  of  the  historical  sciences  is 
not  sufficiently  expressed  by  the  name  "  sciences  of  cul- 
ture," but  receives  full  justice  only  when  they  are  indi- 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  129 

cated  as  mental  sciences  over  against  the  natural  sciences. 
The  historical  sciences  occupy  themselves  with  their  own 
distinct  object ;  they  come  into  touch  with  other  factors 
than  the  natural  sciences.  They  concern  themselves  with 
man,  with  his  psychic  faculties  and  functions,  and  there- 
fore they  follow  a  different  method  and  have  a  different 
name  from  the  natural  sciences.17 

This  reaction  against  monism  in  the  science  of  history 
is  already  remarkable,  because  it  does  not  stand  alone, 
but  is  connected  with  the  entire  movement  which  mani- 
fested itself  toward  the  close  of  the  last  century,  in  many 
different  countries  and  in  various  spheres,  and  which  has 
in  a  previous  lecture  been  characterized  as  a  revolt  of  the 
will  against  the  reason,  of  the  heart  against  the  under- 
standing, of  liberty  against  necessity,  of  man  against 
nature.18  But  it  is  also  remarkable  on  its  own  account, 
because  it  has  once  more  clearly  enunciated  the  difference 
in  aim  and  contents  between  the  natural  and  historical 
sciences  and  has  demanded  for  the  latter  independence 
and  liberty  of  movement.  History  is  something  else  and 
something  more  than  a  process  of  nature  which  develops 
itself  after  a  dialectic  method,  is  independent  of  the  con- 
sciousness, the  will,  and  the  aim  of  man,  and  is  the  neces- 
sary product  of  a  power  which  works,  as  a  whole,  without 
consciousness  and  will.19  But  we  cannot  halt  even 
at  the  conception  of  history  as  science  of  culture  or 
mental  science.  For  if  history,  in  distinction  from  natu- 
ral science,  were  to  teach  us  really,  in  a  definite  sense, 
only  the  particular  das  Einmalige  ("the  singular"),  it 
would  cease  to  be  science  and  would  become  art. 

Rickert  has  the  courage  to  draw  this  conclusion, 
and  refuses  to  acknowledge  any  laws  in  this  domain. 
The  so-called  "  laws  "  in  history  are  nothing  but  Wert- 


130  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

formeln,  formulas  of  valuation.20  Now  we  admit 
that  das  Einmalige  (u  the  singular")  has  great  signifi- 
cance in  history.21  But  when  this  is  postulated,  in  con- 
tradistinction to  and  to  the  exclusion  of  the  "  particular" 
in  nature,  this  position  cannot  be  assumed  without  criti- 
cism. For  if  the  natural  sciences  generalize  and  search 
for  laws  which  apply  to  a  multiplicity  of  cases,  this  does 
not  permit  us  to  conclude  that  these  particular  cases  are 
without  value  and  have  only  served  as  illustrations  of  the 
universal  laws ;  we  must  hold,  rather,  that  they  all  have 
an  historical  significance  in  the  process  of  the  world,  a 
place  and  task  of  their  own.22  Moreover  it  is  not  true 
that  natural  science,  in  its  entirety,  directs  itself  only  to 
the  discovery  of  the  universal ;  it  is  easy  to  say  this,  as  is 
explained  by  Professor  Heymans,  so  long  as  one  thinks 
only  of  the  abstract  natural  sciences,  like  physics  and 
chemistry ;  but  it  can  by  no  means  be  applied  when  the 
concrete  natural  sciences,  like  geology  and  astronomy, 
are  taken  into  consideration.  For  the  student  of  geology 
the  physical  and  chemical  laws  are  not  ends,  but  means, 
the  means  to  account  for  the  appearance  of  definite 
phenomena  in  the  earth-crust,  which,  as  they  appear 
and  are  to  be  explained,  mostly  occur  only  once  and 
no  more.23 

On  the  other  hand  historical  science  cannot  avoid  all 
abstraction  and  generalization.  It  is  true,  history  does  not, 
like  nature,  make  us  acquainted  with  laws,  although 
even  here  more  and  more  doubt  arises  whether,  in  any 
sphere,  we  have  really  attained  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
laws  of  elementary  phenomena.24  But  this  does  not  in 
the  least  hinder  us  from  concluding  that  the  historian 
by  no  means  fixes  his  attention  on  das  Einmalige  ("  the 
singular")    alone,  but   connects  every  person  and  every 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  131 

event  with  the  past,  searches  out  the  connection  of  facts, 
and  thus  carries  on  his  investigations  under  the  guidance 
of  an  idea,  a  plan,  a  course  in  history.  He  who  would 
deny  this  would  make  history  itself  an  impossibility  and 
reduce  it  to  the  viewpoint  of  a  chronicle.  From  this 
point  of  view  the  historian  would  see  trees  but  no  forest ; 
would  retain  facts  but  no  history ;  would  have  bricks  but 
no  building;  would  have  details  but  no  living,  organic 
whole.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  historical  investigation 
has  at  times  lost  itself  in  such  details,  and  in  that  way  has 
called  into  existence  the  danger  of  historicism  and  rela- 
tivism. And  Nietzsche  was  fully  justified  when  he  broke 
out  in  wrath  against  such  a  treatment  of  history,  for  the 
overwhelming  flood  of  details  does  not  elevate  us,  but 
crushes  us  down ;  it  robs  us  of  our  independence  and 
freedom  ;  it  denies  the  superiority  of  mind  over  matter.25 
Troeltsch  remarks,  therefore,  that  "All  history  uses  the 
study  of  details  rather  as  a  means  and  never  views  it  as 
a  final  aim.  And  in  truth  it  is  the  means  of  understand- 
ing the  great  closed  cycles  of  human  civilization,  of  the 
leading  nations,  of  the  important  circles  of  culture,  of  the 
great  branches  of  culture." 26  Without  undervaluing 
the  significance  of  details,  history  aims  at  the  knowledge 
of  the  idea,  of  the  sense  of  history.  Bare  facts  do  not  sat- 
isfy us ;  we  want  to  see  behind  the  facts  the  idea  which 
combines  and  governs  them.27 

The  newer  view  of  history  so  far  recognizes  this  that  it 
makes  the  essence  of  history  to  lie  in  the  realization  of 
values.  If  this  is  so,  the  historian  must  be  "  somewhat  of 
a  man  of  judgment,"  and  must  possess  a  standard  by 
which  he  can  judge  of  the  values  in  history.  The  danger 
is  here  far  from  imaginary  that  the  historian,  in  deter- 
mining these  values,  will  permit  -his  own  interest  to  in- 


132  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

trude  itself  and  will  test  all  facts  by  his  own  limited 
insight  and  his  own  selfish  advantage.  Rickert  sees  this 
danger,  and  discriminates  therefore  between  practical  and 
theoretical,  personal  (individual)  and  general  valuations, 
demanding  that  the  historian  shall  lay  the  former  aside 
and  thus  be  wholly  objective. 

But  granting  the  practicability  of  this  certainly  very 
difficult  discrimination  proposed  by  Rickert,  the  question 
will  nevertheless  remain  whence  we  must  derive  the 
standard  of  the  general  valuations.  It  is  not  to  be  sup- 
posed that  history  itself  will  furnish  it.  It  would  seem, 
no  doubt,  that  Troeltsch  is  of  this  opinion  when  he  says 
that  history,  notwithstanding  that  everything  in  it  is 
relative,  yet  sets  forth  and  maintains  "  norms,  ideals  of 
life,  contents  of  life,"  which  may  be  compared  with  one 
another  by  the  historian.  He  therefore  proposes  wholly 
to  lay  aside  the  old  historico-apologetic  and  speculative 
method,  to  replace  it  by  that  of  the  history  of  religions, 
and  in  this  way  to  prove  the  (relative)  truth  and  value  of 
Christianity.28  But  if  history,  as  Troeltsch  says  else- 
where, makes  everything  relative,  occupies  itself  only 
with  das  Einmalige  ("  the  singular'')  and  the  indi- 
vidual, and  cannot  "  find  a  standard  of  universal  applica- 
tion," it  must  be  impossible  for  it  to  furnish  us  with  the 
norms  and  ideals  by  which  we  may  estimate  facts  and 
persons.  In  a  fact,  by  itself,  there  is  of  course  no  quali- 
tative difference  ;  the  crime  "  happens"  just  as  well  as  the 
noblest  act  of  self-sacrifice ;  to  a  purely  objective  view  sin 
and  virtue  are  in  the  same  sense  products  as  vitriol  and 
sugar.29  The  expectation  that  history  is  to  realize  ideals 
of  life  and  norms  proceeds  from  the  assumption  that 
history  is  not  a  "  play  of  endless  variants,"  but  forms 
a   whole    which    is   animated   by   a   governing   idea,    by 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  133 

the  providence  of  God.30  A  comparison  of  persons  and 
facts  in  history  is  possible  only,  then,  when  the  his- 
torian is  from  the  start  a  "man  of  judgment "  and  brings 
to  his  task  a  standard  of  judgment  acquired  elsewhere. 
And  the  question  remains,  whence  we  must  derive  the 
standard  for  measuring  "  universally  valid  values." 

The  outcome  and  the  result,  the  use  and  the  profit,  — 
culture,  in  a  word,  —  can  scarcely  serve  the  purpose  of  such 
a  standard,  although  Rickert  sometimes  seems  to  incline 
to  this  idea.  For  the  standard  would  then  be  wholly 
utilitarian,  even  if  it  be  social-eudeemonistic  in  character; 
and  all  truth  and  virtue  would  become  subordinated  to 
utility.  But,  apart  from  this,  such  a  standard  would  be 
no  standard  at  all,  i.  e.  it  would  be  no  norm  or  rule, 
which  is  fixed  in  itself,  and  therefore  can  serve  for 
impartial  and  fair  judgment  of  phenomena  and  facts.  If 
their  culture-value  is  to  determine  the  truth  and  goodness 
of  things,  this  value  itself  ought  to  be  fixed  for  all.  But 
this  is  so  little  the  case  that  the  greatest  possible  differ- 
ence exists  about  the  contents  and  the  value  of  the  prod- 
ucts of  culture.  And  this  entirely  without  considering 
the  other  question  how  we  who  have  our  place  in  its 
midst  can  take  the  final  issue  of  history  for  a  standard. 
The  question,  therefore,  continues  to  clamor  for  an 
answer,  where  the  standard  is  to  be  found  which  can  be 
used  in  judging  historical  facts  and  personages.  History 
itself  does  not  present  it ;  immanently,  within  the  circle  of 
historical  phenomena,  it  cannot  be  found.  If  history  is 
to  be  truly  history,  if  it  is  to  realize  values,  universally 
valid  valued,  we  cannot  know  this  from  the  facts  in 
themselves,  but  we  borrrow  this  conviction  from  philoso- 
phy, from,  our  view  of  life  and  of  the  world,  —  that  is  to^-" 
say,  from  our  faith.     Just  as  there  is  no  physics  with- 


134  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

out  metaphysics,  there  is  no  history  without  philosophy, 
without  religion  and  ethics. 

Veiy  certainly  there  is  no  history  without  religion, 
without  faith  in  a  divine  wisdom  and  power.  For  sup- 
pose that  philosophy,  especially  ethics,  could  offer  us  an 
absolute  standard,  by  which  historical  values  may  be 
judged  —  a  possibility  which  is  by  no  means  uncondition- 
ally determined  —  still  the  final  and  most  important  ques- 
tion is  not  answered :  What  is  the  ground  for  the  belief 
that  such  an  absolute  value  has  an  objective  existence  and 
must  be  realized  in  history,  notwithstanding  all  oppo- 
sition? What  right  have  we  to  expect  that  the  good  will 
ultimately  be  victorious?  Rickert  is  of  the  opinion  that 
the  existence  of  such  an  absolute,  transcendent  value  can 
be  accepted  and  maintained  without  postulating  a  tran- 
scendent reality.  But  he  himself  does  not  entirely  escape 
this  postulate.  For  he  has  to  assume  that  the  idea  of 
value,  which,  in  accordance  with  the  German  idealism, 
he  considers  as  the  highest,  namely,  "  development  unto 
freedom,"  is  u  itself  in  some  way  inherent  in  the  nature 
of  the  world."  31  This  idea,  then,  has  an  objective  reality, 
perhaps  not  in  a  personal,  transcendent  God,  but  iruma- 
nently  in  the  nature  of  the  world.  It  is  difficult,  how- 
ever, to  attach  a  clear  conception  to  these  words.  The 
ideas  of  freedom,  of  truth,  of  goodness,  of  beauty,  have  no 
existence  in  themselves,  but  are  abstractions,  which  we 
have  formed  by  our  thinking.  They  are  no  transcendent 
powers  or  forces  which  realize  themselves  and  can  break 
down  all  opposition,  but  they  are  conceptions  which  we 
have  derived  from  reality  and  have  disassociated  from  it 
by  our  thinking.  When  later  on  we  hypostatize  these 
abstractions,  and  when  we  clothe  them  with  divine  wisdom 
and  power,  then  we  do  in  reality  nothing  but  what  natural 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  135 

science  frequently  does  with  its  force  and  laws,  and  what 
the  Roman  of  old  did  when  he  elevated  justice  and  truth 
and  peace  and  all  sorts  of  possible  and  impossible  abstrac- 
tions to  the  rank  of  divinities.  It  is  therefore  in  vain 
when  we  say  that  this  idea  is  grounded  in  the  nature  of 
the  world.  For  it  passes  comprehension  how  the  idea  of 
freedom,  if  it  is  no  more  than  an  idea,  can  be  grounded  in 
the  nature  of  the  world  and  can  realize  itself.  And  if  it 
is  indeed  capable  of  so  doing,  then  it  must  be  more  than 
an  idea,  and  we  cannot  conceive  of  it  in  any  other  way 
than  as  an  attribute  and  power  of  a  personal  God.  IK 
point  of  fact,  goodness,  justice,  wisdom,  etc.,  have  no 
existence  in  this  world  but  as  personal  attributes.  And 
therefore  not  only  the  theology  of  all  the  ages,  but  also 
philosophy  in  a  good  number  of  its  interpreters,  has 
postulated  the  existence  of  a  personal  God.  In  the  newer 
philosophy  Kant  here  set  the  example,  and  at  the  present 
time  he  is  followed  in  this  respect  by  Eucken,  Howison, 
and  many  others.32  If  history  is  to  remain  what  it  is  and 
must  be,  it  presupposes  the  existence  and  activity  of  an 
all-wise  and  omnipotent  God,  who  works  out  his  own 
councils  in  the  course  of  the  world.  The  more  we  pene- 
trate in  our  thinking  to  the  essence  of  history,  as  to  that 
of  nature,  the  more  we  grasp  its  idea  and  maintain  it,  the 
more  it  will  manifest  itself  as  rooted  in  revelation  and  as 
upborne  by  revelation ;  the  more  it  will  lift  itself  up  to 
and  approach  that  view  of  history  which  Christianity  has 
presented  and  wherewith  Christianity  in  its  turn  confirms 
and  supports  revelation  in  nature  and  in  history. 

Historians,  it  is  true,  to  the  detriment  of  their  own 
science,  sometimes  assume  an  inimical  or  indifferent  atti- 
tude towards  Christianity.  Rickert,  for  instance,  will 
have  none  of  it.     He  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  philosophy 


136  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

of  history  has  done  wholly  away  with  it,  that  the  image  of 
the  world  has  been  totally  changed,  and  that  the  idea  of 
"a  closed,  explorable  (ubersehbar)  cosmos"  is  utterly 
destroyed.  The  doctrine  of  Giordano  Bruno  about  the 
infinitude  of  the  world  has  caused  shipwreck  to  all 
world-history  in  the  strict  sense.33  Indirectly,  however, 
this  declaration  is  a  confirmation  of  the  importance  of 
Christianity  for  history ;  for  it  is  indeed  the  special  reve- 
lation in  the  Scriptures  which  has  made  a  world-history 
possible  and  without  which  it  is  threatened  with  destruc- 
tion. The  significance  of  Christianity  for  history  is  there- 
fore universally  acknowledged.34 

In  the  first  place  the  confession  of  the  unity  of  God  is 
the  foundation  of  the  true  view  of  nature  and  also  of 
history.  If  this  be  denied,  we  must  either  abide  by  the 
multiplicity  of  reality,  by  a  pluralism  of  monads  and 
souls,  spirits  or  "  selves,"  demons  or  Gods ;  or  because 
man  can  never  find  satisfaction  in  such  a  multiplicity,  we 
have  to  search  in  the  world  itself  for  a  false  unity,  as  is 
done  by  monism  in  its  various  forms,  and  then  all  differ- 
entiation is  sacrificed  to  this  false  unity.  The  souls  of 
men  then  become  parts  and  phenomena  of  the  one  world- 
soul,  and  all  created  things  become  modi  of  the  one 
substance.  Only,  then,  when  the  unity  of  all  creation  is 
not  sought  in  the  things  themselves,  but  transcendently 
(not  in  a  spacial,  but  in  a  qualitative,  essential  sense)  in  a 
divine  being,  in  his  wisdom  and  power,  in  his  will  and 
counsel,  can  the  world  as  a  whole,  and  in  it  every  creature, 
fully  attain  its  rights.  A  person  alone  can  be  the  root  of 
unity  in  difference,  of  difference  in  unity.  He  alone  can 
combine  in  a  system  a  multiplicity  of  ideas  into  unity,  and 
he  alone  can  realize  them  by  his  will  ad  extra.  Theism 
is  the  only  true  monism. 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  137 

But  to  the  unity  of  God  the  unity  of  humanity  stands 
very  closely  related,  and  this  also  is  of  fundamental 
importance  for  history.  The  evolutionary  hypothesis 
usually  accepts  this  unity,  although  the  right  to  do  so 
from  its  own  standpoint  may  well  be  doubted,  and  it 
considers  man  as  the  highest  creature,  as  the  crown  of  all 
creation.  Thus  Heinrich  Schurtz,  for  instance,  says  that, 
whilst  the  question  cannot  be  scientifically  decided 
whether  humanity  originates  from  one  couple  or  more, 
yet  all  investigation  of  the  races  must  proceed  from  the 
fact  that  "  humanity  forms  one  great  unity."  K  And  not 
only  this,  but  human  nature  also  is  considered  \me  and 
unchangeable.  The  same  historian  of  culture  says  else- 
where, that  changes  of  bodily  structure  still  proceed  with 
animals,  but  that  man,  having  attained  the  height  at 
which  he  now  stands,  no  longer  reacts  on  his  environ- 
ment by  unconscious  bodily  changes,  but  by  weapons  and 
instruments,  by  science  and  art.  The  development  of 
the  mind  has  put  a  stop  to  changes  in  bodily  structure. 
And  this  mind  itself  is  stationary  in  its  structure.  Years 
ago  Virchow  declared  this;  Ammon  has  proved  it;  and 
Hugo  de  Vries  assents  to  it :  "  Man  is  a  stationary  type  " 
(Dauertypus) ;  he  continues  at  the  same  height,  as  con- 
cerns his  hereditary  attributes,  i.  e.,  the  average  attain- 
ment and  the  degree  of  development  of  the  race.36 

However  thankful  we  may  be  that  the  evolutionists 
usually  accept  this  unity  of  humanity  and  human  nature, 
and  thereby  show  that  life  is  stronger  than  doctrine,  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  this  unity  does  not  rest  on  sci-  ^ 
entific  grounds,  but  is  derived  from  revelation.  And  yet 
it  is  an  indispensable  presupposition  for  history.  For 
thereby  only  is  a  history  in  the  true  sense  made  possible,  — 
a  history  of  the  world  and  a  history  of  humanity,  in  which 


138  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

all  men,  all  peoples,  nay,  all  creatures,  are  embraced,  and 
are  held  together  by  one  leading  thought,  by  one  counsel 
of  God.  And  this  unity  is  important  for  history  in  still 
another  sense  .  Eucken  says  with  perfect  truth :  "  A 
type  of  human  nature  ever  stands  between  the  historian 
and  his  sources."  37  Knowledge  of  history  is  possible,  then, 
only  when  the  men  who  act  on  its  stage,  whenever  and 
wherever  they  may  have  lived,  have  been  of  like  passions 
with  us.  For  when  the  historian  wishes  to  give  an  account 
to  himself  of  their  conceptions  and  emotions,  of  their 
words  and  deeds,  he  can  do  so  only  by  transporting  himself 
in  his  imagination  into  the  characters  and  circumstances 
of  the  persons  he  desires  to  depict.  He  must  endeavor  to 
reproduce  within  himself  their  inner  life,  and  thus  to  form 
a  plausible  conception  of  the  way  in  which  they  came  to 
act  as  they  did.38  He  finds  the  key  to  explain  the  think- 
ing and  willing,  the  feeling  and  acting  of  his  historical 
personages,  in  his  own  spiritual  life.  The  unity  of  human 
nature  and  of  the  human  race  is  the  presupposition  of 
all  history,  and  this  has  been  made  known  to  us  only 
by  Christianity. 

But  this  unity  in  its  contents  is  entirely  different  from 
that  after  which  monism  is  striving.  Monism  always 
understands  by  unity  a  universal  principle,  which  is 
abstracted  from  all  that  is  particular,  and  which  is  then,  as 
a  universal  origin,  made  the  ground  of  all  that  is  particu- 
lar. The  psyche  of  man,  for  instance,  is,  according  to 
monism,  a  unity  only  when  all  psychic  phenomena  can  be 
deduced  from  one  principle,  whether  from  conception  or 
from  feeling.  The  organisms  are  a  unity  when  they  have 
successively  originated  from  one  original  cell.  The  world 
is  a  unity  when  all  existence  has  developed  itself  from 
one  matter  and  from  one  force.     Monism  knows  no  other 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  139 

unity  than  a  genetic  one,  and  can  therefore  never  do  full 
justice  to  the  differentiation  of  the  world,  the  difference 
between  the  inorganic  and  organic,  between  irrational 
and  rational  creatures,  the  dependence  and  liberty  of 
man,  —  the  difference  between  the  true  and  the  false,  good 
and  evil.  The  unity  of  monism  is  a  dead,  stark,  uniform 
unity,  without  life  and  its  fulness.  This  is  plainly  shown 
in  the  judgment  which  it  passes  upon  the  heroes  of 
history,  who  are  sacrificed  to  the  idea,  to  the  mechanical 
interaction  of  matter,  to  the  one  power  which  necessarily 
produces  all.  Against  this  view  pragmatism  continually 
raises  protest,  just  as  one-sidedly  seeing  in  the  great  men 
the  makers  of  history,  and  resolving  the  historic  con- 
tent in  their  personality,  and  ultimately  arriving  at  the 
apotheosis  and  adoration  of  genius. 

The  unity  which  revelation  makes  known  to  us  is  of 
another  kind  and  of  a  higher  order.  It  is  the  unity  of 
harmony,  which  includes  riches,  multiformity,  differentia- 
tion. Just  as  soul  and  body  in  man  are  not  genetically 
one  and  have  not  originated  from  each  other,  and  yet 
form  in  the  "  ego  "  of  man  an  inner  organic  unity ;  just 
as  the  members  of  an  organism  are  neither  exclusively 
producent  nor  exclusively  product  of  the  organism,  but 
stand  in  reciprocal  relations  with  it  and  thus  form  a  unity  ; 
so  the  matter  stands  with  every  man  and  every  people  in 
history,  and  also  with  all  humanity.  Therefore  history  is 
so  rich,  its  life  so  full,  and  therefore  so  many  factors  are 
at  work  in  it.  But  therefore  it  is  also  that  the  monistic 
attempt  to  explain  the  entire  process  of  history  from 
specific  biological,  psychological,  or  economic  factors  is  so 
mistaken.  Life  resists  this  view,  the  personality  of  man 
perishes  in  it.  Over  against  it  the  Scriptures  teach  us 
that  the  unity  of  humanity  does  not  exclude,  but  rather 


140  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

includes,  the  differentiation  of  man  in  race,  in  character, 
in  attainment,  in  calling,  and  in  many  other  things. 
Every  man  lives  in  his  own  time,  comes  into  being  and 
passes  away,  appears  and  disappears  ;  he  seems  only  a 
part  of  the  whole,  a  moment  of  the  process.  But  every 
man  also  bears  the  ages  in  his  heart ;  in  his  spirit-life  he 
stands  above  and  outside  of  history.  He  lives  in  the  past 
and  the  past  lives  in  him,  for,  as  Nietzsche  says,  man 
cannot  forget.  He  also  lives  in  the  future  and  the 
future  lives  in  him,  for  he  bears  hope  imperishably  in  his 
bosom.  Thus  he  can  discover  something  of  the  connec- 
tion between  the  past,  the  present,  and  the  future  ;  thus  he 
is  at  the  same  time  maker  and  knower  of  history.  He 
belongs  himself  to  history,  yet  he  stands  above  it;  he  is 
a  child  of  time  and  yet  has  part  in  eternity  ;  he  becomes  and 
he  is  at  the  same  time  ;  he  passes  away  and  yet  he  abides. 

~M1  this  Christianity  has  made  us  understand.  But  it 
does  more  than  that.  The  special  revelation  which  comes 
to  us  in  Christ  not  only  gives  us  the  confirmation  of  cer- 
tain suppositions,  from  which  history  proceeds  and  must 
proceed,  but  itself  gives  us  history,  the  kernel  and  the 
true  content  of  all  history.  Christianity  is  itself  history  ; 
it  makes  history,  is  one  of  the  principal  factors  of  history, 
and  is  itself  precisely  what  lifts  history  high  above  nature 
and  natural  processes.  And  that  it  says  and  proves  by 
its  own  act ;  Christ  came  to  this  earth  for  a  crisis ;  the 
content  of  history  lies  in  a  mighty  struggle.  Monism 
knows  nothing  about  this ;  it  schematizes  everything  with 
its  before  and  after.  It  has  only  one  model  —  earlier  and 
later,  lower  and  higher,  less  and  more,  not  yet  and  al- 
ready past.  It  knows  no  pro  and  contra,  but  thus  it  does 
despite  to  life,  to  the  experience  of  every  man,  to  the 
terribly  tragic  seriousness  of   history.     Revelation    is  a 


REVELATION   AND   HISTORY  141 

confirmation  and  explanation  of  life  when  it  says  the 
essence  of  history  lies  in  a  mighty  conflict  between  dark- 
ness and  light,  sin  and  grace,  heaven  and  hell.  The 
history  of  the  world  is  not  the  judgment  of  the  world ; 
and  yet  it  is  one  of  the  judgments  of  the  world. 

Furthermore  revelation  gives  us  a  division  of  history.39 
There  is  no  history  without  division  of  time,  without 
periods,  without  progress  and  development.  But  now 
take  Christ  away.  The  thing  is  impossible,  for  he  has 
lived  and  died,  has  risen  from  the  dead,  and  lives  to  all 
eternity ;  and  these  facts  cannot  be  eliminated,  —  they  be- 
long to  history,  they  are  the  heart  of  history.  But  think 
Christ  away  for  a  moment,  with  all  he  has  spoken  and 
done  and  wrought.  Immediately  history  falls  to  pieces. 
It  has  lost  its  heart,  its  kernel,  its  centre,  its  distribution. 
It  loses  itself  in  a  history  of  races  and  nations,  of  nature- 
and  culture-peoples.  It  becomes  a  chaos,  without  a  centre, 
and  therefore  without  a  circumference  ;  without  distribu- 
tion and  therefore  without  beginning  or  end ;  without 
principle  and  goal ; '  a  stream  rolling  down  from  the  moun- 
tains, nothing  more.40  But  revelation  teaches  that  God 
is  the  Lord  of  the  ages  and  that  Christ  is  the  turning 
point  of  these  ages.  And  thus  it  brings  into  history  unity 
and  plan,  progress  and  aim.41  This  aim  is  not  this  or 
that  special  idea,  not  the  idea  of  freedom,  or  of  human- 
ity, or  of  material  well-being.  But  it  is  the  fulness  of 
the  Kingdom  of  God,  the  all-sided,  all-containing  domin- 
ion of  God,  which  embraces  heaven  and  earth,  angels  and 
men,  mind  and  matter,  cultus  and  culture,  the  specific 
and  the  generic ;  in  a  word,  all  in  all. 


VI 

REVELATION    AND   RELIGION 

WE  shall  be  strongly  confirmed  in  the  view  that  history 
as  well  as  nature  is  rooted  in  revelation  and  needs 
it  for  its  explanation,  if  we  fix  our  attention  upon  one  of  its 
most  prominent  motive  powers,  namely,  religion.  The  bare 
fact  that  religion  exists  already  means  much.  Demons 
have  no  religion  ;  they  are  no  doubt  convinced  that  God 
exists,  but  the  thought  of  God  moves  them  only  to  fear 
and  hatred.  We  cannot  speak  of  religion  in  animals  ;  the 
idea  of  God  is  indispensable  to  religion,  and  animals  en- 
tirely lack  this  idea,  as  they  lack  all  abstract  conceptions. 
The  veneration  of  a  dog  for  his  master  may  show  some 
resemblance  and  likeness  to  what  religion  is  in  man,  but 
analogy  is  not  identity.1  On  the  other  hand,  religion  is 
characteristic  of  all  peoples  and  all  men ;  however  deeply 
a  human  being  may  be  sunk  in  degradation,  he  is  con- 
scious of  the  existence  of  God  and  of  his  duty  to  wor- 
ship him. 

This  fact  is  of  extraordinary  significance  ;  however 
far  man  may  wander  from  God,  he  remains  bound  to 
heaven ;  in  the  depths  of  his  soul  he  is  linked  to  a  world 
of  unseen  and  supernatural  things  ;  in  his  heart  he  is  a 
supernatural  being ;  his  reason  and  conscience,  his  think- 
ing and  willing,  his  needs  and  affections  have  their  ground 
in  that  which  is  eternal.  And  religion  is  the  irrefutable 
proof  of  this.     It  is  not  thrust  upon  him  by  force  or  foisted 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  143 

upon  him  by  deceit,  but  it  rises  spontaneously  from  his 
own  nature,  although  it  is  nourished  from  without.  The 
religion  of  man  in  the  fallen  state  is  no  doubt  always 
arbitrary,  but  at  the  same  time  also  voluntary,  service. 
Thereby  every  man  acknowledges  and  confesses  that  he 
can  be  free  only  in  absolute  dependence ;  that  he  can 
be  true  to  himself  and  be  a  human  being  only  when  serving 
God.  The  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  includes  free- 
dom ;  the  subjection  of  man  to  God  bears  a  character  of 
its  own,  and  is  distinguished  from  that  of  demons  and 
animals  by  being  inseparably  conjoined  with  his  affinity 
to  God.  In  religion  these  two  things  are  always  united, 
although  sometimes  the  theocratic,  and  then  again  the 
theanthropic,  element  predominates.2 

It  is  true  there  is  an  effort  being  made  to  remove 
religion  from  the  central  place  which  it  occupies  in  the 
life  of  the  individual  as  well  as  in  the  history  of  the  race. 
This  effort,  however,  is  doomed  from  the  outset  to  prove  ^ 
abortive,  because  it  clashes  with  the  unchangeable  needs 
of  human  nature. 

When  the  Mercure  de  France  last  year  opened  a  dis- 
cussion on  the  dissolution  or  evolution  of  religion,  some, 
it  is  true,  used  the  occasion  to  air  their  hatred  of  the 
church  and  religion  or  to  predict  their  approaching  dis- 
appearance. But  even  among  those  there  were  some 
who  sought  a  substitute  for  religion  in  altruism  and 
socialistically  organized  society,  in  morality,  science,  or 
spiritualism.  And  an  overwhelming  majority  were  con- 
vinced that  religion,  although  its  forms  may  change,  never- 
theless in  its  essential  nature  is  ineradicable  and  will  survive 
all  the  crises  through  which  it  may  have  to  pass.  They 
based  their  conviction  especially  upon  these  two  consider- 
ations, that  religion  is  deeply  rooted  in  human  nature,3 


144  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

and  that  science,  which  can  make  known  only  the  inter- 
relations of  things,  but  never  their  origin,  essence,  and 
end,  will  never  be  able  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  the  human 
heart.4  Beyond  that  from  which  science  has  drawn 
away  the  veil  there  always  remains  unexplored  the  do- 
main, sublime,  immense,  and  silent,  where  the  supreme 
power  dwells  on  which  we  depend ;  and  from  the  inner- 
most recesses  of  man's  personality  religion  always  rises 
anew.5 

What  is  thus  said  of  the  present  and  expected  in  the 
future  finds  its  foundation  and  support  in  the  past ;  there 
are  no  peoples  without  religion,  and  history  takes  us 
back  to  no  past  in  which  religion  is  not  already  the 
universal  possession  of  man.6  And  not  only  so,  but  from 
the  beginning  it  has  ever  been  the  vitalizing  element  of 
all  culture.  Of  course  we  must  beware  here  of  one-sided- 
ness  and  take  care  not  to  construe  actuality  in  the  terms 
of  a  theory.  From  his  origin  man  has  been  not  only  a 
religious,  but  also  a  moral  and  corporeal  being ;  various 
wants  and  powers  have  been  implanted  in  him  from  the 
beginning  of  his  existence,  which  have  worked  together 
harmoniously.  Morris  Jastrow's  assertion  that  science, 
art,  and  morality  have  grown  out  of  religion,  is  too 
strongly  put;  they  rather  have  come  forth  together  in 
intimate  connection  with  one  another,  out  of  the  several 
wants  and  inclinations  of  human  nature  as  such.7  No 
monistic  abstract  principle,  but  the  totality  of  human 
nature  has  been  the  starting-point  of  all  development ; 
just  as  little  as  the  need  of  food  and  drink,  shelter  and 
raiment,  have  there  been  developed  immediately  from 
religion,  agriculture,  and  industry,  science  and  art  and  the 
several  constituent  parts  of  culture;  every  one  of  them 
has  its  own  root  in  human  nature,  and  hence  its  own  par- 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  145 

ticular  character  and  life.  But  religion  certainly  belongs, 
and  always  has  belonged,  to  the  most  intimate  movements 
of  the  human  heart,  and  has  made  its  influence  felt  upon 
the  whole  life,  with  all  its  experiences  and  activities. 
Most  certainly  other  agencies  besides  religion  have  been 
at  work  in  the  development  of  science,  philosophy,  art, 
etc.,  as,  for  instance,  curiosity,  desire  for  adornment 
and  sport,  and  the  like.  But  the  more  deeply  we  sink 
ourselves  in  the  past,  the  more  we  find  religion,  morality, 
knowledge,  art,  in  fact  all  the  elements  of  civilization 
together,  undivided  and  undifferentiated.  They  do  not 
yet  exist  independently  side  by  side  with  one  another,  but 
lie  still  undeveloped,  enclosed  in  the  same  germ.  A 
complex,  a  totality  of  experiences  preceded  the  differen- 
tiation. And  among  these  those  of  a  religio-moral  kind 
took  the  first  place.  In  this  sense  it  may  be  said  that 
religion  has  been  the  deepest  cause  of  the  process  of 
civilization,  the  mother  of  arts  and  of  all  sciences.8 

This  consideration  of  human  nature  is  of  great  impor- 
tance for  the  investigation  of  the  origin  of  religion.  At 
present  there  is  a  tendency  among  men  of  science  first  to 
dissolve  the  organic  connections  in  which  religion  appears 
in  life,  and  then  to  investigate  its  origin.  They  treat  reli- 
gion as  a  chemist  does  the  substances,  which  he  separates 
from  their  actual  connections  and  then  analyzes  into 
their  component  parts.  Scientifically  this  is  of  high  value, 
if  only  we  do  not  forget  that  the  process  to  which  science 
subjects  its  object  differs  entirely  from  that  which  hap- 
pens in  actuality.  There  is  no  proof  at  all  that  the  ele- 
ments have  all  existed  originally  in  an  unmixed  state ;  and 
similarly  there  is  no  ground  for  asserting  that  the  factors 
which  we  at  present  discover  in  the  religious  life  ever 
existed  separately.     Actuality  presents  a  different  appear- 

10 


H6  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

ance  from  theory.  Life,  full,  rich  life,  is  always  first ;  the 
abstractions  of  our  thinking  come  only  later.  When 
science  in  its  search  for  the  origin  of  things  allows  itself  to 
be  exclusively  guided  by  the  idea  of  evolution,  and  there- 
fore ever  endeavors  to  go  back  to  the  most  insignificant 
beginnings,  to  the  most  meagre  principles,  it  simply  elevates 
the  abstractions  of  thought  into  concrete  powers,  and  in 
its  interpretation  of  things  takes  refuge  in  mythology. 
No  abstract  principle,  however,  no  simple  power  has  been 
the  origin  of  human  life  in  all  its  richness,  and  no  recti- 
linear law  of  evolution  has  directed  the  development. 
When  we  go  back  in  the  actual  as  far  as  possible  to  the 
origins,  we  find  a  human  nature  which  already  contains 
everything  which  it  later  on  produces  out  of  itself.  Nat- 
ural and  spiritual  life,  religion  and  morality,  knowledge 
and  art,  sense  of  beauty  and  consciousness  of  values,  have 
been  united  in  man  from  the  beginning.  The  experi- 
ences of  life  are  the  background  of  all  development  and 
civilization.9 

The  researches  of  recent  years  into  the  origin  of  things, 
of  religion  and  morality,  science  and  art,  family,  society, 
and  state;  have  put  this  in  the  clearest  light.  Of  course 
we  cannot  speak  here  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  of  a 
scientific  investigation,  whether  naturalistic  or  historical, 
for  the  elements  of  culture  we  have  mentioned  have  al- 
ways existed,  as  far  as  history  carries  us  back.  When 
Lubbock  tried  to  prove  that  all  peoples  have  passed 
through  a  phase  of  atheism,10  he  not  only  overstepped 
the  limits  of  our  empirical  knowledge,  but  he  also  in- 
vented a  condition  which,  if  it  ever  had  existed,  would 
be  totally  unintelligible  to  us,  in  whose  life  religion  forms 
an  essential  part.11  We  can  form  no  conception  of  beings 
which  are  not  animals,  but  men,  and  which  yet  wholly  lack 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  147 

religion ;  they  are  unthinkable  and  impossible.  The  case 
is,  in  fact,  the  same  with  all  the  component  parts  of  human 
civilization ;  men  are  not  thinkable  without  some  knowl- 
edge and  art,  without  some  kind  of  family  and  social  life, 
without  some  conception  of  morality  and  justice.  If,  not- 
withstanding all  this,  science  continues  to  attempt  to  pene- 
trate behind  all  culture  and  to  form  a  conception  of  the 
way  in  which  all  these  phenomena  arose  in  human  life,  it 
is  in  the  nature  of  the  case  shut  up  to  conjectures  and 
guesses.  This  is  frankly  acknowledged  by  many.  For 
instance,  Oscar  Hertwig,  speaking  generally  of  descent  in 
the  past,  says :  "  When  we  try  to  trace  the  genealogical 
chains  of  the  mammals,  amphibians,  and  fishes  in  primitive 
times,  we  launch  into  a  darkness  which  even  the  bright 
light  of  science  cannot  penetrate  with  a  single  ray,  and 
scientific  research  is  accordingly  exposed  to  the  danger  of 
deviating  from  that  path  in  which  alone  it  can  reach  knowl- 
edge of  the  truth  and  consequently  permanent  results."12 
It  is  "  a  fatal  and  yet  unavoidable  necessity  for  the  science 
which  investigates  the  origins  of  the  family,  property,  so- 
ciety, etc.,"  says  Ludwig  Stein,  "  that  it  is  compelled  to 
operate  with  hypotheses."  13  And  with  respect  to  the  origin 
of  religion  it  is  agreed  by  Lehmann  and  Troeltsch,  Tiele 
and  Pfleiderer,  and  many  others,  that  it  is  as  impossible 
now  as  in  former  days  to  speak  of  a  knowledge  of  these 
things,  and  we  have  to  be  content  with  conjectures  and 
hypotheses.14 

That  these  hypotheses  may  not  hang  wholly  in  the  air 
an  attempt  is  made  to  support  them  with  data  derived  from 
embryology  and  anthropology,  from  palaeontology  and 
ethnography.  Study  of  the  animal  and  the  child  on  the  one 
hand,  and  on  the  other  study  of  the  so-called  nature- 
peoples,  is  pressed  into  service  in  order  to  form  in  some 


148  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

sense  an  idea  of  primitive  man  still  wholly  without  cul- 
ture. But  the  method  which  is  thus  employed,  and  the 
results  which  some  think  they  have  obtained,  inspire  little 
confidence,  and  on  better  acquaintance  evacuate  the  hope 
that  along  this  road  we  shall  ever  reach  any  certainty 
about  man's  original  condition. 

Commonly  the  truth  of  the  doctrine  of  the  descent  of  man 
is  tacitly  presupposed.  In  Darwin  himself  this  assumption 
had  at  least  the  foundation  that  he  could  explain  it  by 
means  of  ''natural  selection"  and  "the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence ;  "  but  although  many  have  now  discarded  Darwin- 
ism in  its  original  form,  either  altogether  or  in  part, 
as  an  explanation  of  the  development  of  living  beings, 
they  still  hold  the  theory  of  descent  unimpaired.  As  a 
working  hypothesis  the  idea  of  evolution  undoubtedly  is  of 
undeniable  significance  ;  it  leads  to  the  discovery  of  anal- 
ogies which  otherwise  probably  would  not  have  been  no- 
ticed, and  offers  a  clue  which  opens  a  way  through  the  laby- 
rinth of  phenomena.  Nevertheless,  science  must  never  lose 
sight  of  the  fact  that  it  is  dealing  in  it  with  an  hypothesis 
and  not,  as  Haeckel  supposes,16  with  a  "  firmly  established 
fact."  Sober  naturalists,  who  give  ear  to  facts  alone,  ex- 
press themselves  differently,  not  only  formerly  through  the 
lips  of  Virchow,  but  now  also  through  the  lips  of  Branco, 
Reinke,  Wasmann,  and  others.  Reinke,  for  example,  ac- 
knowledged in  1900  :  u  We  must  confess  unreservedly  that 
there  is  not  at  our  disposal  a  single  unexceptionable  proof 
of  its  correctness."  Two  years  later,  in  still  stronger 
language,  he  affirmed  that  science  knows  nothing  about 
the  origin  of  man.  And  at  the  International  Congress  of 
Zoologists  at  Berlin,  in  1901,  Bnmco  bore  witness  that 
palaeontology  knows  no  ancestors  of  man,  but  that  man 
suddenly  and  immediately  appears  before  us  in  the  dilu- 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  149 

vial  age  as  a  perfect  homo  sapiens.1*  The  mental  and 
physical  gap  between  animal  and  man  remains  at  present 
as  wide  as  it  ever  was.  In  the  structure  of  the  skull  and 
brain,  for  example,  the  interval  between  the  other  mam- 
mals and  the  apes  may  possibly  be  bridged  over,  but  not 
between  the  apes  and  man.  Among  all  the  mammals  now 
existing  there  is  not  one  which  in  this  respect  can  be 
compared  with  man.  Stanley  Hall  also  has  to  acknowledge 
that  what  intervenes  between  the  highest  anthropoid 
brain  of  500  cubic  centimeters  and  that  of  the  lowest  man, 
1150  cubic  centimeters,  is  almost  as  lost  as  a  sunken  At- 
lantis. When  he  adds  that  all  the  ancestors  of  man  have 
been  accidentally  extirpated,  this  is  nothing  but  a  make- 
shift, entirely  without  scientific  value.17  The  common 
ancestor  of  ape  and  man  is  a  mere  invention  of  the  mind.18 
All  inferences  from  the  animal  to  the  original  man  lack 
thus  firm  scientific  foundation.  It  is  not  without  signifi- 
cance that  many  adherents  of  the  doctrine  of  descent  have 
recently  turned  their  backs  upon  historical  zoology  and 
look  for  their  salvation  to  experimental  morphology.19 

It  may  be  doubted,  however,  whether  this  new  science 
will  be  able  to  shed  more  light  on  the  subject.  The  oppo- 
sition to  Haeckel's  biogenetic  law  is  growing  in  strength 
day  by  day.  Geganbaur  and  Oscar  Hertwig  both  intimate 
that  ontogeny  is  a  sphere  where  a  lively  imagination  may 
no  doubt  carry  on  a  perilous  game  in  seeking  phyloge- 
netic  relations,  but  where  assured  results  are  by  no  means 
easy  to  get  at ;  and  they  warn  against  the  false  paths  which 
lead  to  the  construction  of  fictitious  conditions,  or  even  of 
entirely  fictitious  organisms.20  The  embryological  forms 
of  the  mammals  show,  it  is  true,  correspondences  with 
amphibians  and  fishes,  but  this  "ancestral  similarity" 
does   not,   according  to  Professor  Emery,  authorize  an 


150  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

inference  to  "  ancestral  inheritance."  The  simple  germ 
cell  is  already  a  life-form,  which  comprehends  a  fulness 
beyond  belief  of  great  and  small  varieties,  and  which 
already  is  the  product  of  a  phylogenetic  process  of  devel- 
opment. Further,  the  fertilized  germ  cells  of  the  several 
species  of  animals  differ  as  much  from  each  other  in  their 
nature  as  the  individuals  which  come  forth  from  these 
germ  cells.  And  finally,  there  is  a  very  great  essential 
difference  between  the  stages  of  ontogenesis  which  pass 
into  one  another  and  the  forms  of  an  ancestral  series 
which  do  not  pass  into  one  another  at  all.  This  is  the 
reason  why  Hertwig  finds  the  hypothesis  improbable 
that  our  earth  in  a  former  period  produced  only  one 
kind  of  cells ;  and  in  view  of  the  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  species  of  animals  and  plants  prefers  the  polyphyletic 
supposition,  according  to  which  the  organisms  now  living 
are  not  derived  from  one  primitive  cell,  but  from  a  large 
number  of  cells,  which  are  already  differently  organized, 
and  which  in  a  former  period  have  been  produced  in  some 
way  or  other  by  the  creative  power  of  nature.  Closer 
study  thus  leads  in  this  domain  not  to  uniformity,  but  to 
multiformity.  Nature  is  far  from  being  as. simple  as  the 
advocates  of  the  mechanical  theory  conceive  it  to  be. 
There  was  not  in  the  beginning  the  poverty  of  the  mon- 
istic principle,  but  the  fulness  and  wealth  of  created  life. 
The  biogenetic  law  grows  still  more  improbable  when 
it  is  applied  in  detail,  and  the  conditions  of  the  life  of  the 
embryo,  of  childhood  and  of  youth  are  considered  a  reca- 
pitulation of  those  of  the  ancestors  of  men  and  of  the 
first  men  themselves.  The  small  stature  of  human  beings 
in  youth  certainly  ought  to  prove  that  the  original  men 
were  very  small ;  but,  according  to  Stanley  Hall  and 
others,  they  were  rather  of  gigantic  stature.21     The  late 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGION  151 

appearance  of  the  teeth  in  children  ought  to  be  consid- 
ered a  proof  that  original  men  were  toothless,  but  this  also 
is  not  at  all  acknowledged.22  In  the  man  of  our  time  the 
brain  is  of  early  growth,  and  has  reached  its  full  size  at 
the  age  of  about  fourteen  years,  but  the  doctrine  of  the 
descent  of  man  postulates,  on  the  contrary,  a  very  late 
development  for  it  in  the  phylogenesis.23  The  heart  de- 
velops before  the  blood-vessels,  but  in  the  history  of  the 
human  race  the  reverse  must  have  taken  place.24  If  the 
rudimentary  tail  of  man  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  an  argu- 
ment for  his  animal  descent,  then  certainly  the  breasts  of 
the  male  should  be  a  reminder  and  a  remainder  of  the 
period  when  man  was  androgynal ;  but  few  are  inclined 
to  draw  this  conclusion.25  It  is  no  wonder  that  Stanley 
Hall,  having  in  mind  all  these  considerations,  reaches  the 
conclusion  that  there  are  "  many  inversions  "  in  the  on- 
togenetic law :  "  ontogeny  often  reverses  the  order  of 
phylogeny."  26 

A  similar  change  is  noticeable  also  with  regard  to  the 
notion  that  the  nature-peoples  afford  us  the  means  of 
learning  to  know  primitive  man.  The  name  itself  is 
misleading ;  nature-peoples  are  nowhere  to  be  found,  any 
more  than  wild  or  cultureless  peoples.  The  cultured 
peoples  are  no  less  dependent  on  nature  than  the  so-called 
nature-peoples ;  the  difference  between  the  two  is  not  to 
be  sought  in  the  degree,  but  in  the  character  of  their  re- 
lation to  nature.27  And  wild  or  cultureless  peoples  do 
not  exist  either.  The  ridiculous  fancies  about  men  who 
formerly  or  even  now  clamber  up  into  the  trees  like  apes, 
covered  over  the  whole  of  their  bodies  with  hair,  knowing 
nothing  of  fire,  without  language  or  religion,  reappear,  it 
is  true,  now  and  then ;  but  they  are  antiquated.  All  men 
and  peoples,  though  they  may  be  poor  in  culture,  yet 


152  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

possess  at  least  its  fundamental  elements,  the  erect  walk, 
the  average  weight  of  brain,  the  hand  and  the  thumb, 
fire  and  light,  language  and  religion,  family  and  society.28 
Furthermore,  the  nature-peoples  do  not  form  a  separate 
group,  and  do  not  all  stand  on  the  same  level ;  they  can- 
not be  dealt  with  all  alike,  nor  brought  together  under  a 
common  name.29  They  are  related  to  higher  peoples  by 
means  of  all  kinds  of  links,  and  upon  better  acquaintance 
do  not  seem  to  be  nearly  so  barbarous  and  uncivilized  as 
at  first  they  were  thought  to  be.  The  savage  of  Australia 
does  not  stand  intellectually  below  the  level  of  other 
peoples  of  little  culture.  The  decision  about  the  Bata- 
kudes  and  other  South  American  peoples  is  on  the  whole 
favorable.  Among  the  Bushmen  and  the  Esquimaux  the 
imagination  exhibited  in  their  drawings,  toys,  fairy  tales, 
and  legends,  is  a  clear  proof  of  their  capabilities.30  There 
can  then  be  no  question  of  nature-peoples  and  civilized 
nations  differing  in  fundamental  endowment,  as  if  the 
one  were  predestinated  to  barbarism  and  destruction,  the 
other  to  progress  and  high  culture.  Repeated  instances 
have  occurred  of  transitions  from  the  one  group  to  the 
other.  The  Bedouins  of  Arabia,  Syria,  and  Mesopotamia 
live  now  just  as  they  did  hundreds  of  years  ago.  but  they 
have  produced  civilized  races.  Finns  and  Magyars  have 
recently  become  cultured  peoples,  while  their  kindred  are 
still  living  in  the  barbaric  state.  The  Japanese  have  all 
of  a  sudden  accepted  Western  culture,  while  the  Mongols 
and  the  Kalmucks  remain  stationary  at  the  old  stage  of 
civilization.  Thus  it  has  repeatedly  happened  that  nature- 
peoples  have  become  culture-peoples.31  Missions,  espe- 
cially, furnish  abundant  proofs  of  this  fact.32 

While  the  nature-peoples  are  thus  again  being  gradu- 
ually  looked  upon  as  men,  our  eyes  are  being  opened 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGION  153 

on  the  other  side  to  the  sins  and  imperfections  of  the 
culture-peoples.  Experience  has  taught  us  that  even 
here  it  is  far  from  everything  that  glitters  that  is  gold. 
Not  only  were  the  ancestors  of  the  culture-peoples  of  to- 
day, for  instance  the  Germans  and  the  Gauls,  who  were 
idealized  by  Caesar  and  Tacitus,  poor  in  culture,  but  also 
with  regard  to  many  peoples,  for  instance  the  Chinese, 
the  Mongols,  the  Thibetans,  the  Russians,  it  is  a  question 
to  which  of  the  two  groups  they  ought  to  be  reckoned. 
Rude  and  barbarous  customs  still  prevail  among  the  Rus- 
sians, Letts,  Bulgars,  Magyars,  etc. ;  and  in  general  the 
so-called  culture-peoples,  when  carefully  considered,  are 
far  from  standing  on  the  high  level  which  many  ascribe 
to  them.  The  percentage  of  those  who  occupy  the  high- 
est round  of  the  ladder  is  very  low.  Many  individuals  and 
circles  among  the  culture-peoples  fall  below  the  nature- 
peoples  in  civilization.  Vagabonds  and  pariahs,  the  enfee- 
bled and  deficient,  such  as  we  meet  with  in  our  large  cities, 
are  all  but  never  found  among  the  nature-peoples.  The 
mass  among  those  peoples  is  more  intelligent  than  with  us. 
Animism,  spiritism,  superstition,  sorcery,  belief  in  witches 
and  ghosts,  prostitution  and  alcoholism,  crimes  and  un- 
natural sins,  occur  among  the  culture-peoples  no  less,  and 
sometimes  in  more  aggravated  forms,  than  among  the 
nature-peoples.  When  the  nature-peoples  become  civil- 
ized, they  gain  much,  but  lose  no  less.  Many  beautiful 
qualities,  such  as  faithfulness,  truthfulness,  simplicity, 
artlessness,  sincerity,  ingenuousness,  are  lost  in  civiliza- 
tion.33 There  are  many  to-day  who  are  not  far  from 
thinking  of  the  nature-peoples  after  the  idyllic  fashion 
of  the  age  of  Rousseau.  Tolstoi  and  Nietzsche  return 
along  different  paths  to  nature  ;  in  literature  and  art 
there  is  a  reaction  against  the  conventional,  and  a  recur- 


154  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

rence  to  the  unconscious,  instinctive,  passionate  life. 
Stanley  Hall  describes  savages  as  amiable  children : 
u  Most  savages  in  most  respects  are  children,  or  because 
of  their  sexual  maturity,  more  properly  adolescents  of 
adult  size.  Their  faults  and  their  virtues  are  those  of 
childhood  and  youth.  He,  who  knows  them,  loves 
them."34 

Yet  both  theories  are  one-sided :  equally  that  according 
to  which  the  nature-peoples  are  semi-animals  and  that  ac- 
cording to  which  they  are  innocent  children.  The  notion 
that  all  peoples  are  on  the  road  to  progress  is  as  incorrect 
as  that  they  are  continuously  declining  and  degenerating. 
Neither  development  nor  degeneracy  covers  the  course  of 
history ;  this  is  wider  than  our  thinking,  and  is  not  dis- 
turbed by  the  logic  of  our  reasoning.  There  are  peoples 
who  have  developed  and  have  attained  a  high  level  of 
civilization ;  it  may  even  be  not  impossible  that4  this  de- 
velopment in  some  cases,  as,  for  instance,  in  Peru  and 
Mexico,  has  been  autochthonous.  But  it  is  no  less  evident 
that  a  number  of  peoples  have  declined  from  a  more  or 
less  high  degree  of  civilization.  This  has  been  the  case 
with  many  peoples  of  antiquity  in  Asia  and  North  Africa, 
which  have  either  totally  disappeared  or  sunk  into  complete 
insignificance.35  Virchow  called  the  Laplanders  and  the 
Bushmen  even  "pathologically  degraded,  degenerated 
races,"  and  Darwin,  Spencer,  Tylor,  Wallace,  Max  Miiller, 
and  many  others,  have  acknowledged  the  decline  and 
ruin  of  many  peoples.36  Environment  has  had  a  great 
deal  to  do  with  degeneracy.  "  It  is  of  great  importance 
for  the  development  of  a  people,  whether  it  dwells  in  the 
midst  of  the  inhabited  world,  where  it  is  exposed  to  num- 
erous influences,  or  near  its  margin  ;  peoples  living  on  the 
margin  of  the  inhabited  world  are  mostly  poor  in  culture 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  155 

and  few  in  numbers." 37  The  peoples  cannot,  therefore, 
be  arranged  in  succession,  one  after  the  other ;  it  is  arbi- 
trary to  place  the  nature-peoples  at  the  beginning  of  the 
genealogical  table  of  the  human  race  and  to  represent 
their  condition  as  the  original  condition  of  mankind.38 
The  theory  of  development  which  in  every  case  maintains 
apriori,  "that  the  human  race  only  knows  aspiration, 
progress,  development,  and  no  retrogression,  decline  and 
decay," S9  is  just  as  one-sided  as  the  theory  of  degeneracy. 
History  declines  to  follow  in  its  course  a  single  straight 
line.  Every  people  and  every  group  of  peoples,  spread 
over  the  globe,  has  its  own  life,  and  continues  it  in  the 
midst  of  the  others.40  We  must  return  from  the  "  after- 
one-another"  to  the  "  by-the-side-of-one-another,"  from 
uniformity  to  multiformity,  from  the  abstract  theory  of 
monism  to  the  fulness  of  life. 

The  nature-peoples  supply  us,  therefore,  just  as  little  as 
embryos  and  children  with  the  desired  material  for  the 
construction  of  original  man.  The  primitive  man,  where- 
with the  historian  of  our  day  operates,  is  nothing  but 
a  fiction 41  of  the  same  kind  as  the  contrat  social,  of 
which  Rousseau  made  use  in  order  to  explain  the  origin 
of  society,  and  as  the  ape-man,  who  is  placed  by  zoology 
at  the  beginning  as  our  common  ancestor,  and,  according 
as  circumstances  require,  is  thought  of  sometimes  as  an 
ape  and  sometimes  as  a  man.  In  the  same  manner  Wundt 
says:  "It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  the  enormousness 
of  the  gap  which  separates  the  man  of  to-day  from  primi- 
tive man.  But  we  must  not  think  of  this  gap  in  such  a 
way,  as  if  no  connection  existed  any  longer  between  them, 
or  as  if  the  narrow  path  of  a  single  thought  were  the  only 
one  to  lead  from  one  side  to  the  other.  ...  Every  view  which 
conceives  of  primitive  man  in  a  one-sided  manner  puts  it- 


156  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

self  not  only  in  contradiction  with  the  facts,  but  deprives 
itself  also  of  the  possibility  of  comprehending  a  psycholog- 
ical development.  For  every  change  of  motive,  however 
vast  it  may  be  in  some  cases,  presupposes  at  least  this,  that 
some  germs  of  the  motives  which  come  into  activity  later 
on,  were  already  present  originally."42  Primitive  man,  in 
other  words,  must  be  constructed  physically  and  psycho- 
logically in  such  a  manner  that  an  ape  and  a  man  can  be  de- 
rived from  him.  Thus  you  can  make  whatever  use  of  him 
you  like  ;  you  wield  a  two-edged  sword.  If  you  desire  to 
explain  the  animal  or  the  animal  character  in  man,  you  as- 
scribe  to  primitive  man  the  qualities  of  the  ape ;  if,  on  the 
contrary,  you  wish  to  explain  man,  you  acknowledge  in 
him  as  easily  the  necessary  human  qualities.43  Primitive 
man  accordingly  is  a  worthy  counterpart  of  the  animated 
atoms,  the  personified  powers  of  nature,  the  apotheosized 
natural  laws,  the  deified  evolution  idea.  In  reality  he 
has  never  existed ;  he  is  nothing  but  a  poetical  creation  of 
monistic  imagination. 

This  is  gradually  becoming  understood  by  many.  We 
have  already  remarked  that  Oscar  Hertwig  looks  upon  the 
polyphyletic  hypothesis  as  much  more  probable  than  the 
monophyletic,  and  thus  assumes  that  the  creative  power 
of  nature  in  the  beginning  produced  at  once  a  great  num- 
ber of  variously  organized  primitive  cells.  Just  as 
Haeckel,  not  being  able  to  give  a  satisfactory  explanation 
of  them,  declares  matter  and  force,  motion  and  life,  con- 
sciousness and  will  to  be  eternal,  so  Hertwig  places  the 
idea  of  species  already  in  the  very  first  cells  which  were 
produced  by  the  creative  power  of  nature.  Whether, 
however,  we  assign  priority  to  the  cells  or  to  the  organisms 
proceeding  from  them,  or,  in  other  words,  to  the  egg  or  to 
the  chicken,  amounts  to  much  the  same  thing.     The  start- 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  157 

ing-point  in  both  cases  is  not  a  monistic  principle,  but  the 
multiformity  of  life,  and  the  miracle,  and  faith  in  miracles 
as  well,  remains  in  either  case  equally  great.  Sociology 
also  is  beginning  to  see,  now  and  again,  that  the  sociolog- 
ical problem  cannot  be  solved  by  the  single  formula  of  imi- 
tation (Tarde),  local  association  or  clan  (Mucke),  division 
of  labor  (Durkheim),  struggle  of  the  classes  (Gumplowicz), 
blood-relationships  (Morgan),  or  consociation  (Schurtz).44 
Many  accordingly  assume  the  existence  from  the  begin- 
ning of  what  lies  to  be  explained.  Gustav  Ratzenhofer, 
for  example,  maintains  that  society  has  not  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  word  been  originated  :  man  did  not  create  so- 
ciety, but  society  man ;  the  human  race  was  from  the 
beginning  subject  to  its  social  nature ;  the  social  is  what  is 
original,  the  individual  is  derived.45  According  to  Zenker 
even  property  did  not  gradually  come  into  existence,  but 
existed  from  the  beginning.  "  Without  social  life  and  self- 
consciousness,  that  is,  with  common  life  and  without  per- 
sonal work,  the  pithecoanthropos  would  never  have  been 
able  to  lift  himself  out  of  his  animal  state."  46  The  theory 
of  original  promiscuity,  which  was  advocated  by  Lewis 
Morgan  and  found  favor  with  many,  has  later  on  been 
strongly  contradicted  by  Westermarck,  Starcke,  Grosse, 
and  others.47  Among  economists,  according  to  Schmoller, 
a  conviction  is  growing  more  and  more  towards  unanimity, 
that  a  psychologico-ethical  view  of  social  life  is  necessary 
which  shall  recognize  not  only  the  emotions  and  passions, 
but  also  the  ethical  powers  in  man,  and  shall  investigate 
political  economy  in  connection  with  the  state,  religion  and 
morals ;  "all  great  social  communities  are  a  result  of  human 
nature  in  general,  founded  on  language  and  writing,  on 
custom,  law,  morals,  religion,  and  intercourse."  48  In  gen- 
eral men  have  become  more  cautious  in  the  application  of 


158  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  theory  of  evolution  along  single-  and  straight-lined 
processes  of  development.49 

This  is  also  apparent  in  the  investigation  of  the  origin 
of  religion.  History  does  not  lead  us  back  in  this  domain, 
either,  to  the  beginnings ;  all  beginnings,  said  Schelling, 
are  from  darkness  to  light.  If  we  are  nevertheless  deter- 
mined to  seek  out  a  beginning,  we  are  driven  to  conjec- 
tures which  endeavor  to  support  themselves  upon  the 
psychology  of  the  child  and  the  savage.  Nature-peoples 
furnish  us,  however,  very  little  material  for  the  investiga- 
tion of  the  origin  of  religion,  because  religion  has  already 
long  existed  among  them  all  and  is  intimately  interwoven 
with  their  whole  life.  Instead  of  offering  a  solution  of 
the  problems  which  the  man  of  culture  proposes  to 
himself,  the  savage  is  himself  a  problem.  This  is  also 
the  case  with  the  children ;  no  more  than  the  animal  can 
the  child  serve  to  explain  the  adult;  the  adult,  on  the 
contrary,  is  needed  to  explain  the  child.  It  is  extremely 
difficult,  accordingly,  to  penetrate  into  the  life  of  the 
child  soul  and  to  understand  it  truly.60  Moreover  it  will 
not  do  to  compare  present-day  children  with,  and  to  take 
them  as  an  example  of,  original  adult  men.  For  our 
children  on  the  one  hand  have  advantages  far  above  any 
enjoyed  by  primitive  men,  by  their  birth  and  education  in 
the  midst  of  a  rich,  cultured  life ;  and  yet  on  the  other 
hand  they,  as  children,  are  far  behind  the  adults  of  the 
past  ages  in  the  development  of  bodily  and  spiritual 
powers.  If  the  comparison  contained  any  truth  and 
entitled  us  to  a  conclusion,  it  could  only  be  that  primitive 
men  received  and  learned  their  language  and  religion  by 
communication  from  others  ;  that  is,  ultimately  by  revela- 
tion of  God.61 

The   many   and   manifold   theories   which   have   been 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  159 

presented  as  an  explanation  of  religion  have  all  again 
been  abandoned  one  after  the  other.  They  all  have  the 
defect  that  they  derive  religion  from  non-religious  fac- 
tors, and  either  cannot  find  the  transition,  or,  if  they 
indicate  such  a  transition,  always  presuppose  religion ; 
they  thus  oscillate  between  a  metabasis  eis  alio  genos 
and  a  petitio  principii.  The  result  of  all  the  research  is 
accordingly  the  humble  confession,  ignoramus,  we  do  not 
know.  How  religion  arose,  and  out  of  what  causes,  "is 
entirely  unknown  to  us,"  says  Troeltsch,  "  and  just  as  in 
the  case  of  morals  and  logic,  will  always  remain  unknown 
to  us.  An  absolute  equivocal  generation  is  denied  to 
us." 62  Openly  or  secretly  all  turn  back  to  an  inborn 
disposition,  to  a  religio  insita.  Just  as  matter  and  force, 
life  and  consciousness,  society  and  state,  so  also  the  reli- 
gion which  is  to  be  explained  is  already  assumed  in  the 
explanation.  Troeltsch  does  this,  but  also  Schroeder,  who 
is  certainly  an  adherent  of  the  doctrine  of  descent,  and 
speaks,  therefore,  of  Untermenschen  ("  undermen  "),  but 
nevertheless  presupposes  already  in  them  a  divine  spark, 
which  develops  them  into  men.  Tiele  goes  back  to  an 
inborn  feeling  and  need  of  the  infinite,  and  even  Hugo 
de  Vries  speaks  of  the  need  of  religion  as  an  inborn 
quality  of  man.53  In  the  beginning,  therefore,  there  did 
not  reign  the  dead  unity  of  monism  but  the  totality  of 
human  nature. 

If,  however,  religion  as  religio  insita  is  an  essential  ele- 
ment of  human  nature,  it  points  directly  back  to  revela- 
tion. We  stand  here  before  essentially  the  same  dilemma 
as  in  the  case  of  self -consciousness.  If  this  is  not  a  delu- 
sion or  imagination,  the  reality  of  the  self  is  necessarily 
included  in  it ;  hence  religion  is  either  a  pathology  of  the 
human  spirit,  or  it  postulates  the  existence,  the  revelation, 


160  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

and  the  knowableness  of  God.  It  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
necessary  because  of  the  peculiarity  of  human  nature  ;  and 
it  is  universal,  as  is  apparent  from  the  history  of  the 
human  race  and  all  the  peoples.  And  wheresoever  it 
manifests  itself  it  is  a  relation  of  man,  not  to  his  neighbor 
or  to  the  world  in  general,  or  to  one  of  its  parts,  but  to  a 
personal  being,  who  stands  above  nature  and  the  world, 
and  is  therefore  able  to  raise  man  above  them  and  to  unite 
him  to  himself.  Religion  is  always  a  service  ol  God,  and 
hence  it  is  either  folly  or  necessarily  implies  the  existence 
of  God.  Furthermore,  faith  in  the  knowability  of  God  is 
inseparable  from  the  existence  of  God,  which  is  pre- 
supposed in  and  with  the  truth  of  religion ;  for  a  God  who 
is  wholly  unknowable  is  practically  for  us  a  God  who 
does  not  exist.  Consistent  agnosticism  amounts  practi- 
cally to  atheism.  And  finally,  if  God,  even  in  however 
small  a  measure,  is  knowable,  there  can  be  no  explanation 
of  this  except  that  he  has  revealed  himself ;  for  what  we 
cannot  perceive  at  all  cannot  be  known,  and  what  we  can- 
not know  at  all  we  cannot  love  and  serve,  ignoti  nulla 
cupido.  All  who  recognize  and  defend  religion  as  truth 
believe  accordingly,  whether  they  are  willing  to  confess  it 
or  not,  in  the  existence,  knowableness,  and  revelation  of 
God.  Naturalism  in  the  strict  sense  and  religion  are  irrec- 
oncilable. All  religion  is  supernatural,  and  rests  upon 
the  presupposition  that  God  is  distinct  from  the  world 
and  yet  works  in  the  world.  Men  may  impose  limits  on 
revelation  and  not  recognize  it  in  nature  and  history,  but 
only  in  their  own  consciousness  ;  the  thing  itself  remains 
in  principle  the  same :  religion  has  its  foundation  in  reve- 
lation and  derives  from  it  its  origin.54 

The  investigation  into  the  essence  of  religion  has  led  to 
the  same  result  as  that  into  its  origin.    When  the  study 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  161 

of  religions  came  into  vogue,  it  was  thought  that  by 
means  of  comparative  research  the  essence  of  religion 
might  be  determined,  and  thus  the  value  of  all  forms  of 
religion  be  estimated.  But  so  many  and  such  serious 
difficulties  have  been  met  with  in  the  prosecution  of  this 
task  that  it  may  be  reasonably  maintained  that  it  has  now 
come  to  the  dead  point.  It  is  undoubtedly  impracticable 
for  any  one  to  obtain  a  thorough  knowledge  of  all  religions, 
or  even  of  the  principal  religions,  and  to  compare  them 
with  one  another.  Religion  is  of  such  a  complex  nature 
that  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  characterize  accurately  the 
essence  of  a  single  religion,  or  even  of  the  religion  of  a 
single  person.  Very  various  opinions  obtain  among  us  of 
the  essence  of  Christianity,  of  Romanism  and  of  Protes- 
tantism; how,  then,  would  it  be  possible  to  penetrate 
into  the  essence  of  all  the  different  religions  and  to  com- 
pare them  with  one  another?  To  this  must  be  added, 
that  the  study  of  the  history  of  religions  professes  no 
doubt  to  be  undertaken  without  any  prejudice  whatever, 
but  facts  disprove  the  assertion.  Even  the  idea,  from 
which  it  as  a  rule  proceeds,  that  religion  is  neither  an 
illusion  nor  a  disease,  but  a  necessary  element  of  man's 
nature,  a  habitus  and  a  virtue  which  has  a  right  and  rea- 
son to  exist,  —  even  this  idea,  I  say,  is  an  assumption  of 
such  importance  that  it  is  impossible  to  speak  here  of 
unprejudiced  investigation ;  it  is  an  assumption  which 
from  the  outset  binds  and  dominates  the  entire  science. 
But  every  student  of  the  history  of  religions  approaches 
his  task,  whether  he  intends  it  or  not,  with  his  own  con- 
ception of  religion,  which  guides  him  in  his  investigation 
and  serves  him  as  a  rule.  If  he  proceeds,  let  Us  say, 
merely  from  the  view  that  that  religion  is  true  which  lies 
at  the  basis  of  all  and  manifests  itself  more  or  less  purely 

.     11 


162  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

in  each,  he  thereby  puts  forth  a  dogma  wliich  is  derived 
from  philosophy  and  has  far-reaching  results  for  his  in- 
vestigation. Already  in  the  case  of  the  physical  sciences, 
and  yet  more  so  in  the  case  of  the  sciences  of  the  mind, 
it  is  impossible  to  begin  investigation  without  assumptions, 
for  they  all  are  founded  on  ideas  and  canons  which  have 
their  basis  in  the  rational  and  moral  nature  of  man.55  This 
explains  the  fact  that  the  search  for  the  essence  of  reli- 
gion has  ended  by  resolving  it  into  a  vague,  indefinite 
formula  which  is  intended  to  embrace  all  religions,  but 
cannot  do  justice  to  a  single  one  of  them,  and  which,  as 
far  as  it  contains  anything  positive,  has  given  expression 
only  to  the  notion  which  each  investigator  had  formed 
beforehand  of  the  essence  of  religion.56 

Many  have  for  this  reason  turned  their  backs  upon  this 
comparative  historical  investigation  of  the  essence  of  re- 
ligion, and  have  even  run  into  the  opposite  extreme.  They 
say  there  is  no  universal,  objective  religion  valid  for  all, 
and  there  is  no  essence  which  is  everywhere  the  same 
and  only  clothes  itself  in  different  forms.  But  religion  is 
always  something  thoroughly  personal,  —  a  thing  which 
concerns  the  individual  man,  and  hence  it  is  endlessly 
variant  and  incapable  of  being  comprehended  in  a  general 
definition.  He  who  desires  to  know  it  must  watch  it 
in  particular  men,  and  especially  in  the  splendid  speci- 
mens, the  geniuses  and  heroes  of  religion,  the  mystics, 
the  enthusiasts,  the  fanatics ;  they  are  the  classics  of  re- 
ligion. It  is  not  history  but  psychology  which  will  tell 
us  what  religion  really  is.57  Even  a  man  like  Troeltsch, 
who  persists  in  maintaining  the  historical  point  of  view, 
and  upbraids  the  psychology  of  religion  with  the  lack  of 
an  epistemology,  is  compelled  to  confess  that  the  expres- 
sion "  essence  of  religion  "  leads  into  error  on  account  of 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  163 

its  obscurity,  and  creates  the  false  impression  that  it  is 
possible  "to  answer  with  one  stroke  the  different  ques- 
tions which  are  bound  up  with  it  in  one  and  the  same 
investigation."  58  As  it  was  in  the  case  of  the  origin,  so 
again  in  the  consideration  of  the  essence,  of  religion,  many- 
turn  back  from  abstract  monism  to  the  totality  of  reli- 
gious life.  There  is  not  one  principle  which  governs  all 
religions  and  religious  phenomena,  and  there  is  not  one 
formula  under  which  they  all  can  be  summed  up. 

The  investigation  of  the  essence  of  religion  has,  how- 
ever, by  no  means  been  unfruitful.  On  the  contrary,  it 
has  made  as  clear  as  the  day  that  religion  and  revelation 
are  bound  together  very  intimately,  and  that  they  cannot 
be  separated.  All  religion  is  supernatural  in  the  sense  that 
it  is  based  on  faith  in  a  personal  God,  who  is  transcendently 
exalted  above  the  world,  and  nevertheless  is  active  in 
the  world  and  thereby  makes  himself  known  and  com- 
municates himself  to  man.  Let  it  remain  for  the  present 
undetermined  whereby  and  how  God  reveals  himself, 
whether  in  nature  or  in  history,  through  mind  or  heart, 
along  ordinary  or  extraordinary  ways.  Certain  it  is  that 
all  religions,  in  harmony  with  their  own  idea,  rest  upon 
conscious  and  spontaneous  revelation  of  God.  This  is 
confirmed  by  the  consideration  of  what  man  seeks  in  re- 
ligion. Siebeck  divides  religions  into  nature-,  morality-, 
and  redemption-religions.  Tiele,  however,  rightly  ob- 
serves that,  in  a  wide  sense,  the  idea  of  redemption  is 
common  to  all  religions,  and  therefore  all  religions  are 
redemption-religions.  As  to  the  evil  from  which  redemp- 
tion is  sought,  and  the  supreme  good  which  men  desire  to 
obtain,  their  conceptions  diverge  widely.  But  all  reli- 
gions are  concerned  with  redemption  from  an  evil  and 
the  attainment  of  a  supreme  good.     The  first  question 


164  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

always  is,  What  must  I  do  to  be  saved?59  This  being 
so,  religion  everywhere,  by  virtue  of  its  very  nature,  car- 
ries along  with  it  the  idea  of  revelation.  Religion  and 
science  differ  in  many  things,  and  in  this  too,  that  the 
one  owes  the  contents  of  its  knowledge  to  divine  revela- 
tion, the  other  to  human  investigation.60 

To  a  considerable  extent  religion  and  science  (philos- 
ophy) stand  in  relation  to  the  same  objects.  To  separate 
between  religion  and  metaphysics,  however  often  it  may 
have  been  attempted,  is  impossible  ;  religion  is  not  merely 
a  certain  frame  of  mind,  an  emotion  of  the  heart,  but  it 
always  includes  certain  conceptions,  and  the  emotions 
are  modified  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  these  con- 
ceptions. These  conceptions  of  religion  extend  to  man, 
the  world,  and  God,  and  hence  enter  the  same  domain 
which  science  also  tries  to  cultivate.  But  religion  gives 
to  its  conceptions  the  character  of  dogmas  which  it  ac- 
cepts on  divine  authority ;  science  endeavors  to  obtain  its 
conceptions  by  means  of  independent  investigation,  and 
has  no  other  authority  except  reasoning  and  proof.  Now, 
according  to  Tiele,  all  religious  conceptions  move  around 
three  centres,  —  God,  man,  and  the  way  of  salvation.61 
All  these  three  elements  are  most  intimately  connected 
with  the  idea  of  revelation.  Regarding  the  first  element, 
the  doctrine  concerning  God  (theology  proper),  this  is 
clear ;  there  is  no  knowledge  concerning  God,  except 
so  far  as  he  has  revealed  himself ;  the  distinction  of 
nature-  and  revelation-religions,  in  the  sense  that  religions 
may  exist  without  appealing  to  revelation,  is  untenable. 
But  also  in  the  case  of  the  other  two  elements,  the  con- 
nection with  the  idea  of  revelation  is  clearly  traceable. 
For  when  religion  carries  along  with  it  a  distinct  concep- 
tion of  man,  it  soars  far  above  experience.     The  religious 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  165 

anthropology  speaks  of  man's  origin  and  destination,  of 
his  needs  and  ideals,  of  his  disobedience  and  communion 
with  God,  of  his  sin  and  atonement,62  —  ail  of  which  are 
elements  that  cannot  be  obtained  by  means  of  empirical 
investigation  and  scientific  reflection,  but  can  be  known, 
so  far  as  they  are  true,  only  by  means  of  revelation. 
Nearly  all  the  religions  have  their  reminiscences  of  para- 
dise and  their  expectations  of  the  future,  and  trace  them 
back  to  revelation.  And  regarding  the  third  element, 
soteriology,  this  also  is  either  untrue  or  derived  from 
revelation.  For  this  part  of  religious  dogmatics  indicates 
the  means  by  which  communion  with  God  can  be  restored, 
the  power  of  evil  broken,  a  new  life  begun,  and  the  hope 
of  abiding  happiness  realized.63  Among  these  means  a 
chief  place  is  assigned  in  all  religions  to  mediators,  sacri- 
fices, and  prayer.  Those  persons  are  considered  mediators 
through  whom  the  Godhead  makes  known  its  revelations 
to  man.  Sacrifices,  whatever  theory  of  their  origin  and 
purpose  may  be  favored,  always  include  the  idea  that 
man  is  dependent  upon  God,  owes  everything  to  him, 
and  is  acceptable  in  his  sight  through  a  special  service 
(cultus)  distinguished  from  the  ordinary  ethical  life. 
And  prayer,  which  forms  the  heart  of  religion,  has  its 
ground  in  the  belief  that  God  is  not  only  a  personal 
being,  but  also  is  able  to  govern  the  world  by  his  power, 
wisdom,  and  goodness,  and  make  it  subservient  to  man's 
salvation.  Prayer  never,  not  even  in  its  highest  form, 
loses  this  character ;  the  petition  for  the  remission  of 
sins,  for  a  pure  heart,  for  communion  with  God,  is  as 
supernaturalistic  as  that  for  the  healing  of  the  sick  or 
for  deliverance  from  some  danger  to  life.64  Revelation  is 
the  foundation  of  all  religion,  the  presupposition  of  all  its 
conceptions,  emotions,  and  actions. 


166  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Finally,  all  the  attempts  to  classify  the  religions  have 
led  to  the  acknowledgment  of  the  necessity  of  revelation. 
All  the  proposed  divisions  —  into  such  as  have  grown  and 
such  as  have  been  founded,  into  nature-  and  revelation- 
religions,  into  polytheistic  and  monotheistic,  into  partic- 
ular and  universal  religions,  etc.,  —  suffer,  according  to 
the  increasing  conviction  of  many,  from  excessive  one- 
sidedness ;  they  ignore  other  elements,  do  no  justice  to 
the  richness  and  variety  of  religious  life,  and  all  proceed 
tacitly  from  the  Hegelian  notion  that  the  chapters  which 
successively  treat  of  the  several  religions  represent  so 
many  steps  in  the  development  of  religion.  No  one, 
however,  believes  that  a  satisfactory  distribution  has  been 
found.65  As  little  as  natural  phenomena,  societies,  and 
the  peoples,  can  the  religions  be  ranged  one  after  the 
other  in  a  formal  system  without  violence  to  reality. 

In  view  of  this  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that  the  old 
distribution  of  religions  into  true  and  false  has  been  re- 
vived in  a  new  form.  The  more  accurately  the  nature 
of  the  conceptions  of  the  peoples  was  investigated,  the 
clearer  it  became  that  they  contain  various  elements  which 
cannot  be  derived  from  one  single  principle.  Thus  it 
appeared  that  their  religious  conceptions  are  essentially 
distinct,  not  only  from  legends  and  fables,  but  also  from 
myths.  In  the  beginning  of  the  last  century,  under  the 
influence  of  the  romantic  school,  the  idea  prevailed,  and 
through  the  Grimm  brothers  found  acceptance  almost 
everywhere,  that  mythology  was  the  real  science  of  reli- 
gion. This  mythology  accordingly  arose  out  of  nature- 
myths,  was  to  be  looked  upon  as  the  embodiment  of 
religious,  often  sublime,  ideas,  but  afterwards  had  faded 
into  hero-sagas  and  fables.  But  deeper  study  has  led  to  a 
different  view.     Myths,  sagas,  and  fables  no  doubt  often 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  167 

bear  relation  to  one  another;  originally,  however,  they 
are  distinct  in  origin  and  aim.  "  Myths  are  primitive 
philosophy,  the  most  simple  intuitive  form  of  thought, 
a  series  of  attempts  to  understand  the  world,  to  explain 
life  and  death,  fate  and  nature,  gods  and  cults.  Sagas 
are  primitive  history,  artlessly  shaped  in  hatred  and  love, 
unconsciously  formed  and  simplified.  Fables,  on  the  con- 
trary, have  grown  out  of  and  serve  only  the  need  of  en- 
tertainment." 66  Religion  is  always  distinguished  from  all 
these  in  that  it  is  always  connected  with  a  cult.67 

It  is  of  still  greater  importance  to  observe  that  religion 
is  more  and  more  being  recognized  as  distinct  from  magic. 
J.  G.  Fraser  has  no  doubt  attempted  to  explain  religion 
just  by  means  of  magic,68  and  with  him  K.  Ph.  Preuss  is 
of  the  opinion  "  that  primitive  human  stupidity  is  the  origi- 
nal source  of  religion  and  art;  for  both  proceed  directly 
from  sorcery,  which  on  its  part  is  the  immediate  result  of 
that  prudence  which  proceeds  from  instinct."69  This 
theory,  however,  is  very  strenuously  opposed  by  Andrew 
Lang  and  others ;  we  gather,  says  Tiele,  no  figs  from 
thistles;  superstition  cannot  be  the  mother  of  religion.70 
Superstition  and  magic  are  indeed  often  connected  with 
religion,  but  they  are  neither  the  source  nor  the  essence 
of  it.  They  are  rather  to  be  regarded  as  morbid  phenom- 
ena, which  occur  by  no  means  only  among  the  lowest, 
but  also  among  the  most  advanced  peoples  and  religions ; 
and  even  in  the  present  time  in  Christendom,  not  only 
among  the  common  people,  but  relatively  more  markedly 
among  the  cultured  and  educated,  where  they  number 
their  adherents  by  the  thousands;  they  are  not  "a  lower 
stage  or  a  first  step  of  a  religious  development,  but  under- 
currents of  real  religion." 71  If  this  distinction  is  correctly 
drawn,  it  follows  immediately  that  it  is  impossible  to  re- 


168  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

duce  the  religions  and  the  religious  phenomena  among  the 
different  peoples  to  one  head  and  to  derive  them  from  one 
principle.  Monism  as  truly  as  the  doctrine  of  evolution  is 
contradicted  by  the  facts.  The  religions  have  no  common 
root;  various  factors,  fetichism,  animism,  ancestor-wor- 
ship, etc.,  have  worked  together  in  bringing  them  into 
existence.73  Particularly  have  religion  and  magic  differ- 
ent sources  and  must  receive  distinct  explanations. 

The  great  question  in  the  history  of  religions  is  thus  no 
longer,  How  in  general  did  religion  originate  ?  but  Whence 
do  superstition  and  magic  derive  their  origin  ?  This  is  the 
problem  that  confronts  us,  namely,  the  old  question,  irodev 
to  kukov  ?  Existence,  the  good,  the  true,  the  beautiful  are 
eternal  and  have  no  beginning ;  but  becoming,  error,  false- 
hood, sin,  shame,  cannot  be  eternal  and  must  have  been 
originated  in  time.  In  superstition  and  magic  ignorance 
in  general  and  lack  of  knowledge  of  nature  in  particular 
certainly  play  a  r61e.  And  yet  "original  stupidity"  cannot 
be  their  only  source.  For  not  only  do  these  morbid  phe- 
nomena find  credence  in  the  highest  circles  of  civilization 
even  to-day,  but  even  the  most  artless  man  distinguishes 
emphatically  between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural, 
although  he  draws  his  line  of  demarkation  differently  from 
us ;  and  recognizes  a  domain  which  is  subject  to  himself 
and  governed  by  his  knowledge  and  action.73  To  this  must 
be  added,  that  superstition  and  magic  bear  not  only  an  in- 
tellectual, but  also  a  moral  character ;  they  are  errors  of 
the  head,  but  more  especially  errors  of  the  heart.  They 
furnish  us  proof  that  nature,  but  equally  that  God,  is  not 
known.  The  knowledge  of  nature  and  history  also  is  in- 
timately conjoined  with  that  of  God.  Prophets  and  apos- 
tles had  no  knowledge  of  natural  science,  as  it  has  been 
developed  in  these  later  centuries,  but  they  had  a  very 


REVELATION   AND   RELIGION  169 

sound  conception  of  nature,  because  they  knew  God  and 
saw  in  the  world  his  handiwork,  and  they  left  no  room 
for  superstition  and  magic.  So  soon,  however,  as  the  pure 
knowledge  of  God  disappears,  nature  too  in  its  true  charac- 
ter is  disowned,  and  either  exalted  into  the  sphere  of  the 
godhead  or  degraded  to  the  sphere  of  a  demoniacal  power. 
And  this  mixture  of  God  and  the  world,  which  results  from 
vain  speculations  of  the  mind  and  a  darkening  of  the  heart, 
always  was  and  still  remains  the  origin  of  all  superstition 
and  magic. 

But  as  sickness  reminds  us  of  former  health,  and  aberra- 
tion calls  to  remembrance  the  right  path,  so  these  phe- 
nomena of  superstition  point  back  to  the  original  image  of 
religion.  Superstition  and  magic  could  not  have  arisen  if 
the  idea  of  another  world  than  this  world  of  nature  had 
not  been  deeply  imprinted  on  man's  self-consciousness. 
They  themselves  are  of  a  later  origin,  but  they  presuppose 
religion,  which  is  inherent  in  human  nature,  having  its 
foundation  and  principle  in  the  creation  of  man  in  the  im- 
age of  God.  Hence  religion  is,  not  only  with  reference  to 
its  origin  and  essence,  but  also  with  reference  to  its  truth 
and  validity,  founded  in  revelation.  Without  revelation 
religion  sinks  back  into  a  pernicious  superstition. 


VII 

REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY 

THE  arguments  for  the  reality  of  revelation,  derived 
from  the  nature  of  thought,  the  essence  of  nature, 
the  character  of  history,  and  the  conception  of  religion, 
are  finally  strengthened  by  the  course  of  development 
through  which  mankind  has  passed,  and  which  has  led  it 
from  paradise  to  the  cross  and  will  guide  it  from  the 
cross  to  glory. 

We  cannot  reach  the  origin  of  the  human  race  or  form 
an  idea  of  its  primitive  condition  by  the  aid  of  animal, 
child,  and  savage ;  neither  do  biology,  geology  and  palaeon- 
tology give  us  any  certainty  with  regard  to  its  first  abode 
or  concerning  the  unity  of  the  race.  If  there  are  no  other 
sources  and  resources  from  which  to  draw  our  knowledge, 
we  continually  move  in  guesses  and  conjectures,  and  form 
for  ourselves  the  image  of  an  incomprehensible  and  im- 
possible primitive  man  at  the  beginning  of  history. 

Tradition,  the  testimony  which  mankind  itself  bears  to 
its  origin  in  tradition  and  history,  points  out  a  safer  way 
to  acquire  knowledge  regarding  the  oldest  condition  of  the 
human  race.  In  former  times  this  was  the^method  by 
which  people  sought  to  penetrate  into  the  past.  The 
Church  Fathers  derived  all  the  wisdom  they  found  among 
the  heathen  from  the  theology  of  the  eternal  Logos.1 
Augustine  speaks  of  a  Christianity  which  has  existed 
since  the  beginning  of  the  human  race,  and  was  of  the 
opinion  that   the  doctrine  of  God  as  the  creator  of  all 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  171 

things  and  the  light  of  all  knowledge  and  action  had  been 
known  to  all  the  wise  men  and  philosophers  of  all  peoples.2 
Lactantius  rejoiced  in  this  unity  of  all  peoples,  and  beheld 
in  it  a  prelude  of  the  great  alleluiah  which  in  the  days  to 
come  will  be  sung  by  all  mankind,  although  he  complains 
that  the  traditions  have  been  corrupted  by  poetical  license 
and  the  truth  often  perverted  into  a  delusion.3  Both  in 
earlier  and  later  times  in  the  Christian  Church  the  truth 
and  wisdom  found  among  the  heathen  have  been  generally 
derived  from  a  primitive  revelation,  from  the  continuous 
illumination  by  the  Logos,  from  acquaintance  with  the 
literature  of  the  Old  Testament,  or  from  the  operation  of 
God's  common  grace.4 

No  doubt  the  rationalism  of  the  eighteenth  century 
threw  all  these  theories  overboard,  because  it  believed  that 
it  possessed  in  reason  the  only  and  sufficient  source  of  all 
truth.  But  it  was  cast  down  from  this  exalted  pedestal  by 
the  philosophy  of  Kant,  by  the  theology  of  Schleiermacher, 
and  with  more  prevailing  power  by  the  rise  of  the  roman- 
tic school.  When  towards  the  end  of  that  century 
Persian,  Indian,  and  Egyptian  antiquity  gradually  dis- 
closed its  treasures,  the  idea  of  an  original  revelation,  a 
common  tradition,  a  primitive  monotheism,  revived  in 
wide  circles.  A  host  of  men  —  Schelling,  Creuzer,  Chr. 
G.  Heyne,  F.  G.  Welcker,  O.  Muller,  Fr.  Schlegel,  Ad. 
Miiller,  and  others  —  proceeded  from  this  hypothesis  and, 
often  rather  one-sidedly,  elevated  India  or  Egypt  or  Persia 
to  the  cradle  of  the  human  race  and  the  source  of  all  wis- 
dom.5 Traditionalists,  such  as  de  Maistre  and  de  Bonald, 
carried  this  tendency  to  an  extreme,  maintaining  that 
language,  and  with  it  all  knowledge  of  the  truth,  had  been 
communicated  to  man  by  God  in  the  primitive  revelation, 
and  that  this  knowledge  was  now  propagated  by  tradition 


172  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

and  had  to  be  received  on  authority.6  Antagonism  to  the 
autonomy  asserted  by  the  Revolution  led  these  men  to  ignore 
entirely  the  activity  of  reason  and  to  deny  all  personal  in- 
dependence. By  these  extravagancies  the  romantic  school 
digged  its  own  grave ;  empirical  science  raised  its  voice 
against  it,  called  men  back  to  reality,  and  at  first  imagined 
that  all  the  advance  of  culture  as  well  as  the  origin  of  man 
himself  could  be  explained  by  means  of  minute  variations, 
occurring  through  an  endless  series  of  years.  But  deeper 
study  and  continued  investigation,  not  only  of  the  culture 
but  also  of  the  history  of  the  most  ancient  peoples,  has 
in  this  case  too  led  to  the  acknowledgment  of  the  just 
claims  that  lay  at  the  foundation  of  the  old  view. 

In  the  first  place,  we  have  to  consider  the  primitive 
history  of  culture,  which  is  best  known  to  us  through 
many  important  and  exact  researches  concerning  the 
oldest  inhabitants  of  Europe.  The  prehistoric  men  who 
lived  there  no  longer  speak  to  us,  and  have  left  nothing 
behind  them  in  writing ;  hence  our  knowledge  of  their 
condition  always  remains  in  the  highest  degree  jjuperf ect ; 
we  cannot  even  directly  prove  that  they  ^  possessed  lan- 
guage and  religion,  morality  and  lawsf  there  is  here  a 
large  domain  for  the  play  of  the  imagination.  Neverthe- 
less they  are  known  to  us  in  part  by  means  of  the  fossils 
of  their  bones  and  skulls,  by  means  of  the  relics  of  their 
arms  and  tools,  of  their  dwellings  and  graves,  their  food 
and  clothing,  their  furniture  and  ornaments.  And  these 
teach  us  that  the  original  inhabitants  of  Europe  stood  on  a 
much  lower  level  in  culture,  science,  art,  technic,  etc.,  than 
the  culture-peoples  of  the  present  time ;  but  in  intellect, 
talents,  capabilities,  in  bodily  and  mental  qualities,  they 
were  men  of  like  passions  with  us.  In  elements  of  culture 
they  did  not  stand  on  a  lower  plane  than  many  nature- 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  173 

peoples  of  our  day  as,  for  instance,  the  Patagonians  and 
Bushmen,  whom  we  nevertheless  reckon  among  men,  and 
who  have  in  common  with  other  men  the  same  mind  and 
the  same  bodily  structure.  In  fact  the  study  of  the  arms 
and  tools  which  have  been  preserved  proceeds  on  the  as- 
sumption that  those  who  made  them  were  men;  for  we 
consider  objects  arms  and  tools  only  when  they  manife 
intellect  and  reflection,  thought  and  purpose,  anfWlence 
are  an  evidence  of  the  activity  of  the  Jmman  mind. 
Schurtz  is  right  in  saying  that  "all  material  culture  is 
a  creation  of  the  mind,  and  always  serves  to  strengthen 
the  body  or  to  free  it  of  burdens ;  the  staff  lengthens  the 
arm,  the  stone  strengthens  the  fist,  the  dress  protects  the 
body,  the  dwelling  shelters  the  family."7  The  original 
inhabitants  of  Europe,  having  left  behind  objects  such  as 
never  have  been  conceived  or  made  by  any  animal,  —  these 
bear  incontestable  witness  to  their  mental  gifts  and  their 
human  nature.  When  we  consider,  indeed,  that  they  stood 
at  the  beginning  of  culture  and  had  to  invent  many  things 
which  we,  aided  by  their  labor,  simply  need  to  modify 
and  develop,  we  stand  amazed  at  their  inventiveness, 
and  especially  their  artistic  skill,  which  accomplished  so 
much  with  such  defective  means  and  under  such  unfavor- 
able conditions. 

But  there  is  still  something  further  in  ancient  culture 
which  draws  our  attention.  Notwithstanding  all  the  dif- 
ferences caused  by  character  and  talents,  wants  and  envi- 
ronment, soft  and  climate,  there  exists  a  striking  likeness 
between  the  oldest  culture  which  is  met  with  in  Europe 
and  that  which  is  found  in  other  parts  of  the  world  and 
among  other  peoples.  For  example  dolmens,  that  is 
family  graves,  composed  of  five  large  blocks  of  granite, 
are  found  in  all  parts  of  the  earth,  with  the  exception  of 


174  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Australia,  and  are  ascribed  on  this  account  by  some  writers 
on  the  history  of  civilization  to  a  single  race  which  had 
spread  through  various  lands.8  Axes,  which  mark  the 
boundary  between  the  palaeolithic  and  the  neolithic  condi- 
tions show  great  similarity  to  one  another  in  the  whole  of 
Europe  and  in  Egypt ;  and  the  pottery  which  is  found  in 
the  latter  country  vividly  reminds  us  of  the  forms  which 
are  scattered  through  Europe.9  It  is  remarkable  in  this 
respect,  that  numerous  axes  have  been  found  in  Southern- 
and  Central-Europe,  made  of  kinds  of  stone  which  are  not 
indigenous  to  Europe,  but  are  common  in  Central-Asia.10 
The  ornamentation  by  which  the  pottery  especially  is  dec- 
orated is  the  same  which  from  time  immemorial  was  used 
in  Egypt.11  The  same  species  of  cereals,  wheat,  barley, 
and  millet  found  in  Egypt  and  Asia  were  later  raised  in 
Europe.12  All  the  principal  elements  of  culture  in  Europe 
—  tools,  decorations,  agriculture,  cattle-breeding,  dwell- 
ings, and  graves  —  point  back  to  the  East,  to  Egypt  and 
Asia.  On  this  account  Sophus  Muller  says  that  not  only 
has  the  more  recent  culture  been  influenced  by  the  East, 
but  the  oldest  culture  also  did  not  grow  up  independently 
in  Europe,  but  was  introduced  from  the  East.13  In  point 
of  fact,  scientific  research  increases  the  probability  of  the 
hypothesis  that  man  did  not  originate  in  Europe,  but 
came  across  from  Asia  and  Africa  into  Italy  and  Spain. 
Even  such  an  enthusiastic  adherent  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution  as  Ludwig  Reinhart  testifies  that,  as  Europe  is 
only  an  appendix  of  the  vast  continent  of  ^.sia,  so  also 
the  principal  gifts  of  culture  were  for  the  most  part  not 
acquired  in  Europe,  but  brought  over  from  the  ancient 
civilized  countries  of  Western-Asia.14 

The  remarkable  excavations  which  have   been  under- 
taken in   recent  years   in   several  parts  of  Greece  and 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  175 

especially  in  Crete,  have  confirmed  this  result  of  the 
history  of  civilization.  They  make  it  clear  that  Greece, 
long  before  the  Hellenic  culture  proper,  that  is  to  say, 
more  than  a  thousand  years  before  Christ,  passed 
through  an  extremely  interesting  period  of  culture, 
which  is  designated  the  pre-Mycenic  and  the  Mycenic 
ages,  the  latter  of  which  is  intimately  connected  with 
the  Egyptian  civilization.15  Some,  it  is  true,  such  as 
Karl  Penka,  have  been  of  the  opinion  that  civilization 
really  began  in  Northern-Europe  and  spread  thence 
towards  the  South;  others,  like  Solomon  Reinach,  have 
expressed  the  judgment  that  the  civilization  of  Europe 
had  an  origin  of  its  own,  independent  of  Asia.  But 
the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  contrary  are  so  numerous 
and  strong  that  the  great  majority  of  the  experts  are 
persuaded  of  the  Egyptian  origin  of  the  Mycenic  civili- 
zation. Just  as  in  later  days  the  art  of  writing,  the 
brick-kiln,  the  coining  of  money,  Christianity,  etc.,  have 
been  brought  over  from  the  south  to  northern  Europe, 
so  it  happened  with  the  other  constituents  of  civilization. 
The  south  was  the  real  source  of  civilization  for  Europe, 
although  it  is  true  that  the  north  has  greatly  modified  and 
developed  the  elements  received,  as,  for  example,  the  stone 
axe.16  And  Southern-Europe  in  its  turn  stood  under  the 
influence  of  Africa  and  Asia.  The  knowledge  of  metals 
penetrated  from  the  East  into  southern  Europe.  Bronze 
objects  found  in  the  lowest  strata  of  Troy,  pottery  and 
objects  of  worship  in  Crete,  graves  in  large  numbers, 
especially  on  the  islands  of  the  Archipelago,  but  also  in 
Greece  and  Asia  Minor,  daggers  and  axes  of  bronze  in 
the  graves,  ornaments  wrought  on  the  pottery  in  the 
form  of  spirals,  lines,  and  female  figures,  —  all  these 
point  to  the  civilization  of  ancient  Egypt.17 


176  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

The  study  of  Greek  philosophy  points  in  the  same  di- 
rection. Zeller,  Ueberweg  and  others  succeeded  in  intro- 
ducing into  wide  circles  the  idea  that  the  philosophy  of 
Thales  and  his  fellow  spirits  was  the  result  of  opposition 
to  religion,  or  at  least  of  the  emancipation  of  the  mind 
from  religion,  and  that  philosophy  had  taken  an  antitheti- 
cal position  to  belief  in  any  form.  But  further  research 
has  brought  to  light  the  incorrectness  of  this  explanation. 
As  a  rule,  the  philosophers  were  opposed  to  the  supersti- 
tion of  the  people  and  the  superficiality  of  the  masses, 
but  we  have  no  right  whatever  to  represent  them  on  tliis 
account  as  infidel  and  irreligious.  On  the  contrary,  re- 
religion  and  philosophy  were  still  in  their  case  one ;  they 
were  not  one-sided,  materialistic,  nature-philosophers,  but 
on  the  contrary  propounded  a  positive  view  about  man 
and  God.  They  investigated  not  only  the  essence  of 
nature,  but  also  the  essence  of  man,  his  soul  and  its  im- 
mortality. Moreover,  the  philosophy  of  Thales  did  not 
fall  abruptly  from  the  skies ;  a  long  time  of  preparation 
preceded  it.  According  to  the  testimony  of  Pythagoras, 
Plato,  Aristotle,  the  theologians  and  lawgivers  were  the 
precursors  of  the  philosophers.  The  age  before  Homer 
was  by  no  means  one  of  rude  barbarism,  without  history 
and  without  letters  ;  but  the  Pelasgians  brought  over  from 
Asia  a  treasure  of  religious  conceptions,  manners  and 
customs.  When  the  several  tribes  in  Greece  intermingled, 
there  was  born  from  their  intercourse  a  new  cult,  the  cult 
of  the  Muses,  who  formed  the  court  retinue  of  the  Doric 
god  Apollo.  Orpheus  was  in  this  period  the  great  figure  ; 
singers  and  poets  in  their  vopoi  regulated  the  worship 
of  Apollo ;  the  siege  of  Troy  and  the  founding  of  the  colo- 
nies in  Asia  Minor  furnished  new  material  for  thought 
and  hymn  ;  Homer  and  Hesiod  did  not  invent,  but  system- 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  177 

atized  the  religious  ideas  and  customs.  Next  to  these 
poets  and  singers  appeared  the  politicians  and  the  law- 
givers, the  wise  men  and  the  moralists,  the  theologians  and 
the  mystics.  Along  with  them  appeared  very  soon  on  the 
scene  the  real,  afterwards  so-called,  philosophers.  They 
were  men  of  like  passions  with  the  others,  and  stood  not 
outside  the  rich,  full  life  of  their  time,  but,  as  Heinrich 
Gomperz  has  described  them,  as  men  of  flesh  and  blood, 
in  the  midst  of  it.  The  rich  tradition  which  existed  in 
poetry  and  aphorisms,  in  theology  and  legislation,  forms 
the  background  of  their  philosophy,  and  is  itself  intimately 
connected  with  Oriental  wisdom.  The  greatest  thinkers 
of  Greece  —  Pythagoras,  Plato,  Aristotle,  and  later  Plu- 
tarch and  Plotinus  —  derived  their  wisdom,  especially  the 
knowledge  of  the  ideas,  from  ancient  tradition,  and  further 
on  from  divine  revelation.18  Of  course  this  tradition  was, 
to  a  large  extent,  corrupted,  especially  through  the  imagi- 
nation of  the  poets,  and  was  more  purely  preserved  in  the 
Orphic  school  than  in  the  works  of  Homer  and  Hesiod. 
But  it  was  nevertheless  the  source  from  which  philosophy 
drew  its  most  elevated  ideas.  Just  as  poetry  and  art, 
so  philosophy  enriched  itself  from  the  precious  treasure 
which  was  preserved  in  tradition.  The  first  problems  on 
which  thinking  tried  its  strength  were  brought  to  the 
thinkers  by  life  itself.  Philosophy  arose  out  of  religion, 
and  the  question  which  presents  itself  to  us  is,  not  how 
philosophy  later  on  assumed  a  religious  character  in 
Pythagoras  and  Plato,  but,  on  the  contrary,  how  philoso- 
phy was  born  of  religion  and  theology.19 

The  marvellous  discoveries  which  have  been  made  in  re- 
cent years  in  the  land  of  Babylon  and  Assyria  enable  us 
now  to  trace  further  back  this  broad  stream  of  tradition 

which  culture  and  history  both  indicate  to  us.     A  new 

12 


178  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

world  has  here  risen  out  of  the  ground.  New  peoples 
have  appeared  on  the  scene  whose  names  were  scarcely- 
known  to  us.  As  natural  science  has  expanded  our  ho- 
rizon above,  beneath,  and  around  us,  so  historical  science 
has  extended  it  into  an  almost  infinite  past.  They  who 
recognized  the  historical  value  of  the  book  of  Genesis  of 
course  knew  better ;  but  for  many  there  lay  behind  the 
time  of  Moses  nothing  but  a  world  of  rude  barbarism. 
All  this  has  now  been  changed.  Penetrating  into  the 
past 20  under  the  guidance,  not  of  imagination,  but  of  his- 
tory, we  encounter  in  ancient  Asia  not  half-bestial  men 
and  savage  hordes,  but  highly  civilized  peoples  and  a 
richly  developed  culture. 

Not  only  do  we  find  a  land,  the  fertility  of  which 
in  that  dry  climate  was  increased  by  numerous  canals 
and  channels  of  irrigation,  under  the  superintendence 
of  a  large  multitude  of  officials,  whose  activity  was  care- 
fully regulated.  Legislation  and  jurisprudence  also  had 
reached  a  high  degree  of  development.  The  code  of 
Hammurabi  contains  decrees  about  marriage,  about  the 
relations  between  parents  and  children  and  between  free- 
men and  slaves,  about  the  protection  of  honor  and  life, 
about  rents  and  leases,  about  feudal  tenure,  mortgage,  in- 
heritance, and  penal  justice.  Trade  and  art  rejoiced  in  a 
rich  measure  of  prosperity ;  architecture  and  sculpture, 
metallurgy,  the  arts  of  the  goldsmith,  potter,  and  stone- 
cutter produced  works  which  excite  even  now  our  ad- 
miration, and  had  at  their  disposal  even  then  a  great 
wealth  of  forms.  Commerce  flourished  and  moved  along 
excellent  roads  of  communication  which  led  from  Baby- 
lonia to  Western- Asia.  Science  also  found  its  students, 
especially  astronomy,  in  harmony  with  the  astral  char- 
acter  of   the   religion,    but    also    arithmetic,    geometry, 


Rp;VELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  179 

chronology  and  geography,  hieroglyphics  and  history. 
Not  a  few  even  maintain  that  the  civilization  of  Bab- 
ylonia, like  that  of  Egypt,  does  not,  so  far  as  it  is  known 
to  us,  exhibit  a  picture  of  advance  and  bloom,  but  rather 
of  retrogression  and  decadence.  The  oldest  works  of  art 
in  both  lands  are,  in  their  opinion,  far  in  advance  of  later 
productions  in  talent  and  in  freedom  and  truth  of  con- 
ception. Otto  Weber  expresses  this  view  thus :  "  The 
dogma  of  a  gradual  development  from  a  lower  to  a  higher 
level  is  not  sustained  by  the  history  of  the  Oriental  peoples. 
What  history  gives  us  leaves  upon  us,  on  the  contrary, 
the  impression  of  decadence  rather  than  of  an  advancing 
civilization,  which  tries  to  find  fixed  forms ;  everywhere 
in  art,  science,  and  religion,  this  is  confirmed."  21 

It  has  happened  with  the  excavations  in  Babylon  and 
Assyria  very  much  as  it  happens  with  all  discoveries. 
At  first  they  were  greatly  overestimated  and  their  impor- 
tance exaggerated.  Just  as  in  former  ages  all  the  wisdom 
of  the  peoples  was  derived  from  the  books  of  the  Old 
Testament,  and  in  the  days  of  romanticism  from  India, 
Egypt,  or  Persia,  so  also  there  has  arisen  in  sequence 
to  the  important  discoveries  in  the  land  of  Sumer  and 
Accad  a  Panbabylonian  school,  which  imagines  it  has 
discovered  in  Babel's  astral  religion  a  key  to  the  religion 
and  world-view  of  all  the  peoples.  Certain  similar  fea- 
tures in  the  narratives  of  creation  and  the  deluge,  for  ex- 
ample, so  astonished  men  that  borrowing  or  community 
in  origin  was  at  once  assumed,  the  differences  ignored, 
and  even  the  precipitate  conclusion  formed  that  probably 
affinity  and  agreement  existed  in  everything  else  too. 
Just  as  the  points  of  resemblance  between  man  and  beast 
have  been  the  occasion  of  a  rash  inference  of  common  de- 
scent, so  also  the  Panbabylonists,  through  the  mouth  of 


180  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Winckler,  Zimmern,  Jeremias,  Miicke,  Stucken,  Hans 
Schmidt,  and  especially  Jensen  in  his  Gilgamesh-Epos, 
have  made  a  fearful  abuse  of  the  argument  from  analogy. 
The  Babel  formula  seemed  to  furnish  the  explanation  of 
the  entire  history  of  the  world.  But  this  exaggeration 
need  not  cause  much  solicitude;  all  exaggerations  hasten 
by  and  are  succeeded  in  a  short  time  by  a  calmer  and  more 
sober  view.22  And  the  result  will  be  the  recognition  of 
the  significant  fact  that  the  land  of  Babel  was  the  cradle 
of  the  descendants  of  Noah  and  the  starting-point  of  all 
civilization. 

This  fact  receives  strong  confirmation  from  another  side 
also.  Not  only  the  Babylonists  and  the  Assyriologists, 
but  also  the  ethnologists  in  a  wider  sense,  supply  us  with 
strong  grounds  for  the  suggestion  that  the  cradle  of  the 
human  race  stood  in  Central- Asia.  We  meet  with  strik- 
ing points  of  agreement,  in  conceptions,  manners,  customs, 
institutions,  between  the  most  widely  separated  peoples. 
The  state  of  society  of  the  Greeks  as  described  by  Homer, 
for  instance,  shows  remarkable  resemblances  to  the  condi- 
tion of  the  ancient  Irish,  Welsh,  Scottish  Highlanders,  and 
further  to  that  of  the  ancient  Norsemen,  Araucanians, 
Massai,  Turcomans,  and  the  Kirgish.  All  the  institutions, 
all  the  characteristics  of  the  ancient  ancestors  of  the  Ro- 
manic, Germanic,  Slavonic,  and  Semitic  peoples,  find  their 
parallels  in  the  primitive  races  which  still  exist  or  have 
recently  become  extinct.  The  similarity  between  the 
Semites  and  the  American  Indians  is  so  great  that  some 
old  ethnologists  imagined  that  they  had  discovered  in  the 
aborigines  of  America  the  lost  ten  tribes  of  Israel.33 
Richthofen  found  astronomical  conceptions  in  China  which 
distinctly  pointed  back  to  Babylon.  This  led  him  to 
remark  :  "  We  stand  here  before  one  of  the  most  remark- 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  181 

able  problems  which  prehistoric  times  offer  us  in  ref- 
erence to  the  inter-communication  of  peoples."  24  In  a 
word,  the  study  of  history  and  civilization  makes  it  more 
and  more  clear  that  Babylon  was  in  ancient  times  the 
ancestral  country  of  the  human  race  and  the  source  of 
civilization.  The  peoples  in  Western- Asia  stood  in  active 
communication  with  one  another;  there  was  no  "spiritual 
isolation "  (geistige  Sonder exist enz)  of  the  peoples,  no 
Chinese  wall  which  separated  them  from  one  another; 
a  common  tradition  in  the  widest  sense  bound  together 
all  lands  and  peoples,  —  Babylonia,  Arabia,  Canaan,  Phoe- 
nicia, and  Egypt.  Whether  the  tribes  and  generations 
after  the  building  of  the  tower  of  Babel  took  many  ele- 
ments of  culture  away  with  them  from  their  original  home, 
or  whether  these  were  in  various  ways  conveyed  to  them 
or  were  developed  through  later  communication,  it  is  a 
fact  that  the  hypothesis  gains  progressively  in  strength, 
that  the  same  tradition  aDd  the  same  culture  lie  at  the 
foundation  of  the  conceptions  and  customs  of  all  peoples.25 
Probably  more  light  will  be  shed  on  all  this  as  excavations 
are  continued,  the  texts  translated,  and  the  researches  of 
palaeontologists  and  ethnologists  further  prosecuted. 

But  we  are  at  least  warranted  in  saying,  even  at  pres- 
ent, that  the  so-called  Volkeridee  of  Adolph  Bastian  has 
received  a  heavy  blow.  The  ethnologists  have  always 
been  struck  by  the  many  and  strong  analogies  which 
exist  between  even  widely  sundered  peoples  in  all  sorts  of 
conceptions  and  institutions,  manners  and  customs.  The 
celebrated  and  widely  travelled  Bastian  thought  this  ex- 
plicable on  the  hypothesis  that  human  nature  is  every- 
where the  same,  and  that  the  several  peoples  have  given 
birth  wholly  independently  of  one  another  to  the  same 
conceptions  and  customs ;  and  this  theory  for  a  long  time 


182  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

met  with  much  favor.  Dogs  bark  everywhere  alike,  the 
cuckoo  utters  everywhere  the  same  note,  and  in  the  same 
way  man  everywhere  forms  the  same  ideas  and  performs 
the  same  actions.26  Of  course  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
next  to  heredity  variability,  next  to  dependence  inde- 
pendence, plays  an  important  role,  and  it  is  well-nigh  im- 
possible to  draw  the  boundary  line  where  the  one  ends 
and  the  other  begins.  A  frivolous  game  has  often  been 
played  with  formal  agreement,  affinity,  descent,  not  only 
in  the  science  of  religion,  but  also  in  the  science  of 
philology.27  But  on  the  other  side  it  must  not  be  forgot- 
ten that  the  unity  of  human  nature,  on  which  Bastian 
based  his  argument,  includes  more  than  is  actually  derived 
from  it. 

It  is,  of  course,  easy  to  imagine  that  the  animal-man 
stands  behind  the  culture-man  whom  we  meet  with  even  in 
the  primitive  races,  and  that  the  interval  between  man  and 
beast  was  bridged  over  in  earlier  times  b}'  many  transition- 
forms  which  are  now  extinct  and  lost.  This,  however,  is 
pure  fancy,  which  has  no  rooting  in  reality.  The  facts  are, 
that  everywhere  and  always,  so  far  as  investigation  can 
carry  us,  an  essential  difference  exists  between  man  and 
beast.  Human  nature  is  sui  generis  ;  it  has  its  own  char- 
acter and  attributes.  If  this  be  true,  then  the  common 
origin  of  all  men  is  necessarily  given  with  it,  without 
needing  further  proof;  and  in  point  of  fact  this  hypoth- 
esis is  accepted  theoretically  by  many  adherents  of  the 
doctrine  of  descent,  and  practically  by  almost  all.  This 
monogeny,  however,  again  implies  that  the  first  human  pair 
was  either  created  by  God  or  arose  all  of  a  sudden,  by  means 
of  an  enormous  leap  of  mutation,  to  the  height  of  human 
nature,  and  still  further,  that  the  oldest  men  dwelt  to- 
gether for  a  long  time  as  one  family.    But  there  is  involved 


REVELATION   AND    CHRISTIANITY  183 

in  this  not  only  the  possibility  but  also  the  necessity  of  a 
common  tradition.  Human  nature  is  not  an  empty  notion, 
no  purely  abstract  conception,  but  a  reality,  a  particular 
manner  of  being,  which  includes  distinctive  habits,  incli- 
nations, and  attributes.  And  this  tradition  was  undoubt- 
edly supported  and  strengthened  for  a  long  time  by  the 
intercommunication  which  the  families  and  tribes  kept 
up  even  after  they  had  separated.  Some  tribes  no  doubt 
wandered  so  far  away  that  they  became  isolated  and  im- 
poverished in  culture ;  others,  however,  remained  in  close 
proximity  and  came  often  in  contact  with  one  another. 
Commerce,  intercommunication,  intercourse,  are,  accord- 
ing to  the  latest  researches,  much  older  and  more  widely 
extended  than  is  usually  represented.  There  is  nothing, 
therefore,  that  can  be  urged  in  itself  as  an  argument 
against  the  existence  of  a  common  tradition. 

Even  Wundt  acknowledges  "  that  the  historical  testi- 
monies do  not  of  themselves  exclude  the  hypothesis  that 
all  myths  and  religions  have  proceeded  in  prehistoric  time 
from  one  single  centre  of  origin,  if  only  the  possibility  of 
such  an  hypothesis  could  be  psychologically  conceded."  28 
Why  this  should  be  impossible  is  not  easy  to  understand. 
For  since  human  nature  is  one,  the  possibility  is  certainly 
implied  in  this,  that  conceptions  may  be  taken  over  and 
further  developed;  and  it  is  assuredly  more  readily  ex- 
plicable that  peoples  should  have  interchanged  conceptions 
and  customs  than  that  they  should  have  produced  them  all 
independently,  and  yet  in  close  agreement.  Moreover, 
however  much  a  general  tradition,  the  common  property  of 
all,  may  be  denied,  the  same  thing  is  acknowledged  by  all 
in  a  narrower  circle.  Wundt,  for  example,  thinks  it  pos- 
sible that  in  America,  Oceania,  South-Africa,  and  India 
"a  flood  of  legends  may  have  deluged  vast  territories."29 


184  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Every  household,  every  family,  every  town,  every  people, 
in  its  turn  is  a  centre  around  which  spread  out,  in  nar- 
rower or  wider  circles,  conceptions  and  views,  manners 
and  customs.  And  the  human  race  is  similarly  one  large 
family,  which  in  all  its  movements  and  in  all  its  tenden- 
cies is  dependent  on  its  common  origin  and  its  original 
equipment.  It  is,  as  G.  F.  Wright  correctly  observes,  a 
wise  and  holy  arrangement  of  Divine  Providence  that 
succeeding  generations  are  in  a  high  degree  dependent  on 
preceding  ones,  and  that  the  better-favored  parts  of  the  hu- 
man race,  to  whom  much  is  given,  are  made  responsible  for 
the  communication  of  these  gifts  to  the  less  favored.30 

Through  what  channels  this  communication  has  been 
made  it  is  often  impossible  to  trace.  This  gap  in  our 
knowledge,  however,  cannot  be  adduced,  as  Wundt31 
supposes,  as  an  objection  to  the  fact  itself.  For  in  a 
number  of  cases  we  can  say  that  such  channels  must  have 
existed,  although  we  possess  no  detailed  knowledge  of 
them.32  Since  the  human  race  has  been  made  of  one 
blood,  then  certainly  men  at  first  dwelt  together,  and 
when  they  went  forth  to  fill  the  whole  earth  they  must 
also  have  carried  with  them  conceptions  and  customs  from 
the  parental  home  to  all  parts  of  the  world.  The  unity 
of  the  human  race,  which  forms  the  basis  of  the  unity  of 
human  nature,  necessarily  includes  in  it  an  original  com- 
mon tradition. 

Of  course  a  large  measure  of  wisdom  and  circumspec- 
tion is  needed  for  distinguishing  among  the  traditions 
and  manners  of  the  peoples  between  what  has  been 
brought  from  the  original  abode  and  what  has  been  the 
result  of  later  modification  and  mutilation,  extension  and 
augmentation,  by  the  different  peoples.  Apologetics  has 
sometimes   taken   its   task   here   too   easily,  for  general 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  185 

phrases  do  not  suffice  here ;  every  element  of  the  civili- 
zation of  mankind  needs  to  be  investigated  carefully  and 
comprehensively  before  we  are  ready  to  draw  conclusions. 
And  even  after  the  deepest  and  most  extended  research 
it  will  be  found  that  we  have  very  often  to  be  satisfied 
with  a  conjecture  or  a  probability. 

Nevertheless  there  are  phenomena  which  point  back 
with  great  probability  to  a  common  origin.  Among  these 
we  find,  for  example,  the  knowledge  of  a  single  supreme 
Being,  which  is  found  among  various  peoples.  We  have 
no  historical  testimony  to  the  development  of  polytheism 
into  pure  monotheism ;  when  polytheism  comes  no  longer 
to  satisfy  the  intellectual  circles,  it  is  remodelled  into 
pantheism,  which  has  in  common  with  polytheism  the 
"  nature-character  "  of  the  godhead,  and  dissolves  the  mul- 
titude of  nature-gods  into  one  nature-godhead.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  have  many  historical  examples  of  mono- 
theism not  developing,  indeed,  but  gradually  degenerating 
into  polytheism  and  polydemonism.  There  are  Christian 
churches  in  the  past,  and  in  the  present  also,  which  fur- 
nish proof  of  this  statement ;  and  even  among  the  most 
cultured  people  there  are  some  who,  in  our  own  day,  turn 
not  only  to  Mohammedanism  and  Buddhism,  but  also 
to  the  crudest  forms  of  superstition  and  sorcery ;  some- 
times even  theologians  and  philosophers  prefer  polythe- 
ism to  monotheism.  Goethe  himself  once  said  that  he 
was  not  satisfied  with  one  system,  but  was  by  turns 
monotheist,  polytheist,  and  pantheist.33  We  may  also 
see  with  our  own  eyes  the  theoretical  profession  of  faith 
in  one  God  accompanied  in  practice  by  the  adoration  of 
many  angels  and  saints.  The  same  phenomenon  appears 
among  many  peoples. 

When  some  speak  of  "  monotheistic  currents  "  in  the 


186  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Babylonian  religion,  very  serious  objections  may  certainly 
be  advanced.  But  it  cannot  be  denied,  and  is  indeed 
recognized  on  all  hands,  that  many  nature-peoples  in 
Africa,  America,  Australia,  Mongolia,  Tartary,  and  the 
Indian  Archipelago,  alongside  of  a  practical  religion 
full  of  superstition  and  sorcery,  believe  in  a  supreme 
good  God,  who  is  often  called  the  great  Spirit,  the 
supreme  Being,  the  Father,  our  Father.  It  may  be 
that  this  belief  in  such  a  supreme  Being  has  often  been 
too  much  idealized,  as,  for  example,  by  Andrew  Lang ; 
it  is,  no  doubt,  seldom  worshipped,  and  even  sometimes 
not  conceived  in  a  pure  monotheistic  form;  it  remains, 
nevertheless,  in  the  religions  of  the  nature-peoples  a  most 
remarkable  phenomenon,  which  cannot  be  explained  from 
Christian  or  Mohammedan  influences,  and  as  little  from 
animism  or  ancestor-worship.  And  if  now  we  do  not 
forget  that  the  religious  worship  of  natural  phenomena 
and  spirits  always  already  presupposes  the  idea  of  God, 
and  that  religion,  according  to  many  students  of  the 
philosophy  of  religion,  is  rooted  in  human  nature  as  such, 
the  hypothesis  lies  close  at  hand  that  we  are  confronted 
in  this  belief  in  the  great  Spirit  with  an  original  monothe- 
ism which  preceded  all  polytheistic  religions  and  is  still 
at  work  in  them.34 

But  not  to  insist  upon  this  or  other  agreement  in  de- 
tails, so  much  at  least  remains  undoubtedly  assured  that 
human  nature,  both  in  body  and  soul,  points  back  to  the 
common  origin  of  all  men.  In  the  fundamental  ideas  and 
fundamental  elements  of  religion,  morality,  law,  science, 
art,  technic,  —  in  short,  in  all  the  foundations  of  culture,  — 
a  unity  exists  which,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the  doctrine 
of  descent,  must  be  considered  a  miracle.  According  to 
the  nominalistic  point  of  view,  represented,  for  example, 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  187 

by  Professor  William  James,  all  men  must  be  considered 
as  not  originally  one,  but  as  gradually  becoming  one. 
This  view  forgets  that  whatever  can  become  one  already  is 
one  in  its  deepest  foundation,  and  it  ignores,  moreover, 
the  actual  unity  which  has  through  all  the  ages  existed 
among  men  notwithstanding  all  differences.  According 
to  James,  it  is  pure  accident  that  our  ancestors  have  fol- 
lowed precisely  the  line  of  thought  along  which  we  still 
travel,  just  as,  according  to  Darwin,  we  owe  it  to  pure 
chance  that  our  women  have  not  been  trained  like  bees, 
and  on  this  account  refrain  from  killing  their  daughters. 
This,  however,  does  not  remove  the  fact  that  the  methods 
of  thinking  and  acting,  which  have  been  gradually  in- 
vented by  men  and  transmitted  by  heredity  from  genera- 
tion to  generation,  have  become  inextirpably  tenacious. 
Yea,  according  to  James'  own  expressions,  "  these  funda- 
mental ways  of  thinking  "  have  continually  grown  firmer 
and  remain  practically  useful  and  indispensable.35  We 
may  therefore  quietly  set  aside  the  hypothesis  that  these 
modes  of  thinking  and  acting,  like  men  themselves,  have 
come  gradually  into  being;  in  reality,  they  form  the 
immutable  foundation  on  which  all  our  civilization  is 
built. 

Thus  it  is  in  every  respect.  The  human  race  is  every- 
where and  always  bound  to  its  nature,  to  its  origin,  to  its 
past.  There  are  a  multitude  of  ideas,  a  whole  complex 
of  views  regarding  the  chief  concerns  of  life  which  men 
have  in  common.  They  concern  the  idea  of  God  as  the 
almighty  and  all-wise  source  of  all  things,  the  world  as 
established  by  wisdom,  order  and  the  reign  of  law,  the 
unity  and  harmony  of  creation,  the  symbolical  meaning 
of  all  things,  the  distinction  between  a  world  of  things 
seen  and  unseen,  the  opposition  of  truth  and  falsehood, 


188  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  struggle  between  good  and  evil,  the  memory  of  a 
golden  age  and  a  subsequent  decay,  the  wrath  of  the  gods 
and  the  hope  of  reconciliation,  the  divine  origin  and  des- 
tination of  man,  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  the 
expectation  of  a  judgment,  reward  and  punishment  in 
the  hereafter.36  All  these  fundamental  ideas  form  the 
beginning  and  the  foundation  of  history,  the  principle 
and  starting-point  of  all  religion,  morality,  and  law,  the 
bond  of  all  social  relations,  the  germ  and  the  root  of  all 
science  and  art,  the  harmony  of  thinking  and  being,  of 
being  and  becoming,  of  becoming  and  acting,  the  unity  of 
logic,  physics,  and  ethics,  of  the  true,  the  good,  and  the 
beautiful.  All  these  fundamentals  are  given  from  the 
beginning  in  human  nature;  they  are  transmitted  from 
generation  to  generation,  and  are  at  the  same  time 
grounded  in  the  very  nature  of  man,  so  that  dependence 
and  independence  work  together  here.  And  they  all 
point  back  to  a  divine  origin:  "all  knowledge  is,"  at 
least  so  far  as  principles  and  foundations  are  concerned, 
"  of  divine  origin." 37  Knowledge  in  this  sense  flows 
from  revelation. 

To  this  original  revelation  is  joined  on  that  revelation 
which  according  to  the  Old  Testament  was  bestowed  upon 
Israel.  The  latter  is  built  upon  the  former  and  rests  upon 
it,  and  is  at  the  same  time  the  continuation,  the  develop- 
ment and  completion  of  it.  The  distinction  between  what 
has  come  to  be  called  general  and  special  revelation  does 
not  begin  until  the  call  of  Abraham  ;  before  that  the 
two  intermingle,  and  so  far  have  become  the  property  of 
all  peoples  and  nations.  Special  revelation  certainly  is 
set  antithetically  over  against  all  the  corruption  which 
gradually  entered  into  the  life  of  the  peoples,  but  it  takes 
up,  confirms,  and  completes  all  that  had  been  from  the  be- 


REVELATION  AND   CHRISTIANITY  189 

ginning  put  into  human  nature  by  revelation  and  had 
been  preserved  and  increased  subsequently  in  the  human 
race.  The  earlier  view,  which  exclusively  emphasized  the 
antithesis,  no  less  than  that  now  prevalent  which  has  an 
eye  only  for  the  agreement  and  affinity,  suffers  from  one- 
sidedness.  The  latter,  however,  is  giving  way  gradu- 
ally to  another  and  better  view.  For  a  time  the  notion 
was  prevalent  that  the  history  and  the  religion  of  Israel 
could  be  thoroughly  explained  if  the  books  of  the  Old  Tes- 
tament were  subjected  to  free  criticism  and  redating  like 
other  literature.  But  when  this  historical  criticism  had 
analyzed  and  rearranged  the  books  of  the  Bible,  consciously 
or  unconsciously  under  the  influence  of  the  doctrine  of 
evolution,  —  after  all  this  source-criticism,  the  problem 
of  the  religion  of  Israel  remained  still  unsolved.  Histor- 
ico-critical  investigation  had  not  succeeded  in  destroying 
the  peculiar  and  special  character  of  this  religion.  And 
yet  this  was  the  motive  which  had  given  the  impulse  to 
this  research.  What  profit  was  there  in  the  analysis  of 
the  sources  if  Israel  itself  with  its  religion  remained  in 
the  midst  of  the  peoples  unexplained?  It  is  therefore 
that  Panbabylonism  has  drawn  away  the  attention  of 
scholars  and  supplanted  the  historico-critical  period  by  a 
religio-historical  one.  It  has  been  right  in  suggesting 
that  there  may  be  a  great  difference  and  a  long  interval 
between  the  origin  of  ideas  and  institutions  and  their  liter- 
ary description ;  it  has  restored  to  honor  the  living  tradi- 
tion, and  has  shown  that  there  are  many  other  ways 
besides  the  literary  one  of  exercising  and  receiving  influ- 
ence. For  the  field  of  religion  especially  these  observa- 
tions have  been  of  great  importance.  For  a  religion  is  not 
invented  by  this  or  that  thinker,  and  is  not  imposed  upon 
a  people  from  without,  but  is  always  a  doctrine,  a  worship, 


190  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

a  sum  total  of  conceptions,  rules,  ordinances,  and  institu- 
tions which  are  linked  to  the  past,  live  in  the  hearts  of 
the  people,  and  are  transmitted  from  generation  to  gen- 
eration. And  religious  and  moral  conceptions  do  not 
develop  themselves  after  a  logical  method,  as  a  result  of 
apriori  thought,  but  are  often  of  older  origin,  exist  side 
by  side  with  each  other,  and  develop  themselves  together 
in  mutual  connection.  The  simple  and  rectilinear  the- 
ory of  evolution  comes  in  conflict  with  the  complicated 
reality. 

Thus  the  religio-historical  method  was  right  in  revert- 
ing from  literary  criticism  to  the  study  of  religion,  and 
therewith  from  theory  to  life,  from  a  system  of  abstract 
conceptions  to  the  folk-soul,  to  the  totality  of  reality. 
Its  purpose,  however,  is  to  derive  this  totality,  this  com- 
plex of  conceptions  and  prescriptions,  not  from  Moses 
and  the  patriarchs,  but  from  Babylonia.  There,  in  its 
opinion,  is  to  be  found  the  source  of  the  religion  and 
worship  of  Israel,  and  even  of  the  whole  of  Christianity. 
"  Babel  and  Bible,"  says  Otto  Weber,  "  are  products  of 
one  and  the  same  world- view."  w  Continued  research  will 
result,  however,  here,  as  in  geology  and  anthropology,  in 
a  reaction  from  one-sidedness,  and  soon  in  the  agreement 
the  unlikeness  and  the  difference  will  also  be  noticed. 
In  the  meantime,  however,  this  gain  has  been  registered, 
that  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  consider  Israel  as  an 
island,  separated  by  a  wide  ocean  from  the  rest  of  the 
world.  Israel  stands  as  a  people  and  in  its  entire  re- 
ligious life  in  relation  with  its  environment,  and  also 
with  the  past.  No  sudden  breach  was  made  by  the 
prophets  of  the  eighth  century  before  Christ  between 
the  past  and  the  future.  The  narrative  of  creation  and 
the  deluge,  monotheism  and  the  worship  of  Jehovah,  the 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  191 

laws  and  ceremonies  of  the  cultus,  the  reminiscences  of 
paradise  and  the  expectations  of  the  future,  the  idea  of 
the  Messiah  and  the  Servant  of  Jehovah,  and  all  the 
eschatological  conceptions,  are  much  older  than  the  lite- 
rary documents  wherein  they  are  mentioned.  Babel  does 
not  lie  behind  the  Bible,  but  behind  the  Scriptures  lies 
the  revelation  which  begins  with  the  origin  of  the  human 
race,  continues  in  the  tribes  of  the  Sethites  and  Semites, 
and  then  flows  on  in  the  channel  of  the  Israelitish  cove- 
nant towards  the  fulness  of  time. 

For  although  Abraham  left  Babylonia  and  was  sent  to 
dwell  apart  in  a  strange  land,  the  God  who  manifested 
himself  to  him,  and  later  to  Moses  and  to  Israel,  is  no 
new,  strange  God,  but  the  God  of  old,  the  creator  of 
heaven  and  earth,  the  Lord  of  all  things,'  who  had  been 
originally  known  to  all  men,  and  had  still  preserved  the 
knowledge  and  worship  of  himself  in  many,  in  more  or 
less  pure  form.39  The  segregation  and  the  election  of 
Israel  served  the  sole  purpose  of  maintaining,  unmixed 
and  unadulterated,  continuing  and  perfecting,  the  original 
revelation,  which  more  and  more  threatened  to  be  lost,40 
so  that  it  might  again  in  the  fulness  of  time  be  made 
the  property  of  the  whole  of  mankind.  The  promise  be- 
came temporarily  particular,  in  order  that  thus  it  might 
later  become  universal.  Israel  belongs  to  the  human 
race,  remains  in  relation  to  all  peoples,  and  is  chosen  not 
at  the  cost,  but  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  human  race,    yi 

Hence  the  peculiarity  of  the  religion  of  Israel  does  not 
consist  exclusively  or  primarily  in  its  ethical  monotheism. 
There  are  a  number  of  elements  in  the  history  and  reli- 
gion of  Israel  which  occur  nowhere  else,  so  far  as  is  now 
known  to  us,  and  not  even  a  parallel  to  which  is  found 
among  other  peoples.      Among   these   are  the  name  of 


192  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Jehovah,  the  cosmogony  free  from  all  theogony,  the  idea 
of  the  unity  of  the  human  race,  the  narrative  of  the  fall, 
the  week  of  seven  days  and  the  Sabbath,  circumcision  of 
all  male  children  on  the  eighth  day,  prophetism  which  ac- 
companies Israel  through  its  entire  history,  the  plan  of 
salvation  embracing  all  nations,  ethical  monotheism,  the 
invisibility  of  God  and  the  impossibility  of  representing 
him,  etc.41  And  there  are  many  more  elements  in  the  Old 
and  New  Testaments  still  whose  explanation  is  sought 
by  the  Panbabylonists  in  the  astral  religion  of  Babel, 
but  in  such  a  manner  that  the  far-fetched  character 
and  the  artificiality  of  the  derivation  are  manifest  to  all.42 
Nevertheless  all  these  elements  do  not  yet  form  the  es- 
sence of  the  religion  of  Israel.  They  stand,  indeed,  in 
very  close  connection  with  it,  and  form  with  it  an  in- 
tegral whole ;  but  the  substance  of  the  revelation  which 
came  to  Israel,  and  the  core  of  the  religion  which  cor- 
responded with  it  in  Israel,  consist  in  something  else. 

In  order  to  find  this,  we  must  go  back  to  the  prophets 
and  psalmists,  to  Jesus  and  the  apostles,  and  they  all  teach 
us  unanimously  and  clearly  that  the  content  of  the  divine 
revelation  does  not  consist  primarily  in  the  unity  of  God, 
in  the  moral  law,  in  circumcision,  in  the  Sabbath,  in 
short,  in  the  law,  but  appears  primarily  and  principally 
in  the  promise,  in  the  covenant  of  grace,  and  in  the  gos- 
pel. Not  law,  but  gospel,  is  in  the  Old  and  the  New 
*  Testament  alike  the  core  of  the  divine  revelation,  the 
essence  of  religion,  the  sum  total  of  the  Holy  Scriptures. 
Every  other  view  fails  to  do  justice  to  special  revelation, 
effaces  its  difference  from  general  revelation,  degrades 
the  Old  Testament,  rends  apart  the  two  economies  of  the 
same  covenant  of  grace,  and  even  gradually  changes  the 
gospel  of  the  New  Covenant  into  a  law,  and  makes  of 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  193 

Christ  a  second  Moses.  Paul,  however,  declares  that  the 
promise  is  older  than  the  law,  that  Abraham  already  re- 
ceived the  righteousness  of  faith,  not  by  the  law,  which 
was  in  his  days  not  yet  in  existence,  but  by  the  promise 
which  was  granted  him  by  grace.  The  law  was  thus 
originally  not  joined  to  the  promise,  but  was  added  to  it 
later,  that  transgressions  might  abound,  and  accordingly 
the  necessity  and  indispensableness  of  the  promise  might 
be  ever  more  clearly  revealed,  and  its  contents  ever  more 
fully  developed  and  at  last  completed.  The  law  thus  is 
temporal,  transitory,  a  means  in  the  service  of  the  prom- 
ise, but  the  promise  is  eternal;  it  had  its  beginning  in 
paradise,  was  preserved  and  developed  by  revelation  in 
the  days  of  the  Old  Covenant,  received  its  fulfilment 
in  Christ,  and  is  now  extended  to  the  whole  human  race 
and  all  the  peoples.43 

In  this  promise,  given  to  the  patriarchs  and  to  Israel, 
there  are  three  things  included.  In  the  first  place,  there 
is  the  free,  electing  love  of  God,  who  seeks,  calls,  and 
adopts  as  his  own  Abraham  and  his  seed,  by  pure  grace, 
without  any  desert  or  merit  of  their  own.  The  new  ele- 
ment, which  enters  in  with  Abraham  and  later  with  Israel, 
consists  in  this,  that  God,  the  knowledge  and  service  of 
whom  were  gradually  passing  away,  at  a  given  point  of 
time  places  himself  in  a  most  special  relation  to  a  par- 
ticular person  and  people.  This  relation  is  not  grounded 
in  nature ;  it  is  not  a  matter  of  course ;  it  does  not  exist 
by  virtue  of  creation ;  it  is  not  instituted  on  the  part  of 
man,  by  his  conscience  or  reason,  by  his  feeling  of  de- 
pendence or  need.  But  it  is  an  historical  product;  the 
initiative  came  from  God;  he  so  reveals  himself  as, by  the 
act  of  revelation,  to  receive  a  particular  person  and  people 
into  communion  with  himself.     The  calling  of  Abraham, 

13 


194  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  deliverance  from  Egypt,  the  institution  of  the  cove- 
nant on  Sinai,  are  accordingly  the  main  pillars  upon 
which  the  religion  of  Israel  rests.44  It  is  the  sovereign 
and  gracious  will  of  God  which  calls  this  federal  relation 
into  life.  By  this  will,  which  injects  itself  into  history  and 
establishes  a  new  relation  between  God  and  his  people, 
God  is  once  for  all  in  Israel  made  free  from  nature  and 
raised  above  it.  God  is  no  nature-power,  as  is  the  case 
among  the  nations.  He  is  an  independent  person,  has  his 
own  nature  and  will,  and  a  law  and  worship  of  his  own 
which,  in  the  most  stringent  way,  prohibit  all  idolatry 
and  image- worship.  The  human  race  owes  a  great  deal 
to  Babylon,  many  good  things  of  civilization  and  culture. 
But  let  us  not  forget  that  there  have  also  come  forth 
from  Babylon  all  superstition  and  magic.  It  was  Babylon 
which  made  all  peoples  drunk  with  the  wine  of  her  for- 
nication and  sorcery.46  And  it  was  Israel  alone  which, 
by  the  revelation  of  God,  was  delivered  from  these  bonds, 
and  in  this  respect  Israel  stood  alone  in  the  midst  of  all 
peoples. 

Because  to-day  we  evaporate  religion  into  frames  of 
mind,  detach  it  from  every  object,  and  retain  scarcely  any 
sympathy  with  the  knowledge  and  worship  of  God,  we 
no  longer  feel  the  importance  of  this  entirely  unique 
position  of  Israel.  The  prophets  and  apostles,  however, 
thought  of  it  very  differently.  The  true  religion  consisted 
for  them  first  of  all  in  the  knowledge  and  worship  of  the 
true  God,  according  to  his  will  and  in  consonance  with 
his  command.  They  still  knew  the  difference  between 
faith  and  superstition,  between  religion  and  magic,  be- 
tween theology  and  mythology.  Well,  now,  Israel  is  the 
people  chosen  by  God,  which  never  had  a  mythology, 
and  has  rescued  the  human  races  from  the  bonds  of  super- 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  195 

stition  and  sorcery.  The  Bible  did  not  come  forth  from 
Babylon,  but  in  its  fundamental  thought  is  in  diametrical 
opposition  to  Babylon,  and  has  made  an  end  to  Babylon's 
spiritual  dominion  over  the  peoples.  Granted  that  the 
chaos-myth,  as  Gunkel  supposes,  has  had  an  influence 
upon  Israel,  that  Rahab  and  Leviathan,  Tiamat  and  Na- 
chash,  were  originally  mythological  conceptions;  they  have 
on  Israel's  soil,  in  the  sphere  of  special  revelation,  totally 
cast  aside  this  character.  The  poetical  personification  of 
natural  phenomena  is  in  Israel  as  strong  as  among  other 
peoples;  the  thunder  is  God's  voice,  the  light  his  gar- 
ment, the  lightning  his  fiery  arrow,  the  storm  his  breath, 
the  clouds  are  his  chariot,  and  the  like.  But  nowhere  is 
this  poetry  presented  as  a  description  of  objective  reality, 
and  never  are  these  poetical  conceptions  combined  and 
elaborated  into  a  mythological  narrative.  Israel  has  no 
mythical  feeling ;  by  special  revelation,  by  the  interven- 
tion of  God  in  history,  by  miracles,  it  has  been  profoundly 
convinced  of  the  distinction  between  God  and  the  world ; 
the  knowledge  of  God  has  expelled  all  myths.  God  no 
doubt  works  in  nature  and  in  history,  but  he  transcends 
them  as  the  free  and  almighty  One ;  he  has  a  character 
and  will  of  his  own.  However  personal  and  poetic  the 
description  of  the  phenomena  of  nature  may  be  —  though 
it  may  be  said  that  the  mountains  clap  their  hands,  that 
Tabor  and  Hermon  rejoice,  that  the  cedars  gambol  like 
calves,  and  that  the  whole  creation  listens  and  keeps 
silence,  declares  the  honor  of  God  and  proclaims  his 
glory  —  they  are  never  represented  as  real,  independent 
powers  with  which  God  has  to  struggle.  The  narratives 
also  of  the  creation  and  the  fall,  of  the  deluge  and  the 
building  of  the  tower  of  Babel,  of  the  patriarchs  and 
judges,   are    for    the    Israelite    no    myths,    but   history. 


196  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Israel's  God  is  far  exalted  above  nature,  but  by  special  reve- 
lation he  brings  about  in  the  world  a  peculiar  history.46 

In  the  second  place,  God's  pardoning  grace  is  contained 
in  the  promise  which  was  given  to  Israel.  Although 
Tiamat  and  Nachash,  Rahab  and  Leviathan,  are  no  longer 
real,  inimical  nature-powers,  yet  certainly  the  Old  Testa- 
ment knows  a  power  which  opposes  God.  But  this  power 
must  not  be  looked  for  in  the  abyss  or  the  stars,  nor  in 
the  sea  or  the  mountains ;  on  the  contrary,  it  appears  in 
history,  in  the  world  of  men.  It  is  sin,  sin  alone,  which 
opposes  God  and  with  which  he  fights.  It  admits  of  no 
doubt  that  sin  and  sickness  (misfortune,  disaster,  demo- 
niacal possession),  guilt  and  misery,  forgiveness  and  de- 
liverance, were  in  Israel's  consciousness  more  intimately 
connected  and  much  more  closely  interrelated  than  in  ours. 
All  the  pious  of  Israel  wrestled  with  the  problem  of  the  re- 
lation between  them.  But  this  very  wrestling  presupposes 
that  there  is,  after  all,  a  distinction  between  them ;  it  can 
arise  only  when  the  just,  convinced  of  his  innocence, 
maintains  himself  in  his  religio-moral  consciousness  in 
the  face  of  the  suffering  of  the  world.  Therefore  we  owe 
to  special  revelation  in  Israel  the  purely  ethical  concep- 
tion of  the  nature  of  sin,  with  respect  both  to  its  origin 
and  to  its  essence  and  punishment.  Sin  is  no  disease, 
although  disease  is  often  the  result  and  proof  of  it ;  it  is 
not  involved  in  existence  itself,  for  every  creature,  as  it 
comes  forth  from  the  hand  of  God,  is  very  good ;  it  con- 
sists in  transgression  of  God's  commandment.  As  God 
is  distinct  from  nature,  so  also  is  his  moral  will  distinct 
from  the  law  of  nature,  the  ethical  from  the  physical,  the 
"  what  ought  to  be  "  from  "  what  is."  The  third  chapter 
of  Genesis,  therefore,  tells  us  just  about  the  origin  of  sin ; 
it  cannot  be  explained  except  as  a  narration  of  how  sin 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  197 

has  entered  into  the  world,  and  consists  in  transgression 
of  God's  command.  The  following  chapters  sketch  for 
us  the  progress  of  sin,  which  is  an  imagination,  a  product 
of  the  heart  of  man  from  his  youth.  And  when  again 
after  the  deluge  the  stream  of  unrighteousness  flows  on 
its  course,  God  chooses  Abraham  and  his  seed  for  a  people 
of  his  own,  that  they  may  walk  in  holiness  before  his 
face. 

But  the  electing  love  of  God  is  at  the  same  time 
a  forgiving  love.  God  not  only  elects  and  calls,  but 
gives  himself  to  his  people ;  he  joins  himself  to  them,  so 
intimately  and  tenderly,  that  he  charges  their  guilt  and 
transfers  it,  as  it  were,  to  himself.  I  am  thy  shield  and 
exceeding  great  reward ;  I  am  the  Lord  thy  God,  who 
has  led  thee  out  of  Egypt.  The  covenant  with  Abraham 
and  his  seed  is  built  in  a  certain  sense  upon  redemption 
and  remission,  and  the  walk  before  God's  face  to  which 
the  patriarchs  and  Israel  were  called  is  the  duty  of  grati- 
tude. The  law  which  God  gave  his  people,  entered  in 
after  the  promise,  is  built  on  the  promise  and  is  placed 
in  the  service  of  the  promise.  It  was  not  a  law  of  the 
covenant  of  works,  but  a  law  of  the  covenant  of  grace,  a 
law  of  the  covenant,  a  law  of  gratitude.  It  served  the 
purpose  not  of  acquiring  righteousness  and  life,  but  of 
confirming  these  gifts  to  our  consciousness,  and  of  bring- 
ing them  out  in  our  walk  before  God's  face.  Nor  was  the 
ceremonial  law  a  means  to  bring  about  reconciliation,  but 
to  maintain  the  reconciliation  which  already  existed  in 
the  covenant  relation.  Prophecy  revived  from  time  to 
time  the  consciousness  of  this :  it  did  not  usher  in  a  higher 
law,  it  did  not  establish  a  new  religion,  it  was  not  the 
promulgator  of  ethical  monotheism,  but  it  had  the  cove- 
nant of  God  with  his  people  for  its  pre-supposition  and 


198  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

was  built  upon  the  regulation  of  their  reciprocal  relation 
in  the  law.  Never  did  it  call  upon  the  people  to  make 
themselves  God's  people  by  keeping  the  law;  it  always 
started  from  the  supposition  that  Israel  had  become  God's 
people  by  election,  and  laid  upon  them  the  demand  that 
therefore  they  must  as  God's  people  walk  in  his  ways. 
Morality  was  in  Israel  grounded  in  religion.  God  for- 
gives sins  for  his  name's,  for  his  covenant's,  for  his  glory's 
sake. 

That  God  forgives  sin  by  grace,  for  his  name's  sake  — 
the  knowledge  of  this  mystery  we  owe  wholly  to  the  special 
revelation  which  God  granted  unto  Israel.  We  would 
value  this  more  highly  if  we  had  a  deeper  consciousness 
of  guilt.  For  the  forgiving  love  of  God  is  not  a  matter 
of  course;  it  is  not  known  to  us  from  nature,  or  from 
history,  or  from  our  own  intellect  and  conscience.  On  the 
contrary,  appearances  are  against  it,  —  we  do  not  perceive 
it  by  sight  or  by  touch ;  it  is  a  matter  of  faith.  Nay,  more 
than  this :  if  God  forgives  sin  for  his  own  sake,  then  he 
must  himself  provide  the  atonement.  For  without  atone- 
ment, without  the  shedding  of  blood,  there  is  no  remission 
of  sins.  In  the  ceremonial  legislation  God  himself  gave 
his  people  instruction  in  this  matter;  it  pointed  to  the 
way  in  which  God  himself  would  bring  about  reconcili- 
ation. Man  can  as  little  make  propitiation  for  his  sin  as 
he  can  forgive  it  himself.  But  God  can  do  both,  atone 
and  forgive ;  he  can  do  the  one  just  because  he  can  do 
the  other.  The  tension,  however,  which  existed  between 
them  in  the  days  of  the  Old  Testament,  the  time  of  the 
7rape(7t?,  is  reflected  in  the  consciousness  of  the  Israelites, 
as  a  disharmony  between  righteousness  and  suffering,  holi- 
ness and  blessedness,  virtue  and  happiness,  but  in  this  way 
contributes  to  prepare  the  way  for  its  own  solution.     For 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  199 

so  in  Israel's  prophecy,  psalmody  and  chokhma,  the  pro- 
found thought  is  gradually  formed  of  a  suffering  which 
is  endured  on  account  of  and  for  others ;  thus  there  gradu- 
ally reveals  itself  the  divine  mystery  of  an  innocent  and 
atoning  suffering,  which  is  illustrated  in  Isaiah  by  the 
Servant  of  Jehovah,  who  is  wounded  for  our  transgres- 
sions, bruised  for  our  iniquities,  but  upon  whom  was  the 
chastisement  of  our  peace,  and  with  whose  stripes  we  are 
healed. 

In  the  third  place  the  gospel  in  the  Old  Testament  in- 
cludes also  the  promise  of  God's  unchangeable  faithfulness. 
The  more  Israel's  apostasy  and  unfaithfulness  increased, 
making  it  ever  more  apparent  how  little  reliance  could 
be  placed  on  man,  the  louder  the  prophets  announced 
that  God  will  not  break  his  covenant  and  will  not  annul 
his  promise.  Mountains  may  depart  and  hills  may  be  re- 
moved, but  his  loving-kindness  shall  not  depart  from  his 
people,  and  the  covenant  of  his  peace  shall  not  be  removed 
forever.  The  prophets  narrate  the  past  of  Israel,  they  ex- 
plain the  present;  but  they  likewise  foresee  the  future 
not  as  fortune-tellers  and  soothsayers,  but  as  seers  and 
watchmen  upon  the  walls  of  Zion,  as  searchers  according 
to  the  description  of  Peter,  and  as  inquirers  under  the 
guidance  of  the  Spirit  into  the  salvation  which  in  the 
future  was  to  be  obtained  and  given  by  the  Messiah. 
Thus  they  see  what  others  do  not  see ;  persevere  in  be- 
lieving where  others  doubt ;  cling  to  the  promise  in  hope 
against  hope,  and  expect  that  God  himself  will  in  his 
own  time  realize  and  extend  his  dominion  to  all  peoples 
through  his  Anointed  One.  As  he  is  to  complete  his 
revelation  through  the  Prophet  like  unto  Moses  and  to 
procure  the  atonement  through  the  Servant  of  Jehovah,  so 
also  is  he  to  establish  his  kingdom  on  the  earth  through  the 


200  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Anointed  King.  Theology  leads  through  soteriology  to 
eschatology.  The  love  of  election  passes  over  through 
the  grace  of  forgiveness  into  the  full  communion  of  God 
with  his  people.  In  the  future  God  will  make  a  new 
covenant,  wherein  the  old  promise,  I  will  be  your  God 
and  you  shall  be  my  people,  will  be  fully  realized. 

These  are  the  contents  of  the  gospel,  which  was  preached 
and  intrusted  to  Israel.  No  criticism  of  the  books  of  the 
Bible  can  destroy  this  content.  Election,  gracious  for- 
giveness and  true,  perfect  communion,  are  the  great 
thoughts  and  the  spiritual  gifts  which  Israel  has  received 
from  God  and  in  the  fulness  of  time  has  communicated 
to  humanity.  For  in  the  Person  of  Christ,  who  is  the 
Son  of  God  and  also  the  Son  of  Man,  who  is  at  the  same 
time  the  highest  prophet,  the  only  priest  and  the  eternal 
king,  all  the  promises  have  been  fulfilled.  He  indeed  is 
the  object  of  the  conflict  of  the  ages,  at  present  fiercer  and 
more  serious  than  ever  before.  Judged  from  the  present 
position  of  scientific  investigation,  it  would  seem  as  if 
everything  concerning  his  person  and  work  is  uncertain 
and  even  unknowable.  All  kinds  of  hypotheses  have 
been  erected  and  numerous  attempts  made  to  explain 
the  origin  and  essence  of  Christianity.  Judaism  and 
Heathenism,  apocryphal  and  Talmudic  literature,  political 
and  social  conditions,  the  mythologies  of  Egypt  and  Per- 
sia, of  Babylonia  and  India,  are  called  upon  to  help  us  de- 
rive not  only  the  world  and  man,  religion  and  morality, 
but  also  the  Christian  religion,  from  weak  beggarly  ele- 
ments and  the  poorest  possible  beginnings.  These  in- 
vestigations have  an  important  value  and  contain  a  rich 
promise.  Through  them  the  Christian  religion  will  become 
better  known  in  its  close  connection  with  the  world  and 
history,  and  the  words  and  facts  of  the  New  Testament 


REVELATION   AND   CHRISTIANITY  201 

will  be  better  understood  in  their  universal  significance 
and  bearing.  But  more  than  this,  all  these  investigations, 
provided  they  are  not  broken  off  half-way  but  carried  on 
to  the  end,  will  throw  into  ever  clearer  and  clearer  light 
the  uniqueness  of  the  Christian  religion. 

For  Christ,  the  mediator  of  creation,  the  life  and  the 
light  of  men,  the  promise  to  the  fathers,  the  desire  of  the 
nations,  the  saviour  of  the  world,  and  the  judge  of  the  quick 
and  the  dead,  is  akin  to  all  and  to  everything,  and  at  the 
same  time  distinguished  from  all  and  exalted  above  all. 
Whatever  may  be  adduced  to  elucidate  and  explain  his 
person  and  work,  he  appears  now  as  ever  on  the  pages  of 
the  gospel  before  us  and  the  whole  world  in  his  unique 
superiority.  The  central  facts  of  the  incarnation,  satisfac-  / 
tion,  and  resurrection  are  the  fulfilment  of  the  three  great 
thoughts  of  the  Old  Covenant,  the  content  of  the  New 
Testament,  the  Krjpvyiia  of  the  Apostles,  the  foundation 
of  the  Christian  Church,  the  marrow  of  its  history  of 
dogma  and  the  centre  of  the  history  of  the  world.  With- 
out these  facts  history  breaks  into  fragments.  Through 
them  there  is  brought  into  it  unity  and  variety,  thought 
and  plan,  progress  and  development.  From  the  prote- 
vangel  to  the  consummation  of  all  things  one  thread  runs 
through  the  history  of  mankind,  namely,  the  operation  of 
the  sovereign,  merciful,  and  almighty  will  of  God,  to  save 
and  to  glorify  the  world  notwithstanding  its  subjection 
to  corruption. 

This  will  of  God  forms  the  heart  of  pure  religion  and 
at  the  same  time  the  soul  of  all  true  theology.  For 
according  to  the  counsel  of  this  will  we  are  chosen,  con- 
formably to  this  will  we  are  regenerated,  through  this  will 
we  are  sanctified.  In  virtue  of  the  good  pleasure  of  this 
will  both  that  which  is  in  heaven  and  on  earth  will  be 


202  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

gathered  in  one  in  the  dispensation  of  the  fulness  of  time 
under  Christ  as  Head.  And  in  the  whole  course  of  rev- 
elation this  will  of  God  unfolds  itself  ever  more  clearly 
as  the  love  of  God,  the  grace  of  the  Son,  and  the  com- 
munion of  the  Holy  Ghost. 


VIII 

REVELATION   AND  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE 

IF  Christianity  were  at  one  with  itself,  and  there  were 
no  other  religions,  the  recognition  of  its  truth  would 
be  easier.  But  it  is  endlessly  divided  and  torn  to  pieces. 
The  one  church,  which  was  the  centre  of  village  and  city 
in  the  Middle  Ages,  is  completely  demolished ;  on  every 
side  a  number  of  sects  arise  around  her,  each  laying 
claim  to  be  the  purest  expression  of  Christian  truth,  and 
continually  subdividing  and  multiplying.  Beyond  that, 
the  religions  of  the  various  nations  are  latterly  becoming 
much  better  known  to  us  than  in  former  centuries,  and 
the  relation  which  Christianity  bears  to  other  religions 
has  become  a  serious  problem.  Among  those  religions 
there  are  some  which  number  millions  of  adherents,  and 
numerically  considered  may,  therefore,  put  in  a  more 
telling  claim  to  the  name  of  world-religions  than  Chris- 
tianity. They  provide  examples  of  strong  conviction  of 
faith,  earnest  piety,  and  self-denying  devotion  which  bear 
comparison  with  those  of  Christian  confessions.  All  the 
elements  of  religion  —  doctrine  and  ethics,  consciousness 
of  sin  and  forgiveness,  comfort  and  hope,  contempt  of 
death  and  certainty  of  salvation,  prayer  and  praise,  assem- 
blies and  public-service  —  appear  in  all.  The  claim  to 
divine  revelation  is  common  to  all  religions.1 

This  extension  of  the  religious  horizon  would  not  have 
proved  so  undermining  to  faith  in  Christian  truth  had  it 
not  been  accompanied  by  a  keen  criticism  of  the  power 


204  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

and  value  of  human  reason.  In  accordance  with  Scrip- 
ture, Christian  theology  has  always  taught  that  sin  in- 
volves also  error,  and  thus  has  not  only  corrupted  the 
heart  and  will,  but  also  blinded  the  understanding.  This 
doctrine  of  Scripture  was  especially  reasserted  in  the 
Reformation,  in  opposition  to  the  Roman  view  that  the 
natural  gifts  have  remained  to  men  and  only  the  supernat- 
ural lost.  Luther,  above  all,  was  not  on  friendly  terms 
with  reason;  though  the  substance  of  this  doctrine  is 
merely  that  intelligence  has  been  blinded  by  sin,  but  not 
extinguished,  and  by  its  nature  remains  able  to  under- 
stand unseen  and  divine  things.  The  newer  philosophy, 
however,  emancipated  itself  entirely  from  this  Christian 
conviction  and  placed  its  trust  exclusively  in  the  power 
of  reason,  and  was  soon  called  upon  to  pass  through  an 
unpleasant  experience.  Both  Descartes  and  Bacon  estab- 
lished a  separation  between  faith  and  reason,  leaving  the 
domain  of  faith  to  theology  and  satisfying  themselves 
with  a  position  external  to  it.  For  a  while  they  lived  in 
the  illusion  that  they  could  very  well  dispense  with  reve- 
lation and  faith,  and  could  throw  sufficient  light  upon  all 
that  man  needs  for  his  religious  and  moral  life  by  reason. 
When  this  new  philosophy,  however,  had  reached  the 
highest  point  of  its  development,  it  was  wrecked  by  its 
own  continued  inquiry.  In  criticising  revelation  it  had 
forgotten  one  thing,  —  criticism  of  itself.  Reason  in  this 
newer  philosophy  took  its  starting-point  in  childish  naivete* 
from  its  own  integrity  and  trustworthiness.  But  when 
it  had  completed  its  work  of  demolishing  revelation  and 
now  came  to  itself  and  examined  its  own  nature  and  con- 
tent, it  found  itself  quite  dissatisfied  with  itself.  Reason 
found  in  reason  its  keenest  inquisitor,  and  received  its 
sharpest  criticism  from  itself.     All  that  had  appeared  to 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     205 

stand  firm  began  to  waver  and  to  fall.  The  secondary 
attributes,  the  law  of  causality,  the  objective  world  of 
sense,  the  ideas  of  substance,  personality,  and  self-con- 
sciousness, the  world  of  supernatural  and  divine  things  — 
all  appeared  untenable  and  unknowable.  Kant  struck  the 
balance  of  this  critical  process  thus:  the  intelligence  of 
man  is  confined  to  the  world  of  phenomena,  and  does  not 
know  anything  of  what  lies  behind  it.  Reason  is  not 
merely  blinded  or  weakened  by  sin ;  it  is  in  its  very  na- 
ture blind  and  deaf  and  dumb  in  the  presence  of  the 
spiritual  world. 

Whatever  value  we  may  attach  to  this  critical  philoso- 
phy, there  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  has  roughly  shaken 
confidence  in  human  reason,  and  has  given  a  deep  wound 
to  the  faith  and  conviction,  to  the  spiritual  security  and 
moral  will-power  of  the  modern  man.  As  on  the  one  side 
it  has  declared  man  autonomous,  and  set  him  free  from 
all  objective  forms  and  external  authority,  on  the  other 
side  it  has  opened  the  door  for  a  wild  anarchy  of  thought. 
If  the  knowledge  of  God  and  of  spiritual  things  is  ex- 
cluded from  the  domain  of  science,  then  not  only  is  science 
bereft  of  moral  character  and  made  atheistic,  but  religion 
and  morality  also  are  left  to  individual  caprice.  Both 
become  matters  of  private  judgment  and  individual  taste ; 
each  one  can  do  what  he  will.  That  is  an  incalculable 
injury,  not  only  for  the  schools,  but  still  more  for  life ; 
agnosticism  produces  ethical  and  practical  indifference. 

But  naturally  one  cannot  live  on  criticism  and  agnos- 
ticism. Although  the  agnostic  view,  that  "  scientific  su- 
perstition," as  Mr.  F.  W.  H.  Myers  calls  it,  is  embraced 
to-day  by  many  learned  men,  it  has  never  been  the  creed, 
nor  is  it  now  the  creed,  of  the  human  race.2  Questions 
continually  arise  in  the  mind  for  which  every  one  neces- 


206  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

sarily  seeks  an  answer.     There  are  some  beliefs  for  which 
man  cannot  afford  to  wait.     What  must  I  do  to  be  saved  ? 
is  a  question  of  an  urgency  of  a  totally  different  kind 
from  the  cause  of  the  tides  or  the  meaning  of  the  marks 
on  the  moon.    Men  must  settle  roughly  somehow  or  other 
what  they  have  reason  to  hope  or  to  fear  from  the  unseen 
world.3     Auguste  Comte's  positive  philosophy  grew  into 
a  sociolatry  and  a  positive  religion  which  made  humanity 
and  its  heroes  objects  of  worship.    The  whole  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  is  full  of  endeavors  to  recover  the  loss  that 
had  been  suffered,  to  heal  the  gaping  wound.     Kant  him- 
self began  it.     In  order  to  find  a  place  for  faith  he  con- 
fined science  to  the  knowledge  of  sensible  phenomena; 
what  he  demolished  by  theoretical  reason,  he  tried  to  build 
up  by  practical  reason.     After  him  first  one  and  then  an- 
other arose,  to  make  a  similar  effort  to  find  a  way  to  the 
unknown  land.     Speculative  reason  and  intellectual  con- 
templation, mysticism  of  feeling  and  the  moral  power  of 
the  will,  the  faith  of  the  church  and  the  religions  of  the 
nations,  were  all  summoned  in  turn  to  aid  in  penetrating 
into  the  supernatural  world,  and  building  up  the  knowl- 
edge of  God  on  a  new  scientific,  unassailable  foundation. 
However  these  efforts  may  differ,  they  all  have  in  com- 
mon that  they  no  longer  subject  themselves  to  any  so- 
called  external  authority,  but  try  to  find  out  God  through 
man.     Theology  has,  since  Kant's  time,  become  theology 
of   consciousness  and  experience,  and   thus  loses   itself 
practically  in  religious  anthropology. 

In  this  transformation  of  theology  into  the  science  of 
religion  the  new  conception  of  science  comes  to  light. 
Kant  had  already  limited  the  power  of  the  intelligence,  be- 
cause he  was  under  the  influence  of  the  one-sided  New- 
tonian  explanation   of    nature  and   could   recognize   as 


EEVELATION  AND  RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     207 

scientific  only  a  conception  of  the  world  which  bore  a 
strictly  mechanical  character.4  This  mechanism  is  in  wide 
circles  no  longer  looked  upon  as  a  sufficient  explanation  of 
the  world,  so  that  philosophy  has  acquired  a  new  value ; 
but  nevertheless,  the  idea  still  exists  that  there  is  only  one 
science,  or  at  most  two  sciences,  namely,  the  sciences  of 
nature  and  of  history,  and  that  accordingly  there  are  only 
two  scientific  methods,  the  empirical  and  the  historical.6 
Thus,  if  theology  is  to  be  a  science,  and  the  knowledge 
of  unseen  and  divine  things  trustworthy,  the  same  method 
must  be  applied  in  its  domain  as  in  those  of  nature  and 
history.     Theology  must  become  an  empirical  science.6 

But  in  this  way  the  word  "  experience  "  is  made  to  play 
an  ambiguous  r61e.  When  used  in  religion  and  theology, 
it  has  a  wholly  different  significance  from  that  which  it 
bears  in  empirical  science.  In  the  latter  what  is  meant  is, 
that,  by  consistent  application  of  the  empirical  method, 
personal  interest  in  the  inquiry  is  to  be  excluded  as  much 
as  possible,  and  that  the  phenomena  are  observed  and  ex- 
plained in  their  purity  and  impartially  ;  empiricism  even 
calls  to  its  help  the  experimental  proof.  But  when  men 
speak  of  experience  in  religion,  they  mean  it  to  be  under- 
stood, on  the  other  hand,  that  religion  is,  or  at  any  rate 
must  become,  a  personal  matter  through  and  through. 
Religion  is,  according  to  this  interpretation,  no  doctrine, 
no  precept,  no  history,  no  worship,  in  a  word,  not  a  belief  on 
authority,  nor  a  consent  to  truth,  but  arises  from  within, 
when  the  heart  is  touched  and  a  personal  fellowship  es- 
tablished between  God  and  our  soul.  Now  there  is  cer- 
tainly such  a  religious  experience  ;  the  devotional  writings 
of  all  religions  bear  witness  to  it,  and  serve  in  their  turn 
to  feed  and  strengthen  that  religious  life  even  more  than 
Bible  and  catechism.7    But  the  mistake  is  when  men  fancy 


208  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

they  in  this  way  make  theology  a  science  as  exact  as  that  of 
nature,  and  thus  arrive  at  a  scientific  knowledge  of  un- 
seen and  eternal  things.8 

For  whatever  meaning  religious  experience  may  have,  it 
is  not  and  cannot  be  an  heuristic  principle.  Experience 
comes  into  being  only  when,  first,  there  exists  something 
to  experience,  and  afterwards  this  something  is  really  ex- 
perienced ;  it  cannot  otherwise  exist.  Religion  is  without 
doubt  a  matter  of  the  heart ;  but  it  cannot  be  separated 
from  all  objective  knowledge  of  God  through  his  revela- 
tion in  nature  and  history,  in  Scripture  and  conscience. 
A  subjective  religion  is  always  preceded  by  an  objective 
religion,  whatever  this  may  be.  Just  as  language  pre- 
supposes the  capacity  for  speech  in  the  child,  but  yet  is 
learned  from  the  mother,  so  also  religious  experience 
arises  out  of  preceding  revelation.  Every  child  grows  up 
in  the  religion  of  its  parents,  and  thereby  develops  its 
own  religious  life  ;  the  pious  teaching  and  example  of  the 
mother  awaken  piety  in  the  heart  of  the  child.  No  less 
than  in  sensation,  science,  and  art,  does  this  take  place  also 
in  religion.  Man  is  never  self-sufficient  and  independent  of 
the  outside  world  ;  he  needs  the  earth  to  feed  and  clothe 
him,  light  to  see,  sound  to  hear,  the  phenomena  of  nature 
or  the  facts  of  history  to  observe  and  to  know,  and  in  the 
same  way  revelation  to  awaken  and  strengthen  his  reli- 
gious life.  The  heart  cannot  be  separated  from  the  head, 
nor  faith  as  trust  from  faith  as  knowledge.  Even  those 
who  look  upon  dogmatics  as  an  exposition  of  pious  feelings 
recognize  that  these  feelings  nevertheless  are  due  to  exter- 
nal influences,  as,  for  example,  from  the  person  of  Christ.9 
Experience  does  not  come  first,  after  which  interpretation 
follows,  but  revelation  precedes,  and  is  experienced  in 
faith.10 


REVELATION  AND  RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     209 

If  we  reject  the  empirical  order  and  proceed  in  an  op- 
posite direction,  we  reach  the  so-called  psychology  of 
religion  which  has  latterly  aroused  so  much  attention. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  this  young  science,  for  which 
Pietism  and  Methodism  prepared  the  way,  and  which  is  a 
direct  fruit  of  the  empirical  psychology  and  theology,  has 
a  right  to  exist,  and  may  be  expected  to  yield  important  aid 
for  the  knowledge  and  guidance  of  religious  life.  It  may 
be  hoped  also  that  the  method  which  has  been  applied  in 
this  science  by  James,  Starbuck,  Coe,  and  others,  will 
gradually  meet  the  objections  which  to-day  are  properly 
urged  against  it.  Finally,  we  may  acknowledge  that  dog- 
matics, especially  in  the  doctrine  of  the  or  do  salutis,  must 
become  more  psychological,  and  must  reckon  more  fully 
with  religious  experience.11  But  this  does  not  alter  the 
fact  that  the  psychology  of  religion  only  inquires  into  the 
experiences  of  the  soul  and  cannot  form  a  judgment  upon 
their  right  and  value.  It  observes  and  describes  the  phe- 
nomena of  religious  consciousness,  but  it  cannot  pro- 
nounce upon  their  truth  and  purity.  It  regards  religion, 
no  doubt,  as  one  of  "the  most  important  biological  func- 
tions of  mankind,"  u  but  it  can  never  come  to  the  question 
of  its  truth,  it  cannot  elevate  itself  to  a  logos  of  religion,  and 
therefore  can  never  replace  metaphysics  or  dogmatics.13 

We  may  reasonably  question  even  the  anticipation  of 
Coe,  that  this  psychology  of  religion  will  be  able  to 
regain  many  who  in  our  days  have  turned  away  from  all 
religion.14  For  without  underestimating  the  new  conclu- 
sions which  present  themselves,  and  the  important  sug- 
gestions which  have  been  derived  from  this  new  study  of 
religious  life,  the  results  to  which  it  has  led  do  not  support 
the  expectations  which  Coe  formed  for  them.  This  is 
very  clearly  manifested  in  the  fact  of  conversion,  to  which 

14 


210  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  greatest  attention  has  been  devoted.  The  psychology 
of  religion  not  merely  conceives  conversion  as  a  "  natural 
and  necessary  process,"  15  forming  a  part  of  man's  biolog- 
ical development  and  connected  intimately  with  puberty,16 
but  its  investigation  gradually  loses  sight  of  what  must 
be  understood  by  conversion.  In  itself  it  has  no  standard 
by  which  to  form  a  judgment  of  what  conversion  consists 
in  ;  it  inquires  into  and  describes  conversion  only  as  a 
psychological  phenomenon.  But  regarded  from  this  point 
of  view  the  treason  of  Judas  is  as  important  as  the  peni- 
tence of  Peter,  and  conversion  is  nothing  other  than  one 
of  the  many  transformations  of  consciousness,  or  altera- 
tions of  personality,  which  take  place  so  frequently  in 
human  life.17  If  all  these  religious  phenomena  are  studied 
only  from  a  psychological  standpoint,  the  result  is  that 
they  lose  their  character  and  their  content  is  sacrificed 
to  their  form.  Conversion  thus  loses  its  special  meaning ; 
on  the  ground  of  certain  analogies  with  other  psycholog- 
ical phenomena  it  is  confused  and  identified  with  them  in 
the  same  manner  as  in  the  religio-historical  method.  All 
religions  are  first  compared  one  with  another,  and  then,  on 
the  ground  of  some  points  of  agreement,  are  identified 
with  one  another.  What  conversion  is  and  ought  to  be 
no  psychology  of  religion  can  teach  us ;  the  Scriptures 
alone  can  tell  us  that ;  and  if  they  do  not  tell  it  to  us, 
nobody  knows. 

This  remark  applies  not  to  conversion  only,  but  also 
to  all  special  religious  experiences,  such  as  conscious- 
ness of  sin,  repentance,  faith,  hope,  sense  of  forgiveness, 
prayer,  fellowship  with  God ;  and  it  applies  as  well  to 
religion  in  general.  Religious  psychology  occupies  a 
neutral  standpoint  outside  and  above  all  religions,  and 
studies  and  compares  the  religious  experiences  of  Ro- 


REVELATION  AND  RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     211 

manist  and  Protestant,  Christian,  heathen,  Jew  and 
Mohammedan,  and  feels  itself  naturally  attracted  by  those 
persons  and  groups  whose  religious  life  bears  a  more  or 
less  eccentric  character ;  mystics,  fanatics,  enthusiasts 
of  all  sects  and  confessions,  form  for  it  interesting  cases 
which  it  eagerly  inquires  into.18  But  again  the  qualita- 
tive discrimination  disappears  from  view;  or  rather  the 
psycKcTogy  of  religion  does  not  perceive  it,  and  attends 
only  to  the  psychological  form  of  these  phenomena;  it  does 
not  penetrate  to  their  core  and  essence.  So  it  treats  them 
all  alike.  Religion  is  everywhere  the  same  as  to  contents, 
—  only  the  form  differs, — and  every  religion,  wherever  it 
appears,  is  therefore  true  and  good.  Thus  James,  for  ex- 
ample, says  that  religion  is  quite  "  private  "  and  "  individu- 
alistic "; 19  all  do  not  need  to  have  the  same  religion ;  each 
one  has  his  own  God.  So  long  as  a  man  has  use  for  his 
God,  he  cares  little  about  who  he  is ;  "  God  is  not  known ; 
he  is  used."  In  the  house  of  the  Father  are  many  man- 
sions; "all  ideals  are  matters  of  relation."20  The  ques- 
tion even  arises  whether  polytheism  does  not  better 
correspond  to  the  variety  of  religious  experience  than 
monotheism,  for  what  is  required  is  not  an  absolute  power, 
but  only  one  higher  than  that  of  nature.21 

That  this  peculiar  idea  is  not  a  private  opinion  of  Pro- 
fessor James,  but  a  necessary  and  general  conclusion  from 
the  premises,  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  other  men, 
though  widely  separated  from  one  another,  announce  the 
same  opinion.  Some  years  ago,  even,  Schian  declared 
that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  ideal  type  of  faith  and 
piety,  but  that  each  dogmatist  presents  his  own  type.  If 
there  is  no  infallible  Scripture,  "  there  can  exist  only  a 
subjective  and  purely  individual  notion  of  what  belongs  to 
Christian  faith."     All  ways  are  good,  if  they  but  lead  to 


212  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

faith :  not  to  what  is  contained  in  faith,  for  this  differs 
endlessly,  but  to  faith  as  trust  in  God  as  revealed  in 
Christ.22  Schian  has  received  much  support  from  others 
in  this  idea,23  and  Professor  Herrmann  too  has  given  his 
adherence  to  it  during  the  last  few  years.  The  strict 
Ritschlian  distinction  between  religion  and  metaphysics, 
between  judgments  of  value  and  judgments  of  being,  has 
led  him  to  supplant  faith  almost  wholly  by  trust.  Reve- 
lation, he  says,  is  not  an  external  thing,  but  "  man  receives 
the  revelation,  which  is  the  ground  of  his  religion,  be- 
cause the  depths  of  his  own  being  are  opened  to  him." 
Religion  is  a  new  life,  and  rests  upon  an  experience  of  the 
power  of  moral  good,  as  Jesus  has  shown  us.  To  trust  in 
that  power  is  to  believe,  to  live,  to  be  saved.  And  be- 
cause religion  is  thus  "  the  complete  quickening  of  a  man, 
there  is  no  general  religion,  the  same  for  every  one,  but 
there  are  only  individuals  in  religion."  2i  So  we  see  that 
from  the  standpoint  of  religious  psychology  there  is  no 
longer  a  place  for  metaphysics,  theology,  or  dogmatics,  nor 
even  for  an  "  ethics  of  the  religious  personality."  For 
every  standard  fails  here ;  there  is  no  single  law  or  rule ; 
the  individual  man  is  the  measure  of  all  things,  also  of 
religion ;  God  does  not  say  how  he  will  be  served,  but 
man  decides  how  he  will  serve  him. 

Naturally  such  a  consistent  indiff  erentism  does  not  please 
all,  and  in  the  long  run  cannot  satisfy  any  one.  Most  of 
those  who  have  followed  Kant  and  Schleiermacher  in 
taking  their  standpoint  in  the  religious  subject,  try  never- 
theless to  build  up  on  that  subject  one  or  another  view 
of  the  world.  In  truth,  Kant  himself  set  limits  to  knowl- 
edge in  order  to  make  a  place  for  faith,  and  to  find  room, 
by  reasoning  on  the  nature  and  content  of  practical  reason, 
for  the  reality  of  a  moral  government  of  the  world.     And 


REVELATION  AND  RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     213 

Schleiermacher,  though  striving  after  the  liberation  of 
theology  from  philosophy,  could  act  in  this  way  according 
to  his  conviction  only  because  he  believed  he  possessed  in 
the  religious  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  an  immediate 
revelation  of  the  Infinite.25  The  peculiarity  of  the  whole 
mediating  theology  which  spread  over  the  world  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  and  remains  still  to-day  dominant  in 
many  circles,  is  its  effort  to  attain  a  transcendent  reality 
—  which  was  only  more  or  less  a  reflection  of  the  old 
dogmatics  —  by  means  of  speculative  reasoning  on  the 
immanent  requirements,  needs,  or  experiences  of  the 
religious  and  ethical  man.  Ritschl,  it  is  true,  set  himself 
in  opposition  to  this,  and  brought  about  a  separation 
between  religion  and  metaphysics  which  Herrmann  espe- 
ially  has  carried  forward.  But  a  powerful  reaction  the- 
ologically and  philosophically  has  arisen  against  this 
separation,  even  among  RitschTs  own  followers.  We  are 
witnesses  in  these  days  of  a  rebirth  of  philosophy,  a  fresh 
acknowledgment  of  the  right  of  metaphysics;  and  in 
connection  therewith  of  a  fuller  recognition  of  the  spirit- 
ual life,  of  its  norms  and  values  of  its  religious  and  ethi- 
cal nature.26 

This  new  philosophy,  however,  appears  in  many  respects 
different  from  that  of  former  times.  The  old  problems 
always  remain  the  same,  but  they  return  in  quite  another 
form.  Whilst  formerly  the  procedure  was  often  aprioris- 
tic,  and  the  world  was  constructed  out  of  the  idea,  now 
the  opposite  direction  is  taken  and  an  effort  is  made  to 
raise  the  real  world  of  sensation  and  experience  to  its  idea. 
The  natural  and  mental  sciences  have  brought  much 
that  is  new  into  the  field.  What  has  been  said  as  to  the 
source  of  mathematical  axioms,  the  ideas  of  number,  time, 
and  space,  matter  and  force,  movement  and  law,  the  de- 


214  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

velopment  of  the  whole  organic  life,  in  plants,  animals, 
and  humanity,  the  interpretation  of  history,  of  the  origin 
and  progress  of  state  and  society,  presents  so  much  that  is 
important  that  nobody,  and  certainly  no  philosopher,  can 
neglect  it  without  great  loss.27  This  applies  also  to 
psychology.  Here  above  all  continued  study  has  shown 
that  the  so-called  empirical  psychology  cannot  suffice  for 
the  right  understanding  of  the  psychical  life. 

Researches  into  uncommon  phenomena,  such  as  telep- 
athy and  telsesthesy,  hypnotism  and  spiritualism,  faith- 
and  prayer-healing,  the  intuition  of  genius  and  prophetic 
or  poetic  inspiration  have  demonstrated  one  fact  beyond 
all  doubt,  —  that  the  psychical  life  of  man  is  much  richer 
than  his  conscious  intelligence  and  action.  One  may  dis- 
agree over  the  names;  but  whether  we  speak  of  waking 
and  dreaming,  day  and  night,  supraliminal  and  sublimi- 
nal, intuitive  and  reflexive  consciousness,  in  any  case 
there  is  a  great  difference  between  what  happens  beneath 
and  what  above  the  threshold  of  consciousness.  It  cer- 
tainly does  not  commend  itself  when  Max  Dessoir  speaks 
of  two  personalities  in  one  man ; 28  for  there  always  remains 
a  weaker  or  stronger  consciousness  that  both  dwell  in  one 
and  the  same  breast,  and  belong  to  one  person.29  But 
still  a  man  may  be  so  divided  against  himself,  and  so 
many  alterations  may  take  place  in  his  consciousness, 
that  he  leads  as  it  were  a  double  life.  Sometimes  he 
seems  to  live  in  two  worlds,  which  have  nothing  to  do 
with  each  other.  In  many  pathological  cases,  and  espe- 
cially in  the  so-called  demoniacal  possession,  the  apparatus 
of  consciousness  appears  to  become  an  instrument  of  a 
foreign,  mysterious  power.  Apart  altogether  from  these 
extremes,  however,  in  every  man  there  is  present  a  differ- 
ence between  his  subliminal  and  supraliminal  conscious- 


REVELATION  AND  RELIGIOUS  EXPERIENCE     215 

ness.  Man  tries  to  give  direction  to  his  life  by  his 
consciousness,  but  that  life  itself  has  its  origin  in  the 
depth  of  his  personality.  It  must  not  be  forgotten, 
Coe  says  truly,  that  though  reason  is  necessary  to  guide 
the  ship  of  life,  feeling  is  the  stream  that  propels  it.30 
Beneath  consciousness  there  is  a  world  of  instincts  and 
habits,  notions  and  inclinations,  abilities  and  capacities, 
which  continually  sets  on  fire  the  course  of  nature. 
Beneath  the  head  lies  the  heart,  out  of  which  are  the 
issues  of  life. 

For  this  reason  empirical  psychology  will  never  be  able 
fully  to  explain  the  psychical  life.  It  may  with  the  ut- 
most closeness  examine  the  phenomena  of  consciousness, 
the  sensations,  the  feelings,  the  passions,  and  it  may  try  to 
conceive  their  working  mechanically  ;  it  may  even  en- 
deavor to  explain  the  ego  or  the  self-consciousness  by 
association  of  ideas  ;  but  naturally  it  cannot  penetrate 
to  what  lies  behind  and  beneath  consciousness,  and  can 
kindle  no  light  in  the  secret  places  of  the  heart.  Herein 
the  declaration  may  find  its  application  that  God  alone 
proves  the  hearts  and  reins  of  man.  Empirical  psy- 
chology can  inquire  into  the  conditions  of  consciousness, 
can  even  investigate  the  self -consciousness  which  slowly 
arises  in  man  and  is  subject  to  all  kinds  of  changes.  But 
the  question  whether  a  hidden  ego  or  an  independent 
soul  lies  behind  it  is  beyond  its  reach.  So  soon  as  it  oc- 
cupies itself  with  this  question  it  passes  beyond  itself 
into  metaphysics.31  Let  us  put  it  more  strongly  still,  — 
in  inquiring  into  the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  em- 
pirical psychology  always  takes  its  start  from  an  abstrac- 
tion ;  it  separates  man  from  his  social  environment,  the 
psychical  processes  from  their  contact  with  life,  and  in 
those  psychical  processes  it  again  isolates  definite  phenom- 


216  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

ena,  such  as  sensations  of  time,  space,  color,  wholly  from 
the  psychical  life.  No  doubt  there  are  gains  to  be  regis- 
tered by  this  method  ;  but  we  must  abandon  the  illusion 
that  human  psychical  life  can  ever  find  its  explanation  in 
this  manner.  For  if  science  cherishes  this  illusion  it 
degenerates  into  psychologism,  historism,  and  relativism, 
and  the  fulness  and  richness  of  life  are  curtailed.  In  re- 
ality all  these  phenomena  of  consciousness,  so  far  from 
being  isolated,  exist  only  in  intimate  mutual  relations,  and 
ever  spring  out  of  the  depths  of  personality.  The  whole 
cannot  be  explained  in  an  atomistic  manner  by  a  combina- 
tion of  its  parts ;  but  on  the  contrary  the  parts  must  be 
conceived  in  an  organic  way  by  unfolding  the  totality. 
Behind  the  particular  lies  the  general,  and  the  whole  pre- 
cedes the  parts.  If,  for  example,  we  had  to  learn  to  see, 
we  should  be  dead  before  the  task  was  accomplished.32 
But  just  as  the  bird  knows  how  to  build  its  nest,  so  we 
bring  with  us  from  our  birth  all  kinds  of  abilities  and 
capacities.  It  is  the  instinctive,  organic  life  which  in 
sensations,  in  thoughts  and  actions,  gives  an  impulse  to  us 
and  shows  us  the  way.  Instinct  and  capacity,  norm  and 
law,  precede  the  life  of  reflection.  Man  is  not  sent  into 
the  world  unarmed,  but  is  equipped  in  body  and  soul  with 
rich  gifts  and  powers ;  he  receives  the  talents  which  he 
has  only  to  invest  and  augment  them  in  the  acts  of  his 
earthly  life.  Empirical  psychology  may  thus  possess  an 
important  pedagogical  significance,  but  it  takes  its  origin 
from,  and  also  leads  back  to,  metaphysical  psychology. 
And  thus  it  becomes  manifest  that  empirical  life  is  rooted 
in  an  aprioristic  datum,  which  does  not  come  slowly  into 
existence  by  mechanical  development,  but  is  a  gift  of  God's 
grace,  and  a  fruit  and  result  of  his  revelation.83 

If  psychology  leads  by  serious  reflection   to   a   meta- 


REVELATION  AND  RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     217 

physical  reality,  and  this  again  to  the  idea  of  revelation, 
we  are  not  far  removed  from  the  conviction  that  man,  in 
the  hidden  places  of  his  soul,  yet  belongs  to  another  and  a 
higher  world  than  that  of  this  earthly  existence.  Plato 
asserted  that  the  human  soul  existed  before  its  indwelling 
in  the  body,  lived  in  the  world  of  ideas,  and  preserved 
the  memory  of  it  in  its  earthly  exile.34  Others  cherish 
the  idea  that  man  in  the  hidden  side  of  his  nature  holds 
communion  with  the  unseen  world  and  can  receive  from 
it  all  kinds  of  manifestations  and  revelations.  The  So- 
ciety for  Psychical  Research,  established  in  1882,  aimed 
at  inquiring  into  all  the  phenomena  which  belong  to  the 
domain  of  spiritualism,35  and  one  of  its  members,  namely, 
F.  W.  H.  Myers,  who  died  in  1901,  arrived  with  others 
at  the  conclusion  that  man  in  his  subliminal  life  possesses 
faculties  and  powers  whereby,  without  the  help  of  the 
body,  he  can  hold  communication  with  souls  and  spirits.36 
Now  there  has  always  existed  very  great  difference  of 
opinion  as  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  hypnotic  and  spir- 
itualistic phenomena,  notwithstanding  the  exact  research 
which  has  been  devoted  to  them.  On  the  one  side  an 
attempt  is  made  to  explain  all  these  phenomena  in  a 
natural  way,  especially  by  suggestion,  and  this  attempt  is 
even  extended  to  the  miracles  of  Scripture ;  and  on  the 
other  side,  men  feel  forced  by  the  facts  to  assume  in  some 
or  in  many  cases  a  supernatural  interposition.  It  is  unnec- 
essary to  examine  here  the  correctness  of  these  opinions ; 
for  it  is  not  impossible,  a  'priori ,  that  such  an  intercourse 
with  souls  and  spirits,  without  the  help  of  the  body,  may 
exist.  If  the  human  soul  indeed  exists  from  the  begin- 
ning as  a  whole,  and  is  not  slowly  produced  by  steps  and 
stages  in  the  way  of  mechanical  evolution,  then  it  is  in 
itself  super-empirical,  and  has  part  in  another  world  be- 


218  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

sides  this  visible  one.  It  is  then  spiritual  in  its  essence, 
and  it  is  possible  for  it  to  hold  communication  with  spirits 
or  souls  without  the  body.  The  body  evidently  is  the 
organ  of  the  soul ;  it  is  not  the  body,  but  the  soul,  which 
sees  and  hears,  thinks  and  acts,  through  the  body.  Thus 
there  is  nothing  absurd  in  the  idea  that  the  soul  can  exer- 
cise those  activities  in  special  cases  without  the  organ  of 
the  body.  It  is  also  remarkable  that  humanity,  every- 
where and  in  all  ages,  has  acknowledged  this  possibility, 
that  Scripture  often  presupposes  it,  and  that  it  is  included 
in  the  idea  of  revelation.  For  revelation  always  supposes 
that  man  is  able  to  receive  impressions  or  thoughts  or 
inclinations  from  another  than  this  phenomenal  world, 
and  in  a  way  other  than  that  usually  employed. 

But  when  science  undertakes  to  inquire  into  the  phenom- 
ena which  belong  to  such  a  spiritual  intercourse,  it  exposes 
itself  to  serious  dangers.  For  naturally  those  who  devote 
their  time  and  strength  to  this  study  will  not  be  contented 
with  the  phenomena  as  such,  but  in  order  to  obtain  com- 
pletely trustworthy  material  for  their  work  will  adopt  the 
experimental  method,  and  will  endeavor  to  produce  such 
experiences  in  themselves  or  in  others  by  artificial  means. 
The  seriousness  of  scientific  study  compels  them  to  seek 
such  intercourse  with  the  world  of  spirits  themselves. 
Such  an  intercourse  is  not  within  the  circle  of  their  com- 
mon experience ;  if  it  is  possible,  it  can  only  be  reached  in 
artificial  ways,  that  is,  by  the  help  of  means,  all  of  which, 
however  diverse,  have  the  tendency  to  throw  into  the 
background  the  conscious  supraliminal  life  and  to  set  the 
subliminal  consciousness  to  work.  If  we  do  not  lay  stress 
on  the  injury  which  these  artificially  induced  trance  con- 
ditions may  work  to  the  bodily  health,  yet  we  must  at 
least  observe  that  it  is  silently  supposed  that  subliminal 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     219 

life  is  the  chief  domain  of  the  spirit.  Just  as  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  unconscious  so  spiritism  and  hypnotism  in- 
culcate the  idea  that  consciousness  is  only  a  temporary  and 
defective  form  of  knowledge,  and  that  true  being  lies  in  the 
unconscious ;  and  the  best  way  to  come  into  contact  with 
this  being,  and  to  obtain  knowledge  about  it,  is  in  the  dream, 
the  ecstasy,  the  trance.  Nevertheless,  whosoever  intention- 
ally robs  himself  of  self-consciousness,  reason,  and  will,  ex- 
tinguishes the  light  which  God  has  given  to  man,  annihilates 
his  human  freedom  and  independence,  and  degrades  him- 
self to  an  instrument  for  an  alien  and  unknown  power.37 

For  —  and  this  is  a  second  danger  which  threatens  — 
nobody  knows  to  what  influences  he  abandons  himself  in 
such  states  of  trance.  It  is  easy  to  say,  on  the  one  side, 
that  all  is  suggestion  or  hallucination,  or,  on  the  other 
side,  that  a  real  intercourse  with  spirits  takes  place ;  but 
nothing  is  really  certain.  By  intentionally  suppressing 
reason  and  will,  and  by  going  back  from  this  world  of 
revelation  to  a  land  of  darkness,  we  lose  all  guidance  and 
make  all  control  impossible.  The  reality  of  the  phenom- 
ena and  revelations  which  take  place  in  the  ecstatic  state 
remains  uncertain ;  uncertain  it  remains  also  whether  the 
spirits  who  appear  are  really  what  they  represent  them- 
selves to  be;  and,  again,  whether  the  revelations  which 
they  give  contain  truth  or  lies,  must  be  followed  or  re- 
jected.38 Let  it  be  supposed  that  real  intercourse  is  held 
with  the  spirits,  still  the  alternative  is  ever  before  us 
whether  we  shall  give  ourselves  unconditionally  up  to 
the  phenomena  and  revelations  thus  received,  in  which  case, 
just  as  in  common  human  intercourse,  we  should  become 
dupes  of  misleading  and  seduction  ;  or  whether  we  shall 
later  on  control  the  revelations  received  by  the  standards 
which  conscience  has  given  to  us,  in  which  case  we  should 


220  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

interpret  them  according  to  the  view  of  the  world  and 
life,  which  is  ours  in  conscious  existence. 

The  history  of  occultism,  whether  in  earlier  or  later 
times,  demonstrates  this.  The  complaint  is  common  that 
the  revelations  which  spiritualism  and  hypnotism  impart 
to  us  are  characterized  by  banality  and  are  not  worth  the 
attention  which  is  bestowed  upon  them ;  also  that  they 
contain  nothing  more  than  fragments  of  the  world-view 
which  the  receiver  already  adheres  to.  Myers,  for  example, 
is  of  opinion  that  "  psychical  research  "  indicates  the  reality 
of  the  spiritual  world,  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  and 
endless  "  spiritual  evolution,"  and  that  it  has  established 
these  beyond  all  doubt.  In  consequence  of  this  he  ex- 
pects that  religion  in  the  future  will  no  longer  rest  on 
authority  and  belief,  but  on  observation  and  experiment, 
and  in  that  way  will  in  the  long  run  bring  about  a  "  syn- 
thesis of  religious  belief." 39  But  these  ideas  are  so  well 
known  that  there  is  really  no  need  of  revelation  to  make 
them  known  to  us  ;  they  have  been  proclaimed  at  all  times 
by  pantheistic  philosophy,  and  have  only  in  later  days 
received  another,  and,  for  our  generation,  more  attractive 
form,  through  a  peculiar  combination  of  Darwinism  and 
Buddhism,  evolution  and  theosophy,  Western  intelligence 
and  Eastern  wisdom.  It  is  so  incredible  that  this  pan- 
theistic-theosophical  world-view  should  be  produced  by 
the  revelation  of  spirits  that  it  could,  on  the  contrary,  be 
with  more  justice  contended  that  the  newer  philosophy 
has  in  a  high  degree  furthered  occultism,  and  has  strength- 
ened the  belief  therein.  And  as  to  the  expectation  that 
religion  will  rest  in  the  future  on  the  results  of  psychical 
research,  the  remark  may  suffice  that  the  religion  which 
seeks  its  foundation  in  intercourse  with  and  in  the  revela- 
tion of  spirits  denies  the  name  and  the  essence  of  pure 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     221 

religion,  and  instead  of  this  introduces  pagan  superstition. 
Belief  in  spirits  leads  among  all  peoples  and  at  all  times  to 
spirit- worship.  For  if  the  spirits  of  demons  or  the  deceased 
can  be  called  up,  hold  communication  with  us,  and  reveal 
to  us  secret  things,  then  naturally  arises  the  notion  that 
they  are  more  or  less  partakers  of  the  divine  attributes  of 
omniscience  and  omnipresence,  and  can  help  or  injure  us, 
at  least  in  a  certain  degree.  This  belief  leads  uninten- 
tionally and  of  itself  to  the  practice  of  adoration  and 
homage.  Occultism  issues  on  the  one  side  in  unbelief 
and  indifference  with  regard  to  existing  religions,  and 
on  the  other  in  the  most  abounding  superstition,  spirit- 
worship,  and  magic.40 

There  is  only  one  religion  which  in  principle  condemns 
and  prohibits  all  this  superstition  and  magic,  and  that  is 
Christianity.  The  Old  Testament  already  contained  the 
revelation  that  the  Lord  alone  is  Israel's  God,  and  there- 
fore he  only  must  be  worshipped  and  served ;  soothsaying 
and  magic,  inquiry  of  spirits  and  demons,  are  throughout 
forbidden.  In  the  New  Testament  this  worship  of  the 
one  only  true  God  is  emancipated  from  all  national  limits, 
and  is  thus  raised  to  its  true  condition  as  a  worship  in 
spirit  and  in  truth.  True  there  are  prophets  and  apostles 
who  act  as  organs  of  revelation,  but  they  are  still  men, 
and  enjoy  no  other  honor  than  that  which  belongs  to 
their  office  and  vocation ;  even  Mary,  the  blessed  among 
women,  is  an  ordinary  member  of  the  church.  There  is 
also,  according  to  the  Scripture,  a  realm  of  spirits ;  but 
the  angels,  notwithstanding  the  great  power  which  is 
given  to  them,  and  the  important  task  which  is  intrusted 
to  them,  are  never  objects  of  religious  worship ;  while  the 
attitude  which  is  required  to  be  taken  toward  the  devils 
is  so  far  from  one  of  abject  slavery  that  the  only  duty 


222  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

which  we  are  commanded  to  fulfil  toward  them  is  to 
hate  and  resist  them. 

Christianity  is  the  absolutely  spiritual  religion,  because 
it  is  the  only  religion  which  sets  religion  in  relation  to 
God  alone ;  therefore  it  is  nothing  else  but  religion ;  the 
idea  of  religion  is  completely  fulfilled  in  it.  For  if  reli- 
gion is  a  reality,  then  necessarily  it  must  consist  in  this,  — 
that  man,  avoiding  all  idolatry,  shall  rightly  acknowledge 
the  one  true  God,  trust  only  in  him,  subject  himself  to  him 
alone  in  all  humility  and  patience,  expect  all  good  things 
from  him,  love,  fear,  and  honor  him  with  the  whole  heart, 
so  that  he  would  rather  renounce  every  created  thing  than 
do  anything  in  the  least  against  the  will  of  God.  Now,  this 
is  completely  fulfilled  in  Christianity.  It  is  purely  a  ser- 
vice of  God  alone,  with  exclusion  of  all  creatures.  God 
is  the  content  and  the  subject,  the  beginning  and  the 
ending,  the  alpha  and  the  omega,  of  religion,  and  nothing 
of  the  creature  enters  into  it.  On  the  other  side  the 
whole  man  is  taken  into  fellowship  with  that  one  true 
God;  not  only  his  feelings,  but  also  his  mind  and  will, 
his  heart  and  all  his  affections,  his  soul  and  his  body. 
Christianity  is  religion  alone,  and  therefore  the  pure  re- 
ligion, the  full  and  complete,  indissoluble  and  eternal, 
fellowship  of  God  and  man. 

Christian  theology,  which  investigates  this  religion,  is 
on  this  account  alone  an  independent  and  genuine  sci- 
ence. As  soon  as  the  Christian  religion  is  no  longer 
acknowledged  to  be  the  pure,  complete  religion,  but  is 
thrown  into  a  heap  with  all  religions,  theology  ceases  to 
be  an  independent  science.  There  may  still  remain  the 
study  of  the  religious  man  (religious  anthropology),  and 
also  psychological  and  historical  inquiry  into  the  religions 
of  different  peoples,  perhaps  also  an  endeavor  to  frame 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     223 

a  philosophy  of  religion  and  a  metaphysics,  but  there  is 
no  longer  a  theology,  no  longer  an  inquiry  into  the  knowl- 
edge of  God,  and  thus  no  standard  for  the  judgment  of 
religious  phenomena.  There  only  remains  positivism, 
psychologism,  relativism.  Revelation,  religion,  and  the- 
ology stand  or  fall  together. 

But  if  theology  possesses  a  reason  for  and  a  right  to 
existence,  it  brings  with  it,  as  an  independent  science,  its 
own  method  also.  At  the  present  time  most  people  hold 
another  opinion.  Because  they  have  abandoned  the  self- 
sufficiency  of  the  Christian  religion,  they  cannot  hold  to 
a  theology  with  a  method  of  its  own.  They  suppose  that 
there  are  only  one  or  two  scientific  methods,  namely,  the 
physical  and  the  historical.  And  thus,  if  theology  is  to 
maintain  itself  as  a  science  in  the  university,  it  must 
accept  one  of  these  two  methods,  and  apply  it  logically 
to  the  whole  domain  of  inquiry ;  in  other  words,  it  must 
become  natural  or  historical  science.  In  this  way  it  would 
lose  its  right  to  form  an  independent  faculty  in  the  circle 
of  science,  and  would  require,  therefore,  to  be  brought  into 
the  domain  of  the  philosophical  faculty.41 

Whether  one  accepts  this  consequence  or  not,  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  the  standpoint  is  founded  violates  science, 
and  denies  its  richness  and  diversity.  True,  if  monism 
were  the  right  world-view,  and  if  all  phenomena  were 
purely  modifications  of  one  substance,  then  there  would 
be  only  one  science  and  also  only  one  method.  It  would 
be  to  deny  its  principle,  to  give  an  independent  place  to 
historical  science  by  the  side  of  natural  science,  and  to 
defend  the  right  of  the  historical  method.  But  the  world 
is  richer  than  materialistic  or  pantheistic  evolution  wishes 
it  to  appear.  A  single  factor  never  suffices  for  the  expla- 
nation of  phenomena  in  any  domain.     Everywhere  there 


224  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

is  a  richness  of  life  and  a  fulness  of  being.  There  are 
different  kinds  of  creatures  and  phenomena,  each  of  which 
requires  a  special  method  according  to  its  nature,  that  we 
may  know  and  understand  it.  Religion  and  virtue,  art 
and  science,  beauty  and  justice,  cannot  be  handled  and 
measured  like  bodies ;  yet  they  exist,  and  occupy  a  domi- 
nating place  in  existence.  Reality  does  not  arrange  itself 
to  fit  our  system,  but  our  system  must  form  itself  in 
accordance  with  reality. 

Life  itself  receives  much  greater  injury  from  monistic 
doctrinairism  than  science.  If  the  empirical  and  histori- 
cal methods  are  the  only  paths  to  knowledge,  then  that 
wisdom  which  by  nature  is  proper  to  every  man,  and  is 
augmented  and  extended  in  the  practice  of  life,  loses  all 
its  value,  and  there  arises  between  the  schools  and  society 
a  continually  greater  divergence  and  ever  increasing  op- 
position. For  however  science,  with  her  inquiries  and 
results,  may  serve,  lead,  and  promote  life,  this  life  always 
and  everywhere  precedes  science ;  it  did  not  originate  in 
science,  and  cannot  wait  for  it.  Family  and  society,  work 
and  vocation,  agriculture  and  cattle-rearing,  trade  and 
industry,  morality,  justice,  and  art,  have  all  an  independ- 
ent source  and  sustain  their  own  character.  The  whole 
complete  life,  which  reveals  itself  in  all  these  domains 
and  activities,  can  gratefully  make  use  of  the  light  which 
science  kindles,  but  it  flows  from  its  own  proper  source 
and  streams  onward  in  its  own  channel.  For  both  life 
and  science  it  is,  therefore,  of  the  highest  importance  that 
the  empirical  knowledge,  which  is  obtained  in  life,  and 
the  scientific  knowledge,  which  is  striven  after  in  the 
schools,  should  support  and  strengthen  one  another;  the 
wisdom  of  life  is  the  starting-point  and  the  foundation  of 
all  science,  and  the  researches  of  the  learned  should  not 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     225 

aim  at  extinguishing  this  knowledge  of  practical  experi- 
ence, but  at  purifying  and  augmenting  it.42 

This  applies  especially  to  religion.  If  theology  ac- 
knowledges no  other  method  than  that  which  is  usually 
taken  in  the  sciences  of  nature  and  history,  the  religious 
man  is  not  only  totally  dependent  on  the  clericalism  of 
science,  but  religion  itself  is  robbed  of  its  independence 
and  freedom.  This  is  recognized  by  all,  so  far  as  under 
the  influence  of  Schleiermacher  they  strive  to  set  religion 
free  from  all  knowledge  and  assent,  and  conceive  it  as 
only  trust  in  the  heart.  But  this  endeavor  is  a  fruitless 
one.  For  religion  does  not  spring  up  in  every  individ- 
ual spontaneously,  without  outside  influence,  but  always 
comes  to  development  by  connecting  itself  with  the  re- 
ligious representations  which  are  recognized  in  a  definite 
circle  as  truth.  The  word  "faith,"  which  in  Christendom 
expresses  subjective  religiousness,  includes,  along  with 
the  original  religious  habit  which  dwells  in  the  heart  of 
man,  also  the  adjustment  to  representations  which  exist 
in  this  religion  about  God,  world,  man,  etc. ;  it  is  at  the 
same  time  knowledge  and  trust,  and  expresses  the  pecul- 
iarity of  the  Christian  religion  so  well  because  this  reli- 
gion desires  a  knowledge  of  God  which  is  at  the  same 
time  trust,  love,  piety.  Just  because  religion  always  in- 
cludes knowledge,  it  comes  into  collision  with  science, 
and  vice  versa.  This  collision  has  existed  through  all 
ages  and  in  all  religions ;  the  cause  does  not  lie  in  arbi- 
trary or  occasional  abuses  of  power,  as  would  be  the  case 
if  faith  were  nothing  more  than  a  matter  of  feeling  ;  but 
the  cause  is  that  both,  according  to  their  several  natures, 
move  in  the  same  domain  and  pronounce  themselves  on 
the  same  objects  and  phenomena.43  And  knowledge  be- 
longs so  intimately  to  the  essence  of  religion  that  religion, 

15 


226  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

if  freed  from  all  religious  representations  and  limited 
purely  to  feeling,  would  immediately  lose  its  own  char- 
acter. For  feeling  has  in  itself  no  content  and  no  quality  ; 
religious,  ethical,  and  sesthetic  feelings  do  not  exist  inde- 
pendently of  each  other,  but  are  distinguished  by  the 
various  representations  by  which  feeling  is  awakened. 
Monism,  therefore,  always  promotes  the  confusion  of  reli- 
gious and  aesthetic  feeling,  and  thereby  weakens  religion ; 
to  limit  religion  to  feelings  does  not  maintain  its  inde- 
pendence, but  undermines  its  existence. 

After  the  criticism  of  "  the  pure  reason,"  which  Kant 
has  worked  out  from  the  standpoint  of  a  mathematical- 
mechanic  science,  and  after  the  criticism  of  "  the  historical 
reason,"  which  has  recently  been  developed  by  men  like 
Dilthey,  Windelband,  Rickert,  over  against  the  one-sided- 
ness  of  the  science  of  nature,  a  "  criticism  of  the  religious 
reason  "  is  still  necessary.  Theology  is  occupying  itself 
with  this  task  in  all  lands ;  the  formal  part  of  dogmatics 
is  drawing  thought  to  itself  much  more  than  the  material 
part.  Yet  it  cannot  proceed  here  by  mere  speculation. 
Each  science  must  borrow  its  form  from  the  object  which 
it  investigates,  for  method  is  determined  by  the  object. 
Now,  if  the  object  of  theology  is  no  other  than  the  true 
and  pure  religion,  which  appears  to  us  in  Christianity  as 
the  fruit  of  revelation,  then  the  inquiry  after  method  re- 
sults in  this  one  and  very  important  question:  How 
does  the  Christian  religion  itself  represent  that  a  man 
comes  to  her,  acknowledges  her  truth,  and  by  her  becomes 
a  true  religious  man,  —  that  is,  a  Christian,  a  child  of 
God  ?  Theology  may  afterwards  reflect  upon  the  answer 
which  the  Christian  religion  gives,  as  she  does  also  upon 
other  elements  of  truth ;  she  has  even  the  right,  the  duty, 
and  the  vocation  to  do  this.    But  she  can  never  produce  any 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     227 

other  method  than  that  which  is  given  by  her  own  object. 
The  plan  of  salvation  in  the  Christian  religion  determines 
the  method  of  Christian  theology. 

If  we  institute  an  inquiry  into  that  plan  of  salvation, 
we  are  met  by  the  fact  that  the  Christian  religion  does  not 
bring  us  merely  into  relation  with  persons  and  events  of 
the  past,  but  by  means  of  revelations  in  history  seeks  to 
bring  us  into  fellowship  with  that  God  who  manifests  his 
truth  in  that  he  is  always  the  same,  in  the  past  and  in  the 
present.  The  Christian  religion  is  an  historical,  but  also  a 
present,  religion.44  Whoever  seeks  fellowship  with  God, 
excluding  all  history,  and  revelation  in  nature  and  history, 
—  that  is  to  say,  without  Christ,  —  experiences  a  reli- 
gious feeling  which  misses  the  objective  reality,  which 
feeds  only  on  itself,  and  therefore  also  digests  itself.  He 
who  frees  himself  from  all  connection  with  what  is  before 
and  around  him  ruins  himself  by  his  autonomy.  On  the 
other  hand,  whosoever  considers  the  Christian  religion 
simply  and  alone  as  historical  religion,  and  does  not 
make  it  a  religion  of  the  present,  wipes  out  in  principle 
the  distinction  between  Christianity  and  the  other  reli- 
gions, and  reduces  it  to  a  phenomenon  which  belongs  only 
to  the  past,  and  loses  its  significance  for  to-day  and  the 
future. 

The  peculiarity  of  the  Christian  religion,  then,  as  has 
been  so  often  shown,  and  acknowledged  even  by  oppo- 
nents,45 lies  in  the  person  of  Christ.  All  other  religions 
are  independent,  to  a  certain  degree,  of  their  founders, 
because  those  founders  were  nothing  more  than  their  first 
confessors.  But  Jesus  was  not  the  first  Christian ;  he 
was  and  is  the  Christ.  He  is  not  the  subject,  but  the  ob- 
ject, of  religion.  Christianity  is  not  the  religion  of  Jesus, 
still  less  Jesus-worship,46  but  Christ-religion.     Christian- 


228  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

ity  is  now  as  dependent  on  him,  from  moment  to  moment, 
as  when  he  trod  this  earth.  For  he  is  not  a  person  who 
lived  and  worked  only  in  the  past,  but  he  lives  and  works 
still,  is  still  Prophet,  Priest,  and  King,  and  himself  upholds 
the  church,  which  he  established,  from  age  to  age,  and 
assures  to  her  the  victory.  Christianity,  according  to  its 
own  confession,  does  not  exist  through  the  strength  and 
fidelity  of  its  confessors,  but  through  the  life  and  will  of 
its  Mediator.  The  stages  of  the  application  of  salvation  are 
as  much,  and  in  the  same  sense,  his  interest  as  the  im- 
petration  of  salvation.  His  will  and  his  work  is  to  make 
men  truly  religious,  to  bring  them  into  fellowship  with  God, 
and  that  is  also  the  will  and  the  work  of  God  himself.  For 
the  will  of  God  to  save  the  world  was  not  only  an  annun- 
ciation of  God's  inclination  in  the  past,  but  is  an  action, 
a  deed,  a  work  of  God,  which  goes  on  from  day  to  day. 
God  is  love ;  but  that  love  is  no  quiescent  attribute,  but 
an  eternal,  omnipresent  energy  which  realizes  itself  in  the 
hearts  of  men.  God  is  Father;  but  that  Fatherhood  is 
no  mere  title  of  honor,  but  an  almighty,  energetic  power 
which  regenerates  men  as  his  children  and  heirs.47  Chris- 
tianity is  no  mere  revelation  of  God  in  the  past,  but  it  is, 
in  connection  with  the  past,  a  work  in  the  midst  of  this 
and  every  time.  The  Father  of  Jesus  works  always  hith- 
erto, and  he  himself  works  also.  All  other  religions  try  to 
obtain  salvation  by  the  works  of  men,  but  Christianity 
makes  a  strong  protest  against  this ;  it  is  not  autosoteric 
but  heterosoteric ;  it  does  not  preach  self -redemption,  but 
glories  in  redemption  by  Christ  alone.  Man  does  not 
save  himself,  and  does  not  save  God,  but  God  alone  saves 
man,  the  whole  man,  man  for  eternity.  It  is  a  religion, 
not  of  works,  but  of  faith ;  not  of  merits,  but  of  grace. 
Christianity  proves  itself  in  the  plan  of  salvation  to  be 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     229 

the  absolutely  spiritual  and  pure  religion.  Man  can  add 
nothing  to  it,  —  salvation  is  God's  work  alone ;  of  him, 
and  through  him,  and  to  him,  are  all  things. 

But  this  almighty  and  always  active  will  of  God  is 
not  realized  without  man,  as  antinomians  of  all  kinds 
imagine,  but  in  man,  and  through  man.  It  is  realized, 
according  to  the  witness  of  the  whole  Scripture,  in 
regeneration  and  faith,  in  conversion  and  forgiveness  of 
sin,  in  sanctiflcation  and  perseverance.  In  other  words, 
if  we  ask  of  the  prophets,  of  Christ  and  his  apostles, 
how  man  comes  to  a  knowledge  of  the  truth,  and  to  a  new 
life  in  God's  fellowship,  then  they  give  the  answer  unani- 
mously, —  not  by  knowledge  or  action,  nor  yet  by  science 
or  art,  nor  yet  again  by  good  works  or  civilization,  but  by 
faith  and  conversion.  Scripture  has  a  richness  of  names 
for  this  plan  of  salvation ;  it  never  gives  a  dry,  dogmatic 
description,  nor  an  abstract  scheme  of  conceptions,  but 
shows  it  to  us  in  life,  and  gives  us  thereby  a  psychology 
of  religion  such  as  no  scientific  investigation,  and  no  ques- 
tionaire  method  can  bring  to  light.  For  all  the  steps  in  the 
way  of  salvation  are  God's  work,  the  effect  and  fulfilment 
of  his  will ;  but  because  they  take  place  in  man,  and  are 
realized  in  his  consciousness  and  will,  they  may  all  be  con- 
sidered and  described  also  from  an  anthropological  point 
of  view.  The  distinct  individuality  and  experience  of  the 
prophets  and  apostles  themselves  appear  in  the  different 
names  by  which  the  process  of  salvation  is  indicated.  But 
from  whatever  point  of  view  this  plan  of  salvation  is  con- 
sidered, this  is  always  the  result,  —  that  man,  in  order  to 
become  a  child  of  God,  does  not  need  to  be  a  cultured 
being  or  a  citizen  of  standing,  a  man  of  science  or  of  art, 
a  civilized  or  a  developed  man.  These  are  all  good,  but 
not  one  indicates  the  way  to  divine  fellowship.     In  order 


230  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

to  become  a  sharer  in  this  a  person  must  be  regenerated, 
changed,  renewed,  or,  to  use  the  most  common  term,  a  per- 
son must  be  converted.  Conversion  is  the  sole  and  the 
absolutely  peculiar  way  to  heaven. 

In  speaking  in  this  way  the  Christian  religion  gains  at 
once  the  consciences  of  all  men.  For  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that,  if  there  is  really  a  redemption,  this  must 
consist  before  all  things  in  redemption  from  sin.  All 
men  have  a  notion  of  good  and  evil,  a  conscience  which 
accuses  or  excuses  them,  a  consciousness  of  guilt  and 
impurity,  a  fear  of  punishment,  and  a  desire  for  re- 
demption. But  they  often  err  as  deeply  about  the  char- 
acter of  sin  as  about  the  way  of  redemption.  On  the 
one  side,  sin  is  minified  to  an  accidental  and  arbitrary 
act,  from  which  man  can  eventually  deliver  himself  by 
knowledge  or  act;  on  the  other  side,  sin  is  considered 
as  such  an  ineradicable  evil  that  it  is  identified  with  being 
and  nature  itself.  Confucius  holds  here  the  opposite  view 
from  Buddha,  Mohammed  from  Maui,  Socrates  from  Plato. 
And  within  the  Christian  church  the  same  ideas  and  con- 
trasts appear  now  and  then.  In  our  days  some  preach 
the  doctrine  that  one  must  not  take  sin  too  seriously, 
because  it  is  no  habit,  no  condition,  no  bad  inclination  of 
the  heart,  but  exclusively  an  arbitrary  act  of  the  will, 
which  very  easily  arises  from  the  conflict  between  the  indi- 
vidual and  society,  between  nature  and  culture,  but  for 
that  reason  also  can  easily  be  given  up  and  conquered.48 
On  the  other  hand,  sin  is  represented  as  a  mass  of  egoistic 
instincts  and  passions,  which  have  been  carried  over  by 
man  from  his  former  animal  condition,  which  still  hold 
supremacy  over  the  altruistic  inclinations  in  the  savage 
and  in  the  child,  and  anachronistically  and  atavistically 
exercise  their  influence  in  the  criminal  type.49 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     231 

The  two  views  approach  one  another  in  this  way,  that 
the  innate  egoistic  inclinations,  namely,  the  animality  and 
sensuality,  are  of  themselves  no  sin,  that  they  also  in  later 
life,  if  they  are  yielded  to  in  conflict  with  the  interests  of 
society,  cause  no  guilt  and  no  stain,  but  only  betray  a  weak- 
ness and  disease,  which  need  cure.  What  the  wound  is  to 
the  body,  that  is  the  criminal  in  society.60  In  so-called 
"  Christian  Science  "  sin  consequently  is  put  into  the 
same  category  as  illness,  and  both  are  represented  as  an 
illusion,  as  an  error  in  thought,  which  can  only  be  cured 
by  thought.61  The  fundamental  error  of  heathenism  thus 
returns,  because  the  holiness  of  God  is  lost,  and  the  gods 
are  identified  with  the  powers  of  nature ;  and  therefore  the 
distinction  between  sin  and  misery,  and  accordingly 
between  redemption  from  sin  and  relief  from  misery,  is 
lost.  Modern  superstition  and  the  increasing  quackery 
rest  upon  each  other.  If  the  power  on  which  man  de- 
pends loses  the  character  of  personal  holiness,  man  feels 
himself  no  longer  a  guilty  sinner,  but  a  powerless,  helpless, 
miserable  creature,  and  desires  not  an  ethical  redemption, 
but  physical  cure  and  bodily  welfare.  And  if  one  cannot 
find  these  among  the  physicians,  they  are  sought  for 
amongst  the  charlatans  and  quacksalvers  through  super- 
stitious and  magic  means. 

The  Christian  religion  alone  maintains,  in  opposition 
to  all  these  tendencies,  the  purely  ethical  character  of  sin. 
It  does  this  by  distinguishing  between  creation  and  fall. 
In  all  systems  which  identify  sin  with  the  substance  of 
things,  creation  is  changed  into  a  fall,  and  the  fall  which 
Scripture  relates  is  represented  as  the  symbol  of  a  re- 
markable progress  in  the  life  of  humanity,  as  the  rise 
from  animal  innocence  into  the  state  of  human  conscious- 
ness.62    In  reality,  the  whole  order  of  things  is  thereby 


232  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

reversed ;  God  becomes  the  author  of  sin,  and  the  serpent 
the  author  of  human  progress.  The  Ophites  acted,  there- 
fore, logically  when  they  represented  God  as  an  unhappy 
demiurge,  and  the  serpent  as  a  blessed  deity.  In  truth, 
in  the  voluntaristic-pantheistic  philosophy  of  recent  times 
it  is  not  God  who  saves  man,  but  man  who  saves  God. 
Scripture  restores  the  original  order  by  distinguishing  and 
separating  creation  and  fall,  but  maintains  thereby  also 
the  possibility  of  redemption.  For  if  sin  is  identified  with 
animality  and  sensuality,  and  has  its  origin  in  the  descent 
and  nature  of  man,  then  there  is  no  redemption  possible 
except  by  annihilation.  Heaven  is  then  no  uppermost 
expansion  of  true  life,  but  the  extinction  of  all  conscious- 
ness, will,  and  personality,  the  abyss  of  nothing,  the  sink- 
ing into  everlasting  death.  On  the  contrary,  if  sin  bears 
an  ethical  character,  then  redemption  is  possible,  and  con- 
version is  in  principle  the  conquest  of  sin,  the  death  of  the 
old  and  the  resurrection  of  the  new  man.53 

But  in  that  case  conversion  is  a  necessary  and  moral 
duty  for  every  man.  If  the  Christian  religion  maintains 
the  absolute  necessity  of  conversion,  it  joins  to  itself 
again  the  witness  of  all  consciences,  the  doctrine  and  life 
of  the  whole  of  humanity.  Every  man  has  the  deep  and 
ineradicable  conviction  that  he  is  not  what  he  ought  to 
be  ;  there  is  a  schism  between  his  duty  and  his  inclination 
which  he  cannot  deny  and  cannot  do  away  with.  Man  is 
broken  ;  his  unity,  his  harmony  has  gone.  And  the  strang- 
est thing  in  this  strange  phenomenon  is  that  he  is  not 
two  men  who  struggle  with  one  another,  but  he  is  in  both 
cases  the  same  man.  It  is  our  conceptions,  ideas,  incli- 
nations and  desires  which  are  striving  together  and  seek- 
ing to  obtain  the  mastery ;  it  is  the  same  subject  which 
excuses  and  accuses  itself,  which  gives  way  willingly  to 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     233 

sinful  desire,  and  is  afterwards  torn  by  repentance  and 
grief,  which  alternately  springs  up  in  joy  and  languishes 
in  sorrow.54  From  the  whole  history  of  man  resounds 
a  heart-breaking  complaint  over  the  disruption  of  life ;  it 
finds  its  finest  expression  in  the  songs  of  the  poets,  but  each 
man  knows  it  by  experience ;  all  religion  is  animated  by  it, 
every  effort  toward  reform  proceeds  from  it,  all  ethics 
assume  the  imperative  tone  after  the  descriptive  one,  and 
every  philosophy  strives  to  set  the  heart  at  ease  as  well 
as  to  satisfy  the  intelligence.  Men  may  differ  as  to  the 
nature  and  the  reach  of  conversion,  but  its  necessity  is 
established  beyond  all  doubt ;  the  whole  of  humanity  pro- 
claims the  truth  of  the  fall. 

There  is  no  doubt  much  diversity  in  the  manner  in  which 
conversion  takes  place.  Scripture  makes  it  clear  that  by 
conversion  is  meant  a  religious  and  moral  change  in  man, 
by  which  he  deserts  his  sinful  ways  and  learns  to  know, 
love,  and  serve  with  his  whole  heart  the  true  God,  who  has 
revealed  himself  in  Christ ;  but  it  at  the  same  time  allows 
a  wide  application  of  this  idea,  and  discriminates  the  pro- 
cess itself  from  the  manner  in  which  it  is  brought  about. 
It  speaks  of  the  conversion  of  Israel  and  of  the  heathen,  of 
individuals  and  of  towns  and  of  peoples,  and  it  exhibits  in 
the  examples  of  Nathanael  and  Nicodemus,  Zaccheus  and 
Mary  Magdalene,  Paul  and  Timothy,  different  modes  in 
which  conversion  may  be  realized.55  In  early  times,  when 
Christianity  was  conquering  a  place  for  itself  in  the  world 
through  the  preaching  of  the  apostles,  conversion  coalesced 
with  the  resolution  to  abandon  idolatry  and  to  serve  the 
only  living  God.  The  New  Testament  describes  to  us  the 
transition  of  Christianity  from  Judaism  to  the  Greco- 
Roman  world,  and  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  book  of  the 
mission  which  was  fulfilled  by  the  work  of  the   apos- 


234  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

ties.56  When  later  the  church  obtained  a  firm  foothold 
in  the  world,  and  grew  not  so  much  through  missions 
among  the  heathen  as  by  means  of  catechizing  her  own 
children,  conversion  assumed  another  form,  while  re- 
maining the  same  in  essence.  In  infant  baptism  it  was 
confessed  that  conversion  and  regeneration  differ,  and 
conversion  is  ordinarily  a  coming  to  consciousness  of  that 
new  life  which  has  long  before  been  planted  in  the  heart. 
An  illustration  of  this  is  supplied  also  by  revivals,  which 
do  not  occur  among  heathen,  but  only  within  the  limits 
of  the  Christian  church.  The  psychology  of  religion  also 
suggests  that  the  sudden  conversions  which  occur  in 
revival-meetings  need  not  be  so  sudden  as  they  appear, 
but  may  be  a  revivification  of  impressions  and  emotions 
received  sometimes  years  previously,  and  have  sunk  into 
the  heart  beneath  the  threshold  of  consciousness,  and  by 
the  force  of  peculiar  circumstances  spring  again  into  new 
life.67  It  is  a  good  work  to  awaken  the  sleeping  churches, 
and  to  stir  up  the  unconscious  life  into  conscious  action, 
but  it  is  a  fault  if  the  organic  existence  of  the  church  is 
insufficiently  recognized,  involving  as  this  does  a  mis- 
understanding of  the  covenant  of  grace  and  too  close  an 
identification  of  conversion  with  one  definite  form  of  con- 
version, which  is  therefore  prescribed  as  necessary  to  all 
and  produced  artificially.  As  soon  as  this  happens,  human 
agency  is  confused  with  the  work  of  the  Spirit,  the  essence 
is  sacrificed  to  the  form,  and  sometimes  even  to  very 
strange  forms,  and  the  earnestness  and  richness  of  Scrip- 
ture is  lost. 

It  may  be  remarked  throughout  Scripture  that  the 
essence  and  the  seriousness  of  conversion  are  never  ob- 
scured, and  yet  the  rich  variety  of  its  manifestation  is 
continually  exhibited.     Mary  and  Martha  were  very  dif- 


REVELATION  AND  RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     235 

ferent  in  religious  disposition,  but  Jesus  loved  them  both. 
The  apostles  differed  in  endowments  and  character,  but 
they  were  all  disciples  of  the  Lord.  In  the  Christian 
church,  Augustine  and  Francis  of  Assisi,  Luther  and  Cal- 
vin, Wesley  and  Zinzendorf,  walked  in  various  pathways, 
but  still  they  were  all  children  of  the  same  Father's  house, 
with  its  many  mansions.  So  far  as  it  is  intended  merely 
to  give  expression  to  the  rich  diversity  of  spiritual  life, 
the  distinction  between  "  healthy-minded  "  and  "  morbid- 
minded  souls  "  need  not  be  condemned.58  All  have  not  the 
same  experience  of  guilt  and  grace;  the  deeper  knowl- 
edge of  sin,  and  the  richer  comfort  of  forgiveness,  are  not 
the  root,  but  the  fruit  of  Christian  faith.59  The  Gospel 
is  so  rich,  and  the  salvation  purchased  by  Christ  contains 
so  many  and  diverse  benefits,  that  the  most  varied  needs 
of  men  are  satisfied  by  it,  and  the  richest  powers  of  human 
nature  are  brought  to  development.  There  are  times  in 
which  the  Gospel  especially  attracts,  because  it  promises 
forgiveness  of  all  guilt  of  sin  ;  and  there  are  other  times  in 
which  it  charms  most,  because  it  stills  the  thirst  for  a 
new,  holy  life.60  The  Gospel  of  the  Synoptics,  of  John, 
and  Paul,  and  Peter,  and  James,  have  awakened  various 
sympathies  in  the  different  churches  and  among  different 
peoples  in  different  times  and  places.  In  every  nation 
is  accepted  with  God  he  who  fears  him  and  works 
righteousness. 

Nevertheless  conversion  must  remain  conversion.  What 
it  is  no  science  or  philosophy  can  tell  us,  but  we  learn 
from  Holy  Scripture  alone.  If  this  does  not  tell  us,  or  is 
not  to  be  trusted  in  what  it  tells  us,  we  are  in  despair  as 
to  the  redemption  of  the  world  and  the  salvation  of  man- 
kind. Philosophy  may  teach  us  through  the  lips  of  Kant 
and  Schopenhauer  —  though  even  this  always  under  the 


236  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

influence  of  Christianity  —  that  if  sin  is  to  be  really  elimi- 
nated from  human  nature,  a  sort  of  regeneration  is  neces- 
sary. But  it  can  never  proclaim  the  glad  tidings  that 
such  a  conversion  exists,  nor  can  it  show  the  way  to  obtain 
it.  The  psychology  of  religion  may  bring  into  view  the 
phenomena  which  are  connected  with  conversion  from  the 
anthropological  side,  and  illustrate  them  by  analogies  from 
other  regions,  but  it  does  not  penetrate,  as  it  itself  ac- 
knowledges,61 to  the  core  and  the  cause  of  these  phe- 
nomena. It  even  incurs  the  danger  —  if  it  abandons  the 
guidance  of  Scripture  and  presents  these  phenomena  ex- 
clusively from  an  anthropological  standpoint — of  sac- 
rificing the  essence  to  the  form  and  the  kernel  to  the  husk. 
Viewed  psychologically,  all  alterations  of  personality  are 
alike :  the  fall  is  as  much  a  transformation  of  consciousness 
as  redemption  and  regeneration ;  the  change  of  a  virtuous 
man  into  a  drunkard  or  a  voluptuary,  a  thief  or  a  mur- 
derer, is  as  much  a  "  conversion  "  as  the  coming  to  himself 
of  the  prodigal  son  and  his  return  to  his  father's  house.62 
If  certain  phenomena  which  are  often  connected  with 
conversion  are  wanting,  some  rashly  conclude  that  conver- 
sion itself  has  not  really  taken  place,  or  was  not  wholly 
necessary.  By  the  side  of  the  "  twice-born  "  is  ranged,  then, 
the  category  of  the  "  once-born  men,"  or  righteous  men  who 
have  no  need  of  conversion.63  The  diversity  of  religious 
phenomena  leads  men  rashly  to  the  conclusion  that  con- 
version has  no  reality,  that  all "  conversions  "  are  in  them- 
selves equally  real,  and  that  each  man  can  be  saved  in  his 
own  way.64  Thus  under  the  psychological  treatment  the 
essence  of  conversion  is  lost,  just  as  life  perishes  under 
vivisection.  Pragmatism,  which  only  takes  into  account 
empirical  phenomena,  is  nominalistic  in  principle,  and  be- 
comes relativistic  in  result. 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     237 

Scripture  and  experience  are  both  in  opposition  to  this 
levelling  of  all  essential  distinctions;  for  both  testify 
that  conversion  is  not  one  of  those  many  transformations 
of  consciousness  which  often  take  place  in  human  life, 
but  that  it  bears  a  specific  character.  Conversion  can 
be  said  to  be  genuine  only  when  a  man  is  changed  in  his 
entire  being  in  such  a  way  that  he  experiences  a  hearty 
repentance  and  an  inner  horror  of  sin,  succeeded  by  a 
lively  joy  in  God  and  a  sincere  desire  for  the  fulfilment  of 
his  will.  True  conversion  consists  only  in  the  dying 
of  the  old  sinful  man,  and  in  the  resurrection  of  the  new, 
holy  man.65  "  All  holy  persons  are  twice-born  persons," 66 
for  by  nature  man  does  not  possess  that  holiness  and  that 
deep  and  hearty  love  to  God  and  desire  for  the  fulfilment 
of  his  commandments.  When  Kant  and  Schopenhauer, 
and  many  others  speak  so  much  of  the  radical  evil  in 
human  nature,  they  thereby  bear  witness  to  the  truth. 
Stanley  Hall  rightly  asks,  "  Who  that  is  honest  and  has 
true  self-knowledge  will  not  confess  to  recognizing  in  his 
own  soul  the  germs  and  possibilities  of  about  every  crime, 
vice,  insanity,  superstition,  and  folly  in  conduct  he  ever 
heard  of?"67  And  James  acknowledges  in  the  same  way 
that  "  healthy-mindedness  is  inadequate  as  a  philosophical 
doctrine  because  the  evil  facts  which  it  refuses  positively 
to  account  for  are  a  genuine  portion  of  reality." 68 

Now  there  may  be  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  pos- 
sibility and  reality  of  a  conversion  such  as  Scripture  and 
the  Christian  religion  teach.  But  if  it  exists,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  that  it  has  another  source  and  another  cause 
than  the  purely  psychological  operation  of  human  represen- 
tations and  powers.  The  psychology  of  religion  rightly 
says  that  it  neither  will  nor  can  pronounce  a  decision.69 
James  goes  even  further,  and  says  that  reality  itself  is 


238  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

revealed  in  the  unconscious,  that  hidden  powers  and 
ideas  work  there,  and  that  God's  mercy  is  working 
through  the  "  subliminal  door ";  and  so  he  calls  him- 
-self  a  supernaturalist,  though  in  a  modified  form.70  It 
causes  no  wonder  that  this  supernaturalism  is  acknowl- 
edged in  religious  experience,  for,  if  revelation  in  history, 
especially  in  the  person  and  work  of  Christ,  is  denied,  the 
truth  and  the  right  of  religion  can  only  be  maintained  by 
accepting  a  revelation  in  the  religious  subject.  If  religion 
is  really  communion  with  God,  it  includes  his  indwelling 
and  inworking  in  the  human  soul.  Scripture  and  theol- 
ogy, therefore,  have  always  taught  and  maintained  such  a 
fellowship  of  God  and  man  in  their  doctrine  of  the  mysti- 
cal union.  But  if  this  revelation  in  the  subject  is  isolated 
from  all  objective  revelation  in  nature  and  Scripture,  in 
history  and  the  church,  it  opens  the  door  for  all  kinds  of 
error.  Finally,  such  a  subjective  revelation  results  in 
nothing  beyond  a  u  more,"  which  works  in  the  "  sublimi- 
nal consciousness  "  of  man,  and  is  interpreted  by  each  one 
according  to  his  nature  and  environment.71  Pragmatism 
leads  here  also  to  indifferentism  regarding  all  religions. 

Such  a  religious  indifferentism  is,  however,  in  conflict 
with  all  experience,  and  is  in  the  strongest  way  con- 
tradicted by  the  Christian  religion.  For  the  conversion 
which  brings  us  into  fellowship  with  God  never  happens 
unmediatedly,  but  is  always  connected  with  representa- 
tions and  impressions  which  we  have  received  at  some 
time,  shorter  or  longer,  previously.72  It  always  takes 
place  in  connection  with  historical  Christianity,  which 
in  one  or  another  form  exists  before  and  without  us, 
and  now  enters  into  harmony  with  our  own  soul.  It 
does  not  arise  spontaneously  out  of  and  by  ourselves,  but 
causes  us  to  live  with  fuller  conviction  in  the  religious 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     239 

circle  wherein  we  were  born  and  brought  up,  or  into 
which  in  later  life  we  have  been  introduced.  The  reli- 
gious representations  are  thus  no  subjective  interpreta- 
tions of  our  personal  emotions ;  we  formulate  them  as 
little  as  the  child,  who,  though  it  brings  with  it  the  fac- 
ulty of  speech,  does  not  produce  speech  itself,  but  receives 
the  whole  treasure  of  words  from  the  lips  of  its  mother. 
Man  does  not  produce  truth  by  thought  in  any  domain, 
and  certainly  not  in  religion,  but  by  inquiry  and  study  he 
learns  to  know  the  truth,  which  exists  independently  of 
and  before  him.  Therefore  religious  experience  is  neither 
the  source  nor  the  foundation  of  religious  truth  ; 73  it  only 
brings  us  into  union  with  the  existing  truth,  and  makes  us 
recognize  as  truth  what  formerly  was  for  us  only  an  empty 
sound,  or  even  was  denied  and  opposed  by  us.  Conversion 
is  not  the  source  of  truth,  but  the  source  of  certainty  as  to 
the  truth.  It  bears  witness  in  our  heart  as  to  the  religious 
representations  which  existed  outside  of  and  before  us. 

So  we  have  on  the  one  side  to  maintain  the  dependence 
of  religious  experience  on  historical  Christianity,  and  on 
the  other  side  equally  to  recognize  its  independence  and 
liberty.  Many  know  no  other  dilemma  than  either  external 
authority,  blind  belief,  intellectual  consent  to  alien  and 
hard  dogma,  or  else  free  piety  and  individual  formulation  of 
religious  life.74  But  reality  teaches  us  quite  differently. 
Just  as  we  with  open  eyes  do  not  create  the  reality  of  the 
world,  but  only  recognize  it,  —  just  as  we  by  thought  do 
not  produce  the  truth,  but  seek  and  find  it,  —  so  also  the 
religious  man  receives  the  reality  of  spiritual  things  which 
are  presented  to  him  by  God  perfectly  freely  and  spon- 
taneously. He  now  sees  them,  where  he  was  formerly 
blind ;  he  understands  now  what  he  earlier  as  a  natural 
man  could  not  conceive;  by  re-birth  he  enters  into  the 


240  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

kingdom  of  heaven ;  by  loving  the  will  of  God  he  knows 
that  Jesus  speaks,  not  of  himself,  but  of  the  Father ;  he 
hears  and  understands  Jesus*  voice  now  because  he  can 
endure  his  word. 

So  one  can  understand  that  conversion  produces  and 
generates  an  unwavering  certainty  as  to  the  things  which 
the  Christian  religion  teaches  us.     If   it  were  nothing 
more  than  a  matter  of  feeling  or  sentiment,  and  were 
confined  entirely  to  the  mysticism  of  the  heart,  it  would 
not  be  able  to  awaken  such  a  personal  interest  in  the 
objective   words   and   events   of   Christianity.     But   ex- 
perience teaches  otherwise.     Conversion  takes  place  in 
connection  with  the  Christian  religion  ;  faith,  which  forms 
its  positive  side,  is  the  substance  of  things  hoped  for,  the 
evidence  of  things  not  seen,  because  it  is  at  the  same  time 
cognitio  and  fiducia,  a  trustful  knowledge  and  a  knowing 
trust.     It  is  accompanied  from  its  first  existence  by  a  group 
of   representations,  is  born  in  our  heart  in  connection 
with  them,  and  binds  us  to  them  irrevocably.    Conversion, 
which  is  equally  repentance  and  faith,  sorrow  and  joy, 
death  and  resurrection,  changes  the  whole  man  in  prin- 
ciple as  to  his  being  and  consciousness,  incorporates  him 
into  another  world  of  representations  than  that  in  which 
he  formerly  lived.      Those  representations  also  depend 
mutually  on  each  other.     Both  psychologically  and  logi- 
cally the  representations  which  we  receive  in  our  conver- 
sion associate  themselves  with  those  which  Christianity 
includes  within  the  circle  to  which  we  belonged  from 
birth  or  were  later  adopted  into.     It  is  not  the  least  merit 
of  Christianity  that  it  includes  such  an  harmonious  whole 
of  representations,  which  reconcile  subject  and  object,  man 
and  world,  nature  and  revelation.76 

This  whole  process  of  conversion,  which  begins  with 


REVELATION  AND   RELIGIOUS   EXPERIENCE     241 

the  awakening  of  the  consciousness  of  guilt  and  misery 
and  develops  itself  into  a  hearty  joy  in  God  through 
Christ,  is  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  psychologically 
mediated.  We  do  not  here  see  God  face  to  face,  even  if 
we  descend  into  the  depths  of  our  own  soul.  Uncon- 
sciousness, ecstasy,  hallucination,  dreaming,  and  contem- 
plation do  not  bring  us  nearer  to  him  than  the  conscious 
life,  as  the  mysticism  of  all  centuries  has  fancied,  for  we 
walk  by  faith  and  not  by  sight.  And  not  only  so,  but 
there  arise  in  our  own  heart,  in  the  world  around  us,  and 
in  the  revelation  of  Scripture  itself,  all  kinds  of  difficulties 
which  we  cannot  resolve.  But  if  we  are  convinced  in  our 
deepest  soul  that  God  will  save  us  personally,  and  in  its 
beginnings  has  saved  us,  then  it  is  an  unavoidable  postu- 
late of  faith  that  this  will  also  reveals  itself  outside  of  us  in 
history,  and  that  the  world  and  humanity  will  not  be  led  to 
an  eternal  death  and  a  dark  night  and  an  unfathomable 
abyss,  but  to  a  never-ending  day  of  light  and  glory.  Above 
the  power  of  nature  and  above  the  power  of  sin  raises  and 
maintains  itself  the  almighty  will  of  the  Heavenly  Father, 
who  subdues  wind  and  sea  and  all  things. 

Conversion  and  faith  in  our  own  heart  are  the  opera- 
tion and  fruit  of  that  will.  Though  they  occur  thus  in  a 
psychological  way,  which  takes  into  account  each  man's 
character  and  environment,  yet  they  are  a  revelation  of  that 
will  which  works  in  us  both  to  will  and  to  do  according  to 
his  good  pleasure.  In  and  by  our  own  testimony  we  hear 
the  testimony  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  which  in  its  turn  is  added 
to  the  witness  of  Holy  Scripture  and  of  the  church  of  all 
centuries.  In  this  witness  the  souls  of  all  God's  children 
are  secure ;  through  the  breakers  of  doubt  it  brings  them 
into  the  haven  of  God's  love. 


IX 

REVELATION   AND  CULTURE 

THE  well-known  preacher,  J.  Chr.  Blumhardt,  once 
said  that  man  must  be  twice  converted,  first  from 
the  natural  to  the  spiritual  life,  and  then  from  the 
spiritual  to  the  natural.1  He  thus  declared,  in  somewhat 
paradoxical  language,  a  truth  which  is  confirmed  by  the 
religious  experience  of  every  Christian  and  by  the  history 
of  Christian  piety  in  all  ages.  The  spiritual  life,  which  is 
from  above,  strives  again  after  what  is  above ;  it  expresses 
itself  in  the  sigh  of  the  psalmist,  —  Whom  have  I  in 
heaven  but  thee,  and  there  is  none  upon  earth  that  I 
desire  beside  thee ;  and  it  knows  no  higher  desire  than  to 
depart  and  be  with  Christ,  which  is  far  better.  It  was 
under  the  influence  of  this  inclination  of  the  spiritual 
life  that  in  the  early  days  of  Christianity  ascetic  life  arose, 
and  it  is  for  that  reason  also  that  it  has  maintained  itself 
till  the  present  day  in  various  pious  circles.  Other  causes 
and  considerations  have,  however,  certainly  added  to  that 
influence,  which  in  primitive  times  gave  origin  and  strength 
to  this  tendency  of  spiritual  life. 

When  Christianity  entered  into  the  world,  it  was  im- 
mediately called  on  to  face  a  difficult  problem.  Chris- 
tianity, which  is  based  on  revelation,  appeared  in  a  world 
which  had  long  existed  and  led  its  own  life.  A  society 
had  been  formed  which  was  full  of  intricate  interests.  A 
state  was  in  existence  the  citizens  of  which  lived  in  safety 
and  peace.     Arts  and  sciences  were  practised  and  had  been 


REVELATION   AND    CULTURE  243 

brought  to  great  perfection.  Morals  and  habits  had  assumed 
a  fixed  form.  Conquests  had  created  a  powerful  kingdom, 
and  had  brought  in  enormous  capital.  In  a  word,  the  Gos- 
pel of  Christ  found  a  rich  natural  life,  a  highly  developed 
culture.  And  thus  the  question  was  inevitably  raised  how 
the  relations  between  the  two  should  be  adjusted. 

The  different  forms  in  which  this  question  may  be  put 
show  its  importance  and  extent.  For  the  problem  always 
remains  the  same,  whether  one  speaks  of  the  relation 
between  the  preaching  of  the  apostles  and  the  Greco- 
Roman  world,  or  between  re-creation  and  creation,  the 
work  of  the  Son  and  the  work  of  the  Father,  the  king- 
dom of  heaven  and  the  kingdoms  of  the  earth,  sabbath- 
and  week-days,  Christianity  and  humanism,  church  and 
state,  faith  and  science,  theology  and  philosophy,  author- 
ity and  reason,  the  religious  and  empirical  world-view, 
heaven  and  earth,  divine  gifts  and  human  labor,  revelation 
and  culture.  The  problem  which  is  present  in  all  these 
forms  of  expression  belongs  not  to  a  single  period,  but  has 
been  in  order  all  through  the  ages,  and  will  remain  so  till 
the  return  of  Christ.  And  it  does  not  belong  to  scientific 
thought  alone,  but  forces  itself  upon  every  man  in  his 
every  day  life.  All  tendencies  which  present  themselves 
in  life  and  thought  can  be  described  and  estimated  from 
the  standpoint  they  take  respecting  this  principial  ques- 
tion. Even  systems  which  have  broken  with  all  religion 
and  Christianity  are  compelled,  by  the  force  of  reality,  to 
take  it  into  account.  For  though  thousands  exert  them- 
selves to  set  our  present-day  culture  free  from  all  the 
past,  and  to  establish  it  on  a  new  scientific  foundation,  in 
reality  all  our  institutions  of  family  and  society  and  state 
are  still  resting  on  Christian  principles,  and  all  our  morals 
and  habits  are  still  pervaded  by  the  Christian  spirit. 


244  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Therefore  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the  first 
Christians  did  not  solve  this  world-historical  problem 
satisfactorily,  and  did  not  attain  unanimity  in  the  posi- 
tion which  they  adopted.  There  were  those  who  looked 
so  kindly  upon  culture  that  they  failed  to  do  justice  to 
the  rights  and  requirements  of  the  Christian  confession. 
There  were  others  who  turned  their  backs  on  the  entire 
culture  of  the  time,  and  sought  their  strength  in  renounc- 
ing it.  The  early  Christians  were  nevertheless  not  essen- 
tially ascetics.  They  firmly  believed  that  the  earth  is 
the  Lord's,  and  the  fulness  thereof  ;  and  they  consid- 
ered themselves  the  new  humanity,  in  which  Jew  and 
Greek  found  their  unity  and  destination.2  But  the  then 
existing  culture  was  so  intimately  connected  with  all  kinds 
of  heathen  practices  that  Christians  could  take  little  part 
in  it  without  denying  their  faith,  and  needed  to  content 
themselves  with  practising  the  more  passive  virtues  of 
Christian  morality.  In  a  world  such  as  Paul  describes  in 
the  first  chapter  of  his  epistle  to  the  Romans  there  was, 
for  a  small,  weak  body  of  believers,  no  other  than  a  nega- 
tive position  possible. 

But  this  negative  position  nevertheless  brought  serious 
dangers  in  the  long  run.  When  in  the  second  century 
dualistic  and  ascetic  Gnosticism  spread  in  its  varied 
forms  over  the  Roman  empire,  it  did  not  fail  of  influence 
over  many  Christians  also.  The  ascetic  inclination  which 
thus  appeared  was  in  the  third  and  fourth  centuries  in- 
creased by  the  worldliness  of  the  church,  and  strengthened 
by  the  infiltration  of  Stoic  and  Neoplatonic  elements  of 
thought.3  From  that  time  onward  many  sought  solitude  in 
order  to  pass  their  life  in  penitence,  or  to  devote  it  to  works 
of  mercy.  This  anchorite  life  in  the  West  underwent  later 
an  important  modification,  and  was  made  use  of  by  the 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  245 

church  for  all  kinds  of  moral  ends,  —  land-development  and 
agriculture,  science  and  art,  the  spreading  of  the  gospel 
and  the  expansion  of  the  church.  But  the  church  also  felt 
the  influence  of  this  recognition  of  the  monastic  life,  and 
developed  a  double  way  to  the  attainment  of  the  ideal  of 
Christian  perfection  by  introducing  the  distinction  be- 
tween precepts  and  counsels.  Perfection,  to  be  sure,  is 
the  goal  for  every  Christian,  as  much  for  the  laity  as 
for  the  clergy  and  the  monk.  But  the  vow  of  poverty, 
chastity  and  obedience  is  nevertheless  the  shorter  and 
safer  way  to  that  goal.  Ascetic  life  is  a  specially  meri- 
torious striving  after  perfection ;  monastic  life  sets  apart 
a  special  class  of  men,  and  is  a  praiseworthy  form  of  Chris- 
tian life ;  marriage,  family,  social  vocation,  service  of  the 
state,  property,  and  riches  are  not  in  themselves  sinful, 
but  place  many  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  religious  life ; 
he  who  abstains  from  them  acts  better,  and  becomes  the 
religious  man  par  excellence.^ 

Though  this  asceticism  is  intimately  associated  with  the 
doctrine  and  the  life  of  the  Roman  Church,  it  has  never- 
theless, from  the  Reformation  to  the  present  day,  exercised 
also  a  strong  attractive  power  over  many  churches  and 
sects  in  Protestantism.  Anabaptism  certainly  cannot  be 
fully  explained  from  the  monastic  orders  and  sects  of  the 
Middle  Ages ;  for  whence  came  then  its  schism  with  the 
Roman  Church,  and  its  strong  opposition  to  its  hierarchy 
and  forms  of  worship?  But  it  adopted  the  old  ascetic 
ideal,  and  tried  to  realize  it  by  a  radical  reformation 
in  the  circle  of  believers.  This  reformation  ended  in 
separation,  —  separation,  namely,  between  church  and 
world,  Christian  and  civil  life,  re-creation  and  creation, 
Spirit  and  Word,  New  and  Old  Testament ;  in  a  word,  be- 
tween the  heavenly  substance,  which  Christ  brought  with 


246  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

him  and  communicates  to  his  believers  in  regeneration,  and 
the  earthly  substance,  which  we  receive  from  Adam  in  the 
natural  birth.  The  same  dualism  has  in  a  modified  form 
since  continued  to  work  in  many  devout  circles,  and  has 
even  received  more  lately  strong  support  from  all  those 
persons  and  schools  which  ascribe  to  original  Christianity 
an  ascetic  ideal  of  life.  These,  however,  are  themselves 
divided  again  into  two  parties. 

The  first  group  is  formed  by  those  who,  by  inclination 
or  education,  by  their  own  experience  or  through  exterior 
influences,  have  learned  to  know  the  value  of  the  ascetic 
life,  and  therefore  look  with  more  or  less  of  grief  and 
offence  on  present-day  culture.  There  are  not  a  few  who, 
in  comparing  the  life  of  our  time  with  that  of  Jesus,  dis- 
cover no  connection  or  congruity,  but  only  contrast  and 
opposition.  If,  they  say,  Jesus,  who  condemns  the  power- 
ful and  rich,  despises  earthly  treasures,  feels  compassion 
for  the  sick  and  poor,  and  seeks  out  the  publican  and  sin- 
ner, is  right,  then  present-day  society,  with  its  mammon- 
ism  and  capitalism,  with  its  self-conceit  and  deification  of 
power,  is  quite  wrong.  They  demand  of  Christians,  If 
you  confess  Jesus  as  the  Son  of  God,  and  accept  his  word 
as  divine  truth,  why  do  you  not  follow  his  example  and 
walk  in  his  footsteps  ?  Why  do  you  live  in  magnificent 
homes,  clothed  in  purple  and  fine  linen,  and  fare  sump- 
tuously every  day,  and  gather  treasures  which  are  cor- 
rupted by  moth  and  rust?  And  why  do  you  not  give 
your  possessions  away,  feed  the  hungry,  relieve  the 
thirsty,  shelter  the  homeless,  clothe  the  naked,  visit  the 
sick  and  in  prison,  proclaim  the  gospel  to  the  poor? 
They  explain  to  us  and  figure  out  how  Jesus  if  he  lived 
now  would  behave,  and  what  would  be  his  conduct 
towards  the  press  and  politics,  towards  the  market  and 


Mttfrgt 


REVELATION  AND   CULTURE  247 

exchange,  towards  the  factory  and  parliament.6  And 
some  have  taken  the  matter  so  seriously  to  heart  that 
they  have  sought  to  put  this  moral  ideal  into  actual  prac- 
tice. Tolstoi,  for  example,  constructed  a  wholly  passive 
ethics,  from  the  commandment  in  the  sermon  on  the 
mount,  to  resist  not  evil.  The  source  of  all  misery  is 
found,  they  declare,  in  society,  with  its  lies  and  pretences ; 
in  the  church,  with  her  absurd  dogmas ;  in  the  state,  with 
its  law  and  war;  in  the  whole  civil  life  of  our  time, 
with  its  marriage,  castes,  conventional  forms,  corrupt  at- 
mosphere, tobacco  and  alcohol.  And  escape  from  these 
miseries,  we  are  told,  is  possible  only  if  we  turn  our  backs 
on  all  these  institutions,  return  to  nature,  abandon  alto- 
gether all  force  and  justice,  all  wrath  and  punishment, 
and  live  again  like  children,  simply  and  uprightly.  Then 
the  broken  harmony  between  need  and  satisfaction  will  be 
restored,  and  happiness  and  peace  return.6 

On  the  other  side  are  those  who  agree,  no  doubt,  that 
original  Christianity  bore  an  ascetic  character,  but  draw 
therefrom  just  the  opposite  conclusion,  namely,  that  Chris- 
tianity has  had  its  day,  and  can  no  longer  live  with  our 
present-day  culture.  In  the  estimate  of  the  person  of 
Jesus  an  important  change  has  slowly  taken  place.  After 
Rationalism  had  rejected  the  church  doctrine  concerning 
the  person  of  Christ,  men  such  as  Strauss  and  Renan, 
Schenkel  and  Keim  and  Holtzmann  took  indeed  a  humani- 
tarian view  of  the  life  of  Jesus.  But  in  their  view  Jesus, 
though  not  the  Son  of  God,  was  still  the  true,  ideal  man, 
who  established  the  pure  religion  by  his  word  and  deed, 
free  from  all  sacerdotalism  and  ceremonial  worship,  who 
purified  morals  from  all  legalism,  who  as  a  human  man 
shared  in  all  the  pleasures  of  life,  and  presented  a  moral 
ideal  which  deserves  our  admiration  and  imitation  to-day.7 


248  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

But  in  these  last  days,  especially  since  the  investigations 
of  Baldensperger  and  Johannes  Weiss,8  an  entirely  new 
conception  has  in  the  case  of  many  taken  the  place  of  this 
humanitarian  idea.  Humanitarian  traits  are  not  indeed 
entirely  lacking  from  the  figure  of  Jesus ;  yet  according 
to  the  description  given  of  him  by  the  Synoptic  Gospels 
he  was  a  totally  different  kind  of  man.  He  was  not  a 
quiet,  pious  man,  and  not  a  philosophic  teacher  of  virtue, 
but  a  prophet,  an  enthusiast,  a  fanatic,  who  lived  under 
the  impression  of  the  speedy  advent  of  the  kingdom  of 
God,  and  therefore  exhorted  his  contemporaries  to  faith 
and  conversion.  As  a  man  he  was  not  nearly  so  great  as 
the  liberal  theology  has  represented  him.  Although  he 
was  characterized  by  a  praiseworthy  willingness  to  help 
all  misery,  he  was  nevertheless  a  limited  and  superstitious 
man,  believed  in  evil  spirits  and  eternal  punishment,  was 
subject  to  visions  and  hallucinations,  showed  traits  even 
of  an  hereditary  epilepsy,  paranoia,  and  finally  attempted, 
when  his  preaching  received  no  acceptance,  to  gain  the  vic- 
tory by  an  act  of  force.  His  doctrine  contained  nothing 
new,  but  joined  itself  to  the  ideas  and  expectations  of  his 
time ;  his  notion  of  the  kingdom  of  God  was  not  that  of  a 
moral  community,  but  bore  an  exclusively  eschatological 
character ;  and  his  ethics  acquired,  under  Essenic,  or  even 
under  Buddhistic,  influences,  an  ascetic  color.  Perhaps  he 
was  originally  an  Aryan,  or  perhaps  even  he  never  existed, 
and  his  figure  is  the  creation  of  one  or  another  of  the  sects 
produced  by  the  commotions  of  the  age.9  In  any  case  his 
view  of  the  world  and  life  is  not  suitable  for  our  time  and 
circumstances.  When  he  pronounces  his  woe  on  the  rich, 
esteems  occupation  with  earthly  affairs  an  obstacle  to  the 
heavenly  vocation,  recommends  the  unmarried  condition, 
and  takes  no  thought  at  all  of  political  and  social  life,  he 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  249 

can  be  no  example  for  us,  and  his  ethics  can  supply  us 
with  no  standard.10  Nor  does  this  opposition  to  Chris- 
tian ethics  concern  subordinate  points,  but  their  kernel 
and  essence.  Christian  ethics  have  laid  to  their  charge 
legalism  and  heteronomy,  seeking  for  reward  and  tran- 
scendent eudaemonisin,  withdrawal  from  the  world  and 
contempt  of  all  culture,  and  especially  of  the  senses  and 
marriage.  Nietzsche  has  endeavored,  therefore,  to  reverse 
all  its  values.  Instead  of  the  morals  of  slaves  which  Jews 
and  Christians  have  introduced,  he  wished  to  restore  to 
honor  the  original  morals  of  free  men ;  his  system  may 
be  called  a  logical  aristocratic  anarchism.11 

If  we  are  to  speak  of  the  relation  which  Christianity 
bears  to  culture,  we  must  first  of  all  give  a  clear  account  of 
what  we  understand  by  culture,  and  of  precisely  the  kind 
of  culture  Christianity  is  to  form  a  contrast  to.  The 
word  "  culture,"  which  has  come  into  use  especially  since 
the  eighteenth  century,  along  with  other  terms,  such  as 
civilization,  enlightenment,  development,  education,  indi- 
cates generally  cultivation,  improvement,  and  always  pre- 
supposes an  object  which  must  be  improved.  This  object 
may  be  indicated  generally  by  the  name  of  nature,  for  it 
always  consists  of  something  not  made  by  man,  but  offered 
to  him  by  creation.  Culture  in  the  broadest  sense  thus 
includes  all  the  labor  which  human  power  expends  on 
nature.  But  this  nature  is  twofold;  it  includes  not  only 
the  whole  visible  world  of  phenomena  which  is  outside  man, 
but  also,  in  a  wider  sense,  man  himself ;  not  his  body  alone, 
but  his  soul  also.  The  faculties  and  powers  which  man 
possesses  have  not  been  acquired  by  him,  but  are  given  to 
him  by  God ;  they  are  a  gift  of  nature,  and  these  gifts  are 
a  means  for  cultivating  the  external  world,  as  well  as  an 
object  which  must  be  cultivated.    Thus  there  are  two  great 


250  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

circles  of  culture.  To  the  first  belong  all  those  activities 
of  man  for  the  production  and  distribution  of  material 
goods,  such  as  agriculture,  cattle-rearing,  industry,  and 
trade.  And  the  second  circle  includes  all  that  labor 
whereby  man  realizes  objectively  his  ideals  of  the  true, 
the  good,  and  the  beautiful,  by  means  of  literature  and 
science,  justice  and  statecraft,  works  of  beauty  and  art, 
and  at  the  same  time  works  out  his  own  development  and 
civilization.12 

Such  a  culture  has  existed  at  all  times,  from  the  moment 
when  man  appeared  on  the  earth  and  sought  satisfaction 
of  his  manifold  needs  by  labor.  And  from  its  first  origin 
this  culture  has  been  closely  connected  with  religion ;  in  all 
ages  and  among  all  peoples  these  two  are  found  together, 
and  go  forward  hand  in  hand.  It  was  not  till  the  eigh- 
teenth century  that  culture  was  raised  to  a  power  which 
emancipated  itself  from  the  Christian  religion  and  the 
whole  ancient  world-view,  and  sought  to  become  an  abso- 
lutely new,  modern  culture.  Nobody,  therefore,  can  declare 
that  culture  as  such  stands  in  contrast  with  religion,  for 
all  the  preceding  centuries  raise  a  sharp  protest  against 
such  an  assertion.  It  can,  at  the  most,  be  contended  that 
our  specifically  present-day  culture  is  in  conflict  with 
religion  and  Christianity. 

But  before  this  can  be  proved  an  exact  definition 
should  first  be  given  of  what  is  meant  by  modern  culture. 
Immense  difficulties  present  themselves  when  this  is  at- 
tempted, and  the  hope  of  attaining  a  clear  and  generally 
accepted  conception  seems  illusive.  In  the  first  place, 
modern  culture  in  some  respects,  and  according  to  some 
estimates,  forms  an  antithesis  to  that  of  former  centuries. 
But  this  antithesis  is  not  absolute.  We  are  all,  whether  we 
will  or  not,  standing  on  the  shoulders  of  former  genera- 


REVELATION  AND   CULTURE  251 

tions.  All  our  society,  family,  labor,  vocation,  state-craft, 
legislation,  morals,  habits,  arts,  sciences,  are  permeated 
still  with  the  Christian  spirit.  The  opponents  of  Christi- 
anity know  this  very  well,  and  their  antagonism  against 
Christianity  is  so  strong  just  because  the  Christian  spirit 
shows  itself  all  along  the  line,  leavens  everything,  and 
exerts  its  influence  even  upon  them  notwithstanding 
themselves.  Thought  has  often  to  a  great  extent  eman- 
cipated itself  from  Christianity ;  but  life  goes  quietly 
on,  and  is  continually  fed  from  the  sources  of  the  past. 
Modern  culture  would  like  to  be  absolutely  modern,  but 
it  is  not,  and  cannot  be  so ;  it  is  a  product  of,  and  thus 
also  a  moment  in,  history. 

But  even  if  we  do  not  take  into  account  this  alliance 
with  the  past,  and  wish  to  judge  modern  culture  on  its 
own  merits,  we  do  not  obtain  the  unity  and  clearness 
which  are  necessary  in  order  to  form  an  exact  conception 
of  it.  For  modern  culture  is  an  abstract  name  for  many 
phenomena,  and  forms  no  unity  at  all.  Not  only  are  there 
innumerable  factors  which  have  contributed  to  its  devel- 
opment, but  it  is  also  in  the  highest  degree  divided  in 
itself.  Everywhere,  and  in  all  domains,  in  politics,  social 
economy,  art,  science,  morals,  instruction,  education,  there 
are  parties,  tendencies,  and  schools  which  stand  in  oppo- 
sition to  one  another ;  the  realms  of  justice  and  culture, 
church  and  state,  faith  and  science,  capital  and  labor, 
nomism  and  antinomism,  combat  each  other,  and  proceed 
on  different  principles.  Monism  no  doubt  seeks  here 
also  for  an  abstract  unity ;  but  it  sacrifices  the  diversity 
and  richness  of  life  to  a  theory,  and  blinds  itself  to  the 
sharp  contrasts  which  reality  exhibits.  It  is,  therefore,  an 
empty  phrase  to  say  that  modern  culture  is  at  strife  with 
Christianity  and  religion;  as  to  some  phenomena  it  may 


252  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

be  said  with  some  appearance  of  right,  but  to  others  it  is 
not  in  the  least  applicable. 

Finally,  we  should  consider  that  modern  culture  in  the 
sense  of  an  extensive  group  of  various  phenomena  is  not  a 
finished  thing;  it  is  not  complete,  and  not  objectively 
placed  before  us ;  it  has  existed  but  a  short  time  in  the 
past,  and  is  still  developing  from  day  to  day.  We  are 
thus  in  the  middle  of  it,  and  live  in  a  "  transition  period," 
—  an  expression  which  says  little  of  itself,  because  all  time 
is  a  time  of  transition  and  change,  but  yet  here  embodies  an 
old  and  well-known  truth,  in  opposition  to  all  who  try  to 
separate  the  present  from  the  past  and  the  future  and  make 
it  absolute.  Therefore  nobody  can  say  whither  modern 
culture  will  lead  us ;  one  can  surmise,  guess,  speculate, 
but  there  is  no  certainty  at  all.  As  to  the  phenomena  which 
now  already  present  themselves,  and  are  included  under  the 
name  of  modern  culture,  the  estimates  of  their  value  vary 
very  much.  There  are  some  of  them  which  are  approved 
by  nobody.  Who,  for  example,  defends  the  materialistic 
tone,  the  mammonism,  the  alcoholism,  the  prostitution  so 
prevalent  in  these  days  ?  Who  is  blind  to  the  defects  which 
attach  to  our  modern  culture  or  to  the  dangers  to  which  it 
exposes  us?  Each  one  is  thus  obliged,  whatever  religious 
or  philosophical  standpoint  he  may  occupy,  to  apply  a 
standard  in  his  judgment  of  modern  culture  ;  he  cannot 
accept  it  in  its  entirety ;  whether  he  will  or  not,  he  goes  to 
work  eclectically,  and  will  approve  some  phenomena  as  in 
agreement  with  his  own  world-view,  and  dissent  strongly 
from  others  in  the  name  of  that  same  world-view.  And 
as  to  the  future,  the  estimation  of  modern  culture  will  de- 
pend upon  the  direction  in  which  it  moves,  which  nobody 
can  foresee  or  foretell.  Men  are  alternately  panegyrists 
and  grumblers,  and  the  same  man  plays  in  turn  the  one 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  253 

or  the  other  role  according  to  what  pleases  or  vexes 
him. 

The  assertion  that  modern  culture  is  in  conflict  with 
Christianity  is  thus  a  meaningless  phrase.  Who  ven- 
tures to  assert  that  marriage  and  family,  state  and  society, 
art  and  science,  trade  and  industry  as  such  are  condemned 
and  opposed  by  Christianity  ?  At  the  most  such  an  assertion 
may  be  made  as  to  the  manner  and  the  direction  in  which 
these  institutions  and  activities  at  the  present  time  are 
developing  or  are  carried  on.  This  is  no  doubt  what  is 
meant.  There  are  phenomena  upon  which  a  very  differ- 
ent estimate  is  placed  by  many  of  our  contemporaries  from 
that  placed  upon  them  by  the  gospel  of  Christ.  But  it  is 
mere  presumption  for  them  to  identify  their  judgment  with 
modern  culture  itself  and  to  reject  the  whole  of  Christianity 
in  her  name.  It  may  be  explainable,  for  it  makes  an  im- 
pression to  say  that  culture,  and  science  and  state  have 
antiquated  Christianity ;  but  it  is  not  excusable,  for  it 
places  the  antithesis  in  a  false  light,  brings  confusion  into 
the  ideas,  and  is  injurious  to  both  Christianity  and  culture. 

If  we  search  out  what  in  modern  culture  is  antithetically 
opposed  to  Christianity  and  then  reduce  this  to  a  princi- 
ple, we  shall  arrive  at  the  same  idea  which  was  found 
above  to  be  irreconcilable  in  it  with  Christian  faith. 
The  complaint  which  many  make  against  Christianity, 
its  doctrine  of  faith  and  life,  is  based  on  its  so-called  heter- 
onomy  and  transcendence.  There  is  in  modern  society  a 
striving  after  independence  and  freedom,  such  as  was  un- 
known in  earlier  times,  or  at  least  not  recognized  in  the 
same  degree.  We  meet  with  this  among  all  men,  and  in 
every  position  and  circle  of  life  ;  science,  art,  industry, 
trade,  labor,  capital,  all  desire  to  govern  themselves,  and  to 
be  obedient  only  to  the  laws  which  are  laid  down  for  them 


254  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

by  their  own  mode  of  life.  This  striving  in  itself  is  not 
illegitimate  or  unjustifiable,  for  men  are  not  machines,  but 
free-thinking  and  free-living  rational  and  moral  beings. 
But  it  undeniably  often  assumes  a  character  which  inter- 
dicts existence,  and  the  right  of  existence,  to  all  objective 
authority,  to  all  external  law,  to  every  destiny  of  man 
which  passes  beyond  this  earthly  life.  The  legitimate 
struggle  for  independence  and  liberty  is  transformed  into  a 
theoretically  proclaimed  and  practically  applied  autonomy 
and  anarchy,  and  these  naturally  place  themselves  in  op- 
position to  Christianity.  For  Christianity  comes  into 
collision  with  such  an  autonomy,  as  does  every  religion. 
It  asserts  all  possible  freedom  and  independence  for  man, 
for  it  teaches  his  creation  after  the  image  and  likeness  of 
God  ;  but  it  maintains  at  the  same  time  that  man  is  a 
creature,  and  thus  can  never  become  or  be  absolutely  in- 
dependent ;  it  joins  him  to  God,  and  binds  him  to  his  word 
and  will.  When  the  apologists  of  modern  culture  accuse 
Christianity  of  legalism,  heteronomy,  transcendent  eudse- 
monism,  etc.,  these  are  words  which  intentionally  repre- 
sent the  matter  in  an  unjust  way  and  rouse  prejudice 
against  Christianity ;  but  the  matter  itself  is  beyond  dis- 
pute. It  is  supernaturalism,  which  in  point  of  fact  forms 
the  point  of  controversy  between  Christianity  and  many 
panegyrists  of  modern  culture. 

The  Christian  religion  cannot  abandon  this  supernat- 
uralism without  annihilating  itself.  There  is  even  no 
religion  thinkable  or  possible  without  belief  in  a  supernat- 
ural power.  For  all  religion  implies  that  God  and  the 
world  are  distinct,  and  that  God  can  work  in  the  world, 
enter  into  fellowship  with  man,  and  by  that  fellowship 
can  raise  him  above,  and  maintain  him  against,  the  world. 
Because  Christianity  is  the  pure  and  true  religion,  it  is  not 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  255 

less,  but  more  supernatural  than  all  other  religions.  For 
these  religions  dissolve  the  godhead  into  all  kinds  of  nat- 
ural powers,  see  everywhere  in  the  world  only  the  influ- 
ences of  good  or  evil  spirits,  and  cannot  therefore  bring 
man  into  a  true  fellowship  with  God.  But  according  to 
the  Christian  confession  the  one,  all-wise,  all-good,  and 
all-powerful  will  of  God  lies  behind  the  phenomena  of 
nature  and  the  events  of  history,  and  this  will  breaks  down 
all  resistance  in  the  world  and  humanity  and  leads  them 
in  the  face  of  their  opposition  to  salvation  and  glory. 
This  is  the  idea  which  underlies  the  whole  of  Scripture ; 
on  it  Moses  and  the  prophets,  Christ  and  the  apostles 
take  their  stand ;  the  Christian  church  is  built  on  the  great 
facts  of  creation,  incarnation,  and  resurrection;  the  gos- 
pel as  it  is  preached  by  Jesus  himself  in  his  earthly  life 
embodies  this  same  counsel  and  will  of  God. 

It  is  not  open  to  doubt  that  it  was  not  as  a  poet  or  phi- 
losopher, as  a  scholar  or  artist,  as  a  politician  or  social 
reformer,  that  Jesus  appeared  among  the  people  of  Israel. 
What  is  new  and  peculiar  in  the  person  of  Christ  consists  in 
this  —  that  he  was  more  than  Solomon  and  Jonah,  or  one  of 
the  prophets ;  that  he  is  the  Messiah,  the  Son  of  God,  sent 
by  God  to  seek  the  lost,  and  save  sinners,  to  proclaim  the 
gospel  to  the  poor,  and  to  preach  the  acceptable  year  of 
the  Lord,  to  declare  the  Father,  and  to  reveal  his  name. 
What  he  came  to  bring  to  earth  is  therefore  a  blessing  of 
unspeakable  value,  namely,  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  not  as 
a  community  which  could  be  founded  by  human  endeavor, 
but  as  a  heavenly,  divine  treasure,  embracing  righteous- 
ness, salvation  from  corruption,  eternal  life,  and  obtainable 
only  through  regeneration,  faith,  and  conversion. 

We  may  differ  on  the  question  whether  Jesus  was  right 
in  this  preaching  of  the  gospel,  and  whether  the  knowl- 


256  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

edge  of  God  and  eternal  life  mean  the  highest  good  for  man. 
There  are  many  at  least  who  den}7  and  controvert  this, 
and  seek  to  set  Christian  morals  aside  in  favor  of  the  ethics 
of  individualistic  or  social  eudsemonism.  Now  Christian- 
ity leaves  full  room  for  the  ethical  culture  of  our  own 
personality  in  the  midst  of  society,  but  there  is  a  notable 
contrast  between  the  two  systems  of  ethics,  which  cannot 
be  disguised  or  obliterated.  Christian  morals  lays  stress 
upon  sin  and  grace,  the  ethics  of  evolution  proclaims  the 
natural  goodness  of  man  ;  the  former  regards  man  as  a  lost 
being,  who  needs  salvation,  the  latter  sees  in  him  the  one 
creature  who  can  reform  and  save  the  world ;  the  first 
speaks  of  reconciliation  and  regeneration,  the  second  of 
development  and  education ;  for  the  one  the  new  Jerusa- 
lem comes  down  from  God  out  of  heaven,  for  the  other 
it  comes  slowly  into  being  by  human  effort ;  there  divine 
action  moves  history,  here  evolution  is  the  all-directing 
process.13 

But  this  is  certain, — if  the  gospel  is  true,  then  it  carries 
with  it  its  own  standard  for  the  valuation  of  all  culture. 
Jesus  has  shown  this  distinctly  in  the  attitude  which  he 
adopted  towards  all  earthly  things  and  natural  relations. 
He  was  no  ascetic :  he  considered  food  and  drink,  cover- 
ing and  clothing,  as  good  gifts  of  the  Heavenly  Father, 
and  was  present  at  wedding-feasts  and  dinners.  And  he 
was  as  little  an  epicurean,  who  thinks  only  of  himself 
and  cares  only  for  himself;  he  was  continually  moved 
with  compassion  for  all  kinds  of  misery.  Neither  shallow 
optimism  nor  weak  pessimism  finds  in  him  an  ally.  But 
although  he  did  not  despise  natural  institutions  and  bless- 
ings, still  he  does  not  undertake  to  estimate  them  as  such 
or  to  determine  their  inherent  value.  That  was  not  the 
work  which  the  Father  had   given  him  to  do.     He  ac- 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  257 

cepted  the  social  and  political  conditions  as  they  were, 
made  no  endeavor  to  reform  them,  and  confined  himself 
exclusively  to  setting  the  value  which  they  possessed  for 
the  kingdom  of  heaven.  And  in  that  connection  he  said, 
that  nothing  a  man  possesses  in  this  world  —  food  or  drink, 
covering  or  clothing,  marriage  or  family,  vocation  or  posi- 
tion, riches  or  honor — can  be  compared  with  that  pearl  of 
great  price  which  he  alone  can  present.  It  must  all  be 
abandoned,  if  necessary,  for  the  gospel's  sake,  and  the 
treasures  of  earth  are  often  a  great  obstacle  to  entrance 
into  the  kingdom  of  God.  In  a  word,  agriculture,  indus- 
try, commerce,  science,  art,  the  family,  society,  the  state, 
etc.,  —  the  whole  of  culture  —  may  be  of  great  value  in 
itself,  but  whenever  it  is  thrown  into  the  balance  against 
the  kingdom  of  heaven,  it  loses  all  its  significance.  The 
gaining  of  the  whole  world  avails  a  man  nothing  if  he 
loses  his  own  soul ;  there  is  nothing  in  creation  which 
he  can  give  in  exchange  for  his  soul. 

The  truth  of  this  declaration  can  be  denied  only  by  the 
man  who  shuts  his  eyes  to  the  awful  seriousness  of  real  life. 
Not  only  does  Scripture  teach  that  man  has  lost  himself, 
and  may  lose  himself  more  and  more,  but  our  own  experi- 
ence also  testifies  to  this.  Man  is  lost  before  God,  for  he 
does  not  give  himself  to  God,  and  does  not  serve  him  in 
love,  but  flies  from  him,  and  hides  himself  from  his 
presence.  He  is  lost  for  his  neighbor,  for  he  abandons 
him  in  his  need,  and  sacrifices  him  to  his  own  interests  in 
the  struggle  for  existence.  He  is  also  lost  for  himself, 
for  there  is  a  cleft  between  his  being  and  his  conscious- 
ness, a  dissension  between  his  duty  and  his  desire,  between 
his  conscience  and  his  will.  That  is  the  reason  why  we 
seek  diversions  in  the  world ;  instead  of  re-collecting  our 
thoughts  we  scatter  them,  and  in  proportion  as  with  our 

17 


258  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

representations  and  imaginations,  with  our  thoughts  and 
desires,  with  our  inclinations  and  passions,  we  move  in 
various  directions,  we  lose  more  and  more  the  centre  of 
our  own  life.  Man  is  ever  losing  himself  more  and  more. 
No  treasures  are  able  to  compensate  for  the  spiritual  loss 
of  our  soul,  for  when  the  soul  is  lost  all  is  lost.  Nothing 
fills  the  emptiness,  nothing  replaces  the  loss,  nothing 
covers  the  poverty.  For  this  reason  Christ  brought  the 
kingdom  of  heaven  to  earth ;  he  implants  it  in  the  hearts 
of  men,  and  thereby  gives  them  back  to  God,  and  their 
neighbor,  and  also  to  themselves.  Peace  with  God  carries 
with  it  for  man  peace  with  himself  also ;  the  cleft  between 
his  conscience  and  his  will  is  filled  up ;  the  discord  be- 
tween his  being  and  consciousness  is  reconciled ;  his  soul 
with  all  its  powers  is  brought  back  to  unity  in  the  fear  of 
God's  name.  His  duty  becomes  his  choice,  and  his  choice 
his  privilege.  Conversion  is  a  turning  back  to  God,  but 
at  the  same  time  a  coming  to  one's  self.14 

If  this  is  the  content  of  the  gospel,  —  namely,  that  God 
maintains  and  renews  the  ethical  ideal  of  man  by  his 
merciful  and  powerful  will  in  the  way  of  forgiveness  and 
conversion,  —  then  the  reality  of  this  content  may  indeed 
be  denied,  but  it  is  inconceivable  that  such  a  gospel  should 
be  opposed  to  culture.  Much  rather  is  it,  if  we  may  so 
say,  the  most  important  element  of  all  culture,  —  prin- 
ciple and  goal  of  what  all  culture  in  the  genuine  sense  of 
the  word  strives  after,  and  must  strive  after.  There  are 
indeed  many  who  think  that  the  development  and  prog- 
ress of  the  human  race  principally  or  exclusively  consist 
in  the  improvement  of  material  welfare.  But  this  mate- 
rialistic view  of  life  is  strongly  contradicted  by  man's  ra- 
tional and  moral  nature.  Heart  and  conscience  witness  to 
us  all  that  man  cannot  live  by  bread  alone ;  "  life  is  not 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  259 

the  highest  good."  It  is  not  religion  only,  but  philosophy, 
which  has  at  all  times  proclaimed  this.  Its  chief  repre- 
sentatives have  declared,  without  exception,  that  the  des- 
tiny of  man  and  humanity  must  bear  an  ethical  character, 
and  that  that  ethical  character  must  take  the  first  place  ; 
the  good  is  the  same  as  the  divine,  and  is  raised  high 
above  the  sensual  world  ;  ethics  goes  further  than  physics. 
So  powerfully  does  this  idea  of  the  value  of  the  good  work 
in  the  heart  of  man  that  material  culture,  which  began  to 
flourish  in  the  last  century  and  for  some  time  cast  a  cer- 
tain glamour  over  materialism,  soon  gave  way  to  a  strong 
reaction  in  life,  and  by  the  disappointment  which  it 
brought  caused  the  heart  of  man  to  thirst  again  after 
idealism  and  mysticism.  Even  Haeckel  has  felt  this  in- 
fluence ;  he  has  continued,  indeed,  to  call  his  world- view 
materialistic,  but  he  has  raised  his  monism  to  the  rank  of 
religion,  and  regards  as  its  kernel  the  worshipping  of  the 
true,  the  good,  and  the  beautiful.15 

Now  as  soon  as  culture  wishes  to  be  ethical  culture,  not 
in  name,  but  in  fact  and  in  truth,  it  loses  all  ground  for 
accusing  the  gospel  of  enmity  against  it,  and  it  cannot  do 
itself  greater  service  than  by  honoring  the  gospel  as  the 
chief  and  highest  power  making  for  culture.  It  cannot 
bring  a  valid  objection  even  against  the  supernatural  ele- 
ments which  are  included  in  the  gospel,  because  as  ethical 
culture  it  rests  on  metaphysics,  and  on  deeper  introspec- 
tion proves  to  be  based  indeed  on  revelation.  Thus,  it  is 
historically  proved  that  culture  has  not  had  an  independent 
origin  and  development,  but  from  its  first  commencement 
is  bound  up  with  religion  in  the  closest  way.  The  higher 
elements  of  culture  especially,  such  as  science,  art,  and 
morality,  are  indebted  to  religion  for  their  origin  and 
growth.    The  oldest  science  of  which  we  have  knowledge, 


260  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

in  Greece,  Egypt,  Babylon,  and  India,  was  theology ; 
philosophy  originated  in  religion,  and  only  later  brought 
forth  various  particular  sciences.16  Art  among  the  people 
of  old  bore  a  specially  religious  character ; 17  and  among  all 
men  of  ancient  times  we  meet  the  tendency  to  regard 
moral  laws  as  divine  commandments.18  Science,  art,  and 
morality  are  cognate  in  origin,  essence,  and  meaning  with 
religion,  for  they  are  all  based  on  the  belief  in  an  ideal 
world,  the  reality  of  which  is  assured  and  guaranteed  only 
by  religion ;  that  is,  from  God's  side  by  revelation.19 

No  doubt  an  endeavor  has  recently  been  made  to  make 
ethical  culture  independent  of  religion.20  But  this  at- 
tempt is  still  new  and  limited  to  a  small  circle,  and  it 
probably  will  have  little  success.  It  is  a  dishonor  for  re- 
ligion, to  be  sure,  to  serve  as  a  police  agent,  or  as  a  watch- 
dog of  morality.  Religion  and  morality  are  not  bound 
together  in  this  external  and  mechanical  way,  but  they  are 
in  alliance  with  each  other  organically,  by  reason  of  their 
inner  nature.  The  love  of  God  includes  that  of  our 
neighbor,  and  the  latter  is  reflected  in  the  former.  For 
good  presents  itself  to  us  all  from  our  earliest  youth  in 
the  form  of  a  commandment.  Neither  autonomic  nor  evo- 
lutionary ethics  can  make  any  change  here.  The  child  does 
not  gradually  create  moral  laws  by  instinct  or  reflection, 
but  is  brought  up  in  a  circle  which  has  possessed  those 
laws  long  before,  and  which  imposes  them  on  the  child 
with  authority.21  As  we  look  around  us  among  the  nations 
and  examine  the  history  of  mankind,  we  are  witnesses  of 
much  vacillation  and  variety,  but  a  fund  of  moral  laws  is  al- 
ways and  everywhere  found.22  Every  man  acknowledges 
that  in  morality  a  law  is  laid  upon  him  which  obliges  him 
to  obedience  in  his  conscience.  If  this  be  so,  then  in  this 
wonderful  phenomenon  we  have  to  do  either  with   an 


REVELATION  AND   CULTURE  261 

illusion,  a  dream,  an  imagination  of  mankind,  or  with  a 
reality  which  is  raised  high  above  the  empirical  world  and 
fills  us  with  deepest  reverence.  For  if  the  moral  law  or 
the  ideal  good  indeed  exists  around  and  above  us,  then  it 
must  be  grounded  in  the  world-power  and  be  one  with 
the  Godhead.  God  alone  is  the  source,  and  thus  also  the 
guarantee  of  the  reality  of  the  moral  law,  of  the  objec- 
tivity of  duty,  the  ethical  vocation  and  destiny  of  man. 
In  so  far  all  ethics  is  also  heteronomous. 

Philosophy,  particularly  since  Kant,  has  strongly  con- 
troverted this  heteronomy,  and  it  is  right  in  its  opposition 
if  this  heteronomy  be  thought  of  as  a  moral  law,  which 
comes  to  us  from  without,  is  forcibly  imposed  upon  us 
from  above,  and  finds  no  echo  in  our  own  spirit.  Such  a 
merely  external  law  may  be,  perhaps,  a  natural  law,  but 
in  no  case  can  it  be  a  moral  law.  Such  a  view  of  the 
heteronomy  of  law  might  be  acceptable,  accordingly,  to 
those  moralists  who  think  that  man  was  originally  an  ani- 
mal, and  has  become  man  by  external  influences,  either  by 
the  pressure  of  society  or  by  the  discipline  of  the  state ; 
but  it  has  no  attractions  to,  and  is  quite  superfluous  to, 
Christian  ethics,  which  is  based  on  Holy  Scripture.  For 
Scripture  teaches  that  man  was  originally  created  after 
God's  image,  and  bore  the  moral  law  in  the  inmost  re- 
cesses of  his  heart ;  that  even  in  the  state  of  sin  he  is  still 
bound  to  the  ideal  world  by  his  reason  and  conscience ; 
and  that  the  dissension  which  now  exists  between  duty 
and  inclination,  according  to  all  experience,  is,  in  princi- 
ple, reconciled  in  regeneration  and  conversion.  As  Jesus 
said  that  it  was  his  meat  to  do  the  will  of  his  Heavenly 
Father,  so  Paul  testified  that  he  delighted  in  the  law  of 
God  after  the  inward  man;  and  all  sincere  Christians 
humbly  speak  the  same  words. 


262  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Autonomous  morality  and  ethical  culture  cannot  raise 
objection  to  this  doctrine,  for  it  is  the  ultimate  fulfilment 
of  what  they  themselves  mean  and  wish.  It  is  rightly 
said  that  good  must  be  the  inner  inclination  of  man. 
Good  does  not  in  a  social-eudsemonistic  way  borrow  its 
standard  and  nature  from  the  consequences  of  human 
actions,  for  these  consequences  are  external,  often  acci- 
dental, and  almost  always  incalculable.  Man  is  not  good 
by  the  operation  and  fruit  of  his  actions,  but  the  actions 
are  good  because,  and  in  so  far  as,  they  are  a  revelation 
and  expression  of  the  good  will  of  man.  There  is  there- 
fore, according  to  Kant,  nothing  in  the  world  which  can 
be  considered  as  good  without  limitation  except  a  good 
will.  The  philosopher  therein  simply  repeated  in  other 
words  what  Jesus  had  said  :  A  good  tree  alone  can  bring 
forth  good  fruit,  and  a  man  can  only  bring  forth  good  things 
out  of  the  good  treasure  of  his  heart.23  This  declaration 
of  Scripture  even  avoids  the  one-sidedness  of  Kant,  who 
makes  it  seem  as  if  good  can  be  achieved  only  if  it  is  ac- 
complished by  the  intellectual  sense  of  duty  alone  without 
the  co-operation  of  the  heart.  In  place  of  this  intellec- 
tual rigorism,  which  always  produces  by  reaction  emo- 
tional romanticism,  Christian  ethics  maintains  that  the 
whole  man  must  be  good  in  intellect  and  will,  heart 
and  conscience.  To  do  good  is  a  duty  and  a  desire,  a 
task  and  a  privilege,  and  thus  the  work  of  love.  Love 
is  therefore  the  fulfilling  of  the  law. 

But  again,  if  this  is  the  kernel  of  Christian  morality, 
with  what  right  can  the  charge  of  enmity  against  culture 
be  brought  against  it?  For  it  is  it  alone  which  makes 
true  culture  possible,  and  places  it  on  a  firm  foundation. 
Ethical  culture  rightly  declares  tlmt  man  must  be  good 
internally,  in  the  roots  of  his  being,  in  the  core  of  his  will ; 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  263 

but  it  feels  itself  obliged,  after  honest  consideration,  to 
confess  that  such  men  do  not  exist,  and  that  it  cannot 
create  them.  All  culture,  whatever  significance  it  may 
have,  just  as  all  education,  civilization,  development,  is 
absolutely  powerless  to  renew  the  inner  man.  For  it 
always  works  externally,  and  does  not  penetrate  into  the 
heart  of  man.  It  may  fashion,  prune,  restrain,  bridle,  form ; 
it  may  force  life  to  run  in  harness ;  it  may  cultivate  legal- 
ism and  even  morality.  But  that  is  nevertheless  not  the 
good,  the  genuine,  inner,  spiritual  good :  it  is  no  true  Sitt- 
lichkeit.  As  long  as  ethical  culture  thinks  itself  sufficient, 
it  is  exposed  to  serious  danger.  For  adhering  firmly  to 
its  ideal,  and  esteeming  itself  able  to  realize  it,  it  will 
hedge  man  about  on  all  sides,  and  lay  upon  him  command 
on  command,  rule  upon  rule  ;  or  it  will,  after  many  endeav- 
ors, convinced  of  its  powerlessness,  abandon  the  height 
of  the  moral  ideal,  give  the  leadership  to  the  will,  and 
permit  every  one  to  live  himself  out  in  accordance  with 
his  own  character.  Phariseeism  and  Sadduceeism  are 
no  uncommon  phenomena  on  philosophical  and  practical 
ground.  Thus  the  true,  and  the  good,  and  the  beautiful, 
which  ethical  culture  means  and  seeks,  can  only  come 
to  perfection  when  the  absolute  good  is  at  the  same  time 
the  almighty,  divine  will,  which  not  only  prescribes  the 
good  in  the  moral  law,  but  also  works  it  effectually  in 
man  himself.  The  heteronomy  of  law  and  the  autonomy 
of  man  are  reconciled  only  by  this  theonomy. 

Ethical  culture  accordingly  can  neither  in  the  source 
nor  in  the  essence  of  morals  be  independent  of  the  meta- 
physical foundation  ;  and  finally  much  less  can  it  dis- 
pense with  it  in  the  definition  of  the  goal  of  morality.24 
As  long  as  it  remains  diesseitig,  it  cannot  give  to  the 
question,  What  may  be  the   goal  of   the  moral  action? 


264  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

any  other  answer  than  that  this  is  to  be  found  either  in 
the  individual  man  or  in  humanity.  In  the  first  instance, 
whether  it  wishes  to  do  so  or  not,  it  sacrifices  the  com- 
munity to  the  individual,  and  in  the  second  it  sacrifices 
the  individual  to  the  community.  But  nature  itself  dis- 
tinctly proves  that  neither  of  these  may  be  lowered 
to  a  mere  means  to  the  other ;  the  individual  and  the 
community  are  not  subordinate  to  one  another,  but  co- 
ordinate with  each  other.  If  both  are  thus  to  maintain 
their  independence  and  be  brought  into  agreement,  this 
can  be  accomplished  only  when  men  rise  above  both,  and 
posit  a  goal  for  moral  action  outside  of  both.  Another 
consideration  enforces  the  necessity  of  Jenseitigkeit  still 
more  strongly.  Neither  humanity  nor  the  individual  can 
have  the  origin  or  the  goal  in  itself.  There  was  a  time 
when  they  did  not  exist ;  they  are  transitory,  and  near 
their  end.  In  the  universe  they  occupy  a  temporary, 
transitory  place  ;  they  are  a  means,  and  not  an  end, 
and  certainly  no  final  end,  because  they  are  not  their 
own  origin. 

But  if  neither  the  individual  nfan  nor  humanity  can  be 
the  final  end,  because  they  are  creatures,  then  the  question 
is  unavoidable  what  this  final  end  is.  Ethical  morality, 
which  reflects,  must  go  beyond  this  world  of  visible  things ; 
it  cannot  maintain  its  standpoint  within  humanity.  But 
then  there  are  only  two  paths  open,  — either  humanity,  with 
all  its  culture,  is  a  means  for  the  unconscious,  unreason- 
able, and  purposeless  world-power,  or  it  is  a  means  for  the 
glorifying  of  God.  The  first  can,  and  will,  and  may 
never  be  believed  by  humanity,  for  it  is  tantamount 
to  suicide.  The  second,  that  man  and  humanity  exist 
for  God's  sake,  from  him,  and  through  him,  and  to 
him,  upholds  their  moral,  spiritual  value  far  above  the 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  265 

whole  inanimate  universe,  and  brings  indeed  the  true, 
the  good,  and  the  beautiful  to  eternal  triumph.  This 
alone  gives  peace  to  the  understanding  and  rest  to  the 
heart.  Ethical  culture  must  be  a  philosophy  of  revela- 
tion or  it  cannot  exist. 

Now  the  peculiarity  of  all  revelation  is,  that  while  it 
posits  principles  and  lays  foundations,  it  charges  men  with 
the  application  of  these  principles  and  the  building  upon 
these  foundations.  Creation  was  the  first  revelation,  the 
principle  and  foundation  of  all  revelation ;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  every  revelation  is  also  a  creation,  a  divine 
work,  in  order  to  accomplish  something  new,  to  make  a 
new  commencement,  and  to  unlock  the  possibility  of  a 
new  development.  From  nothing,  nothing  could  begin ; 
all  evolution  supposes  a  germ  ;  all  becoming  proceeds 
from  being.  Thought  and  speech,  life  and  history,  science 
and  art,  have  all  had  their  commencement  in  principles 
which  are  laid  down  by  God's  creative  power.  The  whole 
special  revelation  which  has  its  centre  in  Christ  has  no 
other  content  and  no  other  meaning  than  to  lay  this 
firm  foundation  whereon  the  new  humanity  can  be  built. 
Christ  is  the  head,  and  the  church  is  his  body  ;  Christ  is 
the  cornerstone,  and  believers  are  the  living  stones  of  the 
divine  building.  Nothing  can  be  changed  in  this  founda- 
tion ;  it  is  laid,  and  remains  for  all  time.  But  when  it  is 
laid  both  in  deed  and  word,  in  nature  and  history,  in  the 
world  of  being  and  consciousness,  then  the  independent 
work  of  the  church  begins  with  the  development  of  doc- 
trine and  life,  of  organization  and  worship.  Revelation 
from  God's  side  always  opens  a  way  for  "discovery" 
by  man.25 

This  is  applicable  also  to  culture.  In  the  measure  that 
it  considers  more  deeply  its  own  essence,  it  arrives  at  the 


266  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

discovery  that  it  is  rooted  in  metaphysics  and  founded  on 
revelation.  It  rests  on  data  which  God  himself  established, 
and  is  certain  of  its  rights  and  value  only  because  God 
is  creator,  regenerator,  and  consummator  of  all  things. 
The  creation  of  the  first  man  shows  this ;  the  subduing 
of  the  earth,  that  is,  the  whole  of  culture,  is  given  to  him, 
and  can  be  given  to  him,  only  because  he  is  created  after 
God's  image ;  man  can  be  ruler  of  the  earth  only  because 
and  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  servant,  a  son  of  God.  But  man 
has  not  continued  to  build  on  this  foundation ;  the  devel- 
opment of  the  human  race  has  not  been  normal ;  there  has 
always  on  a  time  of  flourishing  followed  a  time  of  decay 
and  ruin  for  culture.  Then  God  takes,  as  it  were,  the  de- 
velopment into  his  own  hands  by  raising  up  great  men, 
by  causing  new  races  to  appear,  by  creating  events  of  a 
world-wide  significance ;  he  demolishes  the  sinful  devel- 
opment and  raises  culture  from  its  abasement,  and  opens 
out  to  it  a  new  road.  This  is  particularly  manifest  among 
the  Israelites,  in  Abraham,  Moses,  the  prophets,  and  finally 
in  Christ.  Culture,  therefore,  sinks  into  the  background ; 
man  must  first  become  a^ain  a  son  of  God  before  he  can 
be,  in  a  genuine  sense,  a  cultured  being.  Israel  was  not 
a  people  of  art  and  science,  but  a  people  of  religion  ;  and 
Christ  is  exclusively  a  preacher  of  the  gospel,  the  saviour 
of  the  world,  and  founder  of  the  kingdom  of  heaven. 
With  this  kingdom  nothing  can  be  compared ;  he  who 
will  enter  into  it  must  renounce  all  tilings ;  the  cross  is 
the  condemnation  of  the  world  and  the  destruction  of  all 
sinful  culture. 

But  it  is  wrong  to  educe  from  this  pronouncement  that 
the  gospel  must  be  at  enmity  with  culture.  For  although 
the  gospel  limits  itself  to  the  proclaiming  of  the  require- 
ments and  laws  of  the  kingdom,  it  cannot  be  set  free 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  267 

from  the  organic  alliance  in  which  it  always  appears  in 
history  and  Scripture.  For,  in  the  first  place,  Christ  does 
not  stand  at  the  commencement,  but  in  the  middle  of 
history.  He  presupposes  the  work  of  the  Father  in  cre- 
ation and  in  providence,  especially  also  in  the  guidance  of 
Israel ;  yea,  the  gospel  asserts  that  Christ  is  the  same 
who  as  the  Word  made  all  things  and  was  the  life  and 
the  light  of  all  men.  As  he  was  then  in  his  earthly  life 
neither  a  politician  nor  a  social  reformer,  neither  a  man 
of  science  nor  a  man  of  art,  but  simply  lived  and  worked 
as  the  Son  of  God  and  Servant  of  the  Lord,  and  thus  has 
only  been  a  preacher  and  founder  of  the  kingdom  of 
heaven,  he  cannot  have  come  to  annihilate  the  work  of 
the  Father,  or  his  own  work  in  creation  and  providence, 
but  rather  to  save  it  from  the  destruction  which  has  been 
brought  about  by  sin.  According  to  his  own  word,  he 
came  not  to  judge  the  world,  but  to  save  it. 

Secondly,  for  the  same  reason,  the  preaching  of  Jesus 
cannot  be  separated  from  what  has  followed  after  the 
cross.  The  gospel  goes  back  in  the  past  to  creation,  and 
even  to  eternity,  and  stretches  forward  to  the  farthest 
future.  Christ,  who  as  the  Word  created  all  things,  and 
bore  the  cross  as  the  Servant  of  the  Lord,  is  the  same  who 
rose  again  and  ascended  into  heaven,  and  will  return  as 
Judge  of  the  quick  and  the  dead.  In  his  exaltation  he 
regains  what  he  denied  himself  in  his  humiliation ;  but 
now  it  is  freed  from  guilt,  purified  from  stain,  reborn  and 
renewed  by  the  Spirit.  The  resurrection  is  the  funda- 
mental restoration  of  all  culture.  Christ  himself  took 
again  the  body  in  which  he  bore  on  the  cross  the  sin  of 
the  world  ;  he  has  received  all  power  in  heaven  and  earth, 
and  is  exalted  by  God  himself  to  his  right  hand  as  Lord 
and  Christ.      The   demand  which   has  been  made  from 


268  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

many  sides  of  late,  as  earlier  by  many  sects  and  monastic 
orders,  that  we  should  return  from  the  Pauline  and 
Johannine  Christ  to  the  so-called  historical  Jesus,  the 
gospel  of  the  Synoptics,  the  sermon  on  the  mount,  and 
the  parables,  is  not  only  impracticable,  because  in  the 
whole  New  Testament  the  same  dead  and  risen  Christ 
meets  us,  but  mutilates  the  gospel,  leads  to  asceticism,  and 
creates  an  irreconcilable  dissension  between  creation  and 
re-creation,  Old  and  New  Testament,  nature  and  grace,  the 
Creator  of  the  world  and  the  Father  of  Christ. 

Such  a  dissension  may  be  proper  to  Gnosticism  and 
Manichaeism,  and  also  to  the  Buddhism  nowadays  ad- 
mired by  so  many,  but  it  is  in  direct  contradiction  to 
Christianity.  The  truth  and  value  of  Christianity  cer- 
tainly do  not  depend  on  the  fruits  which  it  has  borne  for 
civilization  and  culture :  it  has  its  own  independent  value ; 
it  is  the  realization  of  the  kingdom  of  God  on  earth ;  and 
it  does  not  make  its  truth  depend,  after  a  utilitarian  or 
pragmatical  fashion,  on  what  men  here  have  accomplished 
with  the  talents  entrusted  to  them.  The  gospel  of  Christ 
promises  righteousness  and  peace  and  joy,  and  has  ful- 
filled its  promise  if  it  gives  these  things.  Christ  did  not 
portray  for  his  disciples  a  beautiful  future  in  this  world, 
but  prepared  them  for  oppression  and  persecution.  But, 
nevertheless,  the  kingdom  of  heaven,  while  a  pearl  of  great 
price,  is  also  a  leaven  which  permeates  the  whole  of  the 
meal ;  godliness  is  profitable  unto  all  things,  having  the 
promise  of  the  life  which  now  is,  and  that  which  is  to 
come.  The  gospel  gives  us  a  standard  by  which  we  can 
judge  of  phenomena  and  events  ;  it  is  an  absolute  measure 
which  enables  us  to  determine  the  value  of  the  present 
life  ;  it  is  a  guide  to  show  us  the  way  in  the  labyrinth  of 
the  present  world  j  it  raises  us  above  time,  and  teaches  us 


REVELATION   AND   CULTURE  269 

to  view  all  things  from  the  standpoint  of  eternity.  Where 
could  we  find  such  a  standard  and  guide  if  the  everlasting 
gospel  did  not  supply  it?  But  it  is  opposed  to  nothing 
that  is  pure  and  good  and  lovely.  It  condemns  sin  always 
and  everywhere ;  but  it  cherishes  marriage  and  the  family, 
society  and  the  state,  nature  and  history,  science  and  art. 
In  spite  of  the  many  faults  of  its  confessors,  it  has  been 
in  the  course  of  the  ages  a  rich  benediction  for  all  these 
institutions  and  accomplishments.  The  Christian  nations 
are  still  the  guardians  of  culture.  And  the  word  of  Paul 
is  still  true  that  all  is  ours  if  we  are  Christ's.26 


X 

REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE 

ALTHOUGH  the  Christian  religion  is  not  at  enmity 
_  with  culture  in  principle,  still  there  is  no  gainsaying 
that  it  attributes  only  a  subordinate  value  to  all  the 
possessions  of  this  earthly  life.  The  value  of  the  whole 
world  is  not  so  great  as  that  of  the  righteousness  of  the 
kingdom  of  heaven,  the  forgiveness  of  sins,  and  eternal 
life  in  fellowship  with  God.  In  this  respect  the  Christian 
religion  is  in  direct  opposition  to  the  view  of  the  world 
taken  by  the  modern  man,  and  is  neither  prepared  nor 
fitted  for  compromise  with  it.  The  question  between 
them  concerns  no  less  than  the  highest  good  for  man. 

Therefore  not  only  is  Christianity  accused  to-day  of 
rather  opposing  than  furthering  culture  in  the  past,  and 
of  adopting  towards  it  at  the  present  day  a  repellent  and 
hostile  attitude,  but  men  go  further  and  declare  that  it 
has  had  its  time,  and  cannot  be  a  factor  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  future.  If  modern  culture  is  to  advance,  it 
must  wholly  reject  the  influence  of  Christianity,  and  break 
completely  with  the  old  world-view.  There  must  be  in- 
augurated a  Kulturkampf,  compared  to  which  that  of  Bis- 
marck against  the  Jesuits  was  child's  play.  For  Chris- 
tianity in  its  essence,  and  consequently  in  all  the  forms 
which  it  has  adopted  in  its  several  confessions,  is  always 
occupied  with  such  supernatural  subjects  as  eternity, 
heaven,  God,  etc. ;  it  gives  a  bill  of  exchange  for  the  life 
hereafter,   which   perhaps   will   never   be   honored,   and 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     271 

makes  men  indifferent  to  this  life ;  it  does  not  stimulate 
to  activity,  but  recommends  as  the  highest  virtues,  pa- 
tience, forbearance,  obedience,  and  contentment. 

The  present  century,  on  the  contrary,  is  wholly  dies- 
seitig ;  it  believes  no  longer  in  unseen  things,  but  reckons 
only  with  those  which  are  seen  and  temporal.  After  the 
disappointment  caused  by  the  French  Revolution,  a  deep, 
general  dejection  reigned  in  Europe  under  the  Napoleonic 
regime.  But  oppression  occasioned  a  rebound.  When 
the  hour  of  liberty  struck,  humanity  awoke  to  a  new  life 
and  went  to  work  with  unimagined  courage.  Its  energy 
was  crowned,  and  at  the  same  time  increased,  by  the 
brilliant  successes  which  were  achieved  in  science  and 
technic,  in  society  and  state.  Discoveries  and  inven- 
tions, with  their  application  to  life,  showed  what  man 
could  accomplish  by  his  skill  and  labor.  Within  half 
a  century  humanity  was,  as  it  were,  reborn,  and  the 
surface  of  the  earth  was  renewed.  What  the  forefathers 
in  former  ages,  what  even  the  preceding  generation  had 
not  dared  to  think  or  dream  of,  now  came  to  pass  in  real- 
ity.    Humanity  stood  amazed  at  its  own  creations. 

In  the  measure  in  which  self-confidence  grew,  confi- 
dence in  God,  belief  in  miracles,  consciousness  of  misery, 
the  urgency  of  prayer,  and  longing  for  redemption  de- 
creased, at  least  in  many  circles.  Kant  had  boldly 
spoken  the  word,  —  clu  sollst,  also  du  kannst, —  and  the 
humanity  which  trod  the  stage  of  the  nineteenth  century 
adopted  this  motto.  It  perceived  in  itself  a  necessity,  a 
will,  a  power,  and  an  obligation  to  reform  the  world  ; 
and  with  this  pressure  it  felt  its  strength  awaken,  and  an 
irresistible  desire  to  set  to  work.  The  modern  man  no 
longer  feels  himself  a  miserable  creature,  who  has  fallen 
from  his  original  destiny,  and  no  longer  regards  the  earth 


272  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

as  a  vale  of  tears,  which  has  taken  the  place  of  the  original 
paradise.  He  can  conceive  nothing  more  wonderful  than 
this  beautiful  world,  which  has  evolved  itself  from  the 
smallest  beginnings  and  has  reached  its  highest  point 
of  development  in  grand  and  mighty  man.1  He  is  in 
his  own  estimation  no  mere  creature,  but  a  creator  and 
redeemer  of  himself  and  society.2  More  and  more  he 
becomes  his  own  providence.3  And  he  is  so,  and  becomes 
so  through  his  work,  for  labor  is  creation.  By  labor 
men  are  divine,  and  become  continually  more  godlike. 
Labor  must  therefore  be  the  foundation  of  religion  and 
morality,  and  also  of  the  entirety  of  modern  society.4  In 
earlier  times,  no  doubt,  both  outside  and  within  the 
bounds  of  Christianity,  labor  was  estimated  as  of  great 
moral  value,  but  there  was  nevertheless  no  system  of 
morals  built  upon  it,  either  by  the  Greeks,  who  despised 
labor,  or  by  the  Christians,  who  considered  this  life  as  a 
special  preparation  for  eternity,  or  yet  by  the  new  moral- 
ists, who  deduce  the  moral  law  from  the  subject,  that  is, 
from  the  categorical  imperative.  But  among  such  men  as 
Ihering,  Wundt,  HofTding,  Paulsen,  Spencer,  and  Sidg- 
wick,  we  see  ethics  becoming  more  and  more  a  section  of 
sociology,  which  perceives  in  labor  for  himself  and  for 
others  the  calling  and  destiny  of  man.  For  labor  recon- 
ciles the  egoistic  and  social  instincts  and  takes  into 
captivity  the  whole  human  life.5  Labor  is  "  the  meaning 
of  our  existence." 6 

This  awakening  of  human  energy  is  reflected  in  the 
world-view  which  now  receives  the  strongest  s}'mpathy. 
Till  now  the  whole  world  was  riveted  to  absolute  con- 
ceptions, such  as  substance  and  essence,  spirit  and  matter, 
soul  and  faculties,  idens  and  norms.  But  now  everything 
is  changed ;  there  is  nothing  firm,  unchangeable,  steadfast ; 


REVELATION  AND   THE   FUTURE  273 

there  is  no  status  quo,  but  only  an  eternal  movement.7 
Physics  and  chemistry  dematerialize  themselves,  and  seek 
their  foundations  in  pure  mathematical  proportions  ;  psy- 
chology has  closed  the  account  with  substance  and  the 
faculties  of  the  soul,  and  only  reckons  with  psychical 
phenomena ;  logic,  ethics,  and  aesthetics  withdraw  them- 
selves from  the  government  of  fixed  aprioristic  norms, 
and  seek  to  build  themselves  up  on  psychology  and 
sociology  ;  the  atomistic  world-view  has  given  way  in  late 
years  to  the  energetic,  and  the  absolute  is  no  longer  con- 
sidered as  a  being,  but  only  as  a  becoming ;  "  will  is  the 
real  substance  of  the  world." 8  If  Descartes  pronounced 
his  cogito  ergo  sum  as  the  principle  of  philosophy,  the  new 
world-view  proclaims  her  moveo  ergo  fio  ;  vivere  is  now  no 
longer  cogitare,  but  velle  ;  in  a  word,  modern  wisdom  can 
be  summed  up  in  this  short  epigram  of  Proudhon  :  Affir- 
mation du  fr  ogres,  negation  de  Vabsolu.9 

As  this  world- view  is  a  precipitate  of  modern  life,  so  in 
its  turn  it  influences  that  life  and  gives  it  direction  and 
guidance.  The  century  in  which  we  live  is  distinguished 
from  all  preceding  ones  by  its  restless  activity,  by  its 
exploitation  of  physical  and  psychical  forces,  but  at  the 
same  time  also  by  its  endeavor  to  obtain  the  greatest 
possible  results  from  the  smallest  possible  expenditure 
of  power.10  The  activities  of  men  move  in  the  most 
divergent  directions,  and  cross  each  other  every  mo- 
ment, so  that  nobody  can  obtain  a  clear  view  or  give 
a  complete  account  of  them.  And  yet  it  seems  as  if 
all  this  manifold  and  many-sided  labor  accomplished 
to-day  by  men  under  the  sun,  is  animated  by  one  spirit, 
is  directed  by  one  aim,  and  is  made  serviceable  to  one  end, 
namely,  the  improvement  of  the  human  race.  Men  live 
to-day  in  a  land  of  abundance,  but  there  still  remains 

18 


274  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

a  longing  for  a  richer  and  more  durable  happiness.  This 
earthly  life  is  confidently  declared  the  sole  home  of  man ; 
yet  men  seek  even  here  below  another  and  better  dwelling. 
And  therefore  there  are  not  wanting  reformers  who 
earnestly  reflect  on  the  miseries  of  this  life,  and  recom- 
mend ways  and  means  not  only  for  the  deliverance,  but 
also  for  the  perfecting  of  humanity. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  being  made  an  attempt,  which 
should  be  remarked,  to  improve  the  racial  qualities  of  man- 
kind in  an  artificial  way.  Individuals  follow  one  another 
like  small,  unsubstantial  waves  from  an  unlimited  ocean 
of  being,  but  are  all  nevertheless  equipped  with  free  and 
active  powers.  They  must  therefore  not  be  passive  in 
the  routine  of  nature,  and  must  not  lose  heart  from  the 
thought  that  man  remains  eternally  the  same  and  is  cap- 
able of  no  improvement  or  perfecting.  The  Christian 
religion  may  offer  in  its  doctrine  of  the  inheritance  of  sin 
such  a  comfortless  view;  but  this  dogma,  that  man  is 
radically  corrupt,  must  be  saved  by  Christ,  and  can  never 
become  holy  and  happy  by  his  own  power,  is  the  most 
demoralizing  of  all  the  articles  of  the  Christian  faith,  and 
ought  to  be  opposed  and  eradicated  with  determined 
strength.  In  its  place  must  come  the  comforting  convic- 
tion that  man  is  still  always  becoming ;  he  has  already 
raised  himself  above  the  animal,  and  is  moving  in  the 
direction  of  the  Uebermensch.  The  evolutionary  process, 
of  which  we  have  evidence  all  over  the  world,  presses 
on  not  only  forward,  but  also  upward,  to  meet  the  light, 
the  life,  the  spirit.11  It  is  only  necessary  that  man  under- 
stand this  process,  and  take  an  active  part  in  it ;  he  must 
feel  his  responsibility  for  the  carrying  of  the  process 
through  by  man,  and  for  its  advancing  through  him  to  a 
higher  type  of  being.    It  seems  as  if  the  physical  develop- 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     275 

ment  of  man  has  reached  its  end,  at  least  so  far  as  its  basal 
structure  is  concerned ;  but  all  the  more  necessary  now  is 
the  spiritual  development,  that  is,  the  conscious,  inten- 
tional, systematic  work  of  man  towards  his  own  perfecting. 
And  to  this  belongs  in  the  first  place  the  improvement 
and  ennobling  of  the  human  race. 

But  now  we  are  faced  by  the  fact  that,  as  Karl  Pearson 
expresses  it,  "  the  mentally  better  stock  in  the  nation  is 
not  reproducing  itself  at  the  same  rate  as  it  did  of  old ; 
the  less  able  and  less  energetic  are  more  fertile  than  the 
better  stock."  12  And  that  is  not  all ;  but  in  all  lands  the 
law  allows,  apart  from  certain  limitations  of  age  and  consan- 
guinity, complete  freedom  to  marriage,  so  that  it  is  pos- 
sible for  all  kinds  of  weak,  sick,  incurable,  and  degener- 
ate people  to  be  united  in  marriage  and  to  give  birth  to 
unfortunate  children,  and  in  this  way  to  promote  the 
steady  deterioration  of  the  human  race.  Nobody  can 
deny  that  such  a  deterioration  takes  place.  While  hygiene 
does  its  best,  on  the  one  side,  to  prolong  the  life  of  the 
weak  as  much  as  possible,  the  number  of  these  weak 
beings  is  continually  increasing  by  the  complete  freedom 
of  marriage.  Weismann  may  assert  that  propensities 
which  are  acquired  during  life  are  not  inherited,  but  the 
fact  still  remains  that  the  physical  and  psychical  condition 
of  the  parents  influences  that  of  the  children.  Insanity 
and  crime,  tuberculosis  and  alcoholism,  and  all  kinds  of 
venereal  diseases  are  increasing  among  all  nations ;  in- 
creasing numbers  of  inmates  are  sent  to  hospitals  and 
prisons ;  and  all  this  lays  on  the  community  a  burden 
which  in  the  long  run  it  will  not  be  able  to  bear.  There- 
fore it  is  our  duty  to  devote  the  greatest  possible  atten- 
tion to  marriage,  and  to  the  people  between  whom  it  is 
concluded. 


276  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  necessary  that  the  act  of  prop- 
agation be  restored  to  honor.  Ascetic  Christianity  has 
imprinted  the  stamp  of  impurity  on  it,  and  humanity  there- 
fore will  never  become  better  by  returning  to  this  mode 
of  thought.  But  it  will  enter  the  path  of  self -perfecting 
when  it  turns  its  back  on  all  asceticism  and  comes  to 
understand  the  holiness  of  propagation.  The  act  of  gen- 
eration is  not  impure,  but  a  holy  sacrament,  and  all  con- 
ception is  immaculate.  True  progress  will  come  when 
humanity  returns  to  the  classic  honoring  of  the  strength 
and  beauty  of  the  body  and  regains  the  old  respect  for 
the  divinity  of  propagation.13 

But  with  this  restoration  to  honor  of  the  propagation  of 
the  race  earnest  investigation  must  be  combined.  The 
science  of  "  eugenics,"  which  was  already  inaugurated  by 
Francis  Galton  in  1883,  and  for  which  he  not  long  ago 
founded  a  research-fellowship  at  the  University  of  London, 
must  become  a  science  which  subjects  to  exact  inquiry 
everything  that  bears  upon  propagation  and  heredity,  and 
endeavors  to  discover  the  laws  by  which  these  are 
governed.  Such  an  inquiry  has  not  yet  been  prosecuted 
far  enough  to  warrant  the  deduction  of  conclusions  on 
which  legislation  might  be  founded.  But  public  opin- 
ion can  be  instructed,  and  the  way  for  new  legislation 
respecting  matrimony  may  be  prepared,  and  the  state  can 
at  any  rate  begin  to  make  medical  inquiry  obligatory 
before  marriage,  forbid  marriage  in  definite  serious  cases, 
and  so  prevent  the  birth  of  unfortunate  children.  Arti- 
ficial selection  shows  how  genera  and  species  may  be 
modified  among  plants  and  animals  ;  if  this  selection  is 
applied  also  to  the  human  race,  it  will  promote  its  well- 
being  and  improvement  in  the  highest  degree.14 

In   close   alliance   with   this   attempt   to   ennoble  the 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     277 

human  race  by  artificial  selection  is  the  effort  which  is 
making  for  the  perfecting  of  humanity  by  a  radical 
reform  in  education.  Many  opinions  exist  as  to  the 
nature  of  such  a  new  education.  Some  accept  in  prin- 
ciple the  perfect  equality  of  man  and  woman,  defend 
free  marriage  and  free  love,  and  would  withdraw  educa- 
tion as  early  as  possible  from  the  family  and  delegate  it 
to  the  community.  Others,  on  the  contrary,  esteem  the 
woman  in  every  respect  distinct  from  man,  and  wish  to 
maintain  and  re-establish  her  in  the  role  of  mother  and 
educator  of  her  children.  According  to  these,  biology  and 
anthropology  prove  that  woman,  who,  in  her  whole  physical 
and  psychical  development  is  much  more  closely  allied  to 
the  child  than  man,  and  lives  by  instinct,  intuition,  and 
feeling  more  than  he,  is  on  this  very  account  a  much  better 
representative  and  supporter  of  the  human  race;  she  is  more 
44  reminiscent  of  the  past,"  more  "  prophetic  of  the  future,'' 
and  therefore  superior  to  man.  In  the  new  philosophy  of 
sex,  of  which  biological  psychology  already  dreams,  the 
woman  and  the  mother  will  stand  "  at  the  heart  of  a  new 
world,"  become  the  object  "  of  a  new  religion,  and  almost 
of  a  new  worship."  The  mothers  are  the  most  valuable 
portion  of  the  people,  and  must  therefore  be  liberated  in 
the  future  from  all  other  cares  than  those  of  motherhood, 
and  be  treated  by  state  and  society  with  the  highest 
honor.16 

But  whatever  difference  of  opinion  on  this  or  similar 
points  may  exist  among  the  reformers  of  pedagogy,  all 
agree  that  education  requires  radical  changes  and  must 
be  built  up  anew  on  a  scientific  basis.  Education  is  of 
far  too  great  importance  for  the  future  of  humanity  to 
be  abandoned  to  caprice  or  chance.  Education  is  "  man's 
chief  problem,  and  the   home,  school,  state,  and  church 


278  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

are  valuable  exactly  in  proportion  as  they  serve  it,"  yea, 
"  the  highest  criterion  of  pure  science  is  its  educative 
value."  16  And  the  science  which  must  be  the  principle 
and  foundation  of  education  is  genetic  psychology.  This 
teaches  us  that  man  has  slowly  risen  from  the  animal,  and 
repeats  in  his  development  as  embryo  and  suckling,  as 
child  and  boy  and  youth,  the  different  stages  of  phy- 
logeny.  The  soul  of  man  is  thus  not  complete,  but  as 
it  has  become,  so  is  it  still  becoming ;  it  does  not  stand 
alone,  but  is  cognate  with  the  souls  of  the  animals  and 
plants  and  all  creatures ;  it  strikes  its  roots  deeply  into 
the  past,  as  the  tree  does  into  the  ground,  is  the  product 
of  an  immemorial  heredity,  and  can  and  must  be  conceived 
and  explained  by  the  history  of  the  human  race.  We 
shall  never  really  know  ourselves  until  we  know  the  soul 
of  the  animals,  and  especially  that  of  those  which  are  in 
the  line  of  our  descent.17 

He  who  takes  into  account  the  lesson  of  evolution 
quickly  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the  present-day  sys- 
tem of  education  is  one  great  error.  Up  to  now  men  have 
given  almost  exclusive  attention  to  the  soul  of  man,  and 
to  its  hereafter.  They  have  taken  their  start  from  ideas, 
fixed  norms,  unchangeable  conceptions,  and  have  placed 
before  themselves  as  their  chief  aim  to  implant  maxims 
and  dogmas,  and  to  fill  the  head  with  representations  and 
ideas  which  are  in  opposition  to  nature,  and  can  therefore 
never  be  assimilated.  This  education  has  neglected  the 
body,  fatigued  the  brain,  weakened  the  nerves,  suppressed 
originality,  slackened  initiation,  and  the  consequence  is 
that  the  children  on  leaving  school  have  possessed  no  inde- 
pendence, and  have  had  no  eye  to  see  and  no  ear  to  hear. 
They  have  been  completely  estranged  from  life ;  and 
what  is  of  more  importance,  the   education  which   has 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  279 

alone  been  hitherto  procurable  has  shown  its  incapacity, 
especially,  in  that  during  its  continuance  men  have  re- 
tained the  same  nature  and  the  same  defects  ;  it  has 
not  eradicated  a  single  sin  or  brought  about  any  moral 
improvement  whatever.18 

Instead  of  this  a  new  system  of  education  must  be  in- 
stituted which  in  the  first  place  is  to  be  characterized  by 
an  honoring  of  the  child.  The  child  has  been  hitherto 
governed  peremptorily  and  from  without,  but  in  the 
future  the  child  must  be  placed  in  the  centre,  must  be 
considered  in  whatever  peculiarity  it  may  have,  and  must 
be  developed  according  to  its  own  individuality.  It  is 
now  the  era  of  the  child.  The  child  is  born  good,  for 
there  is  no  hereditary  sin  ;  every  defect  in  the  child  is  only 
a  hard  shell,  which  contains  the  germ  of  a  virtue,  which 
as  such  has  the  right  not  to  be  eradicated,  but  to  be  trained. 
There  must  be  no  question  of  punishment  or  breaking  of 
the  will ;  if  the  child  is  not  good  in  later  life,  then  it  has 
been  a  victim  of  its  parents  and  teachers,  and  upon  them 
lies  the  guilt.  They  have  to  bow  to  the  superiority  of  the 
child  ;  a  child  is  only  another  name  for  majesty.19 

Further,  this  great  reformation  must  be  wrought  in 
education,  —  it  must  return  from  school  to  life,  from  books 
to  nature,  from  theology  and  philosophy  to  biology.  In 
the  life  of  the  child  sense,  nature,  and  the  body  are  in  the 
foreground.  Before  consciousness  awakens,  and  intelli- 
gence and  judgment  are  formed,  the  child  is  passion,  de- 
sire, movement,  will.  Formerly  men  said  that  life  was 
thought,  but  now  we  see  that  life  is  will.  Will  is  the 
essence  of  the  world,  and  the  innermost  nature  of  man ; 
first  life,  then  thought ;  first  the  natural,  then  the  spiritual. 
The  muscles  make  forty-three  per  cent  of  the  weight  of 
the  human  body,  and  are  the  organs  of  the  will  and  the 


280  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

creators  of  all  culture.  Man  is  one-third  intelligence  and 
two-thirds  will.  The  "age  of  art"  must  thus  take  the 
place  of  the  "age  of  science."  The  body  with  its  members 
and  organs  ought  to  be  developed  before  all  things  ;  manual 
labor,  gymnastics,  sports,  and  all  kinds  of  play  ought  to 
take  up  a  large,  yes,  the  principal  part  in  education.  For 
mere  knowledge  produces  a  serious  danger ;  better  igno- 
rance than  knowledge  which  does  not  develop  the  strength 
of  man ;  "  muscle-culture  "  is  at  the  same  time  "  brain- 
building  "  ;  power  must  accompany  knowledge.20 

As  to  the  knowledge  which  must  be  communicated  in  the 
various  schools  of  instruction,  the  natural  sciences  ought  to 
take  the  place  which  was  formerly  given  to  the  so-called  spir- 
itual sciences,  literature,  history,  theology,  and  philosophy. 
The  science  of  nature  must  form  the  groundwork  of  all 
teaching,  and  the  common  possession  of  all  civilized  peo- 
ple. For  even  the  spiritual  sciences  can  no  longer  be 
understood  and  practised  with  benefit,  if  they  do  not  rest 
on  the  basis  of  the  science  of  nature.  Without  knowing 
man  in  his  prehistoric  life,  they  cannot  attain  their  full 
development.  If  they  have  latterly  advanced,  and  have 
reached  assured  results,  they  are  indebted  for  this  to  the 
application  of  that  method  which  is  used  in  the  sciences 
of  nature.  This,  then,  is  the  indispensable  foundation  for 
all  other  sciences  and  for  all  culture.  Nobody  ought  to  be 
nominated  to  any  important  office,  therefore,  or  to  be  ac- 
cepted as  a  member  of  parliament,  or  as  a  minister  of  the 
state,  unless  he  has  acquired  a  solid  knowledge  of  nature. 
In  a  word,  the  old  world-view  must  be  replaced  in  all 
schools  by  the  world- view  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution. 
Then  only  will  a  great  future  stretch  out  before  education, 
for  knowledge  of  nature  has  not  merely  an  intellectual, 
but  also  great  practical,  technical,  and  ethical  value.21 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  281 

But  a  reformation  which  will  usher  in  a  new  era  for 
the  human  race  cannot  confine  itself  to  a  change  in  the 
system  of  education.  If  reformation  must  consist  princi- 
pally in  replacing  the  old  world-view  by  that  of  evolution, 
then  educational  reform  is  but  a  single  step  in  a  long  road, 
and  there  remains  a  great  deal  to  do.  For  the  old  world- 
view —  that  is,  that  conception  of  world  and  life  which  has 
been  formed  under  the  influence  of  Christianity  —  is  so  in- 
timately interwoven  with  our  whole  being,  with  all  our 
thoughts  and  actions,  that  to  eradicate  it  would  seem  al- 
most a  hopeless  task,  and  if  it  could  be  accomplished, 
would  throw  humanity  into  a  violent  crisis,  the  conse- 
quences of  which  no  one  can  foresee.  Church,  and  state, 
and  society,  religion,  morality,  and  justice,  marriage,  fam- 
ily, and  school,  habits  and  laws,  and  our  whole  culture 
are,  notwithstanding  many  foreign  elements  which  have 
intruded  from  elsewhere,  built  on  a  Christian  basis  and 
animated  by  the  Christian  spirit.  He  who  desires  such 
a  reform  may,  no  doubt,  make  a  beginning,  but  who 
knows  what  the  end  will  be,  and  who  can  estimate  the 
cost?  None  the  less,  if  such  a  reformation  is  to  be 
wrought,  it  cannot  be  satisfied  with  a  mere  change  in 
the  system  of  education ;  it  must  proceed  to  a  total 
rebuilding  of   society. 

However,  even  if  we  do  not  reckon  with  the  conscious 
will  of  man,  there  is  already  at  work  in  present-day  soci- 
ety a  hidden  force  which  affects  it,  as  it  were,  in  heart  and 
reins,  and  distinguishes  it  from  all  earlier  forms  in  a  very 
remarkable  way.  We  may  approve  or  disapprove  of  this 
movement,  but  the  trend  of  modern  society  is  in  the  di- 
rection of  freedom,  autonomy,  and  democracy.  All  bound- 
ary lines  which  formerly  separated  men,  and  all  bonds 
which  encumbered  their  movements  and  activities,  have 


282  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

been  broken  down  one  after  another.  All  forms  of  servi- 
tude —  slavery,  bondage,  feudalism,  and  subordination  — 
are  thought  to  be  opposed  to  the  independence  and  dignity 
of  man ;  even  service  for  wages  appears  to  the  modern  man 
humiliating,  and  is  accounted  merely  another  form  of 
slavery.  All  the  relations  which  have  grown  up  between 
men  in  the  course  of  the  centuries  are  more  and  more  los- 
ing their  organic,  moral,  and  natural  character,  and  are 
being  replaced  by  voluntarily  formed  contracts.  Liberty 
of  religion  and  conscience  has  been  succeeded  by  freedom 
of  habitation  and  occupation,  of  trade  and  intercourse,  of 
union  and  association,  of  writing  and  thinking;  and 
thought  has  so  much  outstripped  discipline  that  the  most 
absurd  ideas  arouse  the  greatest  admiration. 

Specialization  and  multiplication  of  occupations  go  hand 
in  hand  with  this  autonomy.  The  number  of  trades 
which  were  organized  as  guilds  in  Germany  in  the  eigh- 
teenth century  were  counted  by  tens ;  they  are  now  to  be 
numbered  by  thousands,  and  continually  increase,  almost 
from  day  to  day.  Labor  is  endlessly  differentiated  and 
specialized.  All  activities  which  are  auxiliary  to  the  pro- 
vision of  the  necessities  of  life  have  become  independent 
occupations.  The  machine  which  has  replaced  the  imple- 
ment in  the  hand  of  the  workman,  and  operates  much 
more  quickly,  uniformly,  cheaply,  and  powerfully  than  any 
human  power,  increases  the  division  of  labor,  and  makes 
the  simplest  article  into  a  product  which  is  accomplished 
by  the  co-operation  of  many  hands.  And  this  specializing 
of  labor  may  be  observed  not  only  in  material,  but  also 
in  spiritual  domains.  There  was  a  time  when  one  could 
say  of  a  person  that  he  knew  everything  that  was  written 
in  books,  but  such  an  encyclopaedic  knowledge  is  not  pos- 
sible now,  even  for  the  greatest  genius ;  sciences  are  di- 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  283 

vided  and  multiplied,  and  are  so  far  removed  from  the 
common  centre  that  the  investigator  in  one  science  is  a 
complete  stranger  in  the  disciplines  of  the  others,  and 
does  not  even  understand  the  terms  employed  in  them. 

With  this  specialization  of  labor  is  combined,  contrary 
to  what  would  perhaps  apriori  be  expected,  an  increase  in 
social  dependence.  It  is  usually  said  that  the  French 
Revolution  has  made  men  free  and  equal,  but  to  tell  the 
whole  truth  one  has  to  add  that  it  has  replaced  personal 
by  social  dependence.  We  depend  on  each  other  now 
more  than  ever.  Nobody,  no  man,  no  city,  no  village,  no 
people,  and  no  state  is  independent  any  longer.  We  have 
no  food  and  no  drink,  no  covering  or  clothing,  no  warmth 
or  light,  no  furniture  and  no  implements,  which  are  not 
procured  for  us  by  the  community  from  day  to  day.  Each 
man  has  significance  only  as  a  part  of  the  whole,  as  a 
"  labor-unit  of  the  social  organism  "  ;  if  he  be  left  to  him- 
self, and  excluded  from  the  social  body,  he  is  powerless 
and  loses  his  value.  This  life  in  community,  which  forms 
such  a  remarkable  trait  in  the  society  of  to-day,  is  in- 
debted for  its  growth  in  a  large  degree  to  the  decline  of 
the  value  of  personality. 

And  this  social  dependence  is  continually  increasing ; 
the  organization  of  society  is  progressing  from  day  to 
clay  under  our  eyes.  Society  has  already  become  a  most 
artificial  system  of  manifold  and  complicated  relations, 
a  gigantic  organism,  wherein  all  members  are  closely 
connected ;  but  all  agree  that  the  socialization  of  society 
proceeds  without  intermission  ;  we  are  carried  steadily  for- 
ward in  the  direction  of  what  Lamprecht  calls  the  "  bound 
enterprises."  The  anarchy  which  reigns  in  the  produc- 
tion of  goods,  the  abuse  of  power  of  which  the  trusts  are 
guilty,  the  law  of  parsimony  in  labor,  the  caprices  of  de- 


284  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

mand  and  supply,  and  the  conflict  of  capital  and  pro- 
letariat, —  all  this  leads  to  social  organization  and  de- 
mands help  from  the  all-embracing  state.  And  the 
state  has  already  traversed  a  good  part  of  this  way. 
Private  enterprise  has  been  replaced  in  many  depart- 
ments by  the  service  of  the  community;  one  circle  of 
life  after  another  loses  its  independence.  Jurisprudence, 
army,  navy,  taxation,  the  postal  system,  telegraphy,  trams 
and  railways,  instruction  in  all  kinds  of  schools,  the  care 
of  libraries  and  museums,  of  health  and  cleanliness,  of 
poorhouses  and  asylums,  the  exploiting  of  water  and 
heat  supply,  of  gas  and  electricity,  fire-  and  police-depart- 
ments, roads  and  canals,  parks  and  theatres,  savings  banks 
and  insurance  companies,  and  many  other  interests,  are 
wholly  or  in  part  withdrawn  from  private  enterprise  and 
given  into  the  hands  of  local  or  national  authorities. 

Well,  then,  social  reformers  say  to  us,  if  these  things 
are  so,  what  can  we  do  but  help  on  and  direct,  promote 
and  complete,  this  powerful  movement  which  is  already 
proceeding  ?  We  are  working  in  the  same  direction  if  we 
break  down  finally  the  last  barrier  which  separates  men, 
and  that  is  capital,  private  property.  The  Reformation 
has  procured  for  us  religious  freedom ;  that  is,  the  equality 
of  all  men  before  God.  The  Revolution  of  1789  gave  us 
political  liberty,  —  the  equality  of  all  men  before  the  law. 
A  third  reformation  is  now  in  order,  —  the  establishment 
of  freedom  in  society,  and  the  equality  of  all  men  in  re- 
spect to  the  possessions  of  culture.  What  good  are  reli- 
gious and  political  freedom  for  men  if  social  equality  is 
withheld  from  them  ?  What  value  has  the  declaration  of 
the  rights  of  man  if  the  right  to  labor  and  food  and  pleasure 
remains  unsecured?  As  Protestantism  has  prepared  the 
way  for  liberalism,  and  liberalism  for  democracy,  so  now 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  285 

democracy  ought  to  be  fulfilled  in  socialism.  The  motto 
of  liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity  will  be  completely  real- 
ized only  when  the  community,  leaving  the  means  of 
enjoyment  and  the  ratio  of  consumption  to  the  individual, 
possesses  itself  of  all  means  of  production,  —  land,  fac- 
tories, and  implements,  —  and,  systematically  regulating 
the  whole  production,  divides  the  product  among  all  cit- 
izens, according  to  their  merits  or  necessities.  In  a  word, 
the  reformation  of  society  will  reach  completion  only  in 
the  socializing  of  all  the  possessions  of  culture.22 

Men  cherish  the  boldest  expectations  on  the  faith  of 
all  these  reformers.  Marx,  it  is  true,  held  the  opinion 
that  he  had  set  socialism  free  from  utopianism,  and  had 
established  it  on  a  firm,  scientific  basis.  His  effort  was  to 
conclude  an  alliance  between  the  suffering  and  the  think- 
ing part  of  humanity  and  to  make  science  serviceable  for 
the  proletariat.  Therefore  he  made  a  study  of  present- 
day  society,  tried  to  learn  the  laws  which  govern  its  de- 
velopment, and  endeavored  to  show  that  the  old  society 
could  produce  an  entirely  new  one  by  way  of  evolution. 
He  refused  indeed  to  draw  up  a  complete  description  of 
the  future  state,  but  he  did  not  shrink  from  proclaiming 
his  expectations  concerning  it,  and  thus  he  ceased  to  be 
a  scientific  inquirer,  and  came  forward  in  the  role  of  a 
prophet.  And  when  he  further  not  only  published  the 
results  of  his  inquiry,  but  also  made  it  the  basis  of  a  pro- 
gramme which  was  to  be  adopted  and  realized  by  a  definite 
party,  he  threw  off  the  toga  and  put  on  the  mantle  of 
a  preacher  of  repentance  and  a  reformer.  Even  Marx 
thus  could  not  escape  from  utopianism ;  and  the  socialism 
which  operates  under  his  name  is,  as  a  doctrine  concerning 
a  future  society,  no  scientific  school,  but  a  political  party. 
The  society  of  the  future  naturally  is  no  subject  of  ex- 


286  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

perienee  and  investigation,  but  an  object  of  hope  and 
expectation,  of  desire  and  endeavor.  This  is  sufficiently 
proved  by  the  fact  that  socialism,  in  consequence  of  the 
serious  criticism  which  its  anticipated  future  state  has 
aroused,  has  finally  abandoned  all  details  and  left  to  the 
future  what  the  future  shall  bring  forth.23 

Nevertheless  it  can  never  completely  abstain  from  fram- 
ing a  description  of  the  future  state,  either  with  respect 
to  its  own  members  or  those  who  are  outside  ;  for  after  all 
each  man  wishes  to  know,  to  a  certain  extent,  in  what  direc- 
tion and  to  what  end  he  is  led  by  such  a  radical  change  in 
society.  If  the  ideal  which  men  strive  after  cannot  be 
described,  or  on  being  described  betrays  to  all  its  imprac- 
ticability, all  confidence  is  lost  and  all  obedience  is  at  an 
end.  Hope  alone  keeps  socialism  alive ;  u  the  vision  of  the 
future  is  for  every  present  circumstance  the  strongest 
bearer  of  power." 24  Socialism,  therefore,  ever  seeks  its  sat- 
isfaction in  the  forecast  of  Bebel,  that  the  future  state  will 
bring  a  condition  of  happiness  and  peace  for  all  men.  The 
state  with  its  ministers  and  parliaments,  its  army  and 
police,  will  not  be  necessary  in  the  new  society,  for  all 
those  relations  of  possession  and  power  in  the  behalf 
of  which  they  have  been  called  into  being  will  have 
passed  out  of  existence.  All  men  will  receive  equal  posi- 
tions in  life  and  a  suitable  subsistence.  Each  will  have 
to  accomplish  a  definite  work ;  but  this  work  will  require 
only  a  few  hours  a  day,  and  for  the  remainder  of  his  time 
each  man  may  devote  himself,  according  to  his  free  choice, 
to  spiritual  occupations,  to  companionship,  to  pleasure. 
There  will  no  longer  exist  distinctions  between  rich  and 
poor,  idle  and  industrious,  learned  and  ignorant,  the  popu- 
lation of  city  and  country,  because  there  will  no  longer 
exist   commerce,   trade,  money,  or   unequal   division   of 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     287 

pleasure  and  labor.  Each  one  after  the  necessary  labor 
will  do  what  he  pleases,  so  that  according  to  his  free 
option  one  will  become  a  musician,  another  a  painter,  a 
third  a  sculptor,  a  fourth  an  actor.  Even  diseases  will 
disappear  more  and  more,  and  natural  death,  the  slow 
dying  of  the  powers  of  life,  will  become  more  and  more 
the  rule.25 

Socialism  does  not  stand  alone  in  these  Utopian  expec- 
tations. It  has  had  its  predecessors  in  Plato  and  Thomas 
More,  in  Campanella  and  Morelly,  St.  Simou  and  Fourier, 
Proudhon  and  Comte,  and  in  many  other  theologians  and 
philosophers,  in  many  religious  sects  and  political  parties. 
Humanity  as  a  whole  has  always  lived,  and  still  lives,  in 
hope,  notwithstanding  all  empiricism  and  realism.  Men 
paint  the  future  state  in  very  different  colors  ;  and  accord- 
ing to  the  different  conceptions  each  one  has  of  the  highest 
good,  represent  that  future  state  as  a  kingdom  of  morality 
(Kant),  or  humanity  (Herder),  as  a  kingdom  of  liberty,  in 
which  spirit  fully  penetrates  nature  (Hegel),  or  as  a 
Johannine  church,  which  will  at  the  end  replace  the 
church  of  Peter  and  Paul  (Schelling);  as  a  world  in 
which  ideal  or  material  possessions  are  the  chief  enjoy- 
ment. But  such  a  future  is  expected  by  every  one  ;  all 
religion,  all  philosophy,  and  all  views  of  life  and  the 
world  issue  in  an  eschatology.  And  not  only  so,  but  all 
systems  have  in  common  that  they  finish  the  world's 
history  with  to-day,  and  hereafter  expect  only  a  world 
era  wherein  the  hope  and  the  dream  of  humanity  will  be 
realized ; 26  all  eschatology  which  lives  in  the  heart  in- 
cludes the  belief  in  a  speedy  parousia. 

This  ineradicable  hope  of  humanity  is  full  of  potent 
charm.  And  if  to-day  it  springs  up  with  new  strength,  shuns 
no  exertion,  esteems  all  opposition  conquerable,  and  strives 


288  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

to  introduce  the  new  era  for  humanity  by  all  kinds  of  ref- 
ormation, it  compels  respect  and  stimulates  to  activity. 
When  Ludwig  Stein  preaches  a  social  optimism,  which 
wages  war  on  all  Nirvana-philosophy  and  turns  its  back 
on  all  conservatives  and  pessimists  ;  2~  when  Metschnikoff 
proclaims  in  the  name  of  science  the  coming  day  of  the 
abolition  of  all  sickness,  the  lengthening  of  human  life  to 
a  good  old  age,  and  the  reduction  of  death  to  a  gentle, 
painless  fading  away ; 28  when  Stanley  Hall  tells  us  that 
the  world  is  not  old,  but  young,  that  the  twilight  in  which 
we  live  is  not  that  of  the  evening  but  of  the  morning, 
that  the  soul  is  still  always  becoming,  and  is  capable  of 
a  much  higher  development ; 29  when  James  declares  that 
the  world  is,  or  becomes,  that  which  we  make  it :  30  when 
all  these  men  appeal  to  our  responsibility,  to  our  conscious- 
ness of  duty,  to  our  power  and  energy,  then  our  hope  is 
rekindled,  our  courage  is  raised,  and  we  are  stimulated  to 
go  forward  immediately  without  further  hesitation. 

Nevertheless  it  should  be  observed  that  while  this  opti- 
mistic activity  seems  to  depend  only  on  man,  and  to  feel 
not  the  least  need  of  divine  help,  yet  on  the  other  hand 
it  breaks  through  the  circle  of  immanent  thought  and 
action,  mounts  to  transcendency,  and  seeks  strength  and 
security  in  metaphysics.  The  doctrine  that  man  is  cor- 
rupted by  sin  and  cannot  sanctify  and  save  himself  by  his 
own  strength  is  commonly  accounted  the  most  fearful  of 
all  errors ;  autonomy  and  autosotery  reject  all  heterosotery. 
But  at  the  same  moment  when  all  transcendency  and 
metaphysics  are  denied,  the  human  being  is  exalted  above 
his  usual  state  and  is  identified  with  the  divine.  The 
superhuman  task  of  transforming  present  society  into  a 
state  of  peace  and  joy  requires  more  than  ordinary  human 
power  ;  if  God  himself  does  not  work  the  change,  hope  can 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  289 

be  cherished  only  when  human  power  is  divinized.  This 
is  in  fact  the  intimate  idea  of  that  philosophical  theory 
which  Strauss  has  most  clearly  formulated,  that  the  infinite 
is  not  realized  in  a  single  man,  but  only  in  humanity; 
humanity  being  the  true  unity  of  divine  and  human 
natures,  the  man  becoming  God,  the  infinite  spirit  de- 
scending to  finiteness,  the  child  of  the  visible  mother 
nature,  and  of  the  invisible  father  spirit,  the  doer  of 
miracles,  the  saviour  of  the  world.  What  humanity  con- 
fesses concerning  Christ,  and  pronounces  in  its  idea  of 
divinity,  is  merely  a  symbol  of  what  it  finds  in  itself, 
and  what  it  is.  Theology  is  mainly  anthropology;  the 
worship  of  God  is  humanity  adoring  itself.  Comte, 
therefore,  was  quite  consistent  when  he  substituted  the 
worship  of  humanity  for  the  worship  of  God.31 

This  deification  of  man  proves  clearly  that  no  eschatol- 
ogy  is  possible  without  metaphysics.  But  this  is  shown 
still  more  clearly  by  another  fact.  Culture,  ethics,  ideal- 
ism, all  striving  after  a  goal,  must  always  seek  alliance 
with  metaphysics.  Kant  reversed  the  relation  between 
them,  and  tried  to  make  morals  entirely  independent  of 
science ;  but  on  those  morals  he  again  built  up  practical 
faith  in  a  divine  providence.  In  the  same  way,  any 
ethical  system  which  aspires  to  be  true  ethics  and  to  bear 
a  normative  and  teleological  character,  not  falling  into 
merely  a  description  of  habits  and  customs,  is  forced  to 
seek  the  support  of  metaphysics.  If  man  has  to  strive 
after  an  ideal,  he  can  gain  courage  only  by  the  faith  that 
this  ideal  is  the  ideal  of  the  world  and  is  based  on  true 
reality.  By  banishing  metaphysics,  materialism  has  no 
longer  an  ethical  system,  knows  no  longer  the  distinction 
between  good  and  evil,  possesses  no  moral  law,  no  duty, 
no  virtue,  and  no  highest  good.     And  when  the  immanent- 

19 


290  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

humanistic  philosophy  of  Natorp,  Cohen,  and  others  en- 
deavors to  base  ethics  exclusively  on  the  categorical 
imperative,  it  loses  all  security  that  the  "  ought  "  will  one 
day  triumph  over  the  "  is,"  and  the  good  over  the  bad.32 
Whatever  one  believes  to  be  the  highest  good,  this  highest 
good  is  either  an  imagination,  or  it  is  and  must  be  also 
the  highest,  true  being,  the  essence  of  reality,  the  mean- 
ing and  destiny  of  the  world,  and  thus  also  the  bond 
which  holds  all  men  and  nations  together  in  every  part  of 
the  world  and  saves  them  from  anarchy.33 

The  Christian  finds  his  assurance  of  the  triumph  of  good 
in  his  confession  of  God's  sovereign  and  almighty  will, 
which,  though  distinct  from  the  world  and  exalted  above 
it,  still  accomplishes  through  it  its  holy  purpose,  and,  in 
accordance  with  this  purpose,  leads  humanity  and  the 
world  to  salvation.  But  he  who  rejects  this  confession 
does  not  therefore  escape  from  metaphysics.  It  sounds 
well  to  call  man  the  rebel  in  nature,  who,  when  it  says 
"  Die !  "  answers,  "  I  will  live."  34  But  with  all  his  wis- 
dom and  strength  man  is  powerless  against  that  nature 
in  the  end,  unless  it  be  subject  to  a  will  which  maintains 
man  in  his  superiority  above  it.  That  is  the  reason  why, 
even  when  theism  is  denied,  the  true  reality,  the  world- 
will  which  is  hidden  behind  phenomena  and  very  imper- 
fectly manifested,  is  nevertheless  always  thought  of  as 
analogous  to  that  of  man,  and  especally  as  an  ethically  good 
will.  Notwithstanding  all  his  self-confidence  and  self- 
glorification,  man  is,  in  every  possible  world-view,  incor- 
porated in  a  larger  whole,  and  is  explained  and  confirmed 
by  that  totality.  Metaphysics,  that  is  the  belief  in  the  abso- 
lute as  a  holy  power,  always  forms  the  foundation  of  ethics. 

In  our  days  evolution  takes  the  place  of  such  meta- 
physics.    The  modern  man  derives  his  faith  and  anima- 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  291 

tion,  his  activity  and  his  optimism,  from  the  idea  of 
evolution,  which  according  to  his  belief  governs  the 
whole  world.  If  he  endeavors  restlessly  to  establish  a 
holy  and  happy  kingdom  of  humanity  on  earth,  and  stands 
firm  in  his  belief  in  its  realization  notwithstanding  all 
difficulties  and  disappointments,  this  can  be  explained 
only  in  one  way,  —  that  he  feels  himself  borne  on  by  the 
true  reality,  which  is  hidden  behind  the  oftentimes  very 
sad  phenomena.  Striving  and  laboring  to  attain  his 
ideal,  he  believes  himself  in  harmony  with  the  innermost 
motive-power  of  the  world,  with  the  mysterious  course  of 
nature.  To  work,  to  endeavor,  to  strive,  to  become,  is  the 
deepest  meaning  of  the  world,  the  heart  and  the  kernel  of 
true  reality.  The  doctrine  of  evolution  thus  takes  the 
place  of  the  old  religion  in  the  modern  man.35  It  is  no 
science ;  it  does  not  rest  on  undeniable  facts  ;  it  has  often 
in  the  past  and  in  the  present  been  contradicted  by  the 
facts.  But  that  does  not  matter ;  miracle  is  the  dearest 
child  of  faith.  All  change  in  the  world,  as  if  it  were 
nothing,  is  identified  with  development,  development  with 
progress,  progress  with  material  welfare  or  ethical  culture, 
with  liberty  or  morality.  Although  monism  in  its  differ- 
ent forms  denies  that  the  absolute  power  which  rules  the 
world  has  personality,  consciousness  and  will,  yet  it  always 
speaks  of  this  power  as  if  it  were  a  person.  Consciousness, 
instinct,  will,  labor,  endeavor,  development,  aim,  and  holi- 
ness are  unintentionally  ascribed  to  it ;  it  is  even  identi- 
fied with  absolute  divine  love  in  a  naive  way,  which  is 
in  direct  antagonism  to  the  scientific  pretensions  of  the 
speakers.  And  love  is  then  called  "  the  original  of  all 
social  forces,  the  creator  and  reconciler  of  all ;  the  only 
true  God  is  love."  3(5  Just  as  the  pagan  treats  his  idol,  so  * 
modern  man  acts  with  the  idea  of  evolution. 


292  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

The  superstitious  character,  which  is  more  and  more 
taken  on  by  this  idea,  is  clearly  seen  in  the  contents  of 
the  optimistic  expectations  which  are  cherished  concern- 
ing the  future  of  the  human  race.  For  these  expecta- 
tions involve  nothing  less  than  that  human  nature  in  the 
future,  either  slowly  by  gradual  development,  or  suddenly 
by  leaps  of  mutation,  will  undergo  radical  change.  In  the 
future  state  there  will  be  no  longer  any  sickness  or  crime, 
no  envy  or  malice,  no  enmity  or  war,  no  courts  of  justice 
and  no  police,  but  contentment  and  peace  will  be  the  por- 
tion of  all.  Now  it  is  possible  to  say  that  sin  and  crime 
are  owing  to  circumstances  alone,  and  thus  will  disappear 
with  the  reformation  of  the  environment.  But  this  is 
nevertheless  such  a  superficial  judgment  that  no  refuta- 
tion of  it  is  necessary.  Every  man  knows  by  experience 
that  sin  is  rooted  in  his  own  heart.  If  there  ever  is  to  be 
a  humanity  without  sin  and  crime,  holy  and  blessed,  then 
it  must  be  preceded  by  a  radical  change  in  human  nature. 
But  such  a  change  is  not  too  great  for  the  expectation  of 
the  optimists,  for  they  are  assured  of  it  by  evolution. 
Man  has  advanced  so  much  in  the  past  that  we  may 
cherish  the  best  hope  for  the  future.  He  was  an  animal, 
and  became  a  man,  —  why  should  he  not  become  an  angel 
in  the  future?  As  by  immanent  forces  alone  life  has 
proceeded  from  the  lifeless,  consciousness  from  the  un- 
conscious, intelligence  from  the  association  of  representa- 
tions, will  from  feeling,  spirit  from  matter,  good  from 
evil,  what  should  hinder  man  from  conquering  in  course 
of  time  all  sin,  putting  an  end  to  all  misery,  and  establish- 
ing "  the  kingdom  of  man  "  on  earth  once  for  all,  the  more 
because  he  himself  by  exertion  can  lead  and  promote  the 
evolutionary  process  ?  Thus  the  idea  of  an  Uebermensck 
is  intimately  connected  with  the  idea  of  evolution.     Dar- 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     293 

win  himself  believed  in  it,  and  comforted  himself  for 
the  suffering  of  this  present  time  with  the  hope  that 
man  in  the  far  future  would  become  a  much  more  perfect 
creature  than  he  is  now ;  37  and  the  optimistic  evolutionists 
join  in  this  expectation :  man  is  still  in  the  making,  he  is 
still  at  the  beginning  of  his  development,  — a  rich,  beauti- 
ful future  lies  before  him.38 

But  although  this  future  may  speedily  appear,  it  is  not 
in  existence  yet,  and  it  is  not  likely  that  it  will  dawn  in 
the  days  of  the  present  generation.  What  profit  all  these 
expectations  for  the  men  who  now  live,  and  each  day 
draw  nearer  to  their  end  ?  Socialism  scoff's  at  the  Chris- 
tian faith,  which  promises  a  bill  of  exchange  on  eternity  ; 
but  eternity  is  after  all  more  worthy  of  our  trust  than  an 
insecure,  doubtful,  and  distant  future.  So  the  doctrine  of 
evolution  has  found  itself  suddenly  confronted  with  the 
question,  what  significance  the  eschatological  expectations 
have  for  the  individual.  In  the  materialistic  period,  which 
lies  behind  us,  it  had  for  this  serious  question  only  a  con- 
temptuous smile.  But  the  belief  in  a  future  kingdom  of 
humanity  is  always  confronted  by  the  problem  of  personal 
immortality.  And  the  doctrine  of  evolution  assumes  now 
in  its  new  idealistic  form  quite  a  different  bearing  towards 
this  problem.39  Why  should  it  be  impossible  to  introduce 
this  immortality  into  its  system  ?  If  man  in  the  long  proc- 
ess of  his  development  has  raised  himself  by  his  intelli- 
gence high  above  the  animal,  probably  he  can  make  himself 
immortal  by  continual  development.  Of  course  it  is  im- 
probable that  all  men  who  have  already  lived  and  borne 
that  name  have  reached  such  immortality,  for  the  transi- 
tion from  animal  to  man  has  been  very  gradual ;  and  it  is 
also  possible,  as  the  adherents  of  conditional  immortality 
assure  us,  that  even  now  and  in  the  future  not  all  men 


294  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

will  be  able  to  advance  so  far,  but  only  they  who  ethically 
work  out  their  own  self-perfecting.  But  in  itself  there  is 
no  reason  why  man  by  his  own  development  should  not 
become  immortal. 

Death  certainly  cannot  be  thought  of  as  a  catastrophe, 
as  a  punishment  of  sin,  as  a  judgment  which  is  executed 
upon  man.  It  is  simply  a  normal  phenomenon,  a  gradual 
transition,  such  as  often  takes  place  in  the  organic  world. 
The  egg  becomes  a  chick,  the  caterpillar  becomes  a  but- 
terfly ;  and  so  man  advances,  as  at  birth  so  at  death,  into 
another  form  of  existence ;  he  changes  his  clothing,  —  he 
lays  aside  the  coarse,  material  body,  and  continues  his  life 
in  a  finer,  ethereal  body.  So  Darwinism  successively  brings 
us  into  company  with  Swedenborg  and  Jung  Stilling, 
Davis  and  Kardec,  Madame  Blavatsky  and  Mrs.  Annie 
Besant,  Mrs.  Eddy  and  Elijah  Dowie,  with  all  the  theos- 
ophists  and  spiritualists  of  recent  times.  And  it  is  not  to 
be  wondered  at  that  many  adherents  of  the  evolutionary 
doctrine  are  at  the  same  time  advocates  of  spiritualism.40 
For  all  these  tendencies  are  produced  by  the  same  root 
idea :  they  are  all  strongly  opposed  to  the  Christian  doc- 
trine of  creation  and  fall,  of  hereditary  sin  and  ethical 
impotence,  of  redemption  by  Christ  and  salvation  by 
grace  ;  and  they  declare  instead  that  all  is  eternally  be- 
coming, that  in  an  absolute  sense  there  is  no  coming  into 
existence  and  no  dissolution,  but  only  a  change  in  the 
form  of  existence.  This  leads  to  the  consequence  that, 
as  Haeckel  has  equipped  substance,  ether,  and  atoms  with 
spirit,  soul,  conscience,  and  will,  so  men  have  truly  ex- 
isted eternally  ;  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  preexistenceism 
has  again  gained  many  adherents  to-day.41 

But  although  there  may  be  difference  of  opinion  on 
this   point,    human   development   is  a  part  of  the  great 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     295 

evolutionary  process  and  is  bound  to  fixed  laws.  Man 
is  what  he  does,  and  perhaps  already  has  done,  in  pre- 
ceding states  of  existence ;  all  that  happens  to  a  man 
upon  earth,  his  external  as  well  as  his  internal  condi- 
tion is  a  strict  consequence  of  his  behavior  and  actions. 
There  is  place  only  for  merits,  for  the  law  of  reward  of 
man's  works ;  there  is  no  grace  or  forgiveness  in  the 
course  of  nature.  The  ethical  law  is  the  same  as  the 
natural  law ;  everywhere  karma  reigns,  —  the  law  of 
inevitable  consequences.  Therefore  there  exist  also  differ- 
ences among  men,  not  in  origin  and  disposition,  by  divine 
ordinance,  but  by  the  use  or  misuse  which  they  make  of 
their  gifts.  Men  do  not  run  with  equal  ardor ;  they  do 
not  exert  themselves  with  the  same  vigor.  There  are  sar- 
cical,  psychical,  and  pneumatic  men;  and  according  to 
their  work  in  their  earthly  existence  they  continue  their 
life  after  death.  Death  is  no  death,  but  life,  —  a  form  of 
transition  to  a  higher  existence.  The  deceased  do  not 
even  know  that  they  have  died ;  they  keep  a  body,  they 
see  and  hear,  think  and  speak,  consider  and  act,  just  as 
they  did  here  upon  earth.  Perhaps  they  continue  their 
intercourse  for  a  shorter  or  longer  time  with  men  on 
earth,  as  spiritualism  teaches ;  or  they  return  in  another 
body  to  the  earth,  as  theosophy  assumes ;  or  they  continue 
their  purification  in  some  other  way.42 

But  whatever  evolution  thinks  about  the  future,  it  af- 
fords no  rest  for  the  mind  and  none  for  the  heart,  be- 
cause it  takes  away  from  us  the  Lord  of  the  world. 
If  there  is  no  being,  but  only  becoming,  then  there  is 
no  final  state,  either  on  this  side  of  death  for  human- 
ity, or  on  the  other  side  for  the  individual  man.  The 
doctrine  of  evolution  is  even  mortally  wounded  by  this 
eternal  process,  because  the  idea  of  a  never-ending  devel- 


296  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

opment  means  a  process  without  aim,43  and  thus  no  longer 
a  development.  For  every  state  exists  only  to  make  way 
for  another;  as  soon  as  the  kingdom  of  man  came  into 
existence  it  would  pass  away,  and  this  the  more  because, 
according  to  the  testimony  of  science,  the  present  world 
and  the  present  humanity  cannot  last  eternally.44  If 
there  is  no  omnipotent  and  holy  God  who  exists  above 
the  world,  and  is  for  it  the  goal  and  resting-place  of  its 
strife,  then  there  is  no  final  end,  no  completion  of  the 
process  of  the  world,  and  no  rest  for  the  human  heart.  It 
is  then  an  empty  sound  even  to  speak  with  Hoffding 
and  Miinsterberg  of  the  eternal  preservation  of  values,45 
for  all  value  disappears  with  personality ;  or  to  take  ref- 
uge in  a  mysterious  Buddhistic  Nirvana,  as  is  proposed 
by  Schopenhauer  and  von  Hartmann,  wherein  all  life, 
consciousness,  and  will  sink  into  an  eternal,  hypnotised 
condition.46  From  the  standpoint  of  evolution  there  is 
place  only  for  an  eternal  return,  as  was  already  assumed 
in  Greek  philosophy  by  Heraclitus  and  the  Stoics,  and  in 
these  later  days  has  been  advocated  even  by  Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche  was  first  a  pessimist,  pupil  of  Schopenhauer  and 
Wagner ;  later  he  became  a  positivist,  and,  rejecting  all 
metaphysics,  took  his  standpoint  in  reality  as  the  one 
true  world ;  still  later  he  combined  with  this  the  doctrine 
of  the  Wille  zur  Macht ;  the  real  world  became  for  him 
an  ocean  of  powers,  which  is  not,  but  eternally  becomes, 
which  has  no  origin  and  aim,  but  continually  rises  and 
falls,  appears  and  disappears.  Although  he  draws  from 
this  creative  energy  of  the  Wille  zur  Macht  the  belief  in 
the  appearance  of  the  Uebermensch,  and  takes  this  as  the 
aim  of  the  process  of  the  world,  yet  it  is  self-evident  that 
this  belief  is  in  direct  opposition  to  his  positivism,  as 
well   as    to   his   doctrine   of    the   eternal    return.       The 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  297 

Uebermen8ch  is  not  only  a  pure  product  of  his  imagina- 
tion, but  can  only  be  a  transition  form  in  the  process  of 
the  world.47  An  optimism  which  is  exclusively  built  on 
evolution  is  always  transmuted  into  pessimism  if  one 
ponders  a  little  more  deeply. 

This  is  apparent  also  in  the  so-called  meliorism  of 
James.  If  pragmatism  is  opposed  to  idealism,  and  takes 
its  standpoint  in  the  empirical  world,  it  cannot  attain  to 
an  eschatology.  One  may  with  Comte  require  from 
science  that  it  give  us  the  power  to  look  forward  and 
predict  the  future  ; 48  but  Ostwald  rightly  says  that  our 
knowledge  of  the  commencement  and  end  of  the  world  is 
null,49  for  the  world  is  so  enormously  great,  and  human 
society  so  complicated,  that  nobody  can  calculate  with 
any  certainty  how  they  will  develop  in  the  future.  Every 
one  who  holds  strictly  to  experience  must  protest  against 
a  metaphysics  of  evolution  which  speaks  of  an  infallible 
and  eternal  progress.  All  this  belongs  to  the  province  of 
faith,  and  is  not  able  to  withstand  a  logical  and  ethical 
criticism.  On  the  ground  of  empirical  reality  we  can  only 
resign  ourselves  to  ignorance ;  we  know  not  what  the  future 
may  bring,  or  how  humanity  will  be  developed.  The  only 
thing  we  have  to  do  is  to  fulfil  our  duty.  We  cannot  stop 
the  process,  but  we  may  perhaps  bend  and  guide  it  a  little. 
Let  us  take  the  world  as  it  is,  and  make  the  best  of  it. 
Perhaps  the  future  will  be  better  than  we  think.50 

This  meliorism  certainly  does  not  bear  witness  to  strong 
faith  and  great  courage.  It  has  to  all  intents  abandoned 
the  whole  world  to  pessimism,  and  maintains  itself  only 
by  holding  fast  to  duty.  But  this  isolation  of  the  cate- 
gorical imperative  from  the  totality  of  life,  in  which  it  is 
presented  to  us  in  man  and  humanity,  has  in  no  small 
measure  contributed  to  the  appearance  and  spreading  of 


298  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

a  pessimistic  feeling  in  the  nineteenth  century  ; 51  the  sys- 
tem of  Schopenhauer  depends  closely  on  Kant's  criticism. 
If  the  essence  of  things  is  unknowable,  the  misery  of  man 
cannot  be  fathomed.  For  metaphysical  need  is  born  in  all 
of  us,  and  the  thirst  after  the  knowledge  of  the  absolute 
cannot  be  uprooted  from  the  heart.  Our  condition  would 
be  more  tolerable  if  religion  did  not  consist  in  fellowship 
with  God,  or  if  that  fellowship  could  be  realized  and  en- 
joyed without  consciousness.  But  what  we  do  not  know, 
we  have  not,  and  we  love  not.  The  special  needs  of  our 
time  are  therefore  caused  by  agnosticism.  Trust  is  under- 
mined not  only  in  science,  but  also  and  principally  in  our- 
selves, in  the  witness  of  our  self-consciousness,  in  the 
value  of  our  religious  and  ethical  perceptions,  in  the 
power  of  our  intelligence  and  reason.  Doubt  is  awakened 
in  all  hearts,  and  the  uncertainty  causes  our  convictions 
to  sway  hither  and  thither;  we  are  moved  by  every  wind 
of  doctrine,  and  weakened  in  our  will  by  the  yeas  and 
nays  which  resound  on  all  sides. 

Nobody  can  predict  how  the  human  race  will  overcome 
this  disease.  Philosophy,  which  has  revived  in  late  years, 
assuredly  is  not  fitted  for  the  task.  For  it  is  itself  infected 
in  a  great  measure  by  the  disease ;  it  is  uncertain  in  its 
starting  point,  is  in  doubt  concerning  its  own  task  and 
aim,  and  is  divided  into  all  kinds  of  schools  and  systems. 
There  is  no  question  of  a  steady  progress  in  its  history ;  it 
has,  especially  in  the  period  of  Kant,  broken  more  down 
than  it  has  built  up,  and  its  defenders  not  infrequently 
give  utterance  to  the  opinion  that  the  advantage  which  it 
has  produced  consists  solely  in  the  enlightening  of  insight 
into  the  essence  of  human  knowledge,  and  that  aside  from 
this  it  is  mostly  a  history  of  instructive  and  important 
human  errors.52 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  299 

The  ethical  autonomy  also,  which  formed  for  Kant  the 
basis  of  his  metaphysics,  offers  in  its  isolation  no  sufficient 
security.  For  if  the  whole  world  is  ascribed  to  the  opera- 
tion of  a  blind  process,  it  cannot  be  understood  how  con- 
sciousness of  duty  could  obtain  a  firm  foothold  in  this 
stream  of  becoming.  Evolution,  which  is  everywhere 
else  recognized,  does  not  respect  this  apparent  immuta- 
bility, but  penetrates  into  the  essence  of  the  moral  man, 
analyzes  his  views,  shows  the  sources  from  which  his 
opinions  are  drawn,  and  shrugs  its  shoulders  over  the 
eternity  of  moral  duty  and  moral  laws.53  But  apart  from 
this  serious  objection,  moral  autonomy  may  uplift  and  an- 
imate man  for  a  short  time  ;  it  may  fill  him  with  admira- 
tion, as  does  also  the  starry  sky  above  his  head;  and  in 
days  of  self-confidence  it  may  stimulate  him  to  restless 
effort,  but  it  can  give  him  no  comfort  in  hours  of  repent- 
ance and  bitter  agony.  It  is  good  for  the  Pharisee,  who 
knows  no  other  law  than  reward  for  service,  but  it  is  piti- 
lessly hard  for  the  publican  and  sinner,  who  need  God's 
grace.  And  such  poor  sinners  are  we  all,  each  in  his 
turn.  The  strongest  among  men  have  times  in  which 
they  feel  miserable,  and  as  desolate  as  the  prodigal  son. 
The  "  healthy-minded  men  "  are  not  separated  from  "  the 
morbid-minded  "  as  a  special  aristocratic  class,  but  often 
themselves  pass  over  into  their  opposites  ;  optimism  and 
pessimism  alternate  in  every  man's  life.64  Fichte,  the 
philosopher,  affords  us  a  striking  illustration  of  this.  In 
the  first  period  of  his  philosophic  thought  he  felt  no  need 
of  God,  and  was  content  with  the  moral  world-order:  in 
the  beginning  of  things  there  was  not  being,  but  doing ; 
not  the  word,  but  the  deed ;  the  non-ego  was  nothing  but 
the  material  of  dut}^,  and  the  fulfilment  of  this  duty 
the  highest  blessedness.     But  later,  when  serious  experi- 


300  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

ences  had  enriched  his  life  and  thought,  he  returned 
from  doing  to  being,  from  duty  to  love,  from  striving  to 
rest,  from  morality  to  religion.  The  more  deeply  we  live, 
the  more  we  feel  in  sympathy  with  Augustine,  and  the 
less  with  Pelagius.66  Knowledge  of  law  awakens  the  need 
for  grace. 

Present-day  culture  offers  still  less  security  for  a  glad 
hope.  There  are  still  many  who  are  enthusiastic  about 
science,  and  anticipate  from  its  technical  applications  the 
salvation  of  humanity.  The  cries  of  science,  progress,  and 
liberty  are  continually  heard  on  the  lips  of  free-thinkers.56 
But  the  hollowness  of  the  sound  reveals  itself  to  any 
keenly  listening  ear.  Culture  brings  with  it  its  blessings, 
but  also  its  dark  shadows  and  serious  dangers  ;  it  develops 
attributes  and  powers  in  men  which  are  highly  valuable, 
but  it  does  this  almost  always  at  the  cost  of  other  vir- 
tues which  are  not  of  less  value ;  while  it  promotes 
reflection,  sagacity,  activity,  and  strenuous  striving,  it 
suppresses  the  unbiassed  opinion,  the  childlike  naivete', 
the  simplicity  and  the  guilelessness,  which  often  belong  to 
the  natural  life.57  Intellectual  development  is  in  itself  no 
moral  good,  as  rationalism  has  dreamed  ever  since  Soc- 
rates' day,  but  may  be  used  equally  well  for  evil  as  for 
good ;  it  can  be  serviceable  to  love,  but  it  may  also  be- 
come a  dangerous  instrument  in  the  hands  of  hate  ;  not 
only  the  virtuous,  but  also  the  criminal,  profit  by  it.  What 
da  Costa  said  of  the  invention  of  printing,  that  it  was  a 
gigantic  step  to  heaven  and  to  hell,  may  be  applied  to 
all  scientific  and  technical  elements  of  culture. 

We  are  indeed  witnesses  in  our  own  developed  society 
that  sin  and  crime  increase  frightfully,  not  only  in  the 
lowest  ranks  of  population,  but  quite  as  much  in  high 
aristocratic  circles.    Unbelief  and  superstition  in  all  forms ; 


REVELATION  AND   THE  FUTURE  301 

adultery,  unchastity,  and  unnatural  sins,  voluptuousness 
and  excess,  avarice,  theft,  and  murder,  jealousy,  envy,  and 
hatred,  play  no  less  a  part  in  the  life  of  cultured  humanity 
than  among  the  lower  races.  Art  and  literature  are  not 
infrequently  handmaids  to  all  these  sins,  and  the  plays, 
which  in  such  centres  of  civilization  as  Paris  and  Berlin 
are  given  before  the  elite,  seriously  raise  inquiries  whither 
we  are  bound  with  all  our  civilization.58 

And  at  the  same  time  with  these  iniquities  the  cleft  be- 
comes wider  between  religion  and  culture,  between  moral- 
ity and  civilization,  between  science  and  life,  between  the 
various  classes  and  ranks  of  society.  Legislation  is  al- 
most powerless  here ;  internal  corruption,  moral  degener- 
ation, and  religious  decay  cannot  be  removed  by  a  law 
of  the  state ;  on  the  contrary,  every  law  has  to  reckon 
with  the  egoism  and  the  passion  of  men,  if  it  does  not 
wish  to  be  doomed  to  complete  impotence  ;  if  law  does  not 
find  support  in  conscience,  it  does  not  touch  life.  Besides 
this,  legislation  is  put  more  and  more  into  the  hands  of 
the  people,  so  that  it  is  not  seldom  made  the  servant  of 
party  interests.  Complaints  about  the  shady  side  of  par- 
liamentary government  increase  in  all  lands  ; 69  the  state, 
which  is  above  all,  and  has  to  further  the  interests  of  all, 
tends  to  become  a  ball  in  the  strife  of  parties,  and  a  pow- 
erful means  by  which  the  majority  tries  to  suppress  the 
minority.  The  benefit  of  liberty  itself,  in  religious,  social, 
and  political  domains,  comes  very  seriously  into  question 
in  many  countries,  such  as  France. 

There  is  even  reason  for  the  question,  whether  the 
theory  of  evolution  does  not  promote  in  a  high  degree  this 
continual  triumph  of  the  power  of  the  strongest.  For 
though  it  believes  in  progress  in  this  sense,  that  the 
material  gives  birth  to  the  spiritual  in  the  way  of  gradual 


302  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

development,  it  also  teaches  that  in  the  struggle  for  life 
the  unfit  perish,  and  only  the  fittest  survive.  Therefore 
opinions  greatly  differ  on  the  relation  between  Darwinism 
and  socialism ;  according  to  Virchow,  Loria,  Ferri,  and 
others,  Darwinism  is  serviceable  to  socialism,  but  Haeckel, 
O.  Schmidt,  Amnion,  H.  E.  Ziegler,  and  H.  Spencer  main- 
tain, on  the  contrary,  that  the  principle  of  selection  bears 
an  aristocratic  character.60  In  any  case,  we  are  witnesses 
to  this  remarkable  fact,  that  a  social  aristocracy  is  raised 
against  a  social  democracy ;  the  Herrenmoral  of  Nietz- 
sche is  also  defended  on  economical  grounds ;  capitalism 
is  deeply  despised  and  fanatically  opposed,  but  it  gains 
also  strong  support  and  passionate  defence ; 61  and  art  in 
late  years  very  seriously  protests  against  social  levelling, 
and  makes  a  strong  plea  for  riches  and  luxury,  for  the 
genius  and  aristocracy  of  the  mind ;  it  is  highly  normal, 
it  is  said,  that  the  many  should  live  for  the  few  and  the 
few  live  at  the  cost  of  the  many.62 

The  same  fact  also  presents  itself  internationally  in  the 
mutual  relations  of  the  nations.  The  cosmopolitanism  of 
the  "  Enlightenment  "  was  not  only  exchanged  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  for  patriotism,  but  this  patriotism  was  not 
infrequently  developed  into  an  exaggerated,  dangerous, 
and  belligerent  chauvinism,  which  exalts  its  own  people 
at  the  cost  of  other  nations.  In  its  turn  this  chauvinism 
was  fed  and  strengthened  by  the  revival  of  the  race-con- 
sciousness which  in  Gobineau  and  H.  St.  Chamberlain 
found  its  scientific  defenders.  Not  only  in  the  different 
parts  of  the  earth,  but  also  often  among  the  same  people, 
and  in  the  same  land,  races  are  sharply  opposed  to  each 
other,  striving  after  the  chief  power  in  the  state,  and 
supremacy  in  the  kingdom  of  the  mind.  This  race- 
glorification  acquires  such  a  serious  character,  and  so  far 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  303 

exceeds  all  bounds,  that  the  virtues  of  the  race  are  iden- 
tified with  the  highest  ideal.  Deutschtum,  for  example,  is 
placed  on  a  level  with  Christendom,  and  Jesus  is  consid- 
ered as  an  Aryan  in  race.63 

Economical  interests  besides  sharpen  the  competition 
between  the  nations.  Though  this  competition  still  bears 
outwardly  a  peaceful  character,  it  widens  the  gulf  be- 
tween the  nations,  feeds  egoism,  stimulates  the  passions, 
and  may  on  the  smallest  occasion  break  out  into  a  war 
which  would  surpass  all  previous  wars  in  devastation. 
From  a  kingdom  of  peace,  which  shall  embrace  all  na- 
tions, we  are  farther  away  than  ever.  Many  men  have, 
indeed,  dreamed  sweet  dreams  of  such  a  peace,  or  at  least 
of  a  palace  of  peace  and  international  arbitration ; 64  but 
they  have  been  sadly  undeceived,  and  forced  into  fresh 
reflection  by  the  sudden  apparition  of  Japan.  Just  as 
many  in  the  state  are  returning  to  monarchy  and  des- 
potism, and  wish  again  to  accord  the  first  place  in  society 
to  aristocracy  and  capitalism,  so  others  in  international 
relations  defend  the  arming  of  nations,  the  conflict  of 
races,  and  sanguinary  war.  The  effacement  of  all  differ- 
ences between  the  nations  is  not,  according  to  their 
opinion,  the  highest  aim  to  be  striven  after.  An  amalga- 
mated humanity  would  cause,  without  doubt,  an  impov- 
erished civilization  and  a  weakening  of  human  life.  Of 
course  race-hatred  and  contempt  for  foreigners  are  not 
approved  on  this  account;  but  it  is  said  that  strong 
nations,  just  like  strong  individuals,  will  respect  most 
the  rights  of  others  and  will  be  most  merciful  to  their 
defects.  And  though  this  diversity  between  nations  and 
races  may  now  and  then  cause  a  war,  history  proves  that 
such  a  war  has  been  a  source  of  strength  and  welfare  for 
many  peoples,  and  for  humanity  as  a  whole.65     War  is, 


304  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

according  to  Moltke,  an  element  of  the  world-order,  as 
it  is  established  by  God,  in  which  the  noblest  virtues 
of  men  are  developed,  such  as  courage  and  self-denial, 
faithfulness  to  duty,  and  self-sacrifice ;  without  war  the 
world  would  become  a  morass,  and  would  sink  into 
materialism.66 

If  we  take  into  account  all  these  facts,  it  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at  that  culture  is  often  treated  with  deep  dis- 
dain, not  only  by  Christians,  but  by  the  children  whom  it 
has  fed  and  nourished.  There  are  those  —  and  their  num- 
ber increases  —  who,  with  Buckle,  notwithstanding  the 
intellectual  development  which  has  taken  place,  do  not 
believe  in  any  moral  progress  and  speak  only  of  a  circle 
of  development  .67  Others  go  still  farther,  and  are  of  opin- 
ion that  the  human  race,  just  in  consequence  of  culture, 
is  retrograding  physically,  psychically,  intellectually,  mor- 
ally, and  socially,  and  that  safety  can  be  obtained  only  by 
a  radical  change,  namely,  by  a  return  to  nature,  or  even 
to  the  animal  state  in  which  men  originally  lived.  The 
great  number  of  reformers  who  appear  to-day  in  every 
domain  of  thought  and  action,  indeed,  sufficiently  shows 
that  culture,  with  all  its  blessings,  does  not  content  the 
heart,  and  does  not  meet  all  the  needs  of  the  soul.  Evo- 
lutionists and  socialists,  though  glorying  in  the  conquests 
which  the  man  of  culture  has  made,  vie  with  each 
other  in  condemning  present-day  society,  and  build  all 
their  hopes  on  the  future.  But  that  future  is  distant 
and  uncertain  ;  for  he  who  considers  the  moral  corruption 
which  has  attacked  our  culture  at  the  core,  and  takes  into 
consideration  the  perils  which  press  upon  us  from  with- 
out, —  the  red,  the  black,  and  the  yellow  peril,  —  feels 
the  anxious  question  rising  within  him,  whether  our  whole 
modern  culture  is  not  destined  sometime  to  devastation 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     305 

and  annihilation  like  that  of  Babylon  and  Egypt,  Greece 
and  Rome.68 

Thus  it  appears  that  neither  science  nor  philosophy, 
neither  ethics  nor  culture,  can  give  that  security  with  re- 
gard to  the  future  which  we  have  need  of,  not  only  for 
our  thought,  but  also  for  our  whole  life  and  action.  This 
need  of  security  cannot  be  voided  by  saying  that  every 
one  must  do  his  duty  and  leave  the  future  to  itself.  For 
though  there  is  great  truth  in  the  Christian  motto, 
"  Blind  for  the  future,  and  seeing  in  the  commandment," 
such  true  resignation  is  not  born  of  doubt,  but  of  faith, 
and  does  not  leave  the  future  to  itself,  but  to  God's  fath- 
erly guidance.  The  need  of  security  concerning  the 
future  and  the  ultimate  end  of  the  world,  therefore,  al- 
ways remains  with  us,  because  everything  we  value  in 
this  life  is  inseparably  connected  with  the  future.  If  the 
world  at  the  end  of  its  development  is  dissolved  in  a 
chaos,  or  sinks  back  into  everlasting  sleep,  the  value  of 
personality,  of  religious  and  ethical  life,  and  also  of  cul- 
ture, cannot  be  maintained.  The  weal  and  woe  of  man, 
and  the  safety  of  our  souls,  are  closely  interwoven  with 
the  final  destiny  of  the  world.  Therefore,  in  order  to  live 
and  to  die  happily  we  need  a  consolation  which  is  firm 
and  durable,  and  gives  security  to  our  thought  and  labor. 
All  world-views,  therefore,  end  in  an  eschatology,  and  all 
efforts  at  reformation  are  animated  by  faith  in  the  future. 

If  neither  science  nor  culture,  nor  the  combination  of 
both,69  can  give  us  such  security,  the  question  remains 
whether  there  is  anything  else  in  the  whole  world  in  which 
we  can  trust  at  all  times,  in  adversity  and  death,  with 
our  whole  heart  ?  Now  history  teaches,  with  a  distinct- 
ness which  precludes  all  doubt,  that  there  is  only  one  power 
which  can  give  such  a  security,  and  can  awaken  such,  an 

20 


306  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

absolute  confidence  in  the  heart  always  and  everywhere, 
and  that  is  religion.  While  science  can  boast  of  only 
a  few  martyrs,  religion  counts  its  witnesses  by  thousands 
and  tens  of  thousands.  Who  would  be  ready  to  sacrifice 
his  life  for  a  purely  mathematical  or  scientific  truth  ?  If 
we  wish  to  find  the  security  which  gives  us  rest  in  life 
and  death  and  keeps  us  firm  in  the  midst  of  the  storms 
of  doubt,  we  must  seek  it  in  religion,  or  we  can  find  it 
nowhere.  All  certainty  concerning  the  origin,  the  es- 
sence, and  the  end  of  things,  is  based  on  religion.  As 
soon  as  a  world-view  attacks  these  problems,  it  is  met  by 
the  alternative,  either  to  content  itself  with  guesses  and 
doubts,  or  to  take  refuge  in  a  religious  interpretion  of  the 
world.  Comte  thought,  indeed,  that  religion  and  meta- 
physics belonged  to  the  past,  but  none  the  less  made  his 
positivism  serviceable  for  the  preaching  of  a  new  religion  ; 
and  Herbert  Spencer  did  not  explain  how  he,  in  his 
philosophy,  could  accept  an  unknowable  power  behind 
phenomena,  and  could  give  expression  to  the  suggestion 
that  this  power  is  the  same  as  that  "  which  in  ourselves 
wells  up  in  the  form  of  consciousness."  70 

The  reason  why  religion  alone  can  create  such  a  security 
lies  at  hand.  First,  it  always  includes  faith  in  a  divine 
power,  which  is  distinct  from  the  world,  far  above  it,  and 
can  govern  and  guide  it  according  to  its  own  will ;  and, 
secondly,  it  puts  man  himself  personally  into  connection 
writh  the  divine  power,  so  that  he  sees  in  the  affairs  of 
God  his  own  affairs,  and  allied  with  God  can  defy  the 
power  of  the  whole  world,  even  unto  death.  But  this  idea 
of  religion  has  only  come  to  its  true  and  full  embodiment 
in  Christianity.  For  all  religions  which  exist  without  the 
special  revelation  in  Christ,  and  equally  all  confessions 
and  world-views  which  differ  from  it,  are  characterized 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     307 

by  this  common  peculiarity,  that  they  identify  God  and  the 
world,  the  natural  and  the  ethical,  being  and  evil,  creation 
and  fall,  and  therefore  mix  up  religion  with  superstition 
and  magic.  There  is  only  one  religion  which  moves  on 
pure  lines  and  is  conceived  altogether  as  religion,  and  that 
is  Christianity. 

In  this  religion  God  is  the  creator  of  all  things.  The 
whole  world  is  the  work  of  his  hands;  matter  itself  is 
made  by  him,  and  before  its  making  was  the  object  of  his 
thought.  All  being  and  becoming  thus  embody  a  revela- 
tion of  God.  This  revelation  is  the  starting  point  of  the 
unity  of  nature,  the  unity  of  the  human  race,  the  unity 
of  history,  and  is  also  the  source  of  all  laws,  —  the  laws  of 
nature,  of  history,  and  of  all  development.  The  ideas  and 
norms  which  govern  religious,  ethical,  and  social  life,  and 
appear  in  the  self-consciousness  and  the  thought  of  hu- 
manity, are  the  product  of  this  revelation  of  God.  In  a 
word,  that  the  world  is  no  chaos,  but  a  cosmos,  a  universe, 
is  the  silent  postulate  of  all  science  and  art  for  which 
they  are  indebted  to  the  revelation  which  Christianity 
makes  known  to  us.  Nature  and  grace,  culture  and 
cultus,  are  built  upon  the  same  foundations. 

But  this  revelation  is  not  sufficient.  God  is  creator: 
he  is  further  the  reconciler  of  all  things.  There  is  much 
evil  in  the  world,  —  natural  and  moral  evil,  sin  and  misery. 
Christianity  is  the  one  religion  which  connects  these  two 
kinds  of  evil  and  yet  distinguishes  them.  Sin  does  not 
lie  in  matter,  nor  in  nature,  nor  in  the  substance  of  things, 
but  it  belongs  to  the  will  of  the  creature  ;  it  is  of  ethical 
nature,  and  thus  capable  of  being  expiated,  effaced,  ex- 
tinguished. It  can  be  separated  from  the  creature,  so  that 
it  disappears  and  the  creature  remains  intact,  yea,  much 
more,  is  restored  and  glorified.     For  God  is  above  the 


308  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

world,  and  is  also  above  sin  and  all  evil.  He  allowed  it 
because  he  could  expiate  it.  So  he  maintained  through  all 
centuries  and  among  all  men  the  longing  and  the  capacity 
for  redemption,  and  wrought  that  redemption  himself  in 
the  fulness  of  time,  in  the  midst  of  history,  in  the  crucified 
Christ.  "  God  was,  in  Christ,  reconciling  the  world  with 
himself,  not  imputing  their  trespasses  unto  them."  The 
cross  of  Golgotha  is  the  divine  settlement  with,  the  divine 
condemnation  of  sin.  There  it  is  revealed  that  sin  exists ; 
it  is  no  fiction  which  can  be  conquered  by  thought,  no  ex- 
ternal defect  which  can  be  obliterated  by  culture ;  but  it 
is  an  awful  reality,  and  has  a  world-historical  significance. 
But  although  it  exists,  it  has  no  right  of  existence ;  it 
should  not  exist,  and  therefore  it  shall  not  exist. 

For  God  is  the  creator  and  redeemer,  but  also  finally 
the  restorer  and  renewer  of  all  things.  The  history  of 
mankind  after  the  resurrection  of  Christ  is  the  execution 
of  the  judicial  sentence  which  was  passed  on  the  cross,  of 
the  sentence  which  in  Christ  condemns  sin  and  absolves 
the  sinner,  and  therefore  gives  to  him  a  right  and  claim 
to  forgiveness  and  renewal.  The  cross  of  Christ  di- 
vides history  into  two  parts,  —  the  preparation  for  and  the 
accomplishment  of  reconciliation  ;  but  in  both  parts,  from 
the  creation  to  the  cross  and  from  the  cross  to  the  advent, 
it  is  one  whole,  one  uninterrupted  work  of  God.  Chris- 
tianity is  as  religion  much  more  than  a  matter  of  feeling 
or  temperament ;  it  embraces  the  whole  man,  all  humanity, 
and  the  totality  of  the  world.  It  is  a  work  of  God,  a 
revelation  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  ages,  in 
word  and  in  deed,  for  mind  and  heart,  for  the  individual 
and  the  community.  And  it  has  its  heart  and  centre  in 
the  person  and  the  work  of  Christ. 

Christ  occupies  in  Christianity  quite  a  different  position 


REVELATION  AND  THE  FUTURE     309 

from  that  which  Zarathustra  or  Confucius,  Buddha  or 
Mohammed,  hold  in  the  religion  which  was  founded  by 
each  of  them.  Christ  is  not  the  founder  of  Christianity, 
nor  the  first  confessor  of  it,  nor  the  first  Christian.  But 
he  is  Christianity  itself,  in  its  preparation,  fulfilment,  and 
consummation.  He  created  all  things,  reconciled  all 
things,  and  renews  all  things.  Because  all  things  have 
in  him  their  source,  their  being,  and  their  unity,  he 
also  gathers  in  one  all  things  under  himself  as  Head,  both 
those  which  are  in  heaven  and  those  on  earth.  He  is 
Prophet  and  Priest,  but  also  King,  who  does  not  cease 
his  work  until  he  has  delivered  the  kingdom  perfect 
and  complete  to  God  the  Father. 

This  one  equally  sovereign  and  almighty,  holy,  and 
gracious  will  of  God,  which  meets  us  and  speaks  to  our 
conscience  in  the  person  and  the  work  of  Christ,  is  the  firm 
basis  of  our  certainty,  of  our  certainty  concerning  the  past, 
the  present,  and  the  future.  For  nobody  can  deny  that  if 
there  is  and  works  such  a  will,  then  the  origin,  develop- 
ment, and  destiny  of  the  world  are  certain ;  then  the  life 
and  fate  of  every  man  who  identifies  himself  with  this  will 
of  God  and  makes  God's  cause  his  own  is  assured  now 
and  for  eternity.  But  the  world  of  science  and  art,  cul- 
ture and  technique,  knows  nothing  of  such  a  merciful  will 
of  God.  It  can  advance  no  further,  with  all  its  thorough- 
ness and  sagacity,  than  the  postulate  that  there  must  be 
such  a  will  of  God.  But  even  this  result  of  human 
knowledge  and  effort  is  a  significant  fact;  for  it  con- 
tains the  confession  that  the  whole  world,  with  all  its 
development,  is  lost  and  must  perish  if  it  is  not  sus- 
tained and  guided  by  an  almighty  will,  which  can  cause 
light  to  appear  out  of  darkness,  life  out  of  death,  and 
glory  out  of  suffering.     What  eye  has  not  seen,  nor  ear 


310  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

heard,  neither  has  entered  into  the  heart  of  man  to  con- 
ceive otherwise  than  as  a  wish  or  a  sigh,  is  revealed  to  us 
in  the  gospel.  Jesus  Christ  came  into  the  world  to  pre- 
serve it  and  to  save  it.  This  is  the  content  of  the  gospel 
and  the  testimony  of  Scripture  in  spite  of  all  criticism  and 
opposition.  By  this  testimony  the  prophets  have  lived, 
and  the  apostles  and  the  whole  Christian  Church,  and  by 
it  men  will  live  till  the  end  of  time.  For  the  truth  of  this 
testimony  lies  outside  and  beyond  the  bounds  of  all  criticism 
in  the  system  of  the  whole  world,  in  the  existence  of  the 
Christian  church,  and  in  the  need  of  the  human  heart. 
The  world  cries :  Such  a  will  of  God  ought  to  be,  if  I 
am  ever  to  be  saved;  and  the  gospel  says:  There  is 
such  a  will  of  God ;  lift  your  eyes  to  the  cross.  Between 
the  world  as  it  exists  around  us,  with  all  its  laws  and  all 
its  calamities ;  between  culture,  with  all  its  glory  and  all 
its  miseries ;  between  the  human  heart,  with  all  its  aspira- 
tions and  all  its  pains ;  between  this  whole  universe 
and  the  will  of  God  as  it  is  made  known  to  us  in  the 
gospel,  there  exists  a  spiritually  and  historically  indissol- 
uble unity.  Take  away  that  will,  and  the  world  is  lost ; 
acknowledge  that  will,  and  the  world  is  saved.  Revelation 
in  nature  and  revelation  in  Scripture  form,  in  alliance 
with  each  other,  an  harmonious  unity  which  satisfies 
the  requirements  of  the  intellect  and  the  needs  of  the 
heart  alike. 

This  result  of  a  philosophy  of  revelation  is  finally  con- 
firmed by  this,  that  the  will  of  God,  which,  according  to 
the  gospel,  aims  at  the  salvation  of  the  world,  yet  ac- 
knowledges fully  here  and  hereafter  the  diversity  which 
exists  in  the  world  of  creatures.  Monism  in  all  its  forms 
sacrifices  the  richness  of  reality  to  the  abstract  unity  of  its 
system.     It  asserts  that  all  that  exists  is  but  the  develop- 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  311 

ment  of  one  matter  and  one  power ;  it  sees  in  the  diver- 
sity only  modifications  of  the  same  being;  it  dissolves 
even  the  contrasts  of  true  and  false,  of  good  and  evil,  of 
right  and  wrong,  into  historical  moments  of  the  same 
movement,  and  it  concludes  with  the  declaration  that  the 
world  at  the  end  of  the  process  returns  to  chaos,  to  dark- 
ness and  death,  perhaps  after  a  while  to  begin  anew  its 
monotonous  round.  The  eschatological  expectations 
which  present  themselves  under  the  name  of  the  resti- 
tution of  all  things,  hypothetical  or  absolute  univer- 
salism,  and  conditional  immortality,  also  have  received 
so  much  sympathy  only  because  man  closes  his  eyes  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously  to  reality  and  transforms  the 
wishes  of  his  heart  into  prophecies  of  the  future.  By 
the  magic  formulas  of  monism  and  evolution  men  make 
the  world  to  be  and  to  become  in  the  past,  present,  and 
even  in  the  future,  everything  they  please.  But  reality 
scoffs  at  these  phantasies ;  it  places  before  us  the  sorrowful 
facts  that  the  power  of  evil  raises  itself  against  good,  that 
sin  does  not  annihilate  man,  but  hardens  him  spiritually, 
and  that  virtue  and  happiness,  sin  and  punishment,  are  not 
in  proportion  to  each  other  here  upon  earth  as  all  hearts 
and  consciences  require.  And  yet  since  this  is  what  really 
exists,  it  must  in  some  way  be  in  accordance  with  the 
holiness  and  goodness  of  God.71 

The  gospel  is  suited  to  this  reality,  and  is  quite  in 
agreement  with  it ;  it  takes  and  acknowledges  the  world 
exactly  as  it  is  shown  to  our  unbiassed  view ;  it  does  not 
fashion  it  after  a  prescribed  pattern,  but  accepts  it  un- 
prejudicedly, with  all  its  diversities  and  contrasts,  with  all 
its  problems  and  enigmas.  Man  is  indeed  what  Scripture 
describes  him,  and  the  world  appears  as  Scripture  shows  it 
to  us.     A  superficial  view  may  indeed  deny  it ;  deeper  ex- 


312  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

perience  and  more  serious  inquiry  always  lead  back  again 
to  the  acknowledgment  of  its  truth ;  the  greatest  minds, 
the  noblest  souls,  the  most  pious  hearts  have  repeated 
and  confirmed  the  witness  of  Scripture  from  age  to  age. 
Scripture   therefore  does  not  stand   isolated  in  its  con- 
templation of  the  world  and  life,  but  is  surrounded,  up- 
held, and  supported  on  all  sides  by  the  sensus  communis  of 
the  whole  of  humanity ;  there  is  neither  speech  nor  lan- 
guage where  its  voice  is  not  heard.     The  world  certainly 
was  not  originated  in  a  monistic  way,  and  it  does  not 
exist  in  this  way.     From  the  beginning  it  has  shown  a 
great  variety,  which  has  had  its  origin  in  divine  appoint- 
ment.     This   variety   has    been    destroyed   by   sin   and 
changed  into  all  kinds  of  opposition.     The  unity  of  hu- 
manity was  dissolved  into  a  multiplicity  of  peoples  and 
nations.      Truth,  religion,  and  the  moral  law  have  not 
kept  their  unity  and  sovereignty,  but  are  confronted  by 
lies,  false  religion,  and  unrighteousness.     So  the  world 
was,  and  so  it  still  remains.     In  spite  of  all  striving  after 
unity  by  means  of  world  conquest,  political  alliance,  and 
international  arbitration,  trade  unions  and  economical  in- 
terests ;  in  spite  of  the  advocacy  of  an  independent,  positive, 
and  common  world-language,  world-science,  world-moral- 
ity, and   world-culture  —  unity  has   not   and   cannot  be 
realized.      For  these  forces  can  at  the  most  accomplish  an 
external  and  temporal  unity,  but  they  do  not  change  the 
heart  and  do  not  make  the  people  of  one  soul  and  one 
speech.     Thejme  true  unity  can  only  be  brought  about 
by  religion,  by  means  of  missions.     If  there  is  ever  to 
be  a  humanity  one  in   heart  and   one  in  soul,  then  it 
must  be  born  out  of  return  to  the  one  living  and  true 
God. 

Although  the  gospel  lays  this  missionary  work  on  the 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  313 

consciences  of  all  its  confessors  with  the  greatest  earnest- 
ness, yet  it  never  flatters  us  with  the  hope  that  thereby 
the  inner  spiritual  unity  of  mankind  will  be  accomplished 
in  the  present  dispensation.  The  idea  of  a  millennium 
stands  in  direct  opposition  to  the  description  of  the  future 
which  runs  through  the  whole  of  the  New  Testament. 
Jesus  portrays  to  his  disciples  much  rather  a  life  of  strife, 
oppression,  and  persecution.  He  promises  them  on  earth 
not  a  crown,  but  a  cross.  The  highest  ideal  for  the 
Christian  is  not  to  make  peace  with  the  world,  with  sci- 
ence, with  culture  at  any  price,  but  in  the  world  to  keep 
himself  from  the  evil  one.  We  have  no  guarantee  that  the 
church  and  the  world  will  not  as  fiercely  strive  with  one 
another  in  the  future  as  in  the  first  centuries  of  Christi- 
anity. We  have  not  the  least  assurance  that,  in  spite  of  all 
preaching  of  tolerance,  a  persecution  which  will  exceed  all 
previous  oppressions  will  not  break  out  against  the  church 
of  Christ  before  the  end  of  time.  On  the  contrary,  there 
is  great  danger  that  modern  culture,  progressing  in 
its  anti-supernaturalistic  course,  will  be  stirred  up  to 
anger  against  the  steadfastness  of  believers  and  attempt 
to  accomplish  by  oppression  what  it  cannot  obtain  by 
reasoning  and  argument.  At  any  rate,  this  is  what 
the  teaching  of  Christ  and  the  apostles  predicts  of  the 
last  days. 

Because  it  recognizes  this  reality  the  gospel  cannot 
end  in  a  monistic  formula  ;  there  remains  difference,  there 
remains  an  opposition,  until  and,  indeed,  even  after  the 
advent.  Heaven  and  hell  in  what  concerns  their  essence 
are  no  products  of  imagination,  but  elements  of  all  reli- 
gious faith,  and  even  postulates  of  all  thought  which 
seriously  takes  into  account  the  majesty  of  the  moral 
world-order,  the  ineradicable  consciousness  of  justice  in 


314  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

the  heart  of  man,  and  the  indisputable  witness  of  his 
conscience.72  But  in  contradistinction  to  all  other  re- 
ligions Christianity  teaches  that  the  position  which  man 
will  hold  in  the  future  world  is,  in  principle,  determined 
by  the  relation  in  which  he  stands  to  God  and  his  revela- 
tion, and  that  the  allotment  of  that  position  will  be  made 
by  no  one  else  than  Christ,  who  created  the  world,  who 
continually  supports  it  in  its  being  and  unity,  who  is  the 
life  and  light  of  man  always  and  everywhere,  who  ap- 
peared in  the  fulness  of  time  as  the  saviour  of  the  world, 
and  who  therefore  knows  the  world  through  and  through, 
and  can  judge  it  in  perfect  justice.  Nobody  will  be  able 
to  make  objection  to  the  righteousness  and  equity  of  his 
sentence.  Whatever  may  be  the  result  of  the  world- 
history,  it  will  be  acknowledged  by  all  willingly  or  un- 
willingly, be  raised  above  all  criticism,  and  be  consonant 
with  God's  virtues.  Right  and  left  from  the  great  divid- 
ing line  there  remains  room  for  such  endless  diversity 
that  no  single  idle  word  will  be  forgotten,  nor  will  a  single 
good  thought  or  noble  action  fall  unnoted.  Nothing 
of  any  value  will  be  lost  in  the  future ;  all  our  works 
do  follow  us,  and  the  kings  and  nations  of  the  earth 
will  bring  together  into  the  city  of  God  all  their  glory  and 
honor.  Above  all  differences,  and  over  every  variety,  there 
will  extend  into  the  future  the  one  holy  and  gracious  will 
of  God,  which  is  the  bond  of  the  whole  universe,  and  to 
which  all  will  be  subject  and  ancillary.  The  absolute, 
immutable,  and  inviolable  supremacy  of  that  will  of 
God  is  the  light  which  special  revelation  holds  before  our 
soul's  eye  at  the  end  of  time.  For  monism  the  present 
economy  is  as  a  short  span  of  life  between  two  eternities 
of  death,  and  consciousness  a  lightning  flash  in  the  dark 
night.73     But  for  the  Christian  this  dark  world  is  always 


REVELATION   AND   THE   FUTURE  315 

irradiated  from  above  by  the  splendor  of  divine  revela- 
tion, and  under  its  guidance  it  moves  onward  towards 
the  kingdom  of  light  and  life.  Round  about  revelation 
are  clouds  and  darkness ;  nevertheless  righteousness  and 
judgment  are  the  foundation  of  God's  throne. 


NOTES 


THE    IDEA    OP   A    PHILOSOPHY    OP    REVELATION 

1  H.  Winckler,  Himmels-  und  Weltenbild  der  Babylonier. 
Leipzig,  1903,  p.  9. 

2  H.  Winckler,  Die  babylonische  Geisteskultur.  Leipzig, 
1897,  p.  44. 

8  Groen  van  Prinsterer,  Ongeloof  en  Bevolutie.  1862, 
pp.  138  ff. 

4  Fr.  Paulsen,  Philosophia  militans.2  Berlin,  1901, 
pp.  31  ff.  J.  Kaftan,  Der  Philosoph  des  Protest.  Berlin, 
1904.  Theodor  Kaftan,  Moderne  Theol.  des  alten  Glaubens. 
1901,  pp.  76,  102. 

6  Busken  Huet,  Het  Land  van  Bembrandt.  P.  Pijper, 
Erasmus  en  de  Nederl.  Beformatie.  Leiden,  1907.  Paul 
Wernle,  Die  Benaissance  des  Christ,  im  16  Jahrh.  Tubin- 
gen, 1904. 

*  Lezius,  Zur  Charakteristik  des  relig.  Standpunktes  des 
Erasmus.  Giiterslohe,  1895.  H.  Hermelink,  Die  relig.  Be- 
formbestrebungen  des  deutschen  Humanismus.  Tubingen, 
1907  (comp.  the  review  of  this  work  in  Tbeol.  Lit.  Zeitung, 
Jan.  4,  1908).  Max  Richter,  Desiderius  Erasmus  und  seine 
Stellung  zu  Luther  auf  Grund  ihrer  Schriften.  Leipzig, 
1907.  Hunzinger,  Der  Glaube  Luthers  und  das  religion  s- 
geschichtliche  Christentum  der  Gegenwart.  Leipzig,  1907. 
Hunzinger  strikingly  observes  that  the  laudation  of  Erasmus 
at  the  expense  of  Luther  is  in  keeping  with  the  attempt 
perceptible  elsewhere  to  go  back  from  the  Christ  of  the 
Bible  to  the  so-called  historical  Jesus,  the  Jesus  of  the 
Synoptics  or  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount.     The  line  repre- 

317 


318  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

sented  by  Christ,  Paul,  Augustine,  Luther,  and  Calvin  is 
abandoned  in  favor  of  that  represented  by  Jesus,  Pelagius, 
Abelard,  Erasmus,  the  Enlightenment. 

7  Troeltsch,  Protest.  Kirchentum  und  Kirche  in  der 
Neuzeit,  pp.  253-458  of  Die  Christliche  Religion,  in :  Die 
Kultur  der  Gegenwart.  (comp.  for  the  other  side  Katten- 
busch,  Theol.  Rundschau,  1907,  and  Herrmann,  Zeits.  fur 
Theol.  und  Kirche,  1907).  Comp.  also  Karl  Sell,  Katholizis- 
mus  und  Protestantismus.  Leipzig,  1903,  pp.  56  ff.  F.  J. 
Schmidt,  Zur  Wiedergeburt  des  Idealismus.  Leipzig,  1908, 
pp.  60  ff. 

8  Lechler,  Geschichte  des  engl.  Deismus.  Stuttgart,  1841. 
Troeltsch,  art.  Deismus  in  PRE.3 

a  Schelling,  Philos.  der  Offenbarung,  Sammtliche  Werke, 

II,  4,  p.  5. 

10  Lechler,  op.  c,  p.  362. 

11  Groen  van  Prinsterer,  op.  C. 

12  Haller  in  Groen  van  Prinsterer,  op.  c,  pp.  253  ff. 

13  Comp.  the  author's  essay  :  Evolutie,  in  :  Pro  en  Contra, 

III,  3.  Baarn,  1907.  Eucken,  Geistige  Stromungen  der 
Gegenwart.     Leipzig,  1904,  pp.  185  ff. 

14  As  regards  Goethe,  to  whom  Haeckel  loves  to  appeal, 
this  is  clearly  shown  by  Vogel,  Goethes  Selbstzeugnisse  iiber 
seine  Stellung  zur  Religion.3  Leipzig,  1906.  Comp.  also 
Frank  Thilly,  The  World-view  of  a  Poet :  Goethe's  Philoso- 
phy, in  the  Hibbert  Journal,  April,  1908,  pp.  530  ff. 

15  Windelband,  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophic 
Leipzig,  1899,  II,  p.  311. 

16  Bruno  Wille,  Darwins  Weltanschauung  von  ihm  selbst 
dargestellt.     Heibronn,  1906,  pp.  4,  5,  16  ff.,  25. 

17  Bruno  Wille,  op.  c,  pp.  5,  23. 

18  L.  Woltmann,  Der  hist.  Materialismus.  Diisseldorf, 
1906,  p.  148.  H.  Pesch,  Liberalismus,  Sozialismus  und 
christl.  Gesellschaftsordnung.     Freiburg,  1901,  II,  p.  234. 

19  Bruno  Wille,  op.  c,  pp.  7,  12,  14,  16,  17,  19,  23,  25. 

20  For  instance  by  von  Hartmann,  Rcligions-philosophie. 
Leipzig,  II,  pp.  74  ff.     A.  Drews,  Die  Religion  als  Selbstbe- 


NOTES  319 

wusstsein   Gottes.     Jena  u.   Leipzig,    1906,   pp.  184  ff.    J. 
Reinke,  Die  Welt  als  That.3     Berlin,  1903,  pp.  292  ff. 

21  R.  J.  Campbell,  The  New  Theology.  London,  1907, 
pp.  20,  31,  34,  68  ff.  New  Theology  and  Applied  Religion  by 
R.  J.  Campbell,  etc.  London,  Christian  Commonwealth  Co., 
pp.  12,  18,  60,  62.  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  The  Substance  of  Faith 
allied  with  Science.3  London,  pp.  85  ff.  Comp.  against  this 
new  theology  among  others,  Charles  Gore,  The  New  Theology 
and  the  Old  Religion.     London,  1907. 

22  Funt,  Eeligion  der  Immanenz  oder  Transcendenz  ?  in: 
Religion  und  Geisteskultur,  1907,  pp.  287-294.  Bachmann, 
Nomen  est  gloriosum,  ib.,  1908,  pp.  104-114. 

23  Haeckel,  Der  Monismus  als  Band  zwischen  Religion 
und  Wissenschaft.6  Bonn,  1893.  Haeckel,  Die  Weltrathsel. 
Bonn,  1899,  pp.  381-439.  R.  H.  France*,  Der  heutige  Stand 
der  darwin'schen  Lehren.     Leipzig,  1907,  p.  17. 

24  Troeltsch,  op.  c,  p.  255. 

25  Fr.  Delitzsch,  Babel  und  Bibel.  Ein  Rtickblick  und 
Ausblick.  Berlin,  1904,  p.  48.  Id.,  Zur  Weiterbildung  der 
Religion.     Stuttgart,  1908,  p.  53. 

26  Hegel,  Philos.  der  Religion,  I,  p.  120. 

27  Gwatkin,  The  Knowledge  of  God.  Edinburgh,  1906,  I, 
pp.  92, 155-156,  248. 

28  Titius,  Theol.  Rundschau,  Nov.,  1907,  p.  416.  The  ad- 
dress of  Loofs  to  which  Titius  refers,  appeared  in  English  in 
the  American  Journal  of  Theol.,  Ill,  pp.  433-472,  and  has 
been  published  recently  also  in  German  :  Das  Evangelium 
der  Reformation  und  die  Gegenwart,  Theol.  Stud.  u.  Krit., 
1908,  pp.  203-244.  Kattenbusch,  Die  Lage  der  system. 
Theol.  in  der  Gegenwart,  Zeits.  fur  Theol.  u.  Kirche,  1905, 
pp.  103-146  ff.,  especially  pp.  128  ff. 

29  Steinmann,  Das  Bewusstsein  von  der  vollen  Wirklich- 
keit  Gottes,  Zeits.  fur  Theol.  u.  Kirche,  1902,  pp.  429-492. 

80  Of  the  many  works  dealing  with  the  subject  directly  or 
incidentally  the  following  may  be  named  by  way  of  exam- 
ple :  Schelling,  Philosophic  der  Offenbarung.  Staudenmaier, 
Philos.  des  Christ.,  I,  1840.  O.  Willmann,  Gesch.  des  Idealis- 
mus,  3  Bde,  1894-1897.     James  Orr,  The  Christian  View  of 


320  PHILOSOPHY   OF   PvEVELATION 

God  and  the  World.  Edinburgh,  1893.  John  Caird,  The 
Fundamental  Ideas  of  Christianity,  2  vols.  Glasgow,  1904. 
A.  M.  Fairbairn,  The  Philosophy  of  the  Christian  Religion.4 
London,  1905.  A.  Campbell  Fraser,  Philosophy  of  Theism.2 
Edinburgh,  1899. 

81  Schelling,  1.  c.,  p.  26.  For  the  conception  of  revelation 
which  it  was  impossible  to  unfold  in  these  lectures  reference 
may  be  made  to  the  author's  Gereformeerde  Dogmatiek,  2d 
ed.,  I,  pp.  291  ff.  The  present  lectures  elaborate  in  detail 
the  fundamental  ideas  expressed  by  the  author  in  an  address 
on  Christelijke  Wereldbeschouwing,  1904. 


II 

REVELATION    AND    PHILOSOPHY 

1  Renan,  L'avenir  de  la  science,  1890.  Berthelot,  Science 
et  morale,  1897.  Ladenburg,  Der  Einfluss  der  Natur- 
wissenschaft  auf  die  Weltanschauung,   1903. 

2  Haeckel,  Die  Weltrathsel.  1899,  pp.  345  ff. 

8  A.  M.  Weisz,  Die  religiose  Gefahr.  Freiburg,  1904, 
pp.  117  ff. 

4  L.  Stein,  Gedankenanarchie,  in :  An  der  Wende  des 
Jahrhunderts,  1899,  pp.  287  ff.  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Relig- 
ionsphilosophie,  I,  pp.  624  ff.  A.  Drews,  Die  Religion  als 
Selbstbew.  Gottes.  1906,  pp.  237  ff. 

6  Paulsen,  Einl.  in  die  Philosophic,  Vorwort.  Paulsen,  Die 
Zukunftsaufgaben  der  Philos.,  pp.  389  ff.,  in  Systematische 
Philosophic,  in  :  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart,  1907. 

6  Troeltsch,  Die  Absolutheit  des  Christ,  und  die  Eeligions- 
geschichte.  1902,  p.  56.  Comp.  A.  Vierkandt,  Die  Stetigkeit 
im  Kulturwandel.     Leipzig,  1908,  pp.  1  ff. 

7  According  to  the  well-known  saying  of  Ledru-Rollin  : 
Je  suis  votre  chef,  il  faut  done  que  je  vous  suive. 

8  In  Dilthey,  Das  Wesen  der  Philos.,  p.  37,  in  System. 
Philos.,  in  :  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart. 


NOTES  321 

9  J.  B.  Meyer,  Philos.  Zeitfragen.  1870,  p.  92.  Comp. 
further  on  the  history  of  Darwinism  after  Darwin  and  its 
critics  :  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Der  Darwinismus  seit  Darwin,  in 
Ostw aid's  Annalen  der  Naturphilos.  Leipzig,  1903,  pp.  285  ff. 
R.  H.  France*,  Der  heutige  Stand  der  darwin'schen  Fragen. 
Leipzig,  1907.  H.  Meyer,  Der  gegenwartige  Stand  der  Ent- 
wicklungslehre.  Bonn,  1908.  A.  R.  Wallace,  The  Present 
Position  of  Darwinism,  Cont.  Keview,  Aug.,  1908. 

10  Dennert,  Die  Weltanschauung  des  modernen  Naturfor- 
schers.  Stuttgart,  1907,  pp.  60  ff.  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Die 
Weltanschauung  der  modernen  Physik.  Leipzig,  1902.  Lud- 
wig  Baur,  Der  gegenwartige  Stand  der  Philos.,  in:  Philos. 
Jahrbuch,  1907,  pp.  1-21,  156-177,  especially  pp.  164  ff.  A. 
Schneider,  Der  moderne  deutsche  Spiritualismus,  Philos. 
Jahrbuch,  1908,  pp.  339-357. 

11  Ostwald,  Die  Ueberwindung  des  wissensch.  Materialis- 
mus.  Leipzig,  1895.  Id.,  Vorlesungen  iiber  die  Naturphilos.,8 
1905.  Comp.  on  Ostwald :  Dennert,  op.  c,  pp.  222  ff.  W.  von 
Schnehen,  Energetische  Weltanschauung.     Leipzig,  1908. 

12  Comp.  on  this  tendency  especially  Mach,  Popularwiss. 
Vorlesungen,  Leipzig,  1897.  Id.,  Erkenntnis  und  Irrtum., 
Leipzig,  1905.  Also  the  exposition  of  Mach's  philosophy 
by  Houigswald,  Zur  Kritik  der  machschen  Philos.,  Berlin, 

1903.  and  Hell,  Ernst  Machs  Philosophic,  Stuttgart,  1907. 
The  following  may  also  be  consulted  :  Spruyt,  Het  empirio- 
criticisme,  de  jongste  vorm  van  de  wijsbegeerte  der  ervaring. 
Amsterdam,  1899.  Koster,  De  ontkenning  van  het  bestaan 
der  materie  en  de  moderne  physiol.  psychologic     Haarlem, 

1904.  Jelgersma,  Modern  Positivisme,  Gids,  Oct.,  1904. 
Wobbermin,  Theologie  und  Metaphysik.  Berlin,  1901. 
Schapira,  Erkenntnisstheor.  Stromungen  der  Gegenwart. 
Bern,  1904. 

18  Max  Verworn,  ISTatur-  und  Weltanschauung.     Leipzig, 

1905.  Id.,  Principienfragen  in  der  Natur.  Jena,  1905.  Id., 
Die  Mechanik  des  Geisteslebens.  Leipzig,  1908,  pp.  1-20. 
Comp.  Dennert,  op.  c,  pp.  130  ff.  As  a  result  of  this  criti- 
cism of  the  faculty  of  knowledge  modern  science  has  once 
more  become  conscious  of  its  limitations.     Not  only  have 

21 


322  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Duboise-Reymond  in  his  Sieben  Weltrathsel  and  Balfour  in 
his  Foundations  of  Belief  expressed  themselves  to  this  effect, 
but  the  same  views  in  regard  to  the  limitations  of  science, 
and  even  its  exclusively  empirical  character,  are  taken  by  H. 
Poincar^,  La  science  et  l'hypothese;  Id.,  La  valeur  de  la 
science ;  L.  Poincar^,  La  physique  moderne ;  and  others 
whose  works  have  appeared  in  the  Bibliotheque  de  phi- 
losophic scientifique  under  the  editorship  of  G.  le  Bon. 
Comp.  GuBtave  Dumas,  Reflexions  sur  la  science  contem- 
poraine,  Foi  et  Vie,  16  Dec,  1907,  pp.  752-759. 

14  H.  Cohen,  Religion  und  Sittlichkeit.  Berlin,  1907. 
P.  Natorp,  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  Humanitat. 
Freiburg,  1894.  Comp.  TJeberweg-Heinze,  Gesch.  der  Philos., 
Ill,  2,  1897,  pp.  198  ff. 

16  Rickert,  Der  Gegenstand  der  Erkenntniss.*  Tubingen, 
1904.  Id.,  Geschichtsphilosophie,  pp.  51-145,  of :  Die  Phil- 
osophic im  Beginn  des  20  Jahrh.  Heidelberg,  1905,  espe- 
cially pp.  110  ff.  Heymans,  Einfuhrung  in  die  Metaphysik 
auf  Grundlage  der  Erfahrung.     Leipzig,  1905,  pp.  224,  293. 

16  Eialer,  Worterbuch  der  philos.  Begriffe  s.  v. ;  further : 
Der  Monismus,  dargestellt  in  Beitragen  seiner  Vertreter. 
Herausgeg.  v.  Arthur  Drews.  I.  Systematisches,  II.  Historis- 
ches.     Jena,  1900. 

17  Reinke,  Die  Welt  als  That.8     Berlin,  1903,  p.  457. 

18  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter.4  London,  1907. 
Comp.  also :  Fr.  Traub,  Zur  Kritik  des  Monismus,  Zeits.  fur 
Theol.  u.  K.,  May,  1908,  pp.  157-180.  O.  Flugel,  Monismus 
und  Theologie.     Cothen,  1908. 

M  L.  Reinhardt,  Der  Mensch  zur  Eiszeit  in  Europa.  Miin- 
chen,  1906,  p.  2.  Haeckel,  Die  Weltrathsel.  1899,  p.  6.  Id., 
Der  Kampf  um  den  Entwicklungsgedanken.  Berlin,  1905, 
pp.  13  ff.  L.  Stein,  An  der  Wende  des  Jahrh.  Freiburg,  1899, 
pp.  47  ff.  C.  Stumpf,  Der  Entwicklungsgedanke  in  der 
gegenwartigen  Philosophic,  1899. 

20  Rilmelin  in  de  la  Saussaye,  Geestelijke  Stroomingen, 
Haarlem,  1907,  p.  288,  well  says :  "  The  idea  of  evolution 
must  itself  first  be  explained,  before  anything  is  explained 
by  it,"    but  —  what  cannot  be  explained  is  looked  upon  as 


NOTES  323 

evolution.  Eyes  are  being  opened,  however,  to  the  abuse 
made  of  the  word.  Corap.  Lexis,  Das  Wesen  der  Kultur, 
in :  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart,  I.  pp.  13-19.  H.  Schurtz, 
Altersklassen  und  Mannerbtinde.  Berlin,  1902,  pp.  6  ff.,  69. 
Steinmetz,  De  studie  der  volkenkunde.  's  Gravenhage,  1907, 
pp.  30  ff. 

21  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter,  pp.  6,  7. 

22  James,  Pragmatism,  a  New  Name  for  Some  Old  Ways  of 
Thinking.     Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1907,  pp.  9  ff. 

23  Comp.  an  article  by  Prof.  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge,  Natural- 
ism and  Humanism,  Hibbert  Journal,  1907,  pp.  1-17.  L. 
Stein,  Der  Sinn  des  Daseins.     Tubingen,  1904,  pp.  22  ff. 

24  Hoffding,  Philosophy  of  Religion.  London,  1906,  p.  381, 
reviewed  in  Review  of  Theol.  and  Philos.,  Nov.,  1907,  p.  318. 

25  The  idea  that  man's  physical  evolution  has  reached  its 
climax,  and  that  henceforward  it  depends  on  him  to  direct 
with  his  mind  the  further  development  and  to  create  a  new 
world,  occurs  in  many  writers  :  H.  Schurtz,  Urgeschichte 
der  Kultur.,  1900,  Vorwort,  and  pp.  3  ff.  Stanley  Hall,  Ad- 
olescence, 2  vols.  London,  1905,  I,  preface.  Henry  Demarest 
Lloyd,  Man  the  Social  Creator.  London,  1906,  p.  15.  In 
the  last-mentioned  work  occur,  for  example,  the  following 
statements  :  The  laborer  is  the  creator,  he  is  the  remaker  of 
man,  nature,  and  society,  p.  12.  As  labor  is  creation,  by 
labor  men  are  divine  and  become  godlike,  p.  13.  Every 
good  man  (is)  a  creator  and  redeemer,  p.  32.  Man  is  a 
possible  God,  p.  25.  Man  is  not  under  the  law,  he  creates 
the  law,  p.  41.  The  creature  is  the  creator,  every  creature. 
Man  is  not  the  creator,  nor  the  creator  of  all,  but  he  is  the 
greatest  creator  we  know  on  earth.  He  is  the  creator  of 
himself  and  society,  p.  42,  etc. 

26  James,  Pragmatism,  pp.  122,  127, 162,  243,  257. 

27  James,  op.  c.  Comp.  on  the  related  French  philosophy 
of  Ravaisson,  Boutroux,  Bergson,  Le  Roy,  and  others,  an 
article  by  George  M.  Sauvage,  New  Philosophy  in  France, 
Catholic  University  Bulletin,  April,  1906  ;  J.  de  Tonque"dec, 
La  notion  de  la  verite  dans  la  philosophic  nouvelle.  Paris, 
1908.    G.  Rageot,  Les  savants  et  la  philosophic    Paris,  1908. 


324  PHILOSOPHY   OF  REVELATION 

III 

revelation  and  philosophy  —  continued 

1  James,  Mind,  1905,  p.  191. 

2  James,  Mind,  1905,  pp.  194-195. 

8  James,  Pragmatism,  pp.  52,  162  ff.,  242,  264  ff.,  also  in 
his  article,  Does  Consciousness  Exist  ?  in  Journal  of  Phi- 
losophy.    New  York,  Sept.,  1904. 

4  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Kritische  Wanderungen  durch  die 
Philosophic  der  Gegenwart.  1890,  p.  190,  in:  C.  Willems, 
Die  Erkenntnisslehre  des  modernen  Idealismus.  Trier,  1906, 
p.  13.  Comp.  also  Max  Frischeisen-Kohler,  Die  Lehre  von 
den  Sinnesqualitaten  und  ihre  Gegner,  Zeits.  f.  Wissensch. 
Philos.  und  Soziologie,  1906. 

5  Paulsen,  Einl.  in  die  Philosophic  Berlin,  1892,  p.  363. 
Verworn  in  Dennert,  Die  Weltanschauung  des  modernen 
Naturforschers,  p.  147. 

6  So  Helmholtz,  von  Hartmann,  and  others,  in  :  C.  Willems, 
Die  Erkenntnislehre  des  mod.  Ideal,  pp.  42  ff. 

7  E.  L.  Fischer,  Die  Grundfragen  der  Erkenntnisstheorie. 
1887,  p.  424. 

8  Paulsen,  in  Willems,  op.  c,  p.  103. 

9  Verworn,  Naturwissenschaft  und  Weltanschauung.  1904, 
p.  43.  Comp.  Mach.  in  Hell,  Ernst  Machs  Philosophie.  1907, 
p.  23.  Heijmans,  Het  Ik  en  het  psychisch  Monisme,Tijdschr. 
voor  Wijsbegeerte,  I,  3. 

10  Stuart  Mill,  in  Willems,  op.  c,  p.  79. 

11  John  McTaggart  Ellis  McTaggart,  Some  Dogmas  of  Re- 
ligion. London,  1906,  p.  108.  Over  against  idealism  the 
unity  and  independence  of  the  ego  are  upheld  by  Landmann, 
Die  Mehrheit  geistigerPersonlichkeiten  in  einem  Individuuni, 
1894.  Gutberlet,  Der  Kampf  urn  die  Seele.  Mainz,  1903, 
pp.  121  ff.  Rudolf  Otto,  Naturalistiche  und  religiose  Weltan- 
sicht.     Tubingen,  1904,  pp.  244  ff. 

12  Comp.  Dilthey,  Einleitung  in  die  Geisteswissenschaf- 
ten.     Leipzig,    188,'),     pp.    322    ff.     Warfield,     Augustine's 


NOTES  325 

Doctrine  of  Knowledge  and  Authority.  Princeton  Theol. 
Review,  July  and  Oct.,  1907. 

18  James,  Pragmatism,  pp.  165  ff. 

14  Mr.  H.  W.  B.  Joseph,  in  Mind,  1905,  p.  33. 

16  Flugel,  Die  Probleme  der  Philosophic4  Cothen,  1906, 
pp.  114-115. 

16  Paul  Kalweit,  Das  religiose  Apriori,  Theol.  Stud.  u.  Krit. 
1908,  I,  pp.  139-156. 

17  Paulsen,  Einl.  in  die  Philos.     1892,  p.  425. 

18  In  Willems,  op.  c,  pp.  36-47.  Comp.  also  Bradley,  Ap- 
pearance and  Reality,2  London,  1906,  pp.  11  ff.,  and  further 
the  article  by  Frischeisen-Kohler,  cited  in  note  4  above. 

19  Verworn,  in  Dennert,  op.  c,  p.  140. 

20  Comp.  G.  E.  Moore,  Refutation  of  Idealism,  Mind,  N.  S. 
n.  48,  and,  in  answer,  C.  A.  Strong,  Has  Mr.  Moore  refuted 
Idealism?  Mind,  1905,  pp.  178-189.  Further,  J.  S.  Mac- 
kenzie, The  New    Realism   and   the  Old  Idealism.     Mind, 

1906,  pp.  308-328. 
Ed.  von  Hartmann,  in  Willems,  op.  c,  pp.  56-79. 
Dilthey,  Einl.  in  die  Geisteswissenschaften,  pp.  26-48. 
James,  Pragmatism,  p.  257. 

IV 

REVELATION   AND   NATURE 

1  A.  C.  Fraser,  Philosophy  of  Theism.     1899,  pp.  24-34. 

2  Mach,  Erkenntniss  und  Irrtuni.,  p.  5. 

3  Ladd,  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  I,  1906,  p.  11. 
Gwatkin,  The  Kuowledge  of  God,  I,  1906. 

4  Frischeisen-Kohler,    Moderne    Philosophic      Stuttgart, 

1907,  pp.  18-37.  L.  Stein,  Der  Sinn  des  Daseins,  pp.  225- 
239. 

6  Otto,  Natural,  und  relig.  Weltansicht,  p.  44. 

6  Haeckel,  Die  Weltrathsel,  p.  209.  Id.,  Der  Kampf  um 
den  Entwicklungsgedanken,  p.  23.  Comp.  Otto,  op.  c, 
pp.  78,  112  ff.,  200  ff. 

7  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Mechanismus  und  Vitalismus  in  der 


21 
22 
23 


326  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

modernen  Biologie,  Archiv  f.  syst.  Philos.,  1903,  p.  345.    Id., 
Philos.  des  Unbew.,  III.  1904,  p.  vi. 

8  Ostwald,  Die  Ueberwindung  des  wissensch.  Materialis- 
mus.,  1895,  in  Dennert,  op.  c,  pp.  235-236. 

9  Reinke,  Die  Welt  als  That,8  pp.  464  ff. 

10  Otto,  op.  c,  pp.  39,  46,  47. 

11  Alfred  Dippe,  Naturphilosophie.  Mtinchen,  1907, 
pp.  3-14. 

12  L.  Stein,  Der  Sinn  des  Daseins,  p.  24. 

18  Haeckel,  Schopfungsgeschichte.5  1874,  p.  8.  Comp. 
Die  Weltrathsel,  p.  15. 

14  Haeckel,  Schopfungsgesch.,  p.  28.     Weltrathsel,  p.  18. 
16  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter,  p.  23. 

16  Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  ch.  IV,  pp.  35  ff. 

17  Otto,  op.  c.,  pp.  50-57. 

18  Lipps,  Naturwissenschaft  und  Weltanschauung.  1906, 
p.  13.   ' 

19  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Die  Weltanschauung  der  modernen 
Physik,  pp.  195,  197  ff.,  204  ff.  Dennert,  Die  Weltanschau- 
ung des  mod.  Naturforschers,  p.  143. 

20  Fechner,  Ueber  die  Seelenfrage.2  1907,  p.  214.  Comp. 
also  Bradley,  op.  c,  ch.  II,  pp.  25  ff. 

21  Shentone,  The  Electric  Theory  of  Matter,  in  Cornhill 
Magazine,  quoted  in  The  Literary  World,  Aug.,  1907, 
p.  381.  Comp.  also  A.  J.  Balfour,  Unsere  heutige  Weltan- 
schauung. Einige  Bemerkungen  zur  modernen  Theorie  der 
Materie.  Deutsch  von  Dr.  M.  Ernst.  Leipzig,  1904.  M. 
Shoen,  Bestaat  er  een  oer-grondstof  ?  Wet.  Bladen,  May, 
1908,  pp.  249-259,  after  an  essay  in  Naturwiss.  Wochen- 
schrift,  2  Febr.,  1908.  Reinke,  Die  Natur  und  Wir.  Berlin, 
1908,  p.  38. 

22  Dippe,  Naturphilosophie,  pp.  86,  89. 

23  Rethwisch,  in  Dippe,  pp.  79  ff.  Reinke,  op.  c,  pp.  40-50. 
Th.  Newest,  Die  Gravitationslehre  ein  Irrtum.  Wien,  1905. 
For  the  various  views  on  Vital  Force  the  reader  is  referred 
to  the  article  by  von  Hartmann,  quoted  above  in  note  7,  and 
further  to  Karl  Braeunig,  Mechanismus  und  Vitalismus  in  der 
Biologie  des  neunzehnten  Jahrhunderts.     Leipzig,  1907. 


NOTES  327 

24  W.  von  Schnehen,  Die  Urzeugung,  Glauben  und  Wissen. 
Dec,  1907,  pp.  403-415. 

25  Otto,  op.  c,  p.  37. 

26  Kant,  in  Eisler,  Worterbuch,2  p.  618. 

27  Haeckel,  Die  Weltrathsel,  pp.  15-16. 

28  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter,  p.  49.  Reinke,  Die  Natur  und 
Wir,  pp.  25,  26,  33. 

29  Kleutgen,  Die  Philosophic  der  Vorzeit,2  II,  pp.  314-335. 

30  Von  Hartmann,  Die  Weltanschauung,  etc.,  p.  203. 

81  R.  Schmid,  Das  naturwiss.  Glaubensbekenntnis  eines 
Theologen.    Stuttgart,  1906,  p.  87. 

82  Haeckel,  Weltrathsel,  pp.  117-118. 

88  Lodge,  Life  and  Matter,  pp.  54  ff .  Comp.  also  J.  Froeh- 
lich,  Das  G-esetz  von  der  Erhaltung  der  Kraft  in  dem  Geist 
des  Christ.     Leipzig,  1903. 

84  Bruno  Wille,  Darwins  Weltanschauung,  etc.  Comp. 
Lect.  I,  note  16  ff. 

85  In  K.  Dieterich,  Philosophic  und  Naturwissenschaft. 
Freiburg,  1885,  p.  9. 

86  Haeckel,  Weltrathsel,  pp.  342,  404,  405. 

87  Haeckel,  op.  c,  pp.  388  ff.,  439.  Nat.  Schopf.,  pp.  156, 
656.  L.  Stein,  An  der  Wende  des  Jahrh.,  p.  51.  Id.,  Der 
Sinn  des  Daseins,  pp.  42  ff.  Dippe,  Naturphilos,  p.  153. 
Reinke,  Die  Natur  und  Wir,  pp.  209  ff. 

88  Dr.  W.  H.  Nieuwhuis,  Twee  vragen  des  Tijds.  Kampen, 
1907,  pp.  39,  66. 

89  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Die  Weltanschauung,  etc.,  p.  203. 

40  Lipps,  Naturwiss.  und  Weltanschauung,  p.  19. 

41  Ritter,  Schets  eener  critische  geschiedenis  van  het  Sub- 
stantiebegrip  in  de  nieuwere  wijsbegeerte.  Leiden,  1906, 
p.  471. 

42  Natur  und  Christenthum,  Vier  Vortrage  von  D.  Laason, 
Ltitgert,  Schader,  Bornhauser.  Berlin,  1907,  pp.  49  ff. 
Richard  Hamann,  Der  Impressionismus  in  Leben  und  Kunst. 
Koln,  1907. 

**  Smend,  Lehrbuch  der  altt.  Eeligionsgeschichte.  1893, 
p.  458.  Martensen  Larsen,  Die  Naturwiss.  in  ihrem  Schuld- 
verhaltnis  zum  Christenthum.     Berlin,  1897.     Lange,  Gesch. 


328  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

des    Materialisraus.     1882,  pp.  129   ff.     Sellin,  Die  alttest. 
Religion  und  die  Religionsgeschichte,  pp.  28-34. 

44  James,  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience.  1906, 
p.  525.  Id.,  Pluralism  and  Religion,  Hibbert  Journal.  July, 
1908.  Wundt,  Volkerpsych.,  II,  2,  p.  223.  McTatgart, 
Some  Dogmas  of  Religion,  pp.  257  ff.  Rogers,  accord. ng  to 
Hibbert  Journal,  Jan.,  1908,  p.  445.  Corap.  Dr.  Rashdall, 
who  denies  to  God  omnipotence;  Dr.  Harrison,  who  denies 
him  even  creation  (in  McTaggart,  p.  221,  note),  and  the  so- 
called  "  ethical  modernists  "  in  the  Netherlands,  who  dis- 
tinguish between  God  as  nature-power  and  as  ethical  power. 
Hooijkaas,  God  in  de  geschiedenis.  Schiedam,  1870,  p.  35. 
Goethe  already  said :  "  I  cannot  satisfy  myself  in  the  mani- 
fold tendencies  of  my  being  with  one  mode  of  thinking  :  as 
poet  and  artist  I  am  a  polytheist,  but  on  the  other  hand  a 
pantheist  as  a  student  of  nature,  and  one  just  as  decisively  as 
the  other.  If  I  need  a  God  for  my  personality  as  a  moral 
being,  this  also  is  already  provided  for. " 

45  In  Nieuwhuis,  op.  c,  p.  82. 

46  Lange,  Gesch.  des  Material.,  p.  130. 

47  Paul  Griinberg,  Das  Uebel  in  der  Welt  und  Gott.  Lichter- 
felde,  1907.  Bruining,  Het  geloof  aan  God  en  het  kwaad  in 
de  wereld.     Baarn,  1907. 

48  Hibbert  Journal,  Oct.,  1907,  p.  9. 


REVELATION    AND    HISTORY 

1  On  these  various  tendencies  the  reader  may  consult :  R. 
Flint,  History  of  the  Philosophy  of  History  in  France  and 
Germany,  1, 1893.  Rocholl,  Die  Philosophic  der  Geschichte, 
1878,  1893.  M.  Giesswein,  Determin.  und  metaph.  Ge- 
schichtsauifassung.  Wien,  1905.  Fr.  Oppenheimer,  Neue 
Geschichtsphilosophie,  Die  Zukunft,  Nov.,  1905.  Fr.  Eulen- 
burg,  Neuere  Geschichtsphilosophie,  Archiv.  f.  Sozialwiss. 
und    Sozialpolitik,  1907,  pp.  283-337.       Colenbrander,  He- 


^OTES  329 

dendaagsche  Geschiedschrij  vers,Gids,  May,  1907  pp.  319,  341. 
P.  Schweizer,  Die  religiose  Auffassung  der  Weltgeschichte. 
Zurich,  1908. 

2  The  appointment  of  Prof.  M.  Spahn  at  Strassburg  in 
1901  furnished  a  striking  proof  of  this. 

8  Mind,  Oct.,  1907  pp.  506-534. 

4  H.  Peach,  Liberalisnius,  Sozialismus  and  christl.  Ge- 
sellschaftsordnung,2  II,  1901,  pp.  283  ff.  L.  Stein,  Die  soziale 
Frage  im  Lichte  der  Philos.2  Stuttgart,  1903,  p.  47,  R.  Elsler, 
Soziologie.     Leipzig,  1903,  pp.  40-45. 

6  L.  Stein,  An  der  Wende  des  Jahrh.,  p.  50,  enters  a  pro- 
test. 

6  Hugo  de  Vries,  Afstammings-  en  Mutatieleer.  Baarn, 
1907,  p.  35. 

7  In  Nieuwhuis,  Twee  vragen  des  tijds,  p.  77. 

8  Lexis,  Das  Wesen  der  Kultur,  in  Die  Kultur  der  Gegen- 
wart,  I,  pp.  13-19. 

9  Dr.  E.  R.  Lankester,  Natur  und  Mensch,  Mit  einer 
Vorrede  von  Dr.  K.  Guenther.     Leipzig,  pp.  xi  ff.,  28. 

10  Lamprecht,  Die  Kulturhist.  Methode.  Berlin,  1900.  Id., 
Moderne  Geschichtswiss.,  1905.  Compare  on  him  the  above 
mentioned  articles  of  Eulenburg  and  Colenbrander  ;  also  H. 
Pesch,  Lehrbuch  der  Nationaloekonomie,  I,  1905,  pp.  95  ff. 

11  Dilthey,  Einl.  in  die  Geisteswiss.,  pp.  39,  51. 

12  Dilthey,  ib.,  p.  115. 

18  Theob.  Ziegler,  Die  geistigen  und  sozialen  Stromungen 
des  19  Jahrh.  Berlin,  1901,  pp.  1  ff.  H.  St.  Chamberlain, 
Die  Grundlagen  des  19  Jahrh.,4  1903,  I,  pp.  26  ff. 

14  Ranke,  Ueber  die  Epochen  der  neueren  Geschichte, 
1888,  quoted  by  de  la  Saussaye,  Geestel.  Stroomingen, 
pp.  301  ff .  Comp.  also  H.  Pesch,  Der  Gang  der  wirtschafts- 
gesch.  Entwicklung,  Stimmen  aus  Maria  Laach,  Jan.,  1903, 
pp.  1-16,  and  Lehrbuch  der  Nationaloekonomie,  I,  pp.  107  ff. 

16  The  following  writers  deal  with  the  subject  of  laws  of 
history  :  L.  Stein,  Die  soziale  Frage,  pp.  35-42.  Elsler,  Sozi- 
ologie, p.  12.  Rumelin,  Eeden  und  Aufsatze,  1875.  Tiele, 
Inleiding  tot  de  godsdienstwetenschap,  I,2  pp.  193  ff.  H. 
Pesch,  Lehrbuch,  I,  pp.  443  ff.     Dilthey,  Einl.  in  die  Geistes* 


330  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

wiss.,  1, 1883.     Gumplovicz,  Grundriss  der  Sozologie.2   Wien, 
1905,  pp.  361  ff. 

19  Dilthey  op.  c,  p.  145.  Windelband,  Geschichte  und 
Naturwissenchaft.2  Strassburg,  1900.  Rickert,  Kulturwiss. 
mid  Naturw.  Tubingen,  1899.  Id.,  Die  Grenzen  der  naturw. 
Begriffsbildung.  Tubingen,  1902  (cf.  Troeltsch,  Theol.  Rund- 
schau, 1903).  Id.,  Geschichtsphilosophie,  in :  Die  Philos- 
ophie  im  Beginn  des  20  Jahrh.,  II,  pp.  51-135.  Eucken, 
Philosophie  der  Geschichte,  pp.  247-280  of  System.  Philos. 
in  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart.  Lindner,  Geschichtsphilos. 
Stuttgart,  1901.  Richter,  Die  Vergleichbarkeit  naturwissen- 
schaftlicher  und  geschichtlicher  Forschungsereignisse,  Deut- 
sche Rundschau,  April,  1904,  pp.  114-129.  G.  Heymans,  De 
geschiedenis  als  wetenschap,  Versl.  en  Meded.  der  Kon.  Ak. 
v.  Wet.  Afd.  Lett.  1906,  pp.  173-202.  Van  der  Wijck, 
Natuur  en  Geschiedenis,  Onze  Eeuw,  March,  1907,  pp.  419- 
445. 

17  Frischeisen-Kohler,  Moderne  Philos.,  pp.  385  ff. 

18  Eucken,  Philos.  der  Gesch.,  1.  c.  pp.  261  ff. 

19  Marx  in  Woltmann,  Der  histor.  Materialismus,  p.  183, 
coinp.  Engels,  ib.  p.  241. 

20  Rickert,  Geschichtsphilos.,  1.  c.  p.  104. 

21  Dilthey,  Einleitung,  pp.  114-116,  129. 

22  Frischeisen-Kohler,  Moderne  Philos.,  p.  385. 

23  Heymans,  De  geschiedenis  als  wetenschap,  1.  c.  p.  185. 

24  Heymans,  ib.  p.  182. 

25  In  Frischeisen-Kohler,  op.  c.  p.  202. 

26  Troeltsch,  Die  Absolutheit  des  Christ.,  pp.  50  ff. 

27  Buckle  in  Giesswein,  Determ.  und  metaph.  Gesch.,  p.  6. 

28  Troeltsch,  op.  c,  pp.  23  ff.  Id.,  Theol.  Rundschau,  VI. 
pp.  1-3. 

29  Rickert,  Geschichtsphilos.,  1.  c.  p.  82. 

80  Troeltsch,  op.  c.  Comp.  Reischle,  Hist.  u.  dogra.  Methode 
der  Theologie,  Theol.  Rundschau,  1901.  Traub,  Die  religions- 
gesch.  Methode  und  die  syst.  Theol.,  Zeits.  fur  Theol.  u. 
Kirche,  1901. 

81  Rickert,  Geschichtsphilos.,  1.  c.  p.  131. 

82  Eucken,  Philos  d.  Gesch.,  1.  c.  p.  271.   In  this  class  must 


NOTES  331 

be  reckoned  in  general  all  advocates  of  so-called  Personal 
Idealism.  Comp.  Personal  Idealism,  ed.  by  H.  C.  Sturt, 
Oxford,  1902. 

83  Rickert,  1.  c.  p.  121. 

84  Dilthey,  Einl.  in  die  Geisteswiss.,  pp.  123,  135  ff. 
Eucken,  Geistige  Stromungen  der  Gegenwart.  Leipzig,  1904, 
pp.  190  ff.  Hipler,  Die  christliche  GeschichtsaufFassung. 
Koln,  1884.  Harnack.  Das  Christentum  und  die  Geschichte, 
1904.  Sellin,  Die  alttest.  Keligion,  pp.  34  ff.  Fairbairn, 
The  Philos.  of  the  Christian  Keligion,  pp.  169-185.  H.  H. 
Kuyper,  Het  Geref.  beginsel  en  de  Kerkgeschiedenis. 
Leiden,  1900. 

86  H.  Schurtz,  Volkerkunde.  Leipzig  und  Wien,  1903,  p.  5. 
Steinmetz,  De  Studie  der  Volkenkunde,  p.  46 

36  Hugo  de  Vries,  Afstammings-  en  Mutatieleer,  pp.  35, 
36.  Schurtz,  Urgesch.  der  Kultur,  1900,  Vorwort.  Wundt, 
Volker-psychologie,  II,  1,  pp.  16,  587  ff.,  589,  II,  2,  pp.  168. 
Steinthal,  Zu  Bibel  und  Religionsphilosophie.  Berlin,  1890, 
p.  128.  R.  C.  Boer,  Gids,  Jan.,  1907,  p.  83.  Stanley  Hall, 
Adolescence,  I,  preface,  p.  vii. 

87  Eucken,  Geschichtsphilos.,  1.  c.  p.  40. 

85  Heymans,  De  geschiedenis  als  wetenschap,  1.  c.  p.  191, 
194.     Comp.  also  Emerson's  Essay  on  History. 

89  Eucken,  Geistige  Stromungen,  p.  190. 

40  H.  H.  Kuyper,  op.  c.  p.  19. 

41  Dilthey,  Einleitung  p.  41. 


VI 

REVELATION    AND    RELIGION 

1  George  Trumbull  Ladd,  The  Philosophy  of  Religion. 
London,  I,  1905,  pp.  138  ff.  Gutberlet,  Der  Mensch,  sein 
Ursprung  und  seine  Entwicklung.2  Paderborn,  1903, 
pp.  522  ff. 

2  Tiele,  Inl.  tot  de  Godsdienstwet.,  I,  pp.  141  ff. 

8  Het  Vraagstuk  van  den  Godsdienst,  Ontbinding  of  Evo- 


332  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

lutie,  beantwoord  door  de  grootste  Denkers  der  Wereld.  Am- 
sterdam, 1908,  pp.  5, 10,  79,  80,  84,  90,  106, 115, 117,  119, 121, 
197,  289,  316. 

4  Ibid.,   pp.  13,  21,  57,  59,  99,  212,  252,  290,  301. 

6  Ibid.,  pp.  21,  79. 

6  Ladd,  op.  c,  I,  pp.  120  ff. 

7  Morris  Jastrow,  in  Tiele,  Inleiding  tot  de  Godsdienstwet. , 

II,  pp.  219. 

8  Het  Vraagstuk  van  den  Godsdienst,  etc.,  pp.  34,  112  ff. 

9  Dilthey,  Einl.  in  die  Geisteswiss.,  pp.  170,  184,  185. 

10  Lubbock,  Entstehung  der  Civilisation.  Deutsche  Aus- 
gabe,  1875,  p.  172. 

11  Dilthey,  op.  c.  pp.  168, 172. 

12  Oscar  Hertwig,  Das  biogenetische  Grundgesetz,  Intern. 
Wochenschrift  f.  Wissenschaft,  Kunst  und  Technik,  April 
20,  1907,  pp.  97,  98. 

18  L.  Stein,  Die  soziale  Frage,  pp.  38,  63,  105,  107. 

14  Lehmann,  Die  Anfange  der  Religion  und  die  Religion 
der  primitive!!  Volker,  in  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart,  I,  III, 
p.  1.  Troeltsch,  Die  Christl.  Religion,  ib.,  p.  483.  Tiele,  In- 
leiding. II,  p.  183.  Pfleiderer,  Religion  und  Religionen.  Miin- 
chen,  1906,  p.  53. 

15  Haeckel,  Der  Kampf  um  den  Entwickelungsgedanken, 
pp.  56,  70.  Haeckel  is  sometimes  more  modest  and  refers  to 
his  "  Stammesgeschichte  "  as  an  "hypothetical  structure," 
because  the  empirical  records  underlying  it  remain  to  a  high 
degree  defective  ;  comp.  H.  Meyer,  Der  gegenwartige  Stand 
der  Entwickelungslehre,  pp.  59,  60. 

16  Reinke,  Die  Entvv.  der  Naturwiss.  insbes.  der  Biologie 
im  19  Jahrh.,  1900,  pp.  19,  20.  Id.,  Die  Natur  und  Wir. 
Berlin,  1907,  pp.  151  ff.  Branco  in  Wasmann,  Die  moderns 
Biologie  und  die  Entwickelungslehre,2  1904,  pp.  302,  304. 

17  Stanley  Hall,  Adolescence,  II,  p.  91.  H.  Meyer,  op.  c, 
]>.  71.  Lankester,  Natur  und  Mensch,  p.  24.  Dr.  H.  C.  Stratz, 
Wij  stammen  niet  van  de  apen  af.     Baarn,  1907,  p.  23. 

18  Wasmann,  op.  C,  p.  295. 

19  Prof.  Dr.  C.  Ph.  Sluiter,  Het  Experiment  in  Dienst  der 
Morphologie.     Amsterdam,  1907. 


NOTES  333 

20  Oscar  Hertwig,  Das  biogenetische  Grundgesetz  nach  dem 
heutigen  Stand  der  Biologie,  Intern.  Wochenschrift,  April 
13  and  20,  1907,  p.  93.  Most  botanists,  zoologists,  and  pal- 
aeontologists are  at  present  believers  in  polyphyletic  develop- 
ment. H.  Meyer,  Der  gegenw.  Stand  der  Entwickelungs- 
lehre,  pp.  50  ff.  Reinke,  Die  Natur  und  Wir,  pp.  126  ff.,  139  if. 
Wasmann,  Der  Kampf  urn  das  Entwickelungsprobleni  in 
Berlin.     Freiburg,  1907. 

21  Stanley  Hall,  Adolescence,  I,  pp.  35,  45, 49.  Stratz,  op.  c, 
p.  17. 

22  Gutberlet,  Der  Mensch,  sein  Ursprung  und  seine  Ent- 
wickelung.2    Paderborn,  1903. 

28  Stanley  Hall,  Adolescence,  I,  p.  107  ;  II,  p.  67. 
24  lb.  I,  p.  55. 

26  lb.  II,  p.  568. 
28  lb.  I,  p.  241. 

27  Fr.  Ratzel,  Volkerkunde,  3  Bde.     Leipzig,  1885,  I,  p.  5. 

28  Schneider,  Die  Naturvolker,  2  Bde.,  1885,  1886.  Gut- 
berlet,  op.  c,  pp.  380  ff.,  412  ff.  474  ff.  Froberger,  Die  Schop- 
f  ungsgesch.  der  Menschheit  in  der  voraussetzungslosen  Volk- 
erpsychologie.     Trier,  1903. 

29  Steinmetz,  De  Studie  der  Yolkenkunde,  p.  31. 

30  Wundt,  Volkerpsychologie,  II,  2,  1906,  p.  150. 

81  Steinmetz,  op.  C,  p.  41. 

82  Orr,  God's  Image  in  Man.     London,  1906,  pp.  163  ff. 

33  Steinmetz,  op.  C,  pp.  32  ff.  Fr.  Ratzel,  op.  c,  I,  p.  10. 
H.  J.  Koenen,  Het  Kecht  in  den  Kring  van  het  Gezin.  Rotter- 
dam, 1900,  pp.  65,  69. 

34  Stanley  Hall,  Adolescence,  II,  pp.  649-650,  685,  713  ff., 
726  ff. 

35  Korte  Beschouwingen  over  Bloei  en  Verval  der  Natien, 
Wetensch.  Bladen,  July,  1904,  pp.  117-128. 

36  Zockler,  Die  Lehre  vom  Urstand  des  Menschen.  Giit- 
ersloh,  1879,  pp.  140  ff.     Orr,  God's  Image  in  Man,  p.  301. 

37  H.  Schurtz,  Volkerkunde,  1903,  p.  25.  Steinmetz,  op.  c, 
p.  49.     Orr,  op.  c,  p.  186.     Zockler,  op.  c.  135. 

38  Fr.  Ratzel,  Volkerkunde,  p.  I,  p.  14. 
89  Ibid. 


334  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 


40  Steinmetz,  pp.  45,  54. 

41  Dilthey,  Einleitung,  pp.  38,  39. 


42  Wundt,  Volkerpsychologie,  II,  p.  428. 
48  Gutberlet,  Der  Mensch. 

44  L.  Stein,  Der  Sinn  des  Daseins,  pp.  220-239. 

45  G.  Ratzenhofer,  Die  soziologische  Erkenntniss.  Leipzig, 
1898,  p.  125.     Comp.  L.  Stein,  op.  c,  p.  226. 

4<J  In  L.  Stein,  op.  c,  pp.  227  ff. 

47  Dr.  Joseph  Miiller,  Das  sexuelle  Leben  der  Naturvolker.8 
Leipzig,  1906. 

48  Schmoller,  Grundriss  der  allgem.  Volkswirtsehafts- 
lehre.     Leipzig,  1901,  I,  p.  122;  II,  p.  654. 

49  Steinmetz,  op.  c,  p.  54. 

50  Wundt,  Volkerpsychologie,  II,  1.  Leipzig,  1905,  pp.64,  85, 
335.  II,  2,  p.  165.  Id.,  Vorlesungen  iiber  die  Menschen  und 
Tierseele,4  1906,  p.  17.  Fr.  Ratzel,  Volkerkunde,  I,  p.  13. 
Gwatkin,  The  Knowledge  of  God,  I,  pp.  253  ff.  Reinke,  Die 
Natur  nnd  Wir.  1908,  p.  84. 

61  "Wundt,  Volkerpsychologie,  II,  2,  p.  165.  Gutberlet,  Der 
Mensch.,  pp.  398  ff. 

62  Troeltsch,  Die  Christ.  Religion,  in  Die  Kultur  der  Ge- 
genwart,  p.  483. 

58  Schroeder  in  Beitrage  zur  Weiterentw.  der  Christl. 
Religion,  1905,  p.  8.  Tiele,  Inleiding,  II,  pp.  108,  202,  204. 
H.  de  Vries,  Afstammings-  en  Mutatieleer,  p.  36. 

64  Garvie,  art.  Revelation,  in  Hasting's  Dictionary  of  the 
Bible. 

66  Comp.  the  author's  address :  Christelijke  Wetenschap, 
1904,  pp.  73  ff.     Bertholet,  Religion  und  Geisteskultur,  II, 

pp.  i  ff. 

66  Flournoy,  Les  Principes  de  la  Psychologie  religieuse. 
Geneve,  1903,  pp.  8,  9.  James,  The  Varieties  of  Religious 
Experience,  pp.  26,  27. 

67  Comp.  the  author's  Psychologie  der  Religie.  Versl.  en 
Meded.  der  Kon.  Ak.  v.  Wet.,  Afd.  Lett.,  1907,  pp.  1-32. 

68  Troeltsch,  op.  c,  p.  481. 

69  Tiele,  Inleiding,  I,  p.  61;  II,  pp.  66,  110,  214,  215. 
60  Dilthey,  Einl.  in  die  Geisteswiss.,  pp.  167  ff. 


NOTES  335 

61  Tiele,  Inleiding,  II,  pp.  64  ff. 

62  Ibid.,  p.  65. 
68  Ibid. 

64  Pierscm,  Gods  Wondermacht  en  ons  Geestelijk  Leven. 
1867,  p.  42.  W.  Sanday,  The  Life  of  Christ  in  Recent  Re- 
search. Oxford,  1907,  pp.  204  ff.  The  Nature  of  Prayer,  by 
the  Rev.  Lyman  Abbott,  Moncure  D.  Conway,  the  Rev.  Dr. 
W.  R.  Huntingdon,  North  American  Review,  Nov.,  1907, 
pp.  337-348. 

65  Ch.  de  la  Saussaye,  Lehrbuch  der  Religionsgeschichte, 
I,3  1905,  p.  6. 

66  Bethe,  Mythus,  Sage,  Marchen.    Leipzig,  1905,  pp.  43,  44. 

67  R.  C.  Boer,  Heldensage  en  Mythologie,  Gids,  Jan.,  1907, 
p.  84.  Comp.  also  Steinthal,  Zu  Bibel  nnd  Religionsphilos., 
pp.  127,  150.  Dilthey,  Einl.,  pp.  169,  171,  174  ff.,  178. 
Wundt,  Volkerpsych.,  II,  pp.  551  ff.  De  historische 
achtergrond  der  Europeesche  sprookjeswereld,  Wet.  Bladen, 
July,  1908,  pp.  1-16,  after  an  article  by  A.  S.  Herbert,  in  The 
Nineteenth  Century,  Febr.,  1908. 

68  J.  G.  Frazer,  The  Golden  Bough.  Comp.  Ladd,  I,  pp.  144  ff. 

69  Preuss,  Der  Ursprung  der  Religion  und  Kunst,  Globus 
Bd.  86,  87,  p.  249. 

70  Tiele,  Inl.,  II,  120.  Ladd,  I,  pp.  103,  144.  Gwatkin, 
The  Knowledge  of  God,  I,  pp.  249,  252,  263. 

71  Jeremias,  Die  Panbabylonisten.     Leipzig,  1907,  p.  17. 

72  Bethe,  op.  c,  p.  40. 

78  Dilthey,  Einl.,  pp.  178  ff. 

VII 

REVELATION    AND    CHRISTIANITY 

1  Clemens  Alex.,  Stromata,  I,  5 ;  VI,  8. 

2  Augustinus,  de  Civ.,  VIII,  9-12 ;  de  Doctr.  Chr.,  II,  p.  40. 
Retract.,  I,  3. 

8  Lactantius,  Inst.,  VII,  7,  22. 

4  Willmann,  Geschichte  des  Idealismus,  1, 1894,  pp.  14  ff. ; 
II,  pp.  23  ff.  Mausbach,  Christentum  und  Weltmoral.2  Mun- 
ster,  1905,  pp.  9  ff. 


336  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

5  Willmann,  Gesch.  des  Ideal.,  Ill,  pp.  763  ff. 

6  A.  Stockl,  Lehrbuch  der  Philos.,  I,  1887,  pp.  406  fit 

7  Schurtz,  Urgeschichte  der  Kultur,  pp.  298  ff .  Ulrich 
Wendt,  Die  Technik  als  Kulturmacht.     Berlin,  1906. 

8  Schurtz,  op.  c,  p.  441.  S.  Muller,  Urgeschichte  Europas, 
Grundzuge  einer  prahist.  Archaeologie.  Strassburg,  1905, 
]>.  40.  J.  Guibert,  Les  origines.4  Paris,  1905,  p.  348.  C.  W. 
Vollgraff,  Over  den  oorsprong  onzer  Europeesche  beschaving. 
Gids,  Dec,  1905. 

9  S  Muller,  op.  c,  p.  19. 

10  Ibid.,  p.  21. 

11  Ibid.,  p.  22. 

12  Ibid.,  p.  24. 

18  Ibid.,  p.  3.     Comp.  also  pp.  25,  26,  28,  29. 

14  L.  Remhardt,  Der  Mensch  zur  Eiszeit  in  Europa.     1906, 

p.  249. 

15  Holwerda,  in  Ch.  de  la  Saussaye,  Lehrbuch  der  Relig- 
ionsgeschichte,  II,8  p.  245. 

16  S.  Muller,  op.  C.  pp.  49-52. 

17  Ibid.  pp.  30  if. 

18  Willmann,  Gesch.  des  Ideal.,  I,  pp.  2  ff. 

19  Dilthey,  Eiul.,  pp.  184  ff.  Karl  Joel,  Der  Ursprung  der 
Naturphilosophie  aus  dem  Geiste  der  Mystik.  Basel,  1903. 
Willmann,  Gesch.  des  Ideal.,  I,  pp.  1  ff.,  33  ff.,  142  ff.  R.  H- 
Woltjer,  Het  mystiekreligieuse  Element  in  de  Grieksche  Phi- 
lologie.     Leiden,  1905. 

20  D.  Gath  Whitley,  What  was  the  Primitive  Condition  of 
Man  ?   The  Princeton  Theol.  Review,  Oct.,  1906,  pp.  513-534. 

21  O.  Weber,  Theologie  und  Assyriologie  im  Streite  urn 
Babel  und  Bibel.  1904,  p.  17.  Comp.  Tiele,  Inl.,  II,  p.  220. 
Winckler,  Religionsgesch.  und  gesch.  Orient.  Leipzig,  1906, 
p.  9.    Id.,  Die  Babylon.  Geisteskultur.  Leipzig,  1907,  pp.  18  IT. 

22  H.  H.  Kuyper,  Evolutie  of  Revelatie,  Amsterdam,  1903, 
and  the  literature  there  quoted.  Felix  Stahelin,  Probleme 
der  Israel.,  Geschichte.     Basel,  1907. 

28  Steinmetz,  De  Studie  der  Volkenkunde,  pp.  36,  37,  39. 
24  Richthofen,    in    JeremiaB,   Die   Panbabylonisten.     Leip- 
zig, 1907,  p.  15. 


NOTES  337 

26  Winkler,  Religionsgesch.  und  gesch.,  Orient,  pp.  7,  8,  9, 
17,  33.  Id.,  Die  Weltanschauung  des  alten  Orients,  p.  4.  Id., 
Die  Babyl.  Geisteskultur,  pp.  6,  47,  48. 

26  A.  Bastian,  Der  Volkergedanke  im  Auf  bau  einer  Wissen- 
schaft  vom  Menschen.  Leipzig,  1881.  Cf.  Gumplovicz  Grun- 
driss  der  Soziologie,  pp.  27  ff. 

27  As  regards  language  comp.,  Fritz  Mauthner,  Die  Sprache. 
Frankfurt  a.  M.,  pp.  45  ff. 

28  Wundt,  Volkerpsych.,  II,  1,  p.  570. 

29  Wundt,  op.  c,  II,  pp.  343,  571. 

30  G.  F.  Wright,  Scientific  Confirmations  of  Old  Testament 
History,    Oberlin,  1906. 

31  Wundt,  op.  c,  pp.  342,  570. 

32  Jeremias,  Die  Panbabylonisten.,  pp.  15,  16. 
88  See  note  44  of  Lecture  IV. 

84  Andrew  Lang,  Magic  and  Religion,  p.  224,  in  Ladd,  I, 
p.  153.  Waitz,  Anthropologic  der  Naturvolker.  1860,  II, 
pp.  168  ff.  C.  von  Orelli,  Allg.  Religionsgesch.,  pp.  39,  745, 
775  ff.  Id.,  Die  Eigenart  der  bibl.  Religion.  1906,  pp.  11, 
12.  Schroeder,  in  Beitrage  zur  Weiterentw.  der  Chr.  Rel. 
1905,  pp.  1  ff.  Jeremias,  Monoth.  Stromungen  innerhalb  der 
Babylon.  Religion.,  1904.  Baentsch,  Monoth.  Stromungen 
und  der  Monoth.  Israels.,  1907.  Gloatz,  Die  vermutlichen 
Religionsanfange  und  der  Monoth.,  Religion  und  Geistes- 
kultur, 1907,  pp.  137-143.  Soderblom,  Die  Allvater  der 
Primitiven,  ib.,  1907,  pp.  315-322.  Lehmann,  in  :  Die  Kultur 
der  Gegenwart  I,  III,  p.  26. 

86  James,  Pragmatism,  pp.  165,  169,  170,  171,  181  ff. 

86  Willmann,  Gesch.  des  Ideal.,  I.,  pp.  119  ff. 

87  Jeremias,  Monoth.  Stromungen  innerhalb  der  Babyl. 
Religion,  1904,  p.  8. 

88  O.  Weber,  Theol.  und  Assyriologie,  1904,  p.  4. 

89  Gen.  14  :  18-20,  20 :  3  ff.,  21 :  22  ff.,  23  :  6,  24  :  50,  26 : 
19,  40  :  8,  etc.  Comp.  also  Dr.  M.  Peisker,  Die  Beziehungen 
der  Nicht-Israeliten  zu  Jahve,  nach  der  Anschauung  der  altt. 
Quellen.     Giessen,  1907. 

40  Joz.  24:  2,  14,  15;  Deut.  26:  5,  etc. 
«  Ed.  Konig,  Schlaglichter  auf  dem  Babel-Bibelstreit.    Be- 
weis  des  Glaubens,  1905,  pp.  3-23. 

22 


338  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

42  Biesterveld,  De  jongste  Methode  voor  de  Verklaring  van 
het  Nieuwe  Testament,  1905. 

48  WiUmann,  Gesch.  des  Ideal.,  II.,  pp.  12  ff.,  20  ff. 

44  Giesebrecht,  Die  Geschichtlichkeit  des  Sinaibundes.  Ko- 
nigsberg,  1900.  Lotz,  Der  Bund  vom  Sinai.,  Neue  Kirchl. 
Zeits.,  1901. 

4k  Jer.  51:  7,  Comp.  Fr.  Delizsch,  Mehr  Licht.    1907,  p.  45. 

46  Koberle,  Oriental.  Mythologie  und  Bibl.  Keligion,  Neue 
Kirchl.  Zeits.,  1906,  pp.  838-859.  Ed.  Konig,  Altorient. 
Weltanschauung  und  Altes  Test.     Berlin,  1905. 


VIII 

REVELATION    AND    RELIGIOUS    EXPERIENCE 

1  Comp.,  e.  g.,  Otto  Pautz,  Mohammeds  Lehre  von  der 
Offenbarung.     Leipzig,  1898. 

2  Frederic  W.  H.  Myers,  Human  Personality  and  its  Sur- 
vival of  Bodily  Death.  Ed.  and  abridged  by  his  son,  L.  H. 
Myers,  1907,  p.  2. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  3. 

4  Kant  gave  to  his  Allgemeine  Naturgeschichte  und  Theo- 
rie  des  Himmels,  1755,  the  sub-title  of  Versuch  von  der 
Verfassung  und  dem  mechanischen  Ursprung  des  ganzen 
Weltgebaudes  nach  Newtonschen  Grundsatzen  abgehandelt. 

6  Troeltsch,  Die  Absolutheit  des  Christ,  und  die  Religions- 
gesch.,  1902.  Bernoulli,  Die  wissenschaftliche  und  die  kirch- 
liche  Methode  in  der  Theologie.  Freiburg,  1897.  Gross. 
Glaube,  Theologie  und  Kirche.  Tubingen,  1902.  Rade, 
Zeits.  fur  Theol.  und  Kirche,  1900,  pp.  80  ff.;  1901,  pp.  429  ff. 

6  G.  Berguer,  L' Application  de  la  Methode  scientifique  a  la 
Theologie.     Geneve,  1903. 

7  Ritschl,  Rechtf.  und  Versohnung,  II,2  p.  12. 

8  Bachmann,  Zur  Wiirdigung  des  religiosen  Erlebens,  Neue 
Kirchl.  Zeits.,  Dec;  1907,  pp.  907-931. 

1  Schleiermacher,  Ritschl,  Herrmann,  Harnack,  Schian,  one 
and  all,  connect  Christian  experience  in  some  way  or  other 


NOTES  339 

with  the  Person  of  Christ  and  the  revelation  given  us  by  God 
in  him. 

10  Bachmann,  1.  c. 

11  Mulert,  Zeits.  f.  Theol.  und  Kirche.,  Jan.,  1907,  pp.  63, 
436. 

12  James,  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  506. 

13  Troeltsch,  Psychologie  und  Erkenntnisstheorie  in  der 
Religionswissenschaft.  Tubingen,  1905.  Scheel,  Zeits.  f. 
Theol.  u.  K.,  1907,  pp.  149-150,  305-307.  Id.,  Die  moderne 
Religionspsych.,  ib.  1908,  pp.  1-38. 

14  G.  A.  Coe,  The  Spiritual  Life,  1903,  pp.  23-27. 

15  E.  D.  Starbuck,  The  Psychology  of  Religion,  1901, 
pp.  143-153. 

16  Starbuck,  pp.  28  ff.  Coe,  pp.  29,  40  ff.  Stanley  Hall,  Ado- 
lescence, I,  pp.  411  ff.;  II,  pp.  95  ff.;  288  ff. 

"  James,  Varieties,  pp.  178  ff.,  195,  196,  201  ff.  Starbuck, 
op.  c,  pp.  101-117.  Alfred  Binet,  Les  Alterations  de  la  Perso- 
nality.2   Paris,  1902. 

18  James,  Varieties,  pp.  3,  6,  29,  30,  486.  Flournoy,  Les 
principes  de  la  psych,  relig.  1903,  pp.  16,  17.  Murisier,  Les 
maladies  du  sentiment  religieux.2  Paris,  1903,  preface, 
p.  viii. 

19  James,  op.  c,  pp.  135,  163,  325,  430. 

20  James,  op.  c,  pp.  333,  374,  487,  506,  507. 

21  James,  op.  c,  pp.  122, 131-133,  525,  526  Comp.  Lecture 
IV,  note  44. 

22  Schian,  Der  Einfluss  der  Individualitat  auf  Glaubens- 
gesinnung  und  Glaubensgestaltung,  Zeits.  fur  Theol.  und 
Kirche,  1897,  pp.  513  ff.  Id.,  Glaube  und  Individualitat,  id. 
1898,  pp.  170-194. 

28  Pfister,  Das  Elend  unserer  wissensch.  Glaubenslehre, 
Schweizer.  theol.  Zeits.,  1905,  pp.  209  ff.  Haberlin,  1st  die 
Theologie  eine  Wissenschaft  ?  ib.  1906,  pp.  17  ff. 

24  Herrmann,  Christ.  Protest.  Dogmatik,  pp.  583-632  of  Die 
Christl.  Religion,  in  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart.  Id.,  Die 
Lage  und  Aufgabe  der  evang.  Dogm.  in  der  Gegenwart, 
Zeits.  fur  Theol.  und  Kirche,  1907,  pp.  315,  351.  Id.,  Die 
Altorthodoxie  und  unser  Verstandniss  der  Religion,  ib.  Jan., 


340  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

1908,  pp.  74-77.     Comp.  C.  Wistar  Hodge,  The  Idea  of  Dog- 
matic Theology,  The  Princeton  Theol.  Review,  Jan.,  1908. 

25  Comp.  Walther,  Eine  neue  Theorie  liber  das  Wesen  der 
Religion,  Religion  und  Geisteskultur,  1907,  3,  pp.  201-217. 
Bruining,  Over  de  Methode  van  ooze  Dogmatiek,  Teylers 
Theol.  Tijdschr.,  1902,  2,  pp.  175  ff. 

26  By  way  of  example  we  name  :  P.  J.  Schmidt,  Zur  Wieder- 
geburt  des  Idealismus.  Leipzig,  1908.  Dorner,  Die  Bedeu- 
tung  der  spekulativen  Theologie  fur  die  Gegenwart,  Die 
Studierstube,  1907,  pp.  193-207.  McTaggart,  Some  Dogmas 
of  Religion,  pp.  1-12. 

27  C.  Stumpf,  Die  Wiedergeburt  der  Philosophic  Leipzig, 
1908,  especially  pp.  23  ff. 

28  Max  Dessoir,  Das  Doppel-Ich.     Leipzig,  1896,  p.  80. 

29  Hoffer,  Grundlehren  der  Psychologic2  Wien,  1905, 
p.  108. 

80  Coe,  The  Spiritual  Life,  p.  93. 

81  Max  Dessoir,  op.  c,  p.  77. 

82  MSbius,  Die  Hoffnungslosigkeit  aller  Psychologic  Halle, 
1907,  p.  56. 

83  Schmidt,  Zur  Wiedergeburt  des  Idealismus,  p.  96. 

84  Comp.  the  preexistenceisin  of  McTaggart,  Some  Dog- 
mas of  Religion,  pp.  112  ff.    Myers,  Human  Personality,  p.  26. 

86  Bennett,  La  societe  Anglo-americaine  pour  les  recherches 
psychiques.     Trad,  de  M.  Sage.     Paris,  1904. 

86  Myers,  Human  Personality,  p.  16. 

87  As  to  the  dangers  for  body  and  soul  comp.  Zeehande- 
laar,  Het  spiritistisch  Gevaar,  Gids,  Aug.,  1907.  Traub,  in 
Kalb,  Kirchen  und  Sekten  der  Gegenwart.  Stuttgart,  1905, 
pp.  437  ff.,  448,  460.  Coe,  The  Spiritual  Life,  pp.  169  ff .  Joseph 
Hamilton,  The  Spirit  World,  1906,  p.  264. 

88  Traub  in  Kalb,  op.  c,  p.  449  ff. 

89  Myers,  Human  Personality,  pp.  1  ff.,  8,  24,  340  ff. 

40  Traub,  1.  c.  449  ff. 

41  Harnack,  Die  Aufgabe  der  theol.  Fakultaten  und  die  all- 
gemeine  Religionsgesch.,  1901. 

42  J.  Kaftan,  Die  Wahrheit  der  christl.  Religion.  Basel, 
1888,  pp.  266  ff.,  318,  319. 


NOTES  341 

48  Troeltsch,  Der  Begriff  des  Glaubens,  Religion  und  Geis- 
teskultur,  1907,  3,  pp.  191-221. 

44  G.  Vos,  Christian  Faith  and  the  Truthfulness  of  Bible 
History,  The  Princeton  Theol.  Review,  July,  1906,  pp.  289- 
305.  Troeltsch,  Glaube  und  Geschichte,  Religion  und  Geis- 
teskultur,  1908,  pp.  29-39.  R.  Eucken,  Hauptprobleme  der 
Religionsphilos.  der  Gegenwart.2  Berlin,  1907,  p.  38:  Reli- 
gion und  Geschichte. 

45  E.  g.  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Die  Krisis  des  Christenthums 
in  der  modernen  Theologie.     Berlin,  1880,  pp.  1  if. 

46  W.  von  Schnehen,  Der  moderne  Jesuskultus.  Frank- 
fort a.  M.,  1906.  O.  Pfleiderer,  Der  moderne  Jesuskultus, 
Protest.  Monatshef  te,  1906,  No.  5. 

47  Henry  W.  Clark,  The  Philosophy  of  Christian  Experi- 
ence.   Edinburgh,  1905,  pp.  75  if. 

48  Comp.  the  well-known  saying  of  Emerson  :  "The  less  we 
have  to  do  with  our  sins  the  better,"  and  further,  Ph.  Vivian, 
The  Churches  and  Modern  Thought,2  1907,  pp.  208  ff.  ;  F.  R. 
Tennant,  The  Origin  and  Propagation  of  Sin.2  Cambridge, 
1906.  W.  R.  Inge,  Personal  Idealism  and  Mysticism,  1907, 
p.  171.  Lodge,  The  Substance  of  Faith,3  pp.  46  if.  Comp. 
John  M.  Edwards,  The  Vanishing  Sense  of  Sin,  Presb.  and 
Ref.  Review,  Oct.,  1899,  pp.  606-616. 

49  Thus  Lubbock,  Lombroso,  Bagehot.  Comp.  Wynaendts 
Francken,  Sociale  Vertoogen.     Haarlem,  1907,  pp.  245  ff. 

50  Corre  in  R.  P.  Mees,  Wetenschappelijke  Karakterkennis. 
's  Gravenh.,  1907,  p.  63. 

61  In  James,  Varieties,  p.  63. 

62  Stanley  Hall,  Adol.,  II,  p.  72. 

53  Henry  Scott  Holland,  Vital  Values,  pp.  107-110. 

54  H6fler,  Grundlehren  der  Psychologic.2     1905,  p.  108. 

55  Joh.  Herzog,  Der  Begriff  der  Bekehrung.  Giessen,  1903, 
pp.  21  ff.  Jacques  de  la  Combe,  Les  nouveau  nes  de  l'Esprit. 
Paris,  1905,  pp.  133  ff. 

66  John  W.  Diggle,  Short  Studies  in  Holiness.  London, 
1900,  pp.  47  ff. 

67  Starbuck,  Psychol,  of  Religion,  pp.  85, 108,  158. 

68  James,  Varieties,  pp.  78-126,  127-165. 


342  PHILOSOPHY   OF    REVELATION 

69  Joh.  Herzog,  op.  C,  p.  103. 

60  Ibid.,  pp.  99  ff. 

61  James,  Varieties,  pp.  196  ff.,  242-270.  Coe,  The  Spiritual 
Life,  p.  144. 

■  James,  op.  c,  pp.  178  ff.,  201,  203. 
68  James,  op.  c,  pp.  7S  ff. 

64  James,  op.  c.  pp.  162,  374, 377,  487. 

65  Heidelberg  Catechism,  questions  88-90.  Comp.  Genn- 
rich,  Die  Lehre  von  der  Wiedergeburt,  die  Christl.  Zen- 
trallehre  in  dogmengesch.  u.  religionsgesch.  Beleuchtung. 
Leipzig,  1907. 

66  John  W.  Diggle,  op.  C,  pp.  25  ff. 

67  Stanley  Hall,  Adolescence  II,  p.  86. 

68  James,  Varieties,  p.  163. 

69  See  above,  note  61. 

70  James,  Varieties,  pp.  230  ff.,  270,  501,  520  ff. 

71  James,  op.  c,  pp.  433,  513-525. 

72  The  operation  of  a  supernatural  factor  in  the  subliminal 
consciousness  is  denied  by  Peirce,  Jastrow,  Stanley  Hall 
(Adol.,  I,  preface,  II,  p.  43),  over  against  Myers  and  James. 

73  Forsyth,  The  Distinctive  Thing  in  Christian  Experience, 
Hibbert  Journal,  April,  1908,  pp.  481  ff. 

74  Sabatier,  Les  Religions  d'Autorite  et  la  Religion  de 
l'Esprit.     Paris,  1904. 

75  Seeberg,  Grundwahrheiten  der  Chr.  Religion.  Leipzig, 
1903,  pp.  11-37. 

IX 

REVELATION    AND    CULTURE 

1  In  Joh.  Herzog,  Der  Begriff  der  Bekehrung,  p.  19. 

2  Harnack,  Mission  unci  Ausbreitung  des  Christentums  in 
den  erstendrei  Jahrhunderten,2 1,  pp.  185-197.  Sell,  Katholiz. 
und  Protest.     Leipzig,  1908,  pp.  24,  103  ff. 

8  Harnack,  Das  Monchtuin,  seine  Ideale  und  seine  Ge- 
schichte.2  Giessen,  1886.  Zockler,  Askese  und  Monchtum. 
Frankfurt  a.  M.,  1897. 


NOTES  343 

4  P.  Hoveler,  Prof.  A.  Harnack  und  die  katholische 
Askese.  Dtisseldorf,  1902. 

8  E.  g.  The  True  History  of  Joshua  Davidson,  Communist. 
1873  (2  ed. :  The  Life  of  Joshua  Davidson,  by  E.  Lynn  Lin- 
ton, 1889).  Sheldon,  In  his  Steps  :  or  "  What  Would  Jesus 
Do  ?  "  Chicago,  1897,  Rev.  ed.  1899.  Comp.  also  Hall  Caine, 
The  Christian,  and  Marie    Corelli,  The  Master-Christian. 

6  Tolstoi,  Worin  besteht  mein  Glaube  ?  1885. 

7  Weinel,  Jesus  im  neunzehnten  Jahrh.  Tubingen,  1903. 
Schweitzer,  Von  Reimarus  zu  Wrede.  Tubingen,  1906. 
W.  Sanday,  The  Life  of  Christ  in  Recent  Research.  Oxford, 
1907. 

8  W.  Baldensperger,  Das  Selbstbewusstsein  Jesu  im  Lichte 
der  messian.  Hoff  nungen  seiner  Zeit  I.3  Strassburg,  1903.  J. 
Weiss, Die  Predigt  Jesu  vora  Reiche  Gottes. 2  Gottingen,  1900. 

9  The  literature  which  deals  with  Jesus  in  this  spirit  is 
increasing  daily ;  witness  such  works  as  the  following : 
Kalthoff,  Das  Christusproblem,  Grundlinien  zu  einer  Sozial- 
theologie.2  Leipzig,  1903.  Pfleiderer,  Das  Christusbild 
des  urchristl.  Glaubens  in  religionsgesch.  Beleuchtung. 
Berlin,  1903.  Paul  Wernle,  Die  Anfange  unserer  Religion,2 
1904.  W.  B.  Smith,  Der  vorchristl.  Jesus  nebst  weiteren 
Vorstudien  zur  Entstehungsgesch.  des  Urchrist.  Mit  einem 
Vorwort  von  P.  W.  Schmiedel.  Giessen,  1906.  Th.  J.  Plange, 
Christus  ein  Inder  ?  Stuttgart,  1907.  Dr.  de  Loosten,  Jesus 
Christus  vora  Standpunkte  des  Psychiaters.  Bamberg,  1905. 
E.  Rasmussen,  Jesus,  eine  vergleichende  psychopathol.  Studie. 
Leipzig,  1905.  Binet-Sangle,  La  Folie  de  Jesus.  Paris,  1908. 
Arthur  Heulhard,  Le  mensonge  Chretien  (Jesus-Christ  n'a  pas 
existe),  I.  Le  Charpentier.  Paris,  1908.  Bolland,  Het  Leven 
en  Sterven  van  Jezus  Christus,  1907. 

10  Thus  among  others  Mill  On  Liberty,  chap.  2.  Theob. 
Ziegler,  Gesch.  der  christl.  Ethik,  I,  pp.  62  ft.  Paulsen,  System 
der  Ethik,  pp.  50  ff.  Strauss,  Der  alte  und  der  neue  Glaube.2 
1872,  pp.  57  ff.  Ed.  von  Hartmann,  Das  Christentum  des 
N.  Testam.  1905.     Vorwort,  etc. 

11  Nitzsch,  Die  Weltanschauung  Fr.  Nietzsche's,  Zeits.  fur 
Theol.  und  Kirche.     1905,  pp.  344360. 


344  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

12  Lexis,  Das  Wesen  der  Kultur,  in  Die  Kultur  der  Gegen- 
wart  I.     Eucken,  Geistige  Stromungen,  1904,  pp.  226  ff. 

18  Compare  the  contrasts  drawn  by  Forsyth  between  the 
Reformation  and  the  "Enlightenment,"  Hibbert  Journal, 
April,  1908,  pp.  482  ff. 

14  Comp.  the  Pensees  of  Pascal. 

is  Haeckel,  Weltrathsel,  p.  439,  and  above,  Lect.  I. 

16  Comp.  Lectures:  I,  note  2;  VI,  note  7  ;  VII,  note  19. 

17  Portig,  Religion  und  Kunst  in  ihrem  gegenseitigen  Ver- 
haltniss.     Iserlohn,  1879. 

18  Eisler,  Kritische  Einfiihrung  in  die  Philosophic  Berlin, 
1905,  p.  297. 

19  Ernst  Linde,  Religion  und  Kunst.     Tubingen,  1905. 

20  Gutberlet,  Ethik  und  Religion.  Kneib,  Die  Jenseits- 
moral,  pp.  239  ff. 

21  Eisler,  Krit.  Einfiihrung,  p.  297. 

22  Ibid.  p.  302. 

23  Ibid.  p.  292.  Stange,  Der  heteronome  Character  der 
christlichen  Ethik,  Neue  Kirchl.  Zeits.  June,  1908, 
pp.  454-473. 

24  Ibid.  pp.  312  ff.,  324,  330  ff.,  334. 

25  Comp.  Lecture  I,  note  27  ;  Lecture  VI,  note  60. 

26  A.  Ehrhard  Kathol.  Christentum  und  moderne  Kultur. 
Mainz,  1906.  E  W.  Mayer^  Christentum  und  Kultur.  Ber- 
lin, 1905. 


REVELATION    AND    THE    FUTURE 

1  Carneri,   Der   moderne  Mensch.,  Volksausgabe.      Stutt- 
gart, p.  xi. 

2  H.  D.  Lloyd,  Man  the  Social  Creator.    London,  1908,  p.  3. 

3  Ellen  Key,  Das  Jahrhundert  des  Kindes.     Berlin,  1902, 
p.  358. 

4  Lloyd,  op.  c,  pp.  12,  13. 

5  Jeruzalem,  Gedanken  und  Denker.     1905,  pp.  133-148. 
?  L.  Stein,  Der  Sinn  des  Daseins.     1904,  p.  15. 


NOTES  345 

7  Proudhon,  Philosophie  du  Progres.      Bruxelles,   1853, 
pp.  20,  24,  25. 

8  Stanley  Hall,  Adol.,  I,  pp.  131. 

9  Proudhon,  op.  c,  pp.  25,  19,  156. 

10  G.  Portig,  Das  Weltgesetz  des  kleinsten  Kraftanwandes 
in  den  Beichen  der  Natur.  1903-1904. 

11  E.  Key,  Das  Jahrh.  des  Kindes.,  pp.  322,  3-5. 

12  In  Fr.  Galton,  Probability,  the  Foundation  of  Eugenics. 
The  Herbert  Spencer  Lecture  Delivered  on  June  5,  1907, 
p.  10. 

13  E.  Key,  op.  C,  p.  2.      Stanley  Hall,  Adol.,  II,  p.  123. 

14  Galton,  op.  c,  Stanley  Hall,  Adol.,  II,  p.  722.  Lankester, 
Natur  und  Mensch,  pp.44, 49.  Ludwig  Wilser,  Rassentheorien. 
Stuttgart,  1908.  Wynaendts  Franken,  Sociale  Vertoogen. 
Haarlem,  1907,  pp.  1-46.  H.  Treub,  Verspreide  Opstellen. 
Haarlem,  1904.  Nijhoff,  De  Noodzakelijkheid  van  genees- 
kundig  Onderzoek  vdor  het  Huwelijk.     Eotterdam,  1908. 

16  Stanley  Hall,  Adol.,  II,  pp.  561  ff.  Ellen  Key,  op.  C,  p.  86, 
253.     Louise  Stratenus,  Het  Kind.,  pp.  128,  336. 

16  Stanley  Hall,  op.  c,  I,  p.  ix ;  II,  p.  55. 

17  Stanley  Hall,  op.  c,  I,  p.  viii;  II,  pp.  62,  69. 

18  Ellen  Key,  p.  293.     Stanley  Hall,  I,  pp.  168  ff. 

19  Ellen  Key,  pp.  110  ff.  181.  Louise  Stratenus,  Het  Kind., 
p.  103.  Stanley  Hall,  II,  p.  497.  Lodge,  Literary  World, 
Aug.,  1907,  p.  380; 

20  Stanley  Hall,  I,  pp.131  ff.,170  ff.  II,  pp.40  ff.,  58  ff.,  204  ff. 

21  Stanley  Hall,  II, pp.  153  ff.  Lankester,  Natur  und  Mensch, 
pp.  56,  66.  Mach,  Popular-wissensch.  Vorlesungen.  Leipzig, 
1896  (last  lecture).  Lehmann-Hohenberg,  Naturwissenschaft 
und  Bibel.     Jena,  1904,  pp.  5,  45,  55,  etc. 

22  The  Socialistic  literature  is  sufficiently  well-known. 
Com  p.  only  H.  D.  Lloyd,  op.  c.  H.G.Wells,  New  Worlds 
for  Old.  London,  1908.  R  J.  Campbell,  Christianity  and 
the  Social  Order.  London,  1907.  A  series  of  articles  on 
The  New  Socialism,  an  Impartial  Inquiry,  in  the  British 
Weekly,  1908. 

28  Woltmann,  Der  histor.  Materialismus,  pp.  418-430.  Wei- 
sengrun,   Das   Ende   des  Marxisnius.2     Leipzig,   1899.     Ed. 


346  PHILOSOPHY   OF   REVELATION 

Bernstein,  Wie  ist  wissensch.  Socialismus  moglich  ?  Ber- 
lin, 1901. 

24  Paul  Kleinert,  Die  Profeten  Israels  in  sozialer  Beziehung. 
Leipzig,  1905,  p.  27. 

26  Bebel,  Die  Erau,  16e  Aufl.     1892,  pp.  263  ff. 

26  Qumplovicz,  Grundriss  der  Soziologie,1  p.  361. 

27  L.  Stein,  An  der  Wende  des  Jahrh.,  p.  332.  Id.,  Der 
Sinn  des  Daseins,  pp.  149  ff. 

28  Metschnikoff,  Beitrage  zu  einer  optimistischen  Weltauf- 
fassung.     Deutsch  von  Michalsky.     Miinchen,  1908. 

29  Stanley  Hall,  Adol.,  I,  pp.  viii,  xviii. 
80  James,  Pragmatism,  pp.  243  ff. 

sl  Comp.  also  Proudhon,  Philos.  du  Progres,  p.  65.  H.  D. 
Lloyd,  op.  c.  p.  12. 

82  Comp.  PaulKalweit,  Religion  und  Philos.  Idealismus, 
Religion  und  Geisteskultur,  II,  1908,  pp.  44-60. 

88  Paulsen,  Ethik,  in  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart,  System. 
Philos.,  p.  309.  Haering,  Das  Christliche  Leben,2  1907, 
pp.  104  ff.  KUlpe,  Einl.  in  die  Philos.4  1907,  p.332.  Kulpe, 
here  declares  :  "  No  immanent  definition  of  the  supreme  good 
can  possess  more  than  relative  character ;  the  positing  of  a 
transcendental  goal  alone  (which  as  such  is  inaccessible  to 
scientific  ethics)  satisfies  the  idea  of  an  ultimate,  supreme, 
absolute  value."  Comp.  also  C.  Eraser,  Our  Final  Venture, 
Hibbert  Journal,  Jan.,  1907,  and  G.  F.  Barbour,  Progress  and 
Reality,  Hibbert  Journal,  Oct.,  1907. 

84  Lankester,  Natur  und  Mensch,  p.  26. 

85  Gust.  Le  Bon,  Psychologie  du  Socialisme.  Paris,  1902. 
Ed.  Dolle"ans,  Le  Caractere  religieux  du  Socialisme.    Paris, 

1906.  Diepenhorst,Naast  het  Kruis  de  roode  Vaan.,Amst.,p.46. 

86  Lloyd,  op.  c.  pp.  6  ff.  Stanley  Hall,  Adol. ,  I,  pp.  546  ff. ; 
II,  p.  123. 

87  Bruno  Wille,  Darwins  Lebensanschauung,  p.  6. 

88  Stanley  Hall,  Adol.,  I,  p.  viii ;  II,  pp.  63-64. 

89  Comp.  Jos.  Royce,  Immortality,  Hibbert  Journal,  July, 

1907.  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  The  Immortality  of  the  Soul,  ib., 
Jan.,  April,  1908.  Eucken,  The  Problem  of  Immortality,  ib., 
July,  Jan.,  1908. 


NOTES  347 

40  For  example,  "William  Crookes,  Alfred  "Wallace,  Sir  Oliver 
Lodge,  Fred.  W.  H.  Myers  in  England,  Fechner,  Zollner, 
Carl  du  Prel   in  Germany,    Hartogh  Heys  van  Zouteveen   in 

Holland. 

41  For  example,  McTaggart,  Some  Dogmas  of  Religion, 
pp.  112   ff. 

42  Comp.  W.  Bruhn,  Theosophie  und  Theologie.  Gluck- 
stadt,  1907. 

48  Schelling,  Philos.  der  Offenbarung,  p.  365.  Liebmann, 
Analysis  der  Wirklichkeit,  pp.  398  ff. 

44  Bruno-Wille,  Darwins  Lebensanschaung,  p.  6.  Ed.  von 
Hartmann,  Die  Weltanschauung  der  modernen  Physik,  p.  33. 
Otto,  Natur  und  relig.  Weltansicht,  p.  47.  J-  Ude,  Monist. 
oder  Teleolog.  Weltanschauung.  Graz,  1907.  J.  C.  Snij- 
ders,  De  Ondergangder  Wereld,  Tijdspiegel,  Oct.,  1907.  Fridt- 
jof  Nansen,  Hibbert  Journal,  July,  1908,  pp.  748  ff. 

45  Hbffdign  in  Paul  Kalweit,  Religion  und  Geisteskultur, 
1908  pp.  44  ff. ;  in  Lodge,  Hibbert  Journal,  April,  1908, 
p.  565,  and  Barbour,  ib. ,  Oct.,  1907,  pp.  59  ff.  Miinsterberg  in 
Royce,  ib.,  July,  1907,  pp.  724  ff. 

46  About  Schopenhauer's  Nirvana  comp.  J-  de  Jager,  De 
Beteekenis  van  Schopenhauers  Pessimisme,  Gids,  Nov.  1907. 

47  J.  Kaftan,  Aus  der  Werkstatte  des  Uebermenschen, 
Deutsche  Rundschau.,  Oct.  and  Nov.,  1905.  George  S.  Patton, 
Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  The  Princeton  Theol.  Review,  July, 
1908,  pp.  392-436,  especially  pp.  430  ff.  On  the  idea  of  an 
endless  return  of  things,  comp.  Zeller,  Die  Philos.  der  Grie- 
chen,8  III,  pp.  154  ff.  Further,  Gumplovicz,  Soziologie, 
pp.  158, 166  ff . ,  348  ff .  Arrhenius ,  Die  Vorstellung  vom  Weltge- 
baude  im  Wandel  der  Zeiten.   Das  Werden  der  Welten,  1907. 

48  Comp.  also  Ostwald,  Biologie  en  Chemie,  Wet.  Bladen, 
Dec.  1904,  pp.  420-443. 

49  Ostwald,  Naturphilos.,  Syst.  Philos.  in  Die  Kultur  der 
Gegegenwart,  pp.  170-171. 

60  Thus,  in  agreement  with  Huxley,  Romanes,  James,  also 
Siebeck,  Der  Fortschritt  der  Menschheit,  in  Zur  Religions- 
philosophic     Tubingen,  1907. 

62  Hieron.  Lorm,  Der  grundlose  Optimismus,  in  Jeruzalem, 


348  PHILOSOPHY   OF    REVELATION 

Gedanken  und  Denker,  pp.  156-163.  L.  Stein,  An  der  Wende 
des  Jahrh.,  p.  54.  Der  Sinn  des  Daseins,  p.  76.  Comp.  an 
address  by  Dr.  D.  Q.  Jelgersma  on,  Is  de  Geschiedenis  der 
Philosophie  meer  dan  eeoe  Geschiedenis  van  menschelijke 
Dwalingen  ?  Handelsblad,  Oct.  33,  1907.  Also  Topinard  in 
Philip  Vivian.  The  Churches  and  Modern  Thought.  London, 
1907,  pp.  266  if. 

53  Prof.  H.  van  Embden  expressed  himself  to  this  effect  in  a 
discussion  with  Prof.  Aengenent,  Handelsblad,  Nov.  28,1907. 

64  James,  Varieties,  pp.  136  ff. 

65  Joh.  Jungst,  Kultus-  und  Geschichts-religion  (Pelagian- 
ismus  und  Augustinismus).  Ein  Beitr.  zur  relig.  Psych,  und 
Volkskunde.     Giessen,  1901. 

66  Berthelot,  Science  et  Morale.  Paris,  1897.  Ladenburg, 
Der  Einfluss  der  Naturwiss.  auf  die  Weltanschauung,  1903. 

67  Comp.  Lect.  VI.  note  33. 

68  E.  g.  Max  Weber,  Die  Protestantische  Ethik  und  der 
"Geist"  des  Kapitalismus,  Archiv.  f.  Sozialwiss.  und  Sozial- 
politik,  XX  pp.  1  ff.  XXI  pp.  1  ff.  He  concludes  his  im- 
portant survey  with  the  question  whether  culture  is  to 
issue  in  this,  that  men  become  "  professionals  without  spirit, 
pleasure-seekers  without  heart;  non-entities  of  this  sort 
pride  themselves  on  having  mounted  to  a  previously  uu- 
attained  stage  of  culture. " 

69  Paulsen,  Parteipolitik  und  Moral.  Dresden,  1900.  Valck- 
enaer  Kips,  Tijdspiegel,  March,  1908. 

60  Dr.  D.  van  Embden,  Darwinisms  en  Democratic  Maatsch. 
Vooruitgang  en  de  Hulp  aan  het  Zwakke.  's  Gravenhage,1901. 

61  J.  St.  Loe  Strachey,  Problems  and  Perils  of  Socialism. 
London,  1908.  Comp.  Handelsblad,  April  12,  1901,  Avond- 
blad  2,  on  an  essay  by  R-  Ehrenberg,  Over  het  Ontstaan  en 
de  Beteekenis  van  groote  Vermogens,  and  Ammon,  Die  Gesell- 
schaftsordnung  und  Hire  naturlichen  Grundlagen,  1895-1900. 

62  Van  Deyssel,  Prozastukken,  1895,  pp.  43  ff.,  277  If.  Karl 
Bleibtreu,  Die  Vertreter  des  Jahrh.  Berlin,  1904,  II, 
pp.  260-303.  W.  His.MedizinundUeberkultur.  Leipzig,  1908. 
Gerard,  Civilization  in  Danger,  Hibbert  Journal,  July,  1908. 

M  Steinmetz,  De  Rassenquaestie,  Gids,  Jan.  1907. 


NOTES  349 

64  L.  Stein,  An  der  Wende  des  Jahrh.,  pp.  348  ff. 

66  Steinmetz,  Die  Philosophie  des  Krieges.    Leipzig,  1907. 

66  Thus  also  Ruskin,  who  declared  that  he  had  always  ob- 
served that  all  great  nations  acquired  their  power  of  resistance 
and  mental  vigor  in  war,  that  war  has  instructed,  peace  has 
deceived  them ;  war  has  schooled  them,  peace  led  them 
astray,  in  a  word  that  war  has  made  and  peace  has  unmade 
them. 

67  Gumplovicz,  Soziologie  pp.  158-166  ff.,  348. 

68  Ibid.  pp.  350,  352,  354.  A.  J.  Balfour,  Decadence.  Cam- 
bridge, 1908,  p.  42. 

69  Balfour,  op.  C,  p.  48. 

70  C.  Frazer,  Hibbert  Journal,  Jan.,  1907,  p.  242. 

71  C.  Frazer,  Philos.  of  Theism.,  p.  277.  McTaggart,  Some 
Dogmas  of  Religion,  p.  114. 

72  Kant  judged  an  "  Ausgleichung"  between  virtue  and  hap- 
piness necessary  hereafter,  and  Paulsen  is  of  the  same  opin- 
ion, Ethik,  in  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart,  System.  Philos., 
pp.  304  ff.  Comp.  also  a  paper,  with  discussion,  on  Eschato- 
logical  Expectations  in  the  meeting  of  Modern  Theologians, 
April  28,  29,  1908. 

73  Poincare,  La  Valeur  de  la  Science.  Paris,  1905,  p.  276. 
Comp.  J-  Woltjer,  De  Zekerheid  der  Wetenschap.  Amster- 
dam, 1907. 


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